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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Despite having played a crucial role in international relations for centuries, 
power remains a very elusive and contested concept. Questions related to 
different elements of power, the logic of power politics, balances of power, 
and the hegemonic aspirations of agents – to mention just few power-
related themes within the study of international relations or the practice of 
international politics1 – have animated scholars and policymakers for cen-
turies. Similarly, questions concerning power have been at the core of the 
scientific discipline of international relations (IR), which has matured and 
developed into its current form over the last century. The focus of this 
study is not, however, on power in general, but on military power in par-
ticular. These two have often been conceptualised as the same thing, al-
though most scholars today would probably acknowledge the intellectual 
poverty of equating military power with power. The second qualifying re-
mark on this study’s approach to power is that it deals with military power 
in the post-Cold War era.  
 
My decision to undertake this study was animated by two recent develop-
ments that have influenced the way that international politics is understood: 
the end of the Cold War and the emergence of constructivist international 
relations theorising. The first of these, the celebrated end of the Cold War, 
has changed the familiar IR landscape through the demise of the Soviet Un-
ion and the marked increase of violence between non-state actors. Subse-
quently the American-launched War on Terror, declared soon after Sep-
tember 11th 2001, has once again altered the international scene.2 In the 
military field, these two empirical tectonic shifts are reflected in the demise 
of the Cold War era deterrence policies and force structures and in the post-
Cold War era operations against rogue states and non-state actors. Peace 
operations, stability and support operations, humanitarian interventions, 
military operations other than war, and crisis management describe the na-
ture of warfare – at least from a western perspective3 – more than the tradi-
tional Cold War era view of massed mechanised armed forces clashing in 
                                                        
1 In this work I will use “international relations” (IR) to describe the scientific discipline 
and “international politics” to describe practice within the international arena. This ana-
lytical distinction will be made despite their apparent closeness. 
2
 See for example statement by NATO Secretary General George Robertson. ”But 9/11 
has demonstrated with brutal clarity that the scenarios of the past have passed their sell-
by date.” Robertson (2003); Hardt and Negri (2004), pp. 3-35. 
3
 ’West’ is not understood here as a geographical region, but as a historical construc-
tion, which is described today by development, modernity, industrialisation, urbanisa-
tion, capitalism and secularity. Hall (1999), pp. 78-84. The concept of ‘west’ parallels 
the IR-theoretical concept of the western / European / Transatlantic security community. 
See e.g. the book edited by Adler and Barnett (1998).  
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Central Europe under the spectre of nuclear strikes. The above-mentioned 
statement about a western perspective on the nature of war articulates a 
third qualifying remark about this study’s approach to power: this study is 
about shared western understandings of military power in the post-Cold 
War era. 
 
The second major theme underlying this research report is the constructiv-
ist challenge to mainstream IR-theorising by placing added emphasis on the 
social structure of the international system. Instead of conducting research 
that begins from presumably accurate definitions of concepts and then ob-
serves the international reality objectively, constructivism is interested in 
how international reality is constructed by states and other actors via mean-
ingful actions.  
 
Power in general and military power particularly are often considered to be 
at the core of political realism (realism). Distinguishing between theories or 
scientific paradigms based on the topics surveyed or concepts used is not 
the only possible way to categorise theories. Another is to discover how 
they approach or frame a chosen topic or concept. As will be explicated in 
more detail in Chapter 2, the Cold War era literature on international rela-
tions and strategic studies associates realism almost exclusively with the 
topic of military power. The assumptions of realism have thus guided the 
vast majority of scholarly attention paid to the questions of military power 
and war. These assumptions have influenced not only the articulation of in-
teresting, suitable, or even possible research questions, but also the nature 
of research results. After all, the limits of the possible conclusions that sci-
entific research can draw are set by the questions that animate scientific in-
quiry.  
 
The constructivist framework related to this study of military power in the 
post-Cold War world challenges two elements that have animated the real-
ism-based research agenda: brute materialism and methodological indi-
vidualism. Concerning materialism, constructivist framing of military 
power acknowledges the importance of material objects in determining the 
location of an actor on the spectrum of military power. Constructivism, 
however, highlights the social rules or norms that emerge in interaction 
within a pre-existing rule-structure. States thus construct the meaning of 
military power when they prepare for war or wage one. In doing so, they 
are not only developing and using efficient instruments of policy. This so-
cial reading of international politics locates an overall social structure of 
the international system – intersubjectively shared knowledge – that gives 
meaning to the material structure so often highlighted by proponents of re-
alism. With regard to material artefacts (weapon systems for example), 
constructivism focuses on their instrumental and symbolic aspects. Arma-
ments do have intrinsic qualities that are independent of mind, but they also 
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have symbolic-political qualities that imply, for example, the status, iden-
tity, or possible policies of their holder.4 In addition, according to the theo-
retical framework advocated in this study, knowledge of the mind-
independent qualities of material resources is always mediated by interpre-
tive, socially constructed views of the world and the role that science has in 
them. The advocated constructivist framework, thus, “does not deny the ex-
istence of a phenomenal world, externally to thought, but, and this is some-
thing different, that phenomena could constitute themselves as objects in-
dependently of discursive practices.”5 
 
The other defining feature of constructivism in a study of military power is 
its rejection of methodological individualism, which highlights the self-
interested utility-maximising quality of actors in the international system. 
From a constructivist perspective, actors may be or become self-interested 
utility-maximisers, but they are not such by assumption. Rather, their iden-
tities and interests are reproduced or transformed within the social structure 
of the international system. Knowing these identities and interests at any 
point of time is a task for empirical research. Actors’ identities and interests 
today – as is the case with shared understandings concerning military 
power and war – are path-dependent, and in many instances they could 
have become different. 
 
The process of reproducing or transforming the social structure of the in-
ternational system, and the identities and interests of agents as part of the 
structure occurs through agents’ practices – in other words in interaction. 
What agents do now has bearing on the content of the social structure in the 
future. Similarly, the conditions that agents face now are the product of 
past practices (interaction) and in this way not chosen by any individual 
agent. Mutual constitution of agents and structure defines the relations be-
tween them: one cannot think of one without the other. 
 
Concerning the nature of military power in the international system, the 
constructivist framework of this study accentuates the shared understand-
ings of what makes an agent powerful militarily. Although level of tech-
nology and physical resources are important factors in determining military 
power, the focus of this study is on the process by which military power is 
bestowed with meaning in the international arena. Military power is con-
structed, i.e. (re)produced or transformed, within the bounds of the social 
structure of the international system. This means that in conceptualisations 
of military power, the constructivist framework points to the political na-
ture of power in general and of military power in particular. However, at 
                                                        
4
 See for example Adler and Barnett (1998a), pp. 12-13. 
5
 Guzzini (1994), p. 238 (quote). 
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any point in time, agents confront the international system as an objective 
fact, although it is of social origin.  
 
Paraphrasing Alexander Wendt, military power is what states (and possibly 
other actors) make of it.6 In other words, the standards of military power 
are set by the intersubjective understandings of agents (even today, mostly 
states) in the international arena. These intersubjective understandings 
concerning military power form the basis for developing necessary military 
and other resources as well for the attainment of goals by any individual 
state. 
 
The research problem that animates this study is how and through what 
mechanisms has the meaning of military power changed after the Cold 
War? In order to answer this question, this study relies on a morphogenetic 
methodology7 and on a qualitative process-tracing case study that concerns 
the most visible and fiercely debated western discourse of war and military 
power of the post-Cold War era – the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA). The research method of process-tracing entails focusing on the 
sequence of events that has instantiated the shared understandings 
concerning military power within the international system and specifically 
among western developed states. 
 
The above-mentioned changing nature or definition of military power 
within the international system implies also changes in the shared 
conceptualisations of war. From the constructivist perspective, war is not a 
permanently enduring static phenomena that occurs between states, but 
rather an institution of the international system that is reproduced or 
transformed by the actions of states and other actors operating in that 
system. Shared conceptualisations of war among the leading actors within 
the international system define war at any point in history. These conceptu-
alisations of war emerge in the interaction of these actors within pre-
existing shared understandings of war. Thus, what war is today is heavily 
influenced by past conceptualisations of war and thus by social structure of 
the international system. The interaction either reproduces – in other words 
strengthens – the pre-existing conceptualisations of war, or transforms 
them – often incrementally – into new shared definitions of war. 
 
From the constructivist perspective of this study, the end of the Cold War 
not only meant the end of confrontation and tensions between the two su-
perpower-led blocs and the decrease in the probability of a major war with 
catastrophic global consequences. It also challenged the most important ac-
tors of the international system – states – to understand the new rules of the 
                                                        
6 See Wendt (1992). 
7
 See Chapter 4.4.2; Carlsnaes (1992); Archer (1995). 
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international system that began to emerge when the Cold War era operating 
logic of the system, threat perceptions, prescribed policy formulations, and 
military preparations gradually ceased to operate.8 At the same time, how-
ever, these new rules did not emerge automatically. No self-evident and 
shared characterisation of the state of the international system emerged in 
full bloom to serve as a guide for states and other actors in their dealings 
with each other. States (re)constructed these new rules by their own inter-
action – and their interaction with some non-state actors – as the end of the 
Cold War was acknowledged as fact. It is noteworthy that positing the con-
structed nature of the post-Cold War era rules of the international system – 
including shared conceptualisations of war and military power – does not 
imply that the eventual form of these rules was controlled or planned in ad-
vance by one or some actors. The constructivist perspective – elaborated in 
Chapters 4 and 5 – highlights contingence in the interaction of social agents 
within a structure of shared knowledge. How these rules were constructed 
and how they developed is an empirical problem that animates this re-
search. 
 
The post-Cold War era (re)definition of the rules of the international sys-
tem was not a one-time operation that then led to implementation. Rather, 
the rules of the post-Cold War era were constructed in an on-going con-
tinuous process. States and other actors are constantly either reproducing or 
transforming the shared understandings of how to operate within the inter-
national system. Furthermore, the rules of the system are not only regula-
tive in nature, such that they would tell actors how to act. These rules have 
also constitutive effects, i.e. they ‘inform’ actors who they are (assign 
roles) and how this should affect their conduct. 
 
The above-mentioned themes will be elaborated in Chapters 4 and 5. In this 
context one additional remark is necessary concerning the shared nature of 
rules concerning war and military power in the international system. To 
state that a shared view concerning war and military power – and more 
generally a shared set of rules – existed during the Cold War era and then 
was reconstructed in the post-Cold War epoch, does not mean that all ac-
tors agreed upon these rules or that they all viewed them in a similar fash-
ion. Some degree of divergence is to be expected, but the high volume of 
interactions in multiple sectors of social activity is likely to produce a more 
or less coherent and shared worldview at least among similar kinds of ac-
tors – states for example. In addition – as the title of this study indicates – 
the perspective of analysing military power in this study is that of western 
states. As will be explicated below and in Chapter 5, it is assumed that 
within a western community of states – where  shared understandings 
                                                        
8
 See e.g. Koslowski and Kratochwil (1995); Keohane and Nye (1997a), p. 1; Keohane 
and Nye (1997b), pp. 106-107. 
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about the nature of the international system exist – intersubjective under-
standings of war and military power are to be expected. This said, it is as-
sumed in this research that a) within the international system, shared under-
standings of the nature, functioning, and rules of the system emerge in in-
teraction between states; b) the developed western world has shared under-
standings of the international system that are more uniform than the glob-
ally shared understandings of the international system; and c) within the 
west shared understandings of war and military power ‘exist’ and are con-
tinually being (re)constructed by agents’ practices. 
 
This study will proceed in three parts. The first two parts of the study – 
Chapters 2-5 – present the theoretical grounding and provide the frame-
work for the analysis of the shared post-Cold War era western understand-
ings of war and military power. Parts 1 and 2 are structured according to a 
dialectical logic – reaching a synthesis through the interplay of thesis and 
antithesis. The first part – Chapters 2 and 3 – focuses on the Cold War era 
theorising concerning power in general and military power in particular, as 
well as on the postmodernist challenge to these orthodox or mainstream 
conceptualisations of the study of IR, power, and military power.  In pro-
viding a theoretical thesis and antithesis, Part 1 prepares the ground for the 
theoretical synthesis promulgated in Part 2 of the study. The constructivist 
synthesis is introduced in Chapter 4. The succeeding chapter – Chapter 5 – 
elaborates the constructivist theorising into a framework for an analysis of 
military power in the post-Cold War era.  The third part of this research – 
the case study of post-Cold War era military power in Chapters 6-8 – will 
concentrate on an empirical study of post-Cold War military power. The 
aim of Part 3 is to open up the process of redefining military power in the 
post-Cold War world and to show the theoretical usefulness of constructiv-
ism in the central field of realism, namely power and military power. The 
goal is also to broaden the scholarly understanding of military power from 
its traditional (Cold War era) reading and to demonstrate that the ‘construc-
tivist turn’ offers new insights to the discipline of international relations, 
including its centre of gravity, power and military power.  
 
The focus in Chapter 2 is on realism, on its foundational texts and the 
power literature that has been developing within the realist paradigm. It 
will also probe the social power literature that lies behind the discussions of 
power and military power within the discipline of international relations. 
Chapter 2 serves two main purposes. First, it presents a broad realist spec-
trum of power analysis ranging from the classical realists to the newer vari-
ants of the realist paradigm. Chapter 2 thus presents one interpretation of 
realist power analysis during the Cold War – after all, it was realism that 
was mostly associated with power in the Cold War era IR literature, and 
this association has not waned completely even today. Chapter 2 reviews 
the work of several well-known realist scholars and scrutinises the way that 
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many realist authors have been interpreted during the Cold War, when dis-
ciplinary and political factors tended to restrict the promulgation of IR 
theories and policy frameworks. The perspective on realism in Chapter 2 is 
that of Cold War era strategic studies – the ‘mainstream’ way of conceptu-
alising military power during the confrontational decades following the 
Second World War. Relying on several esteemed scholars commonly la-
belled ‘realists’ within the discipline of IR during the Cold War, Chapter 2 
will not attempt to make the case of what the ‘real’ essence of realism has 
been, or whether the propositions made in the name of realism were genu-
inely based on the essence of the realist paradigm. Limitations of space and 
the lack of any need to probe this deep in a constructivist analysis of post-
Cold War era war and military power cause Chapter 2 to be restricted to a 
presentation of ‘typical’ and dominant realist narrative of military power 
in the international system of the Cold War years. This dominant realist 
narrative is then implicitly and explicitly criticised in Chapter 2 and later 
when presenting the postmodern challenge to positivism-rationalism in 
general and realism particularly in Chapter 3.  
 
Second, Chapter 2 presents a point of reference to the post-Cold War era 
deliberations concerning military power. It can be understood as an attempt 
to describe the conditions which faced scholars and policymakers at the end 
of the Cold War. After all, the realist understanding of the nature of the in-
ternational system and the role of military power within it had sedimented 
into a widely accepted and taken-for-granted framework among policy-
makers during the forty odd years of the Cold War. Combining these 
above-mentioned two themes, Chapter 2 elaborates a historical background 
for understanding contemporary academic IR theorising and practical pol-
icy possibilities related to the military. 
 
Chapter 3 presents – briefly – the postmodern antithesis to the orthodox re-
alist conceptualisations of IR concerning international politics, power, and 
military power. This antithesis is presented with an emphasis upon the 
postmodern attack on the premises of the positivist-rationalist paradigm 
within IR. Postmodernism is not analysed in depth. Rather, postmodernism 
is evoked in order to highlight the socially constructed nature of the taken-
for-granted dominance of realism within IR and international politics dur-
ing the Cold War era. Chapter 3 builds upon the explicit and implicit criti-
cism of realism presented in Chapter 2.  
 
The realist assumptions and explanations of power have been widely 
hailed, but have been questioned yet again with the emergence of a focus 
upon second-order theorising in IR. The focal point of this latest criticism 
of realism has been based on questions of ontology and epistemology. But 
the extent of this criticism and associated attempts to ameliorate or redefine 
realism are not restricted to the metatheoretical level. Rather, these phi-
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losophy of science questions have raised several substantive amendment 
proposals and counterarguments to realism. These are presented in Chapter 
4. From a dialectical perspective, constructivism is a theoretical synthesis 
of the realist worldview and IR theory – the dominant mainstream thesis of 
IR and international politics during several decades – and the postmodern 
antithesis of epistemological relativism that challenged the positivist-
rationalist paradigm. With the constructivist framing of power in general 
and military power in particular, Chapter 4 also enables a more thorough 
and exact presentation of research questions, methodology, and methods. 
 
Chapter 5 draws on the literature presented in the preceding chapters relat-
ing to the subject matter of war, power, and military power within the in-
ternational system. The chapter elaborates the constructivist synthesis and 
promulgates the constructivist framework for analysing war and military 
power in the post-Cold War era – the task taken up in Part 3 of this study. 
Although Chapter 5 draws upon constructivism, it is not totally unsympa-
thetic to the assumptions, questions, and explanations of the realist para-
digm – especially its classical and European variants. As will become evi-
dent in Chapter 2, the Cold War era mainstream realist interpretations of 
e.g. Edward Hallett Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Raymond Aron – all ‘clas-
sical European realists’ – were one-eyed, biased, and caricatured. During 
the Cold War the IR-disciplinary and international political circumstances 
converged in a way that seemed to demand a uniform, simplifying, policy-
relevant, and vigilant worldview – applicable to scientific research and 
policymaking.  
 
Chapter 5 thus lays the foundation upon which the military power-related 
case study in Part 3 of the study will be built. This foundation is presented 
in the form of a theoretical framework for the analysis of war and military 
power. Referred to as a ‘paradigm of war framework’, this synthesis relies 
on empirical material concerning the shared understandings of war within 
the west during the post-Cold War era. This framework centres on the 
question of linking shared understandings of military power to a wider set 
of shared understandings concerning war: what is threatening agents, what 
constitute legitimate goals and means of warfare, and what are the armed 
forces’ roles and modes of operations.  
 
Chapter 5 accentuates the processes through which the meaning of war and 
military power are ’negotiated’ in discourses of war. Within the framework 
of the widely accepted and even celebrated end of the Cold War – itself a 
discourse about international politics – this study assumes that the rather 
stable and sedimented Cold War era way to conceptualise war became 
problematic. This possibility for the ‘opening up’ of the international social 
structure does not intend to advocate any a priori assumptions about the 
extent or direction of transformation from the Cold War era conceptualisa-
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tions of war in the post-Cold War era. Rather, the extent and direction of 
this transformation is at the heart of the research problem of this study – 
and will be addressed in Chapter 5 and Part 3 of the book.  
 
The framework of Chapter 5 is not designed to refute the traditional Cold 
War era strategic studies approach to war and military power. Rather, the 
purpose of this study is to engage in a dialogue and to promote a ‘less natu-
ralistic and less objectivist’ view of war and military power within the dis-
cipline of IR. In order to facilitate case study research of the research prob-
lem animating this study – how and through what mechanisms has the 
meaning of military power changed after the Cold War – the following re-
search questions are answered in Part 3:  
 
1. How have shared western conceptualisations of war changed after the 
demise of the Cold War? 
 
2. What are the constituent elements of military power in the contempo-
rary international system, especially from a western perspective?  
 
3. How did these (research question 2) military capabilities become rep-
resentative of military power?  
 
4. How has the American discourse concerning the Revolution in Mili-
tary Affairs affected contemporary western understandings of military 
power? 
 
The answer to the first research question is provided in Chapter 5, where 
the framework for a more detailed constructivist analysis of military power 
is articulated. Chapter 6 begins the empirical research of this study, guided 
by the theoretical framework developed in the preceding chapter. Chapter 6 
answers the second research question. It thus provides a point of departure 
for the contemporary western estimations of military power by analysing 
recent strategic official policy documents that were formulated and circu-
lated by the United States of America, NATO, and the European Union. 
This choice of sources is based on the focus of the constructivist frame-
work, which emphasises the nature of military power as a politically nego-
tiated phenomenon. Thus, while the rather specific and detailed descrip-
tions of military documents and manuals reflect the militaries’ take on the 
constitutive elements of military power, this study’s focus on shared west-
ern understandings of military power point towards the significance of po-
litically ‘negotiated’ intersubjective agreement about the constitutive ele-
ments of military power. This choice of sources, emanating from construc-
tivist IR theorising, does not mean rejecting or denying the significance of 
armed forces in the process of socially constructing the meaning of military 
power in the west. Rather, this means that the influence of the military – 
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whether through argumentation or by implementing military operations de-
cided by politicians – is analysed via the political process of constructing 
shared understandings among a group of states. I.e. the west. 
 
The case study presented in Chapters 7-8 relies on the above-mentioned 
analysis of discourses of war and the understanding that military power is a 
social construction, a practice-related discourse, that resides among the 
agents. It is not controllable by any single agent. Some agent or agents may 
be better positioned than others in shaping the military power discourse. 
The United States has held such a privileged position in the post-Cold War 
era, but this is not the same as saying that some agent or agents are able to 
define military power for others definitively. In addition, it is worth noting 
that the military power discourse is not an unproblematic collection of 
shared ideas: some or even many elements in the discourse of military 
power are more or less contested and thus only partially shared. The ana-
lytical choice to study military power from a western perspective arises 
from the assumption that within the west – or western / Euro-Atlantic secu-
rity community – a greater consensus with respect to the nature of war and 
military power exists than throughout the global international system. This 
explicit western perspective does not, however, preclude the possibilities to 
analyse non-western agents through the theoretical framework developed in 
Chapter 5. In addition, whether non-western agents ‘fit’ this analysis is an 
empirical question, accessible through scientific research. 
 
Chapter 5 identifies seven discourses of war, through which it is possible to 
approach the post-Cold War shared western conceptualisations of war in 
general and of military power in particular. Its analysis of the discourses of 
war indicates that in order to understand military power in the west and 
even more generally within the international system, all discourses need to 
be taken into account, but that one particular discourse has had greater in-
fluence on the western rearticulation of military power: the American-led 
discourse on the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Part 3 of the book 
– particularly Chapters 7-8 – explores the effects of this RMA discourse 
upon the shared western understandings of military power by means of a 
qualitative process-tracing case study. Chapter 7 focuses on the United 
States – the main locus of the post-Cold War RMA discourse. Chapter 8 
focuses on NATO, which has remained the main transatlantic security and 
collective defence organisation during the Cold War and thereafter. From 
the perspective of this study, analysing NATO in this context facilitates lo-
cating the shared transatlantic – and thus western – understandings con-
cerning military power. NATO is conceptualised to be the arena where 
western governments ‘negotiate’ the content of the threats facing the west-
ern states and the alliance as a whole, the nature of contemporary armed 
conflicts, and the requirements that the contemporary security environment 
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poses on the development of national and/or alliance armed forces – i.e. the 
constitutive elements of military power.  
 
In addition, Chapter 8 also analyses the emerging European Security and 
Defence Policy within the framework of the European Union. This analysis 
is conceptualised to deepen and/or broaden the analysis of military power 
within NATO as the inclusion of several non-NATO member-states of the 
EU and the different – more political – nature of the Union widen the con-
ceptual reach of the notion of western understandings of military power. 
While the practical development of military capabilities within the Euro-
pean Union has a relatively short history – less than a decade – this on-
going process is based on shared European understandings of relevant mili-
tary capabilities in the post-Cold War era. Thus, while many of the prom-
ulgated military goals of the Union still remain at the level of work in pro-
gress, unrealised visions, or political declarations, it is these collectively 
agreed visions and promulgated declarations that reflect the shared under-
standings of military power within Europe. These shared understandings 
guide the step-by-step implementation of European capability construction 
and transformation. Together Chapters 7-8 provide answers to research 
questions three and four. 
 
This study will end with a conclusion – in Chapter 9 – that will tie together 
the constructivist synthesis provided for the analysis of military power, the 
Cold War era mainstream conceptualisations of military power, and the 
development of western conceptualisations of war and military power in 
post-Cold War international politics. In addition, avenues for further re-
search are elaborated. 
 
My focus on the changing shared western understandings of war and mili-
tary power in the post-Cold War era from a constructivist theoretical per-
spective is not only based on the theoretical utility of engaging and criticis-
ing the mainstream position on the study of war and military power – po-
litical realism. Shared understandings of war and military power are sig-
nificant also for the practical utility of better understanding the doctrines 
and policies of states in a particular historical context. As shared under-
standings of war and military power change, the nature of war and the con-
stitutive elements of military power also change. The effects of these 
changes are not limited to the explicit use of physical violence only, but 
have wider implications for actors’ identities, the norms of the international 
system, and thus also for the ‘reality’ of the international system. 
 
Any analysis of the changing nature of war and military power in the west 
during the post-Cold War period is a monumental task. Similarly, a thor-
oughly conducted analysis and constructive criticism of the orthodox realist 
view on war and military power will require a great deal of additional re-
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search. Therefore, this study does not claim to offer a complete or all-
encompassing view on war and military power. Instead, I offer a limited, 
theoretically informed analysis of western conceptualisations of war and 
military power after the end of the Cold War.  
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2. THESIS – REALISM, POWER, AND THE COLD WAR 
 
 
If one could identify the one paradigm that has focused its attention on the ex-
pression of power, one would in almost all cases name political realism. 
Whether one draws inspiration from the classical writings of Thucydides or 
from Machiavellism, one is – so the story goes – a realist. The wisdom of real-
ism is centuries old, but in its self-conscious expression it has been a paradigm 
for about fifty years. This paradigm has one focus above all others, namely 
power. This chapter will present the realist paradigm’s conception of power in 
general and of military power in particular. Because not all realists share one 
similar view of power, this rather brief presentation of realism and the varying 
perspectives that different ‘realisms’ hold on power will serve to link contem-
porary theorising on power to its intellectual predecessors. The following dis-
cussion of realism in general and its views on power is thus not exhaustive, but 
it should be sufficient for the task at hand: it frames the challenge that any 
power framework needs to address in articulating new perspectives on power. 
This chapter also presents the already existing theoretical literature as an intro-
duction to the constructivist framing of military power. 
 
This presentation of realism and its perspectives on power is not intended to 
prove that some scholars had it all wrong during the Cold War. Rather, the idea 
is to show that when engaging in power analysis today, there is nothing that 
would force one to rely solely on realism and that power à la realism, which 
has dominated the IR for some decades, is in fact a caricature of classical real-
ist power analysis. This caricature was drawn during the behaviourist period 
that succeeded the emergence of realist theorising in the 1940s. The discussion 
that follows acknowledges the merits of scientific simplification, but also high-
lights tendency within the discipline of international relations during the Cold 
War era to formulate rigorous and parsimonious theoretical constructs in order 
to explain big and significant outcomes with a handful of variables that were 
claimed to be universally true. In addition, this chapter posits that in the articu-
lation and maturation processes of Cold War era realism, the work of the early 
classical realists – above all Edvard Hallet Carr1 and Hans Morgenthau – were 
reduced into a few simple dictums that did not correspond well with what the 
authors actually said in their work. These maxims, which took on a life of their 
own, became unproblematic and virtually axiomatic premises for scientific re-
search and policymaking as the Cold War progressed. This chapter focuses 
                                                             
1
 To label E.H. Carr as a realist is problematic. However, as his work – especially The 
Twenty Years’ Crisis – has been interpreted to be at the core of the realist paradigm by a 
majority of the Cold War era realists, and has since been cited to advance ‘the realist cause’, 
this label – whether actually true or not – is used her as well. On the ‘non-realist’ side of 
Carr, see e.g. Booth (1991), Jones (1996), and Wilson (2000). 
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upon this caricature of classical realism, which dominated the Cold War era 
strategic thinking on military power. 
 
When dealing with realism, conceptual confusion is hard to avoid. The sup-
posed success of the realist paradigm over several decades led to its ramifica-
tion. Realism is thus not a theory, but a paradigm or a theory-family. It is a set 
of assumptions that many scholars share in studying the world. Though it is “a 
theoretical broad church”2 with many different branches, there are still some 
common unifying core beliefs. Power is one of those common characteristics, 
but a wider theoretical perspective is needed in order to grasp the core of realist 
theorising.3 
 
 
2.1. The Articulation and Consolidation of Realism 
 
Power is essentially a concept that international relations, strategic studies, or 
the realist paradigm cannot do without.4 It is common to assign a leading role 
for the realist paradigm in IR studies that deal with power. Although power is 
too important a concept to be identified exclusively with realism, attempts to 
focus on power from non-realist perspectives need to address the genealogy of 
realist power theorising as well as the social power literature within IR in gen-
eral. 
 
A basic distinction is made in power analysis between an understanding of 
power as an attribute of an actor or as a relationship between two or several 
actors. The first conception holds that by looking at several factors (i.e. attrib-
utes of an actor) one can determine an actor’s power without comparing it with 
that of any other actor. This means that objective measurement of an actors’ 
power is possible. The conception of power as attributes usually refers to such 
factors as military and economic capabilities, population, and geography. The 
problem with this notion of power, which was borrowed from the natural sci-
ences, lies in the inability to agree a common measure of power, that would 
allow us to get reliable and accurate information about an actor’s power. The 
view that power is a function of attributes, which is attractive for scholars on 
account of its simplistic conceptualisation of power, has lost ground in favour 
                                                             
2
 Dunne and Schmidt (2001), p. 150. 
3
 Frankel (1996, p. ix) notes that realist theories have “a common center of philosophical 
gravity.” This center of gravity rests in the notion that international politics is a struggle for 
power and security by states in their conflictual relationships in an anarchic world. Gilpin 
(1986, p. 304) believes that political “realism must be seen as a philosophical disposition and 
set of assumptions about the world”.  For a similar argument, see Mastanduno (1997), p. 50, 
also in footnote 4. 
4
 For the coupling of realism and power, see Guzzini (2002a), p. 23 and Wendt (1999), p. 
92. 
  
17
of the relational view.5 Whereas those who favour the attribute approach em-
phasise the power base of an actor, relationalists underline the power position 
of an actor and the power base seen from the power position in question. 
Viewed from this perspective, ” the substantial attribute aspect is determined 
by the relational one.”6 It is worth mentioning that even though power is under-
stood as a relational phenomenon, one cannot escape the dilemma of what con-
stitutes power in a relationship between actors. In addition, the assessment of 
power from a relational perspective becomes more difficult, not only since the 
perceptual variables become more important than in the attribute power ap-
proach.7 
 
In addition to the dichotomy of attribute vs. relational power, there are three 
other ways to conceptualise power. The first is to view power as a property 
concept. This means that certain resources give power to their holder. The sec-
ond sees power as a causal concept, where the attainment of certain goals can 
be seen as the fulfilment of power. Thirdly, power can be seen as a disposi-
tional concept. From this point of view, power is neither a property of the ac-
tor, not the realisation of an objective, but a potentiality of the actor, a capacity 
to effect. One should note that stating what power is in a particular context is 
not only a matter of definition. How a concept is defined also has consequences 
for value assumptions and for the empirical applications of the concept.8  
 
William Fox’s term ‘doctrinal realists’ is perhaps best suited to the group of 
scholars who regard power as an expression of an actor’s capabilities, often 
with reference to military strength. This means, that the state’s overall power is 
seen almost completely as a function of one resource base, namely military re-
sources. The way ahead proposed by these realists is paved with simplifying 
assumptions, without which this power conception could not survive. Among 
the most important of these assumptions is that the international system is hos-
tile and decentralised, thus placing the actors (states or statesmen) under pres-
sure to guarantee their own security.9 This assumption is the one that underlies 
the ‘supremacy of military sphere’ thesis in power calculations, since military 
force is the state’s last resort to defend itself. The ‘supremacy of military 
sphere’ thesis draws on one of the unproblematic maxims of realism, which 
was stated by E.H. Carr in the late 1930s, though not in an attempt to build the 
foundations of realism in one or several short, profound utterances: “The su-
preme importance of the military instrument lies in the fact that the ultima ratio 
of power in international relations is war.”10 Another assumption hidden in the 
                                                             
5
 Mokken and Stokman (1976), p. 41. See also Baldwin (1989), p. 16. 
6
 Mokken and Stokman (1976), p. 43. 
7
 Buzan, Jones and Little (1993), p. 68. 
8
 See Morriss (1987); Guzzini (2002a), p. 16; Lukes (1980), p. 26. 
9
 Spegele (1996), pp. 85-88. 
10
 Carr (1939), p. 139 (original italics). 
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realist power conception is the ‘fungibility of power’ thesis. According to this 
thesis, the overall power of an actor always operates in the same (or almost the 
same) fashion in different situations or in different arenas (for example in mili-
tary, economic and cultural matters). Power, conceptualised primarily as mili-
tary resources, can achieve results with same level of effectiveness whether one 
is dealing with a military dispute or economic co-operation.11 
 
The assumption that power resources are fungible is problematic. Certainly 
there are degrees of fungibility, and some resources are more fungible than oth-
ers. But social sciences lack a medium of power that is comparable to money in 
economics. This means that the fungibility of political power resources in the 
political sphere is lower than that of financial resources in economies. Trying to 
press on with the view of the high fungibility of power resources leads to the 
paradox of unrealised power, i.e. the situation where some stakeholder that 
seems to possess ‘enough’ supposedly fungible power resources, but lacks the 
ability to achieve its will vis-à-vis some less powerful actor.12  
 
It is noteworthy that Morgenthau warned against the reduction of power to 
military power alone. What he called militarism is the notion that the “power of 
a nation consists primarily, if not exclusively, in its military strength, conceived 
especially in quantitative terms.” This reading would reduce power to material 
force. And, as he noted, since “the emergence of the modern state system in the 
fifteenth century, no single nation has succeeded in imposing its will for any 
length of time upon the rest of the world by sheer material force alone.”13  
 
According to Morgenthau, military preparedness gives the other tangible ele-
ments of national power (geography, natural resources, industrial capacity) 
their importance. As factors contributing to a nation’s military preparedness he 
mentions technology, leadership, and the quantity and quality of armed forces. 
In order not to be overwhelmed by other nations’ military preparedness and to 
be able to extract power from other elements of national power, a nation must 
master the technological innovations related to warfare, possess qualified mili-
tary and strategic minds, and have its armed forces equipped with a sufficient 
amount of high-quality arms and men. All of these factors together make it pos-
sible to back the national power with the nation’s military element.14 But as 
Morgenthau explicitly warned, attempts to evaluate the power of a nation by 
looking exclusively at military preparedness leads to an oversimplified and 
crude understanding of the relations between states. The elements of national 
                                                             
11
 Note that Fox (1985) did not explicitly connect doctrinal realists to the attribute view of 
power, nor did he reduce power to military power.  
12
 Baldwin (1989), 133-135. 
13
 Morgenthau (1967), pp. 156-158. 
14
 Ibid., pp. 114-118. 
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power that Morgenthau listed are obviously linked to each other and as he de-
scribed, power is a dynamic, relative phenomenon that is culturally bound.  
 
When looking at power from a broader, resource-based perspective, some 
scholars have maintained that one way to assess power is to look at the overall 
power resources at one’s disposal. Lists of various different important power 
resources are abundant. They refer to such elements as military capabilities, 
population, and geography, among others. These resource lists raise questions 
of how the important resources are selected and differentiated from other re-
sources, how shifts in the importance of different resources relate to the chosen 
theory of power, and how the power of an actor can be measured based on the 
power resources chosen for analysis.15 Morgenthau’s list of the elements of na-
tional power is probably the best known such list.16 
 
The first problem related to different power resources is related to the difficulty 
in assessing material and non-material resources within one conception of 
power. In its crudest form, power analysis from a resource-based view decides 
upon several indicators or categories of power and then either assigns a rank to 
the various agents or assigns a numerical value to different indicators. In the 
case of material and ideational elements of power, the former are more easily 
counted or evaluated; where as the latter are by their nature more difficult to 
quantify. Even if the purpose of a resource-based power analysis is not to 
measure or quantify overall power of an agent, the problem of equating re-
sources to power becomes apparent in the case of an actor who is not willing or 
able to use its vast resource base for certain ends and other actors also ac-
knowledge this fact.17  
 
                                                             
15
 Forsberg (1997), pp. 177-181. Collins notes the difficulties in his analysis of military 
strength. “Just deciding how and what to count can be confusing.” See Collins (1978), 
quote on p. 6; Archer (1995), p. 299; Morriss (1987), p. 138. Wohlforth also notes in his 
defense of realism after the end of the Cold War that “The predictive failure of realist theo-
ries … was linked to the difficulty of assessing power. … Any capabilities-based theory 
which recognizes that capabilities contain significant non-material elements must recognize 
the impossibility of making precise power assessments.” Wohlforth (1994/5), p. 105. 
16
 Morgenthau’s list of the elements of national power can serve as a guide for a relational 
power assessment between nations.  These elements include geography, natural resources, 
industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, 
the quality of diplomacy and the quality of government. Of these elements of power, all but 
geography are constantly shifting. When presenting these elements and further developing 
their contents, Morgenthau expressed a deep concern for the possibility of error in making 
power evaluations. The most typical errors would be to see power as an absolute character 
of a nation, to exclude the dynamic character of the power relations between nations and to 
equate power with a single factor (element). See Morgenthau (1967), pp. 97-98, 106-158. 
On problems of measuring power, see also Waltz (1979), pp. 129-131. 
17
 Morgenthau (1967). For examples of resource-based views of power see Ferris (1973), 
Cox and Jacobson (1974), Cline (1980).  
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Whether we draw on Morgenthau’s elements of national power18 or on concep-
tualisations of power as resources, we need to make an analytical distinction 
between the total power resources of agents and their will or skill to mobilise 
these resources into actual power. This complicates the task of power analysis 
even further, since this means that the researcher is responsible not only for 
judging which resources ‘count’, but also how much they count. This latter fea-
ture is variable, since as circumstances change, so does the degree of resource 
mobilisation.19 
 
The material resources perspective of power described above is perhaps the 
simplest way to conceptualise and operationalise power in the field of interna-
tional relations. Difficulties arise, however, when one has to decide which re-
sources to include in on our power analysis or how to deal with situations with 
more than one actor. In the latter case, it is not only difficult to assess the 
power of the actors, but also to take into account the perceptions of the agents 
and their possibilities and willingness to be part of a power relationship. One 
problem highlighted by strategic studies and its focus on nuclear weapons is the 
process of converting from material nuclear capabilities to calculable power. 
Luttwak tried to show the connection between military (nuclear) capabilities 
and power (political utility of military capabilities) and concluded that “it 
should be clear no comparison of the materiel inputs can be at all adequate to 
define strategic balance. It is rather the output of operational capabilities, which 
must be compared”.20 But when one tries to operationalise this output of nu-
clear weaponry and the defences fielded against such weapons, one runs into 
severe difficulties: should one concentrate on the number of warheads, yield in 
megatons, available delivery systems, accuracy, survivability of weapon sys-
tems…? And these kinds of problems are not only confined to the nuclear 
realm, but extend to include the conventional material and nonmaterial aspects 
of power. As Collins mentions, “no one knows for sure how many bombers 
compensate for how many ballistic missiles”.21 
 
Another way to conceptualise power is to look for its manifestations in the ac-
tual behaviour of different agents in the international arena. This perspective 
                                                             
18
 It is noteworthy that Morgenthau defined power in causal terms as “anything that estab-
lishes and maintains the control of man over man” or “man’s control over the minds and 
actions of other men.” Morgenthau (1967), p. 9, 26. Taking this causal perspective, 
Morgenthau accentuated power resources as the power base of nations. 
19
 A distinction is sometimes made between actual and potential resources (or capabilities) 
of states. The former are those that are immediately at the disposal of a state, where the lat-
ter require mobilisation to be actualised. While this distinction is useful, it does not address 
the question of the will or skill to mobilise power resources.   
20
 Luttwak (1976), p. 68. On p. 53 under the title of ‘measuring strategic power’ Luttwak 
notes that ”purported assessments of the strategic balance based on comparisons of any one 
attribute of the materiel are at best inadequate and at worse deliberately misleading.” 
21
 Collins (1978), p. 6. 
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does not exclude the resource-based view: it is fairly common, for example, to 
analyse manifest power – i.e. behaviour – and yet understand it from a re-
source-based point of view. Perhaps the best-known definition of power comes 
from Robert Dahl, who framed it in the following manner: ”A has power over B 
to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do.”22 
This causal definition is often called the agency concept or formal model, 
which refers to the mechanical metaphors it uses for the development of the 
definition.23 Intention was introduced to the concept of power by Russell, for 
whom power means ”the production of intended effects”.24 In a way, this defi-
nition goes further than Dahl’s, since the effects produced by power are in-
tended by the power holder. But both of these still see power as a manifest 
event, something that is called the ‘episodic power conception’. When power is 
conceptualised in this fashion, it can be said that power is exercised. The defi-
nition of power offered by Morgenthau – “man’s control over the minds and 
actions of other men”25 – follows the causal logic, but is combined with a 
strong resource-based view via his famous elements of national power. 
 
A strong criticism of Dahl’s pluralist conception of power was put forward by 
Bachrach and Baratz with their formulation of the two faces of power. Where 
Dahl focuses only on the exercise of power by an agent, Bachrach and Baratz 
tried to link agency and structure in a more comprehensive approach to power. 
In doing so, they coined the concepts of ‘non-decision making’ and ‘non-
issues’, both of which both refer to a situation in which an agent “devotes his 
energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional 
practices that limit the scope of political process to public consideration of only 
those issues which are comparatively innocuous to” that agent.26 In this con-
text, non-issues refer to those issues not raised due to an agent’s effort to ma-
nipulate the agenda.27 According to Bachrach and Baratz, then, unobservable 
non-decisions can actually have consequences and a causal status.  
 
                                                             
22
 Dahl (1957), pp. 202-203. 
23
 The criticism of Dahl’s conception of power concentrates not only on the issue of the 
‘right’ meaning given to the concept, but also to the positivistic understanding of science/ 
power which underlies Dahl’s formulation. See for example Clegg (1989), pp. 88-89. Mor-
riss calls the merging of having power with the exercise of power the “exercise fallacy”. See 
Morriss (1987), pp. 12-13, 15-17. On the close relationship between methodology and re-
search results in power analysis, see Debnam (1984), p. 70. 
24
 Wrong (1979), p. 2. See also Waltz (1959), p. 205, where power is defined as “the capacity 
to produce an intended effect.” 
25
 Morgenthau (1967), p. 26. 
26
 Bachrach and Baratz (1962), p. 948. See also Clegg (1989), p. 76. 
27
 Three filters that have an effect in the non-decision process are mobilization of bias, an-
ticipated reactions and negative decision-making. See e.g. Clegg (1989), pp. 75-85. On the 
criticism of Dahl’s view on power from structural perspective, see Spiro (1999), 12-13. 
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As part of an attempt to develop international relations into a rigorous science 
that not only produced empirical knowledge from historical cases, but used ab-
straction and deduction, Morton Kaplan wrote his System and Process in In-
ternational Politics. It was published in 1957, when the behavioural revolution 
was under way.28 Basing his argument on general systems theory, Kaplan de-
fined a political system, but noted that contrary to nation states, the interna-
tional system lacks one. Deducing different kinds of international systems (they 
could be called ideal types) and analysing roles and behaviour within them, 
Kaplan shifted the attention from the individual actor or state to the state sys-
tem. In other words, his analytic category is the international system.  
 
Kaplan explicated different forms of international systems in his work.29 Kaplan 
noted that of six different kinds of systems, the balance of power system and 
the loose bipolar system are those that have actually existed. The remaining 
four systems are “deductive-rationalist” constructs.30 The standard of theorising 
set by natural sciences was the basis of Kaplan’s work and that of other behav-
ioralists: Just as “the general pattern of behaviour of the gas may represent its 
adjustment to pressure and temperature conditions within the tank, the set of 
actions of national actors may correspond to the essential rules of the system 
when the other variables take the appropriate specified value. ... In this way the 
historical loses its quality of uniqueness and is translated into the universal lan-
guage of science.”31 
 
The essence of Kaplan’s balance of power system is based on the idea that 
great powers share the essential rules of the system. In short, these rules direct 
them to increase their own capabilities, even at the price of war, while at the 
same time preventing any one great power from acquiring predominant power. 
Should one or several great powers attempt to change the rules of the system or 
if their capabilities change significantly, the balance of power system may be-
come unstable and change. But objective changes in capabilities (capability 
variable) of great powers (actor classificatory variable) do not cause changes; 
they have to be noticed by actors (information variable). Two bloc actors, some 
non-member national actors, and universal actors comprise the loose bipolar 
system that Kaplan sees as the system of the Post-World War II era. Depending 
on the level of hierarchy of the blocs, the loose bipolar system may be on its 
way to becoming either a tight bipolar system (and eventually a hierarchical 
                                                             
28 Kaplan (1957). 
29 The different systems Kaplan mentions are called the ‘balance of power system’, the ‘loose 
bipolar system’, the ‘tight bipolar system’, the ‘universal system’, the ‘hierarchical system’ 
and the ‘unit veto system’. Each of the (analytical) systems can be described along several 
variables, which are ‘essential rules’, ‘transformation rules’, the ‘actor classificatory vari-
ables’, the ‘capability variables’ and ‘information variables’. Kaplan (1957). 
30
 Tellis (1996), p. 58. 
31
 Kaplan (1957), pp. 10-11, 21-53, quote on p. 25. 
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system), or a balance-of-power system. It is in this context that Kaplan expli-
cates the functions of non-member actors and universal actors. They have a 
stabilising effect in a system that in other ways suffers from inherent instabil-
ity.32 
 
In evaluating capability variables Kaplan uses territory, population, industrial 
capacity, skills, military forces, transportation and communication facilities, 
willingness to use capabilities, and the capacity to draw upon the aid of others. 
As far as the concept of power is concerned, he notes that the Hobbesian way 
of linking power to the attainment of goals is not satisfactory. However, Kaplan 
offers no precise definition of power, but mentions the problems one is sure to 
counter when using the concept. The problems, Kaplan sees derive in part from 
his behaviourist orientation, as is clear from his wish to quantify power for pur-
poses of analysis. Seeing power as the attainment of goals (a Hobbesian defini-
tion that Kaplan rejects) makes it impossible to have an independent measure of 
power. Also the need to compare power between actors is not made possible. 
The problem of the imprecise nature of power as a concept for analysing inter-
national politics is highlighted in Kaplan’s argument that power “intuitively ap-
pears to be a useful tool for social science until it is analysed closely.”33 It 
should be noted that the nature of the systemic theory of IR that Kaplan ad-
vanced in 1957 is not centred on the question of measuring power of individual 
states accurately, but rather on the ability to define the systemic model (the six 
different models Kaplan describes) based on his more general notion of power. 
He thus maintains – contrary to Morgenthau – that “power is not the individuat-
ing or distinguishing element of the political.”34 Although it is not possible to 
measure power precisely – and not even necessary for systemic theorising – the 
importance of states should not be overlooked in Kaplan’s analysis: although 
his models reflect a systemic theory of IR, the way that one model is trans-
formed into another depends on the actions of states, not on the system as a 
whole. In this way, Kaplan’s analytic category of the state system exists along-
side a theoretical category of states.35  
 
Writing during the scientification of the discipline of IR and the realist para-
digm, Raymond Aron continued to elaborate on the classical realist theses by 
applying them to the nuclear realm. In his approach, one can see criticism of 
the behavioural revolt and the subsequent drive towards general theories of IR. 
His response to systemic realism (Kaplan 1957, also Waltz’s third-image theo-
rising 1959) was to criticise the security dilemma caused by the anarchical 
character of the international system by devising concepts of homogenous and 
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heterogeneous international systems. Thus, international politics is not to be 
understood as the consequence of a single logic of anarchy. Anarchy has more 
than one logic, and the prevailing logic can be understood by looking at the sys-
tem empirically. And since there is more than one logic of anarchy, a unified 
theory of power alone is insufficient.36 For Aron, a homogenous system is char-
acterised by states of similar type that “obey the same conception of policy.” A 
heterogeneous system is one where “states are organized according to differ-
ent principles and appeal to contradictory values.”37  This realisation intro-
duces ideas and emotions into the discussion in addition to force alone.  
 
Aron’s criticism of realist IR theory was directed at the praxeology of realism 
in a theoretical disguise.38 In other words, American realism was, according to 
Aron, more an ideology than a social scientific theory. In addition to criticising 
(American) realists for their theoretical treatment of anarchy and its one com-
pelling logic, Aron opposed the way power was conceptualised in the main-
stream realist literature. In this matter as well, Aron referred to Morgenthau and 
his elaborations of power. According to Aron, treating power as a means of 
fulfilling objectives and at the same time the immediate objective as well dimin-
ishes the theoretical utility of the concept of power. Citing Morgenthau, Aron 
found “oscillation” between three different interpretations of power that con-
tradict each other.39 
 
As determinants of power Aron listed space (milieu), available material and the 
number of men (resources) and collective capacity (collective action). With 
these very crude “three fundamental elements” his intent was to provide an un-
derstanding of power that can be used in different circumstances across history. 
Criticising the realist (Morgenthau’s) representation of the national interest, 
defined in terms of power alone, Aron advanced three different eternal foreign 
policy objectives of states: power, security and glory (or idea). ‘Eternal’ in this 
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context points to a theoretical perspective that must be elaborated in empirical 
research based on the situation in question.40 In other words, when carrying out 
research, one must move from the three broad eternal objectives to more nar-
row and specifically defined historical objectives of states. To define the na-
tional interest solely in terms of power would, according to Aron, be an attempt 
to imitate the discipline of economics, which is a “science of means”.41 The 
plurality of foreign policy goals and their combined material and ideational na-
ture lead to the statement that one cannot rationally define one general, over-
arching national interest. It has to be done in a specific context with relation to 
relevant actors. 
 
Aron defined power as “the capacity to do, make or destroy.” In the interna-
tional arena he specified this general conception by defining power as “the ca-
pacity of a political unit to impose its will upon other units.” His dispositional 
conceptualisation of power called for the separation of resources and force 
from power. The former can be evaluated somewhat objectively and the latter, 
since it is relational, is not dependent on material resources only. Power is, 
then, based on the force (strength) of a unit having certain goals in a certain 
context. Aron further specified the concept of force. Potential force can be 
equated with all those resources that a unit possesses, and actual force consists 
of those resources that the unit mobilises.42 
 
The dispositional view regards power as potential, latent or implicit as opposed 
to actual or manifest power. In this view, power is possessed; it is to be re-
garded as a capacity. Whereas the episodic conception has difficulties dealing 
with the non-decisions in a social system, the dispositional framing of power 
can deal with them. This way of thinking allows, for example, explanations 
with reference to anticipated reactions of the ‘power subject’. On criticism of 
the behavioural power conception is that actual (manifest) behaviour, which 
can be observed, is often exerted by those who are viewed as powerless. This 
means that it is often the less powerful side that has to use manifest and ob-
servable power while the more powerful actor can implement its will without 
an overt conflict or even without the other party (parties) even realising that 
power is being exercised.43 
 
The dispositional view of power does not reject resources or behaviour as as-
pects of power, but rejects the reduction of power to either. Regarding re-
sources, one can certainly observe those concrete things or artefacts that exist, 
but in order to infer that those things are in fact power resources, one needs a 
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theory of social interaction. One thus “cannot observe resources directly. … 
Most resources are resources only if others recognize them as such.” Similarly, 
reducing power to behaviour alone confines the area of research to those situa-
tions where power becomes manifest. Many instances where power is present 
but remains out of view are then ignored. If one understands power to be a dis-
position, it is obvious that, in this form, it cannot be observed, and its existence 
can only be inferred. This of course is a problematic proposition from an em-
piricist’s point of view. In addition, the idea that power assessments are – like 
facts – theory-laden means that differing views about some actors’ power are 
not only disagreements over facts, but also over theories.44 This explanatory 
perspectivism – the view that the meaning of concepts is derived from the 
metatheoretical assumptions and the ‘substance’ of theories in which these 
concepts are embedded45 – challenges the realist paradigm and its conceptuali-
sations of knowledge. 
 
The notion that power does not have to be observable in order to operate within 
the international system is linked to the idea of structural power. This is partly 
related to the Bachrach and Baratz’s discussion of non-issues and non-
decisions. By controlling the agenda of interaction the concept of structural 
power refers to the indirect institutional effects of power. This facet of struc-
tural power “confers the power to decide how things shall be done, the power 
to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people, 
or relate to corporate enterprises.”46 Holders of structural power thus have the 
ability to define the form of the international game and its rules. Understanding 
power from this perspective has been mostly ignored, since it would have chal-
lenged the tendency to quantify power. The second aspect of structural power 
is related to the unintended – and even unconscious – effects of actions. The 
powerful may cause effects by their mere existence or via actions that were not 
intended to have some realised outcome. Structures thus have causal effects. 
The logic of this one facet of power cannot be incorporated into the causal 
model of power, where an agent’s intention is connected to an outcome via 
power. The third aspect of structural power has been called ‘impersonal 
power’, which refers to the biases of existing social structures to favour some 
agents at the expense of others. The accepted rules of the international system – 
the rites, routines, and discourses – not only constrain agents, but also em-
power them. As these rites, routines, and discourses are intersubjective in na-
ture and not dictated by any one agent, they are said to be impersonal.47 
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The notion of structural power does not necessitate an understanding of one 
overarching power structure. Instead one can conceptualise structural power to 
be located in separate related structures. Susan Strange describes four interre-
lated power structures, namely structures of security, finance, production and 
knowledge (including beliefs and ideas). In order to understand actions and 
outcomes within the international system, one should see how the interacting 
power structures relate to each other and to actors within the system. In this 
context she criticises the realists for over-emphasising the security structure and 
the role of military power.48 
 
Strange’s remarks on structural power relate to another topic concerning power 
analysis, namely whether to regard power as a whole or should it be understood 
from a sectoral or issue-specific perspective. The notion of power as a whole is 
clearly expressed by Kenneth Waltz in his Theory of International Politics. In 
Waltz’s systems theory ”states … have to use their combined capabilities in 
order to serve their interests. The economic, military, and other capabilities of 
nations cannot be sectored and separately weighed.”49 This notion of aggre-
gated power has been criticised by many scholars. In the interdependence lit-
erature, disaggregated power has been discussed in detail and even structural 
realists – the developers of neorealism – have rejected the logic of Waltz’s ag-
gregated power.50 Although the simple aggregated power conception provides a 
parsimonious and simplistic theory of international relations, its usefulness is 
reduced because of its generality and the obvious difficulties of applying such a 
theory in practice.  
 
 
2.2. The Evolution of Strategic Studies and Nuclear Theorising 
 
The academic subject of strategic studies came into existence with the begin-
ning of the Cold War and the nuclear revolution. Strategy as a concept and stra-
tegic thinking more generally had been used for centuries before. The textbook 
portrayal of the transformation of strategy begins with a summary of general’s 
duties mainly during wartime (ancient Greece) and ends with a multi-faceted 
panorama of a state’s preparations for war in the different fields of politics (di-
plomacy), economy and the military. With the advent of nuclear weapons, the 
word strategy came to refer to the art or science of avoiding war, and strategists 
with academic training practiced this science.51 The focus here is on the devel-
opment of the academic subject of strategic studies and the theorising concern-
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ing nuclear weapons and deterrence. Taking into consideration the enormous 
number of publications that started to appear in the latter part of the 1950s con-
cerning primarily nuclear strategy, I will review the substance of strategic stud-
ies during the Cold War. My main interest here is in the links between the stra-
tegic studies community52 with political realism and the assumptions that under-
lie the research programme of the strategic community. The following analysis 
of the western strategic discourse is based on the assumption that during the 
Cold War, deterrence literature and theorising had a major influence on the way 
that military power was conceptualised.  
 
During the mid-1950s the academic subject of strategic studies was established 
in the form in which it is known today. Previously it had been more historical in 
nature and was confined to the efforts of individual scholars, mainly with a 
military background. But, beginning in the latter half of the 1950s, an increas-
ing number of scholars started to work in this are in a more systematic way. 
The majority of the researchers had a civilian background. It is noteworthy that 
the subject established itself as an essentially American enterprise.53  
 
Several defining characteristics of strategic studies were followed by the vast 
majority of scholars in the academic community during the Cold War. Perhaps 
the most important in its theoretical outlook is the adherence to political real-
ism. Another common feature is the moral neutrality of the writing on the sub-
ject. This does not mean that the writing was value-neutral, but rather that 
moral considerations were mostly left out. The third factor that strategic studies 
have in common is the assumption of rationality: actors are assumed to be able 
to calculate the best means to achieve their objectives. The fourth feature 
shared by strategic studies is the tendency for many of the central questions or 
the way that research problems were treated to be indebted to the ideological 
bipolar system of hostility and suspicion that characterised Cold War interna-
tional politics.54 
 
The Realist theory of international relations had its origins in a historical 
mode of thought. … Since the Second World War, some American scholars, 
notably Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, have transformed realism into 
a form of problem-solving theory. … [T]hey tended to adopt the fixed ahis-
torical view of the framework for action characteristic of problem-solving 
theory … It is no accident that this tendency in theory coincided with the 
Cold War, which imposed the category of bipolarity upon international rela-
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tions, and an overriding concern for the defense of American power as a 
bulwark of the maintenance of order.55 
 
The Golden Age of strategic studies – from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s – 
was characterised by the nuclear arms race between the United States (US) and 
the Soviet Union (SU). After all, it was in 1949 that the Soviets exploded their 
first nuclear device. The theory of deterrence56 reflected the uneasy situation 
between hostile blocs with arms that yield unimaginable destruction.57 
 
The nature and sufficiency of deterrence was debated within the strategic 
community. The theoretical side of the debate concerned itself the logic of de-
terrence, and the ‘empirical’ side with the proper deterrence policy in the con-
crete Cold War situation. There were certain common assumptions about the 
nature of the nuclear rivalry, namely concentration on the relationship between 
the two superpowers, belief in mutual vulnerability due to the technological 
implications of nuclear weapons combined with delivery possibilities, and the 
hostile nature of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. De-
veloping from these premises a secure second-strike capability on both sides 
was deemed important if deterrence was to work. And the solution to this prob-
lem was provided by creating more sophisticated technical devices on both 
sides so that each could count on the fact that if attacked, they could still de-
stroy the other – or at least, cause a sufficiently high number of casualties and 
severe destruction. It was this line of reasoning that led to one of the symbols 
of the Cold War, namely MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction). It was MAD, 
both as a description of the relationship between the United States and the So-
viet Union and as a nuclear doctrine, that “pointed to a neat technical fix by 
which a potentially unstable rivalry could be forced into a stable configura-
tion”.58 
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The increasing number of Soviet nuclear explosives was not the only concern 
for the strategic community within the US. The development of delivery sys-
tems in the form of ballistic missiles opened the discussion of the possibility of 
a surprise attack capable of destroying the US nuclear retaliatory force. Vul-
nerability to a decapitating strike became thus one of the themes of deterrence 
theorising, and the invulnerability of nuclear retaliatory forces was given a cen-
tral role in politics and research. The vulnerability assessments that were con-
ducted were very often technical in nature, leaving political considerations 
aside.59 
 
With the development of nuclear weapons and related delivery systems, as well 
as with the Soviet acquisition of a nuclear capability that could be delivered to 
the US or Europe, the US nuclear debate oscillated between maximalist and 
minimalist positions. Minimalists viewed the destructive power of nuclear 
weapons to be such that they call for  “no first use” and “no defense” policies 
and ruled out the possibility of winning a nuclear war. According to the mini-
malist position, the use of nuclear weapons could only be accepted as a retalia-
tory policy. For the maximalists the view of nuclear weapons as purely retalia-
tory devices was questionable. They argued that this kind of understanding 
would leave the initiative to the enemy. Calls were made for the integration of  
nuclear weapons within the maxims of strategy. This meant that nuclear weap-
ons and targeting practice should have been included in plans to wage war to 
win. A First-strike nuclear capability was requested and defences against nu-
clear attacks were favoured.60 
 
The positions of the minimalists and maximalists illustrate the erosion of US 
nuclear supremacy and the increasing tension between MAD logic and the de-
sire of the US to cover its allies with a ‘nuclear umbrella’. Extended deterrence 
made little sense in the MAD framework and it was “the worm in the apple of 
Golden Age theory.”61 From the 1970s onwards, deterrence policy by retalia-
tion was relegated to the back burner while deterrence by warfighting was de-
veloped as a solution to the problem posed by extended deterrence. MAD was 
not rejected in the limited nuclear war scenarios, but it remained the last resort, 
at the top of the escalation ladder, while more limited nuclear responses were 
developed as a way to deter Soviet aggression against US allies. Movement 
from the minimalist position to that of the maximalists was to enhance the 
credibility of western (US) deterrence, especially within the logic of extended 
deterrence. Curiously, the US nuclear doctrine moved toward the Soviet ver-
sion of deterrence by denial.62 Underlying this doctrinal shift one can locate not 
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only the logical disputes within the American strategic community, but also the 
Soviet conceptualisation of deterrence as denial, which challenged or rejected 
the American MAD thinking. 
 
The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) was a manifestation of an attempted shift 
toward defence in the nuclear field. It became the focal point of deterrence the-
ory along with the warfighting theorising that had emerged earlier. This new 
focus was facilitated by the ‘saturation’ of deterrence theory in the preceding 
decades and with the Reagan administration’s proposal to revolutionise the 
foundations of nuclear deterrence. Since deterrence by denial (warfighting) had 
become mainstream and gained the upper hand over Golden Age deterrence by 
retaliation, SDI provided a promising avenue for research and policy. What is 
noteworthy, the SDI program – nicknamed ‘Star Wars’ by its opponents – 
highlighted the technical solution to the problematic nature of deterrence in-
stead of focusing on diplomatic relations between superpowers. This was true 
despite the moral rationale presented for its adoption: was it not morally more 
humane to defend against the missile threat than to prepare for nuclear retalia-
tion? 
 
The end of the Cold War and the emerging ‘new’ threats marked a point of dis-
continuity in the field of strategic studies. The traditional focus on nuclear de-
terrence and arms control between the superpowers suddenly seemed unimpor-
tant, as almost everyone in the field was surprised by the unfolding of events 
that led to the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Nuclear 
weapons remained visible after the end of the Cold War, but in the form of nu-
clear non-proliferation and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by 
‘rogue states’ or other new actors.63 Deterrence theory started to concentrate 
on the problem of deterring an adversary that was not playing the same rational 
game that the superpowers had been playing for forty odd years. 
 
On the one hand, the deterrence debate in the US was attentive to the develop-
ments in the real world throughout the Cold War. The very development of 
deterrence policy by retaliation after the Second World War reflected the status 
quo quality of the US in the ‘new’ international system. After the Soviet Union 
had acquired a nuclear capability, theorising about usability of nuclear weapons 
reflected the doubts of using them against the Soviet Union for fear of retalia-
tion. Similarly, with the increase of nuclear forces on the opposing side, the 
doctrine of massive retaliation was questioned: was a massive attack with nu-
clear weapons reliable when one could expect a massive retaliation? In addition 
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the spectre of a possible Soviet attack in Europe and the US response to such 
an attack was evoked.  
 
On the other hand, deterrence theorising generated an internal logic that drifted 
away from the real world. The problem with nuclear theorising lies in the fact 
that the shortage of empirical evidence makes assessments of different theories 
or hypotheses difficult: the internal logic of the theory is highlighted at the cost 
of neglecting its ability to explain actual practices in the international system. 
The state actors, as instrumental utility maximisers, became reified within stra-
tegic studies in general and deterrence theory particularly.64 This meant that the 
analytical utility that was sought in assuming the characteristics of states was 
transformed into reality. Another difficulty related to deterrence theory is the 
fact that one can never be sure why something did not happen. Did deterring by 
means of a nuclear strike cause the observed outcome or were there some other 
causes? What effect did political considerations have on the matter in question 
(for example upholding common norms)?65 In fact, there may be some inclina-
tion to see deterrence as having been effective if the opposing party does not 
commit the act deterrence is supposed to prevent.66 
 
The above-mentioned problem of lacking empirical evidence concerning nu-
clear deterrence and the difficulty of determining whether deterrence was actu-
ally the cause of a certain outcome is revealed in the credibility theorising so 
important in deterrence. According to Sivonen, from the early 1950s on, US 
deterrence policy aimed at gaining maximum effect from the military posture 
that existed. This led to over-commitment in a situation where the failure of de-
terrence was rarely considered and the focal point of policy was to exploit de-
terrence as much as possible. Where classical realists stressed the importance 
of national interest (as power) and the context of each particular situation pol-
icy was made in, the deterrence ‘theory’ emphasised the political credibility of 
deterrence. The logic of credibility then was diverted from the national interests 
that classical realists stressed, and the defense of the ‘free world’ or ‘west’ be-
came the primary objective.67 This shift from the national interests to the de-
fense of the western way of life, or the rejection of the distinction that George 
Kennan had made between peripheral and vital interests, is shown in the NSC-
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68 document, which states that  “a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a de-
feat everywhere.”68  It was at this juncture that deterrence theory started drift-
ing away from reality and started generating a logic and momentum that be-
came a substitute for reality. This resulting reality – generated in this fashion –
then served as the foundation of explanations. 
 
Cold War era deterrence theorising was also narrow in its focus. It concen-
trated on the costs and benefits of defiance to the deterree, while the costs and 
benefits of compliance were ignored. This framework distorted the analytical 
perspective of deterrence theorising and shifted the focus of the analysis “from 
the adversary’s [deterree’s] choice to the dererrer’s actions.”69 This analytical 
short-sightedness not only had consequences for the theoretical deterrence lit-
erature, but also gave political legitimation to the adoption of different deter-
rence doctrines in the US.  
 
One aspect of the problem of theories drifting apart from reality and following 
their internal logic instead of being sensitive to the events in the world, is the 
often-ignored quality of theories to constitute reality. The basic principle of po-
litical realism – and strategic studies – has been to observe the world as it is 
instead of how it should be and then infer explanations and policy 
recommendations from this premise. This kind of description is a powerful tool 
in the debate between paradigms, since it automatically favours those para-
digms that are ‘scientific’ and explain events in a presumably ‘realistic’ 
fashion. Who would like to be ‘unrealistic’ or ‘unscientific’ in his or her choice 
of theories? Political realism and strategic studies have benefited from this kind 
of depiction as the only way to portray the reality of international politics. 
When one conceptualises the role of paradigms and specific theories in the field 
of social sciences in a broader way that was the case during the heyday of 
realism (until the 1980s), one is immediately confronted with the relationship 
between theories (images) of the world and actions subsequently taken in order 
to achieve certain valued outcomes. How one perceives the world has 
consequences for how one deals with it. In other words, in addition to being 
explanatory devices for a deeper understanding of the world, theories of 
international relations also constitute the international system and its agents. 
Theories thus aid in constructing the reality that they are designed to explain.70 
 
Deterrence is tendentially based on ‘worst-case’-thinking, because there is no 
assurance that the ‘other’ will not use any weakness, if it is offered. Yet, the 
never ending ‘gaps’ that the deterrence discourse finds are not the mere 
product of technological changes, but the result of the very premises of deter-
rence practices[.] … Deterrence policies dispose for a particular stereotyped 
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understanding of the world which reproduces autonomously the perceptions 
of threats. [The Cold War era] superpower relations were decreasingly the 
product of their interaction and increasingly the result of the juxtaposition of 
their internal dynamics.71 
 
The constitutive quality of ‘theories’ – or images of the world – is visible in the 
Truman administration’s document NSC-68 on US national security objectives 
and programs. The underlying world-view of credible deterrence logic was pre-
sented in NSC-68, and within years of its introduction, consecutive US admini-
strations up to the late 1960s more or less followed this logic. It was, after all, 
NSC-68 that was the blueprint for the military application of containment.72 
Bradley Klein has suggested that in addition to describing the post-World War 
II international context, NSC-68 employed a rhetorical strategy of transforming 
the ontological character of hypothetical scenarios into certainties. The docu-
ment described the main players of the post-war international system and con-
structed a fundamental difference between the United States and the Soviet Un-
ion in their political character and interests. The document then used this depic-
tion of the evil intentions of the Soviet Union and its potential military capabili-
ties as a criterion for extensive armament programs. With this rhetorical strat-
egy the future capabilities of the Soviet Union were transformed from merely 
possible to almost certain. Klein argues that this mode of representation was 
typical for the entire Cold War era.73 John Keegan has also criticised the prac-
tice of conflating hypotheses and ontology in Cold War era strategic studies 
and political practice. For him, the source of this conflation can be found at the 
intersection of an observation that war is a universal phenomenon and the hy-
pothesis that there exists a theory of objects of war that is universal in nature.74 
 
Ken Booth presented a similar criticism of Cold War era international relations 
theorising and the way that statesmen and academics interpreted the character 
of international system and the relationship between the two principal actors.  
Writing about the Cold Wars of the mind, Booth called attention to the eschato-
logical Cold War world-view, which suffers from ethnocentrism, ideological 
fundamentalism, strategic reductionism, and the one-sided reading of political 
realism. This worldview was not limited – according to Booth – to the Cold 
War period only, but it reached its peak during the nuclear stalemate of the 
Cold War. Nor has the end of the Cold War meant the abandonment of this 
confrontational conception of the world. Similarly, Anthony Cordesman has 
noted the effect of unintentional bias inherent in strategic studies or “National 
security studies” as he called it. According to him, the majority of analysts in 
the strategic community favoured strong military forces and defense, while only 
                                                             
71
 Guzzini (1994), pp. 249-250 (original italics). 
72
 Sivonen (1992), p. 193. 
73
 Klein (1994), pp. 112-118. See also Gaddis (1982), pp. 89-126; NSC-68 (1950). 
74
 Keegan (1993), pp. 48-49. 
  
35
a minority were interested in analysing arms control or the effects of reducing 
military spending. These national security analysts, according to Cordesman, 
“develop an unintentional bias toward larger U.S. forces and toward a pessi-
mistic view of the threat. … They cease to examine the facts, and concentrate 
on organizing them to prove something.”75 
 
Another feature of realism á la strategic studies has been its technological im-
perative. This was facilitated by the development of atomic weapons during the 
Second World War, which then became the symbols of technological progress. 
According to Judith Reppy strategists “have followed suit, enthusiastically in-
corporating new technological capabilities into their analysis, sometimes to the 
exclusion of other factors affecting military outcomes.”76 In a critical review of 
Barry Buzan’s book An Introduction to Strategic Studies (1987), Reppy noted 
that it was written according to a common realist worldview in which military 
technology was elevated to the category of an independent variable. This point 
of view neglects some important aspects of the Cold War research – e.g. peace 
research – and policy – the peace movement.  It is noteworthy, however, that 
the mainstream research and policy debates concerning the military were con-
ducted almost entirely from a realist perspective. As a result, while certain im-
portant aspects were left out in the depiction of the minimalists vs. maximalists 
debate, it was at the same time a depiction of the terms of the debate. Looking 
at the premises of the realist deterrence discourse from today’s perspective, one 
can see the extent of the uncritical theorising within strategic studies, just as 
Reppy described it.77 
 
 
2.3. Contemporary Realist Discourse – Neorealism and Beyond 
 
One can quite convincingly argue that while Morgenthau’s work did much to 
establish the realist paradigm, Kenneth Waltz oriented the direction of the real-
ist research during the 1980s and 1990s.78 This was done primarily in his The-
ory of International Politics (1979) and subsequent articles, where he articu-
lated and later defended his theory. Waltz’s influence was not only confined to 
those disciplinary engagements where realists debated the tenets of classical 
realism and neorealism, but practically all IR theorists felt the obligation to ei-
ther criticise or agree with Waltz’s theoretical stance. For more than a decade, 
it became a disciplinary reference point or a red flag that other theoretical con-
tenders felt compelled to charge.   
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In developing his theory Waltz pointed out the factor that distinguishes his the-
ory from classical realist thought: international politics is a system with defined 
structure. In addition to its systemic view of international politics, neorealism 
differs in three other ways from classical realism. The first of these is the addi-
tion of structural causation to the unit-level causes: “[s]tructure becomes a new 
object of inquiry”. Where classical realism was primarily inductive in its meth-
ods, neorealism, according to Waltz, “is more heavily deductive.” The second 
distinctive feature of neorealism is its treatment of power. Contrary to the first 
image view of classical realism, neorealism sees power as a means to security 
and additionally defines the structure of the international system primarily by 
the distribution of power. The third distinction separating neorealism from its 
predecessor comes in the form of differing unit level treatment. Neorealism 
holds that states are functionally similar because of the anarchic structure and 
the differences between states can be studied looking at their capabilities.79 
 
For Waltz, the existence of anarchy means that the international political sys-
tem is a self-help system. In this kind of system, states have to be vary all the 
time for their survival, since in international politics, anything goes. Survival is 
given by assumption to the neorealist IR-theory, beyond which many different 
motives can exist. The anarchic system is characterised by the constant possi-
bility of war breaking out. Since physical violence is an ever-lasting possibility, 
one must be prepared to counter it with means of violence. Due to continuous 
anarchy and states’ wish for survival, balances of power occur. The balance of 
power theory, so important in neorealism, explains the result of the system’s 
structural constraints, not intentions of the states, as was the case for Morgen-
thau. For neorealists power is a means to security and other ends, not an end 
itself.80  
 
Waltz’s analysis concentrated on those states that are significant. Waltz sug-
gested that one should explore the distribution of capabilities – the third tier of 
Waltz’s structure – and focus on those states that can be called major states or 
great powers. He acknowledged that the assessment of differing combinations 
of capabilities in several fields – population, territory, resource endowment, 
economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence – is 
problematic, but he pointed out that these assessments should be made roughly 
and that usually there is no serious disagreement about the great powers of the 
epoch.81 
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Based on his interest in studying great powers, Waltz distinguished between 
bipolar and multipolar anarchic structures of international politics when it 
comes to those structures that have existed throughout time. After 1945 the in-
ternational political system’s structure became bipolar. For Waltz, the bipolar 
world was the most peaceful, but not the most stable one. From a structural 
perspective, it was bipolarity that diminished interdependence and uncertainty 
between states.82 The two great powers were able to rely on internal rather than 
external balancing, thus the end result of balancing was more reliable and pre-
cise. In a multipolar world one must highlight those dangers caused by miscal-
culation, whereas in a bipolar world overreaction by either power endangers the 
system.83 
 
In defining the post-Cold War system, Waltz noted the difficulties commonly 
encountered in assessing a system undergoing change. In Waltzian terms, this 
change means a change in the power structure or in the distribution of capabili-
ties. As had been argued in 1979 in the Theory of International Politics, a state 
has to excel in all six of its capability categories in order to acquire great power 
status. But the development of nuclear weapons has weakened the link between 
these capabilities, especially that between military capability on the one hand 
and economic and technological capability on the other. Thus, Waltz argued, as 
long as a county “can retaliate after being struck, or appears to be able to do 
so, its nuclear forces cannot be made obsolete by an adversary’s technological 
advances. ... Nuclear weaponry widens the range within which national eco-
nomic capabilities may vary before the boundary between the great and the ma-
jor power is reached.”84 
 
The answer Waltz gave to the conditions of the post-Cold War structure of the 
international system is of bipolarity, ”but in an altered state.” This means that 
the basic logic of bipolarity applies, but with certain qualifications. These quali-
fications include the fact that the one pole, The United States, is not being held 
in check by anyone. It is unmatched in its economic and military power. This 
would lead us to anticipate that other states would try to balance the American 
power. This balancing, or catching up, by other would-be great powers could 
be achieved mainly non-militarily. Due to the availability of nuclear technology, 
the possession of large-scale conventional forces is no longer necessary. Thus, 
bipolarity with ‘American preponderance’, bluntly formulated as American 
unipolarity85, is disappearing and leads to balance, but the less peaceful condi-
tions of multipolarity are mediated by the existence of nuclear weapons. The 
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effects of increasing multipolarity are located more in the technological and 
economic sectors than in the military one.86 
 
Waltz defined power as “the combined capability of a state”.87 His third-image 
theory of international politics did not bring any new elements to the theorising 
concerning power as Waltz was mostly interested in the concept of power as an 
instrument of discerning the number of great powers in a system. Therefore, 
Waltz circumvented the empiricist problem of measuring power, stating simply 
that “one finds general agreement about who the great powers of a period 
are”.88 The rough ranking of states into great powers and other less significant 
states is based on the economic model of explanation and the possibility of 
studying international politics “in terms of the logic of small-number sys-
tems.”89 
 
At the same time that Waltz’s influential book was published and debated, 
Robert Gilpin challenged the rigorous and narrow Waltzian form of neorealism 
by advancing the realism-based idea of hegemonic war. The basic idea was that 
in modern world, power alone was not sufficient for explanations of interna-
tional politics (or the international political economy, IPE, as he called it). With 
the rise of the capitalist mode of production and economy as well as the con-
solidation of the nation-state, power and wealth were presented as the goals 
that states pursue. While being somewhat unclear about the formation of state 
motives, Gilpin was close to idea, presented earlier by Morgenthau, of the per-
manence of human nature and its influence on world affairs. Being temporally 
synchronised with the interdependence theorising concerning the impossibility 
of an all-encompassing general international power structure based on fungible 
(military) material resources, Gilpin was in fact trying to reduce the military 
emphasis within IR (IPE). This does not mean, however, that Gilpin could be 
described as an interdependence theorist. This he rejects explicitly.90 Instead, 
political and military strength as well as economic efficiency were to determine 
the hegemon’s power. The idea behind this more broadly-based framework be-
gan to develop momentum during the 1970s, since the effect of nuclear weap-
ons had demonstrated the ambiguous connection between ‘usable’ military 
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power and military material during the 1960s. Gilpin’s work challenged the 
Waltzian neorealists’ exclusive reliance on the tenets of anarchy and balance of 
power and suggested a more historically sensitive realist explanatory frame-
work of international politics.91 This meant that the domestic quality of the 
hegemonic power of the day (the US at the time) affected the nature of the in-
ternational system and that it was not to be explained as parsimoniously as 
Waltz had proposed. In Gilpin’s words, realists had “sought to add the missing 
political dimension to other analyses of the interdependent world economy.”92 
 
Gilpin defined power as the combined “military, economic and technological 
capabilities of states.” He differentiated power from prestige, which refers to 
the reputation of an actor concerning its power. The fact that Gilpin defined 
power as capabilities and distinguishes between power and prestige means that 
agent’s actual power may not correspond to the influence it can exert, due to 
perceptual difficulties in realising the ‘right’ level of prestige vis-à-vis the ac-
tual capabilities of the agent.93   
 
Building upon the foundations of neorealism, Stephen Walt modified the 
Waltzian position. Instead of concentrating on balances of power, Walt noted 
that states balance against threats. Taking part in the discussion of whether 
states either balance or bandwagon, Walt clearly stated that balancing against 
threat is more common than bandwagoning. Walt’s aim was is to develop the 
balance of power theory by maintaining its parsimony, while expanding its ex-
planatory content. Instead of focusing on the distribution of aggregated capa-
bilities, Walt aimed at explaining more cases of international balancing and thus 
his balance of threat theory subsumes Waltz’s balance of power theory. Power 
is a significant factor in assessing threat, especially in the form of offensive 
power, but according to Walt, power alone is not sufficient because “the level 
of threat is determined by several factors.”94 
 
IR scholars are divided on whether Walt’s balance of threat theory should be 
seen as a ‘development’ of the realist paradigm or as an improvement over the 
Waltzian balance of power theory. Applying the balance of threat theory to the 
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post-Cold War US grand strategy, Michael Mastanduno came to the conclusion 
that the inclusion of the classical realist view of the importance of statecraft in 
explaining international outcomes (i.e. the addition of intentions to the distribu-
tion of capabilities) is currently better equipped to explain the international con-
text at the Unipolar moment of the US. John Vasquez disagreed, arguing that 
the existence of two differing balancing theories – balance of power and bal-
ance of threat – is a convenient way for the realist paradigm to get it right when 
it comes to explaining the international realm. One can thus choose the theory 
that is better to explain a given phenomenon.95 
 
A related discussion was carried out in International Security in 1999 and 2000 
when Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik provocatively posed the question 
“Is Anybody Still a Realist?” The central argument in the article was that real-
ism has become such an all-encompassing paradigm that it has lost its coher-
ence and distinctiveness. According to the authors, this ‘minimal realism’ holds 
only one core assumption: international politics is characterised by anarchy and 
rationality. Instead of understanding realism in a very broad sense or making 
some ad hoc extensions to it, Legro and Moravcsik suggested that the realist 
paradigm should be characterised by three core assumptions concerning unitary 
and rational states in anarchy, fixed and conflictual state interests and the 
primacy of material capabilities in the international structure. Several scholars 
have attacked this ‘narrow’ view of paradigms and the attempt to characterise 
realism, or its ‘competitors’, with a few rigid assumptions. While critics of 
Legro and Moravcsik acknowledge states in anarchy, accentuation of power, 
and material capabilities to be important characteristics of realism, they state 
that these should not be formulated into strict assumptions that would allow 
preferences, perceptions or beliefs to be the essence of other paradigms.96 
 
 
2.4. The Challenge of the End of the Cold War 
 
The peaceful and almost bloodless end of the Cold War was a shock to many 
IR scholars. It can also be understood as a test case for realism, as becomes 
apparent when surveying the criticism against realism and the defence organ-
ised on its behalf after the end of the Cold War. However, not all scholars share 
this test case thinking or the possibility of judging scientific theories based on 
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only one case – however important it might be.97 In addition, it is noteworthy 
that the scholarly criticism related to the end of the Cold War – and the short-
comings of the various explanations of it – has not been aimed at the realist 
paradigm only, but at Cold War era IR research more generally.  Simon Dalby 
has pointed out that “the dilemma of academic security discourse after the Cold 
War is precisely that its conceptual infrastructure has long outlived any useful-
ness it might have once had”.98   
 
The dominant position of realism within the discipline of IR practically 
throughout the entire Cold War meant that the challenge related to the end of 
the Cold War touched upon realism the most. Its central disciplinary place was 
at stake: 
 
During the Cold War, efforts to displace realism from its dominant position 
were repeatedly thwarted by the continued salience of the U.S.-Soviet an-
tagonism: although indirect, the connection between events and theory was 
undeniable. … A central question faces students and practitioners of interna-
tional politics. Do the rapid decline and comparatively peaceful collapse of 
the Soviet state, and with it the entire postwar international order, discredit 
the realist approach?99 
 
The attack against realism was facilitated by the empirical anomaly of the end 
of the Cold War. First, it was posited that realism could not explain – let alone 
predict – the abrupt end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. 
Both of these ‘failures’ of realism were inferred from the explicitly embraced 
realist goals of scientifically explain and predict outcomes. As e.g. Kenneth 
Waltz had noted in his landmark book, “usefulness is judged by the explanatory 
and predictive powers of the theory”.100 It was not only that realism – particu-
larly neorealism, which dominated the field when the endgame of the Cold War 
was played – had problems in explaining change within the international power 
structure in general, but also that the fall of the communist bloc in the late 
1980s took place rapidly and almost totally unexpectedly.101 One criticism that 
went even further argued that realism was not even capable of understanding 
the end of the Cold War, as the concepts and theoretical constructs it used did 
not touch upon those processes and actors that were relevant in understanding 
the ending of the Cold War. The domestic processes related to the eastern 
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European ‘velvet revolutions’ of the late 1980s were factors that the state-as-a-
black-box version of IR theory had difficulties dealing with.  
 
The realists countered this criticism by pointing out that the end of the Cold 
War reflected changes in the distribution of power within the international sys-
tem. According to this power-political account, external power-related pres-
sures forced the Soviet Union to seek a new response to the challenge posed by 
its declining overall power. The economic decline of the Soviet Union – rela-
tive to the US/the west – has been used to highlight the external pressures that 
forced the Soviet leadership towards ‘new thinking’ in the late 1980s.102 With a 
stagnating and declining national economy, the Soviet Union was not able to 
keep up with the highly burdensome arms race against the US or to maintain its 
empire. And when the realists are pressed about the timing of the Soviet re-
forms in response to its declining power position – there was no compelling 
reason for the Soviet leadership to act when they did103 – agents’ perceptions 
about power relationships were presented as a ‘corrective’ to the general realist 
predictive or explanatory problem related to the Cold War.104 
 
When the explanatory power of balance of power theory came under attack and 
supposedly stable bipolarity came to an end, realism was left in an awkward 
position – without any viable explanation for the dramatic changes taking 
place.105 The expected multipolar post-Cold War system has not yet emerged, 
nor have the Cold War US allies in Europe or Asia turned away from close co-
operation with the United States. The “unipolar moment” following the end of 
the Cold War has thus persisted longer than the taken-for-granted Cold War era 
‘flagship theory’ of realism had expected: the absence of balancing in the post-
Cold War international system has been one of the central puzzles faced by re-
alism.106 
 
The way that the Cold War ended – without large-scale violence in a Soviet 
effort to cling to imperial power through the use of military force – apparently 
contradicts the realist view on polarity-change within the international sys-
tem.107  
 
Peaceful accommodation is the greatest enigma associated with the Cold 
War.108 
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In general, realists of all types tend to associate large-scale international 
change with war.109 
 
The general tendency in the post-Cold War era defence of realism has been to 
articulate further modifications of the neorealist tenets presented originally by 
Kenneth Waltz or to merge parts of two of more realisms in order to arrive at a 
post-Cold War realism – one capable of explaining the rise and fall of the Cold 
War as well as the nature of the post-Cold War international system. Perhaps 
closest to the rigorous Waltzian research programme are the offensive real-
ists110, for whom the pessimistic situation in the international arena is reason 
enough for states to maximise their relative power and use war as one mean of 
statecraft when it serves their interests: states expand rather than balance. John 
Mearsheimer, an offensive realist, has stated that realism “paints a rather grim 
picture of world politics. The international system is portrayed as a brutal 
arena”. Daily life is essentially “a struggle for power, where each state strives 
not only to be the most powerful actor in the system, but also to ensure that no 
other state achieves that lofty position.” In 1990 he argued that it was the dis-
tribution of power, i.e. bipolarity, equality of military power between the US 
and the SU, and the development and distribution of nuclear weapons that were 
behind the peaceful era in Europe – the Cold War. Even if one were to agree 
with this part of his logic, one would not necessarily have to agree with his fun-
damental theoretical stance of pessimist realism, which Stanley Hoffmann has 
called “a caricature of neo-realism”.111 This reading of the nature of the 
international system might be right in some conditions, but it is questionable to 
assume that it will be correct in all circumstances. 
 
Whether the challenge posed by the empirical anomaly of the end of the Cold 
War rejects or refutes realism – or some other IR-theoretical construct – is not 
at issue here. Rather, the demise of the Cold War is evoked here as a challenge 
to all Cold War era IR theories. In addition, it is also conceptualised as a pos-
sibility to reformulate existing IR theories and an opportunity to engage in the 
fruitful process of theory generation and development within the discipline of 
IR. The empirical problem related to the end of the Cold War may thus be con-
ceptualised as invitation to disciplinary reflection and renewal. 
 
 
2.5. Conclusion: Realism, Power, and the Cold War 
 
Realism is a broad topic in IR theorising. Some aspects have been touched 
upon so far in an attempt to formulate a standard of comparison for further 
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power theorising in Chapter 4. This standard is not to be understood as some-
thing that will be criticised from an alternative perspective, but rather as a gen-
eral picture of mainstream IR theorising on power during the Cold War era.  
The classical realist power analysts have been more cited than thoroughly read, 
and I have shown here that these scholars do not have to be read as mainstream 
realist discourse has tended to read them. The accepted or taken-for-granted 
readings of Carr and Morgenthau for example are not simply inaccurate, but 
they are closely tied to the disciplinary struggles of the day, as well as to the 
international political atmosphere that moulded the conventional wisdom of IR 
during the Cold War.112 Similarly the scientification of realism, a process that 
has catalysed the urge to accentuate quantifiable and thus material variables, is 
but one way to approach the field of study. This chapter has also showed that 
not all realists belong to the generalised hardcore of realism and that there is 
evidence, especially in Europe, of theoretical polyphony and responsiveness in 
interpreting international power dynamics.  
 
Classifying power analysis according to theories or paradigms is bound to sim-
plify and even distort the view one has of rich variety of IR theorising during 
the past 50 years. This is evident, since it would be impossible to deal with 
everything that has been written about power in general and its application to 
specific situations: categorisation, and thus simplification, becomes inevitable.  
 
Perhaps the most self-evident realist characteristic in IR analysis is the central 
position given to power. It is either the immediate or ultimate objective of 
states in their interaction within the international system just as it is the means 
of achieving one’s goals. Realists have presented the rationale for this emphasis 
on power from the days of Carr (and according to realist discourse throughout 
the centuries, at least since Thucydides) in the form of the constant threat of 
war in the international system. Whether it is the nature of the system (anarchy) 
or the human condition (human nature) that is the driving force for the realist, 
politics in general and international politics specifically are a struggle for 
power. Related to the centrality of power one can locate national interest as a 
defining characteristic of realist theorising. This should not be taken as saying 
that the national interest is important only within realism – because it is impor-
tant for many theories/paradigms – but that national interests are formed mainly 
by assumption. Whether it is in the interest of a state to maximise power or to 
gain power for other unspecified purposes, power and interest are – by defini-
tion – the hallmarks of realism.  
 
Secondly, much of the realist theorising about power was conducted from a 
resource-based view. Morgenthau’s elements of national power are no doubt 
                                                             
112
 See e.g. Guzzini (1994), pp. 64-65, where he notes that Morgenthau’s concepts became 
“canonised” and “mummified” during the Cold War. 
  
45
the best-known indicators of power within IR. In the neorealist tradition Waltz 
also advanced the resource-based view, although he noted that exact measure-
ment is not possible or indeed needed, since it is always fairly simple to iden-
tify the great powers of the day. It should be noted that realism does not auto-
matically lead one to see power as resources, although it has been very com-
mon to do so within the realist paradigm. If one looks at the way Aron and the 
early Waltz (1959) conceptualised power, they both defined it in a dispositional 
way as a capacity either to impose one’s will upon others or to produce in-
tended effects. However, applying these power conceptions in research within 
the mainstream realist paradigm has not proven successful, mainly because of 
the epistemology underlying the realist paradigm. 
 
The logic behind resource-based conceptualisation of power lies in the empiri-
cist epistemology that has dominated the discipline and the practitioners of real-
ism throughout the decades. Empiricism calls for observables that can be lo-
cated in the international arena and used as explanations for significant events. 
Empiricism can also be located behind the outcome-oriented view of power as 
behavior, which focuses attention on manifest actions within the international 
system: instead of focusing on the resources of actors, one deduces which actor 
is the more powerful on the basis of how states actually behave. And as 
Tuomas Forsberg has maintained, it has not been totally uncommon for realists 
to use both conceptualisations of power, that of resources and that of out-
comes.113 
 
The realist balancing theories – whether relating to power or threat – face the 
problem of how to transform capabilities into action, and thus outcomes. The 
connection between capability and power is not straightforward. The ability to 
form this link would be of importance, since power (or the balance of power) 
has come to play a central explanatory role in realist theories. The sudden de-
mise of the Soviet Union and its empire in Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
have highlighted the problem of equating power with capabilities within an em-
piricist metatheory. While material circumstances underwent only relatively 
little change during the latter part of the 1980s and the first years of the 1990s, 
the power of the Soviet Union declined considerably – or at least one has to 
assume so if one is to maintain the realist premises of power. This will lead one 
to note that the indicators of power of the late Cold War period were erroneous 
(i.e. they had changed during the Cold War) or that statesmen’s assessments of 
power114 changed at a time when the material conditions remained almost unal-
tered. Either way, the problems of empiricist epistemology become clear. 
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The epistemological empiricism underlying realist theorising during and after 
the Cold War has reduced the interest in engaging in military power analysis 
apart from the materialistic perspective. Although material resources have been 
emphasised in military power analyses, military power has remained under-
theorised mainly due to its obvious or self-evident characteristics. By concep-
tualising (military) power as resources or via outcomes in the international 
arena, the empirical stance of realism has been locked by its metatheoretical 
assumptions into a conceptualisation of military power that has attracted inter-
est in cataloguing or quantifying military capability. In addition to the net as-
sessment approach to military power, the Clausewitzian problem of friction has 
been introduced into the military power analysis in the form of the resource-
mobilisation effectiveness or quality of command in the armed forces.115 In the 
latter case, the human dimension of military power serves an explanatory func-
tion when materially based calculable factors yield inaccurate or inconclusive 
answers. 
 
A third feature of the realist conception of power comes in the form of the su-
premacy of the military sphere. This is due to the already mentioned pervasive 
possibility of war that compels states to strengthen their military power. This 
emphasis on the military frequently comes with the (often implicit) view of the 
near-perfect fungibility of power from one issue area to another, i.e. with the 
high degree of usefulness of military resources in all fields of state activity. An-
other a remarkable feature is the tendency to see military power in the form of 
military material. Related to the strong military dimension of power in realism, 
one can connect the view of power used negatively in the form of coercion.116 
Once again, NSC-68 can serve as an example of Cold War era policy con-
nected to the realist lenses of the world. In its assessment of US intentions and 
capabilities, NSC-68 stated that military strength is one of the most important 
ingredients of power. “Without superior aggregate military strength, in being 
readily mobilizable, a policy of ‘containment’ – which is in effect a policy of 
calculated and gradual coercion – is no more than a policy of bluff.”117 
 
One should note that in addition to the materially weighed military dimension 
of power, almost all realists have introduced other material and even non-
material elements or factors that should be taken into consideration when en-
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gaging in power analysis. Carr thought that one should consider economic 
strength and power over opinion in addition to military considerations. In his 
nine elements of national power Morgenthau stressed for example the national 
morale and character as well as the quality of diplomacy and government. In 
Waltz’s list of capabilities, one can find political stability and competence. But 
when it comes to applying these realist theories in practice, it has been the case 
that the immaterial aspects of power have remained in the background, mainly 
due to the difficulties or impossibilities related to the measuring or weighing 
them. An example of this tendency to concentrate on material military power 
can be found in a 1995 study of military power, Power Rules, which discounts 
the problem of evaluating immaterial determinants of capability because “quali-
tative factors are much more difficult to measure than is force structure, and 
their contribution to capability is commensurately harder to assess in the ab-
sence of actual combat experience.”118 
 
The bias toward the military sphere in international politics from a ‘materialist’ 
perspective has contributed to a wide spectrum of variables or indicators of 
military power, often equated with overall power, in the realist power literature. 
The basic division of military indicators is between manpower, military hard-
ware and military expenditure119, all of which are part of the overall military 
power conceptualised in the final analysis as “the elements which contribute 
directly or indirectly to the capacity to coerce, kill and destroy.”120 The suppos-
edly self-evident characteristics related to military power from a realist 
perspective are connected to an understanding of capability in numerical terms. 
This became manifest during the Cold War in estimations expressed as offence-
defence ratios, where a 3 to 1 preponderance was assumed to be enough for a 
successful attack. Similarly the model of attrition warfare relied on the assump-
tion that material superiority in the military sphere was enough, when military 
power had to be used in warfare.121 In the nuclear realm, the so-called ‘bomber 
gap’ and the ‘missile gap’ reflect similar quantitative readings of military 
power, even when the utility of nuclear weapons was highly questionable. The 
quantification model of military power that relies on assumed variables of mili-
tary power in order to make objective assessments is vulnerable to the possible 
biases that are built into the assumptions of research design: “simple alterations 
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in assumptions can create radically different conclusions, even if the input is 
constant.”122  
 
Deterrence theorising and its technologically oriented stance have succeeded in 
providing academically meaningful and policy-relevant information about the 
activities of states in the international system for half a century now. The hos-
tile and threat-penetrated atmosphere of most of the Cold War era left its mark 
in strategic studies, as well as in the reality of the Cold War. This historically 
significant and unique epoch was in a way disposed to support materially and 
militarily oriented theorising.123 Whatever the supposedly real or underlying 
causes of the evolution of the post-WW II international system towards a hos-
tile bipolar system characterised by nuclear confrontation were, deterrence the-
ory did provide – at least for the mainstream western audience – an explanation 
for and a prediction of how the international system works and how statesmen 
should act in order to further the interests of their states. It did this, however, 
with a bias favouring state-centric, materially based explanations and policy 
prescriptions that highlighted the anarchical nature of the international system 
and the relevance of nuclear weapons as the core of power in general, and mili-
tary power specifically.124 It was only with the demise of the Cold War, I sug-
gest, that the socially constructed nature of the ‘natural’ view of power was 
acknowledged and then became a possible target of more systematic criticism. 
 
The sudden, unexpected, and peaceful end of the Cold War thus represented an 
empirical anomaly particularly for the realist paradigm. Critics of realism used 
this anomaly to advance their own positions, while adherents of realism de-
fended themselves either by claiming that one anomalous case does not refute 
an entire paradigm or by appealing to the equivalent inability of other para-
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digms or theories to predict the end of the Cold War and the demise of the So-
viet Union. It is noteworthy that theoretical and metatheoretical challenges to 
realism were voiced before the end of the Cold War. Realism was surely not 
the only theory being discussed in the western IR community. Alternative theo-
retical constructs engaged realism and each other within and outside of the in-
ter-paradigm debate. Similarly the question of the relationship of these theories 
to reality had been raised earlier, with other metatheoretical questions concern-
ing the nature of the basic building blocs of IR (ontology) and knowledge (epis-
temology). 
 
In sum, the speed of the events in the late 1980s and early 1990s helped to 
show many scholars that considerations of material conditions cannot account 
for the end of the Cold War, since the material conditions did not change con-
siderably during the time in question.125 Nevertheless, political realism, in its 
multiple and even contradictory forms, has been a hegemonic discourse within 
IR. This was the case during the Cold War, and although realism has attracted 
more criticism recently than perhaps ever before, it still forms the core of main-
stream IR-theory. In line with the aim of this research, I will next present a 
postmodern challenge to realism. Instead of trying to refute realism, I wish to 
engage it. My aim is to build a theoretical framework concerning military 
power that will allow me to address some questions that have been ‘silenced’ 
or overlooked by the mainstream power analysis in IR. 
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3. ANTITHESIS – THE POWER OF DISCOURSE 
 
 
Chapter 2 provided an account of three major debates concerning realism 
and the study of the international system in the academic discipline of in-
ternational relations.  This disciplinary historical overview focused on the 
main lines of the discussion, to a certain extent privileging some ap-
proaches and methodologies while perhaps slighting others. The intervals 
between these debates highlights the dominance of a certain paradigm and 
the debates themselves a consequential problematisation of the paradigm in 
question. Debate implies transition. As summarised in Chapter 2, the First 
Debate took place in the late 1930s and 1940s between realist and idealist 
understandings of how the world works. With the emergence of the Cold 
War scenario after the Second World War the triumph of realism was evi-
dent. The Second Debate concerned methodology, where traditionalism 
was challenged by a more ‘scientific’ view of international relations, 
namely behavioralism.1  
 
The Third Debate was conducted between positivists and post-positivists. 
Concerned above all with metatheory and especially epistemology, it dealt 
“with the question of science and its applicability to the study of world 
politics.”2 According to Steve Smith, for “the last forty years the academic 
discipline of International Relations has been dominated by positivism.”3 
At the core of the positivist study of international politics has been the 
combination of epistemological empiricism and behavioralist/quantitative 
methodology. Often this positivist stance has been connected to an unre-
flective way to approach social sciences – what Smith calls “unthinking 
positivism”4. This means that positivist scholars have been engaged in their 
profession with little or no concern for the philosophical and theoretical 
underpinnings of their research. Before the emergence of the third debate, 
the ontological and epistemological considerations of the realism-
dominated discipline of IR were mostly overridden by a discussion of theo-
retical ‘substance’ within the confines of positivism (e.g. the inter-
paradigm debate), or with methodological considerations.5 
 
Lapid characterises the post-positivist move with three main features. 
Paradigmatism asserts that metascientific constructs with their thematic 
                                               
1
  See e.g. Lapid (1989), pp. 235-239; Smith (1995), pp. 13-17; Vasquez (1995), p. 217-
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components should be understood as a precondition for scientific intelligi-
bility. This entails the proposal of a new unit of scientific achievement. Ob-
servation should no longer be able to refute the thematic axis of such a me-
tascientific construct. Perspectivism calls for the explicit statement of the 
second order premises and assumptions. A flaw in these thematic assump-
tions can inhibit the growth of knowledge. Second order relativism does 
not question the theory’s content based on evidence, but the standards that 
make judgement possible and privileges some in favour of others.6  
 
Related to the positivist – post-positivist debate is the distinction that 
Robert Cox makes between problem-solving theory and critical theory: 
“theory is always for someone and for some purpose.”7 Problem-solving 
theory does not reflect upon its own perspective, but concentrates on an-
swering questions and solving problems that are identified by the theory’s 
perspective. Critical theory does not see the existing social order as unprob-
lematic and in fact questions the inevitability of existing institutions and 
power relations. It is in a way less conservative in its goals and contains 
problem-solving theories within itself.8 The concept of problem-solving 
theory makes it possible to acknowledge the shortcomings of a theory, as 
well as its merits. Although it is biased according to its premises, its merits 
can be understood from a particular point of view.9 
 
It is difficult to categorise post-positivist or critical theories and the schol-
ars who have engaged and criticised positivism. As in the case of positiv-
ism, there are no clear boundaries between different theories or approaches 
on the post-positivist side of the third debate. As such, post-positivism is a 
much more diverse and multifaceted collection of theoretical constructs 
than one might expect to be the case from the general designation of ‘post-
positivism’. Nevertheless, such a categorisation is needed for the purposes 
of understanding the general lines of argumentation within the discipline of 
IR and in order to promulgate the antithesis of post-positivism vis-à-vis 
political realism. Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit differentiate be-
tween modern and postmodern critical theories. Postmodern critical theo-
rists do not accept foundationalism, they deny the idea of progress, and see 
reality as a social construction. They also direct us to study how language, 
paradigms, and conceptual frameworks affect the world and the way we 
think. Modern critical theorists do not hold such a view of “radical interpre-
tivism of postmodernism”, but acknowledge minimal foundationalism and 
the point that we do have some criteria for separating plausible from im-
plausible interpretations.10 
                                               
6
 Lapid (1989), pp. 239-244. 
7
 Cox (1986), p. 207. 
8
 Ibid., pp. 207-217. 
9
 Sorensen (1998), pp. 87-88. 
10
 Price and Reus-Smit (1998), pp. 261-263. Also in Sorensen (1998); Smith (1995). 
53 
 
This chapter presents a post-positivist antithesis to the positivist stance of 
political realism – in accordance to the third debate. This antithesis is con-
ceptualised in the form of what Price and Reus-Smit call postmodern criti-
cal theories. The post-positivist antithesis to political realism rejects the 
positivist epistemology and ontology of realism. Particularly, this means 
the rejection of epistemological empiricism and ontological materialism – 
the core features of realism. The challenge of the third debate to realism 
was already presented implicitly in Chapter 2, and the antithesis presented 
in this chapter complements it by focusing on second-order theorising – i.e. 
metatheory – concerning ontology and particularly epistemology. The an-
tithesis presented in this chapter is postmodern international theory, al-
though such a classification can be criticised on account of its ambiguity or 
the coherence that this one label supposedly brings to the multitude of at-
tacks against positivism.11 I use it for the purpose of presenting the general 
themes of the post-positivist antithesis. The approaches labelled here as 
postmodern include at least post-structuralism, radical constructivism, criti-
cal theory, and feminist theory. 
  
 
3.1. From Empiricism to Relativism 
 
The epistemological stance of political realism is based on empiricism, un-
derstood as the idea of accessing the truth through observation. Empiricism 
calls for the IR researcher to focus on observables in order to explain sig-
nificant events within the international system. Within the positivist power 
analysis these observables can be located either in material resources or in 
the manifest actions of agents. Because of its empirical focus, realism-
based IR research has neglected or bypassed the social element of interna-
tional reality – social structures and social facts – and has relied on the no-
tion of an observable empirical foundation to knowledge. Building upon 
this empirical foundation, objective knowledge about the world is possible 
– mostly via behavioralist or quantitative methods. Positivist epistemology 
is, then, characterised by faith in empiricism, objectivism, and quantitative-
behavioralist methods. In addition, positivism accepts naturalism, i.e. the 
possibility to analyse natural and social worlds with the same scientific 
methods.12 
 
The anti-foundationalist epistemology of postmodernism denies the possi-
bility of pure observation and thus the possibility of making knowledge 
claims based on observations of reality. For the postmodernist, there is no 
single truth that can be approached and eventually reached. Rather, there 
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are many truths – none of which are universal.13 Thus, the notions of pro-
gress and that knowledge is cumulative are rejected.14 Modernity does not 
equal progress. It is not optimal or superior. Rather, it is arbitrary in nature. 
Postmodernism accentuates the specific historical conditions where knowl-
edge is generated. Objectivity in science is thus dismissed in favor of a 
chosen perspective for seeing and knowing. “There are no truths to dis-
cover…only different perspectives to take.”15 
 
As knowledge is not objective – based on what has been called the scien-
tific method – and as there is no objective way to approach the truth, power 
is implicated in the process of generating knowledge. The prevailing aca-
demic discourses have emerged as a consequence of existing power rela-
tions. The close connection between knowledge and power means that 
nothing in the world is necessary. Rather, “what exists in the world is 
choice posing as truth.”16 Michael Foucault used the term 
‘power/knowledge’ to highlight the interdependence of power and knowl-
edge. “A site where power is enforced is also a site where knowledge is 
produced; and conversely, a site from which knowledge is derived is a 
place where power is exercised.”17 
 
As we have no objective access to the world, it is those with power that are 
able to choose or define the perspective through which world is interpreted. 
These privileging perspectives silence alternative ways to see and concep-
tualise the world. Thus, what on the surface seem to be natural and normal 
are indeed the effects of power. In this manner the academic discourses do 
not emerge as ‘products’ of objective scientific enquiry, but as a conse-
quence of power relations. The same goes with common sense: it is not 
based on the objective aspects of the world around us, but is rather ‘de-
fined’ by the powerful. “Defining common sense is therefore the ultimate 
act of political power.”18 
 
Theories, paradigms, and language are not value-free or neutral. Neither do 
scientific theories ‘produce’ objective knowledge. The postmodernist ‘pro-
ject’ thus encourages research focusing on the effects of theories, para-
digms, and language upon the construction of reality. Similarly, theories 
are not representatives or embodiments of truth, but rather particular con-
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structions of reality, imposed by acts of power. The dominant role of real-
ism within IR – and within international political practice – during the Cold 
War era was not due to its superior truth-value, but due to power relations 
within the international system and within the Anglo-Saxon scientific 
community of IR. Similarly, the prominent standing of rational choice dur-
ing the heydays of positivism was from a postmodern perspective a “mod-
ernist conceit that makes choice pose as truth.”19 
 
The problematic feature of postmodernism – from a positivist perspective – 
is its rejection of the correspondence theory of truth. Without foundations 
to judge the truth of different knowledge claims, the positivist epistemol-
ogy – and indeed positivism as such – is shattered. The postmodernist de-
nial of universal truths touches upon different knowledge claims not only 
within a theoretical framework, but also between theories. According to the 
postmodernist ‘programme’, each theory provides grounds for arriving at 
the truth, and these foundations are not universal. Theory evaluation and 
comparison – in the positivist sense of judging the merits between different 
theories – becomes futile. The positivist aim of seeking cumulative knowl-
edge by following the “standard canons of scientific research”20 is rejected 
and considered as a creation of “an explicit epistemic hierarchy.”21 
 
The postmodernist research programme thus moves the research focus 
away from the positivist project of arriving closer and closer to the truth. 
Since universal truth cannot be arrived at and all truths are relative to the 
theoretical framework in question, it would be practically impossible and 
meaningless to strive to uncover the truth on absolute terms. What the 
postmodernists strive to do, then, is to destabilise, deconstruct, and denatu-
ralise the prevailing discourses, as well as to discover and highlight the ef-
fects that these discourses produce and how they produce them.22 
 
A genealogical history loosens the hold of present arrangements by find-
ing their points of emergence as practices and thus by opposing the forces 
tending to naturalize them.23 
 
Derrida’s deconstructive criticism can be shown to disclose how every so-
cial order rests on the forgetting of the exclusion practices through which 
one set of meaning has been institutionalised and various other possibili-
ties – other possible forms of meaning – have been marginalized.24 
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The acceptance of the postmodernist epistemology, then, requires doing 
away with the positivist notions of empiricism, objectivism, naturalism, 
and behavioralism. In their place the scholar should embrace epistemologi-
cal relativism, focus on language and discourses, and reveal the hidden and 
implicit uses and effects of power upon knowledge, truth, and common 
sense. In addition, for the postmodernist, language is not a neutral medium 
to communicate. ‘Using’ language means acquiring systems of meaning 
that predate their ‘user’: “To speak…is to enter the flow of activity that is 
already constituted in the language.”25 
 
 
3.2. Denaturalising and Destabilising the Positivist-Rationalist Paradigm 
 
Chapter 2 highlighted the powerful realist narrative in IR, according to 
which research on power in the international sphere must be based on the 
tenets of political realism. The realist claim of objectivity – and the effects 
of power that derive from it – has been explicitly attacked by the postmo-
dern approach to IR. Particularly the writing of Kenneth Waltz – the 1979 
published Theory of International Politics – has sparked metatheoretical 
debates within the discipline of IR and has brought criticism of system-
level realism to the fore. However, the metatheoretical attacks within IR 
have not been directed at realism or neorealism only, but more generally at 
the positivist-rationalist paradigm. The neorealism-neoliberalism debate 
has been at the core of this paradigm. The close proximity of neorealist and 
neoliberal lines of though has led some to believe that they are “part of the 
same specific view of international politics rather than two alternatives”.26 
The ‘neo-neo’ debate has focused most clearly on the nature of anarchy and 
on the possibilities that institutions can mitigate the negative impact of an-
archy on the cooperative behaviour of states. In this light, neoliberalism27 
has been conceptualised to explain international cooperation from realist 
premises and assumptions.28 In the words of Robert Keohane, realist theo-
ries should not be replaced, but ought to be supplemented in a way that 
makes IR-theory acknowledge the importance of international institutions 
as the institutional context of action, in addition to power and interests.29  
 
Neorealism and neoliberalism are not exact theories of international poli-
tics. Nor are they separable from the intellectual roots of their predecessors. 
But when we look at these theories’ common assumptions and similar re-
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search interests – questions they seek answers to – we see that they have 
contributed to the intellectual debate of the discipline both in their own 
terms and also as a pair of contestants in a dialectical way, each criticising 
some aspect of the other while proposing an alternative way of seeing it. At 
the same time, however, they have contributed to the incremental and silent 
strengthening of the positivist-rationalist paradigm within social sciences 
and IR – through the process of “a slow accumulation of the past, a silent 
sedimentation of things said”.30   
 
The crisis of the positivist-rationalist paradigm’s evolutionary and accumu-
lating vision of knowledge has thus highlighted the particular conception of 
science and knowledge that lies behind neorealism and neoliberalism. The 
previously secure epistemological foundation of the traditional paradigm 
has been linked to particular foundational claims that have now become 
problematic and contested. One of these formerly unproblematic founda-
tional claims has been the primacy of states in the study of international 
politics and the ”conception of state action as the instrumentally rational 
pursuit of self-interest”.31 
 
The postmodern attack on the positivist-rationalist paradigm has not mani-
fested itself in a total denial of the ‘high-concepts’ within the neo-neo de-
bate – such as anarchy32, sovereignty33, power34, security35, or even the sub-
ject of strategic studies36. Rather, the dominating position of these concepts 
and the way that these concepts have been understood within the neo-neo 
debate has been attacked. Accordingly, anarchy is not – and has not been 
throughout the millennia – the objective condition within the international 
system that the positivist-rationalist paradigm assumes and describes it to 
be. Neither does the compelling self-help logic of anarchy exist objectively. 
Rather, the mainstream conceptualisation of anarchy is just one – the 
dominant – possible way to conceptualise and describe relations between 
agents.37  
 
The anarchy of the positivist-rationalist paradigm is thus not the objective 
fact of international politics – ultimate and uncontested truth – that neoreal-
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 Foucault (1974), p. 141. 
31
 Krause and Williams (1997), pp. 36-43, quote on p. 40. See also Ashley (1986), pp. 
268-270: “Neorealism is bound to the state. … the state-as-actor assumption is a meta-
physical commitment prior to science and exempted from scientific criticism.” 
32
 E.g. Ashley (1986); Ashley (1988). 
33 E.g. Ashley (1988); Weber (1995); Bartelson (1995). 
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 E.g. Ashley (1986). 
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 E.g. Klein (1994); Krause and Williams (1997). 
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ism and neoliberalism purport it to be.  Rather, the ‘accepted’ or main-
stream notion of anarchy is an arbitrary representation, a product of histori-
cally situated practices in academia and everyday modern culture. Accord-
ing to Ashley, the establishment of the sovereignty/anarchy-dichotomy 
through “heroic practice” is not based on observing some unique autono-
mous source. Rather, the ‘production’ of anarchy can be conceptualised 
and grasped through the process of deconstructing the discourse on what 
Richard Ashley has called “the anarchy problematique”.38 This process of 
deconstruction highlights how hierarchical oppositions are created within a 
discourse. In the case of anarchy, it is the notion of sovereignty that cap-
tures the higher level of hierarchy – a privileged position and an ideal. 
Within this hierarchical opposition anarchy is the negative and problematic 
domain, yet to be disciplined by the sovereign state. Deconstruction thus 
‘opens’ a discourse and reveals its shaky foundations. It does not provide, 
however, new standards for evaluating or comparing the failure or success 
of theories.39 This task would not be compatible with the postmodernist 
project.  
 
Similarly, the tradition of projecting the contemporary concept of anarchy 
into history – to the days of Thucydides, Hobbes, or Machiavelli – has been 
criticised. What Waltz characterised as a long tradition of continuity within 
international politics represents the target of postmodern attack: 
 
One who reads the apocryphal book of First Maccabees with events in and 
after World War I in mind will gain a sense of the continuity that charac-
terizes international politics. Whether in the second century before the 
Christ or in the twentieth century after, Arabs and Jews fought among 
themselves and over the residues of northern empire … To illustrate the 
point more generally, one may cite the famous case of Hobbes experienc-
ing the contemporaneity of Thucydides. Less famous, but equally striking, 
is the realization by Louis J. Halle of the relevance of Thucydides in the 
era of nuclear weapons and superpowers … The enduring anarchic char-
acter of international politics accounts for the striking sameness in the 
quality of international life through the millennia, a statement that will 
meet with wide assent.40 
 
What for Waltz was a proof of the soundness of realism for explaining in-
ternational outcomes throughout the centuries has been for the postmodern-
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 What Ashley in the 1980s described as the ‘discourse on the anarchy problematique’ 
can be conceptualised to be the equivalent of the 1990s term the ‘neo-neo debate’. The 
discourse on the anarchy problematique was concerned with the questions of “How can 
there be governance in the absence of a government? How can order be constructed in 
the absence of an orderer? How can co-operation be facilitated under a condition of an-
archy?” See Ashley (1988), p. 227. 
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ists one particular representation of history, a representation that favours 
the present-day positivist utilitarian and state-centric approaches to interna-
tional politics. With this particular present-day bias, the positivist-
rationalist interpretation of international politics needs to be revealed for 
what it is: a particular interpretation of history and present conditions – not 
a universally accepted and true description of objective conditions through-
out history. Despite the elaborate use of historical examples to illustrate the 
accuracy of realism in explaining international outcomes, the mode of real-
ist thought – and more widely the positivist-rationalist thought – is ahistori-
cal in nature. As Cox has argued, the post-World War Two American real-
ists turned realism into a problem-solving theory – “serving particular na-
tional, sectional, or class interests, which are comfortable within the given 
order.” Coinciding with the tensions of the Cold War, this American real-
ism – or neorealism – “is the ideological form abstracted from the real his-
torical framework imposed by the Cold War”.41 
 
In a similar fashion, as the embodiment of goal-oriented human behavior, 
the positivist-rationalist adoption of game theory in general and instrumen-
tal rationality particularly has been attacked. A single universal logic guid-
ing peoples’ and states’ behavior throughout the centuries became chal-
lenged with the problematisation of the state, the condition of anarchy, and 
the methodological underpinnings of the positivist-rationalist paradigm. 
Fitting well into the ahistorical mode of though of the neo-neo debate, the 
narrow scope of game theory and the assumption of instrumental rationality 
became attacked as the destabilisation and deconstruction of the positivist-
rationalist paradigm in general and neorealism particularly started to gain 
momentum in the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, what for the neorealists and neo-
liberals has been a natural starting point describing the nature of the inter-
national system, has been conceptualised as a social and political construc-
tion by the postmodern thinkers.42 
 
The realist conceptualisation of power – as material capability possessed by 
instrumentally rational states – has been challenged in a similar fashion. 
With the focus on material capabilities, the possession and designation of 
power within the positivist-rationalist (mostly realist) power analysis is 
able to bypass agents’ knowledge of power resources and their will to pos-
sess and/or use power. “For the neorealist…power must ultimately be re-
ducible to a matter of capabilities, or means, under the control of the unre-
                                               
41 Cox (1986), pp. 209-212, quotes on p. 209, 211. On the Cold War – not as a value-
free description of international system, but rather as a political discourse – Dalby has 
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flective actor whose status as an actor is given from the start.” According to 
postmodernism, the realist conceptualisation of power is overtly material 
and essentialist, devoid of social content, and thus neglects the intangible 
aspects of power – in favour of what e.g. Carr and Morgenthau argued.43 
 
Within the postmodern project, which focuses upon discourses and lan-
guage, power does not equal material capability. Rather, power means the 
ability to frame issues and discourses according to which agents conceptu-
alise the world and upon which their actions are based. For the postmodern-
ist, “the power of an actor, and even its status as an agent competent to act, 
is not in any sense attributable to the inherent qualities or possessions of a 
given entity.” The power of an actor depends on others’ recognition of that 
power within a community. Actors are thus empowered by performing in 
reference to shared social structures, within which “the community confers 
meaning and organizes collective expectations.”44   
 
The ‘traditional’ positivist-rationalistic conceptualisation of security has 
also been challenged and undermined by the postmodern project. The de-
mise or ‘weakening’ of the focus upon the security of rational territorial 
states against armed aggression by other states or a military alliance has 
been facilitated by the end of the Cold War and the widening of the concept 
of security in academic discourse. This widening has touched upon the 
economic, social, environmental, and political aspects of security in addi-
tion to military security.45 In addition, bringing other referent objects of 
security – e.g the individual – to the fore has challenged the taken-for-
granted nature of militarised state security of the realism-dominated Cold 
War era. Postmodernism has facilitated the process of reconceptualising 
security by denaturalising the conceptualisations of security that prevailed 
during the Cold War and by revealing how the academic discipline of IR 
and political practice during the Cold War produced a particular conceptu-
alisation of security. Accordingly, dangers are not objective, but are con-
structed by presenting things as alien, sick, and subversive. Questioning 
subjectivity, postmodernism acknowledges that in addition to describing 
threats to a particular agent, any representation of danger also constitutes 
the agent.46   
 
According to postmodernism, Cold War era strategic studies was not ‘just’ 
an objective part of the scientific establishment, dedicated to the task of 
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describing and explaining international reality related to the use or planned 
use of military force as objectively as possible. Rather, strategic studies 
constituted – in addition to other Cold War era practices – the Cold War era 
legitimacy of the western-focused, materially oriented, and state-centric 
framework for analysing military power and war. Based on foundational 
epistemology, Cold War era strategic studies purported to be in the position 
to set the agenda of security studies – focusing upon western states from a 
material-realist perspective.47 The security focus of strategic studies was 
narrow in nature and was accompanied by a claim to possess authoritative 
knowledge – what is, not what ought to be – about the relatively unsocial 
international realm.48 As Klein argues: 
 
[S]trategy, in the form of strategic discourse, manifests itself as a set of 
power relations governing both domestic and international politics. … The 
grand master narrative of contemporary strategic discourse is derived from 
the realist tradition … Within this realist framework, the state is consti-
tuted as a fully articulated construct that contains within it no open terrain 
for legitimate political disputation. … the realist state is complete.49 
 
Particularly the deterrence theorising in the Cold War era strategic studies 
has been attacked from the postmodern perspective. As was briefly noted in 
Chapter 2, the realism-inspired deterrence theorising of the Cold War era 
was based on an idealised and ahistorical story of actions taken by assum-
edly rational decisionmakers. This particular representation was, once ‘cre-
ated’, at the disposal of political decisionmakers.50 
 
According to the postmodern reading, then, the strategic discourse à la 
Cold War represented structures of control and authority, revealing them-
selves as neutral communication between researchers and policymakers 
(subjects) about existing things (objective facts). The value of the state-
ments within this kind of discourse can be assessed – according to the posi-
tivist ‘participants’ of this discourse – by analysing the statements’ truth-
value. For the postmodern discourse analyst this notion of language and 
discourse as simple communication is unacceptable, as it totally neglects 
the political content of discourse and bypasses the disciplining and consti-
tutive effects of the Cold War er a strategic discourse.51 
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3.3. Implications for the Study of War and Military Power 
 
The postmodern critique of positivist-rationalism in general and political 
realism in particular has focused on epistemology. The questioning and de-
nial of secure foundations of knowledge have been at the center of gravity 
of the postmodern attack. A shift from objective knowledge to a perspectiv-
ist conceptualisation of knowledge and truth, and an emphasis on the need 
to deconstruct prevailing theories, ‘regimes of truth’, or ‘metanarratives’ 
have characterised the rise of postmodernism.  The epistemological relativ-
ism – i.e. anti-foundational epistemology – that postmodernism espouses 
means a reduction of the significance of material factors in ontology. As we 
cannot access the material world directly by observation, and as knowledge 
is a derivative of power, “there is nothing outside of discourse.”52 Since all 
knowledge is dependent on the prevailing perspective, one cannot accumu-
late knowledge about material ‘reality’. Postmodernism, thus, does not nec-
essarily entail rejecting the material aspects of ‘reality’, but at the same 
time highlights that knowledge of this material reality is always mediated 
by the perspective used to interpret this ‘reality’. 
 
The world exists independently of language, but we can never know that 
(beyond the fact of its assertion), because the existence of the world is lit-
erally inconceivable outside of language and our traditions of interpreta-
tion.53 
 
The objects that exist externally to our thought cannot constitute them-
selves as objects outside discourses. The structures of language and the 
prevailing ways to conceptualise objects thus define the possible limits of 
knowledge and truth. Thus, from the perspective of postmodernism, the 
positivist reliance on materialist ontology – accentuating the observable 
and the material in international reality – and the embracing of epistemo-
logical foundationalism, form a dual move on the level of second-order 
theorising. Together these positivist metatheoretical premises have domi-
nated the social sciences and the discipline of IR until recently.54  
 
Within IR, the dominant position of Cold War era realism was connected to 
its positivist-rationalist premises and the interplay of the scientific research 
of the international system and the practice or policymaking of the bipolar 
international system. The pessimistic outlook of realism fitted nicely into 
the reality of the confrontational Cold War. In addition, it delivered what 
policymakers expected of science: formulated theories and related sugges-
tions for good policy on nuclear deterrence, great power behavior, the mili-
tarisation of the third world and the like. The policy-relevant realist theo-
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ries claimed to observe the world as it is (was), and based on that made 
recommendations, which only irrational policymakers could dismiss. The 
claimed objectivity of realism facilitated its dominating role within the his-
torical context of the Cold War – until its philosophical premises were 
questioned beginning in the 1970s. During the 1990s postmodernism has 
consolidated within the discipline of IR as one of several theories or para-
digms – although the postmodern project has not acknowledged the sub-
stance-related questions of the neo-neo debate. 
 
Concerning this study of war and military power, the ‘merits’ of postmod-
ernism rise from the shift of almost pure material agenda of realism into a 
view of war and military power as socially constructed ‘phenomena’. 
Postmodernism thus guides the formulation of the synthesis of this study – 
in the following chapter – by having deconstructed many of the taken-for-
granted concepts of the positivist-rationalist paradigm and by highlighting 
the importance of prevailing discourses in contemporary interpretations of 
war and military power. According to the postmodern logic, the meaning of 
war and military power are defined within discourses.  However, the radi-
cal anti-foundationalism of postmodernism will be rejected – together with 
the positivist-rationalist belief in secure epistemological foundations – 
when the framework for the rest of this study is formulated in Chapter 4. 
Similarly, both the overtly material view of realism, as well as the blatantly 
discursive emphasis of postmodern conceptualisations of reality, are syn-
thesised in chapter four. 
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4. SYNTHESIS – CONSTRUCTIVISM, POWER, AND THE  
    POST-COLD WAR ERA
 
 
 
Formulating a synthesis between the realist thesis and the postmodern antithesis 
could seem to be an insurmountable task, as it involves synthesising an intellec-
tually coherent, justified, and useful theoretical framework from such contradic-
tory elements of materialistic and empiricist realism on the one hand, and 
highly ideational and relativist postmodernism on the other hand. This chapter 
will provide one solution to this task, taking into consideration the objective of 
this study – the analysis of war and military power in the post-Cold War era. 
My synthesis will rely on constructivist IR theorising of the third debate as one 
of the ‘contending’ approaches in the mostly metatheoretical discourse in the 
discipline of international relations. In all, the synthesis will be drawn at the 
borders of positivism and post-positivism, realism and postmodernism, as well 
as problem-solving theory and critical theory.  
 
Constructivism is not an IR theory as such, but a social theory with IR applica-
tions1. Drawing on the argument presented in Chapter 2, one can say that like 
realism, constructivism is an approach that gives rise to many theories. Some 
scholars depict constructivism as a bridge between rational theories, such as 
neorealism and neoliberalism on the one hand and ‘non-rational’ theories, such 
as postmodernism and poststructuralism on the other hand. Others believe that 
constructivism has the task of bridging the gap between these theories, while 
others emphasise that constructivism is “seizing the middle ground”, for the 
purpose of giving good explanations of international politics. The theoretical 
synthesis of this study builds upon these notions of constructivism and concep-
tualises it as standing “at two intersections – that between materialism and ide-
alism, and that between individual agency and social structure.”2 The construc-
tivist framework of this study thus engages positivist-rationalist theorising as 
part of the post-positivist attack, but also acknowledges some of its merits.  
 
Neorealism and neoliberalism, the representatives of the rationalist approach, 
can be broadly labelled as positivist IR theories. For some time, these theories 
have found it difficult to explain the functioning of the international system, as 
they have been overwhelmed by the rapid changes that took place with the end 
of the Cold War. Constructivists criticise both of the above-mentioned ap-
proaches particularly in respect to what they both ignore: “the content and 
sources of state interests and the social fabric of world politics.”3 Constructiv-
ism thus emphasises – in the ‘spirit’ of critical theory – that theories do more 
than solve some pre-existing problems. They highlight questions worth pursu-
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 Adler (1997), p. 323; Ruggie (1998a), p. 34; Wendt (1999), p. 7. 
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 Adler (1997), pp. 325-6. See also Wendt (1992); Smith (2001), pp. 228, 242-246. 
3
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ing and problems worth solving.4
 Two distinct features of constructivism in IR 
are obviously important and emphasised by all constructivists: the rejection of 
purely material explanations of international politics and the understanding that 
identities and interests of agents are in process, not to be taken by assumption 
in a theory. In other words, constructivism challenges the brute materialism 
and methodological individualism that underpins contemporary mainstream 
IR theory. 
 
The constructivist synthesis of this chapter builds upon the political realist no-
tion of the primacy of material reality. In many cases material things can cause 
effects, whether people acknowledge the existence of these material artefacts 
or not, or despite what one thinks of them. On exploding, a bomb causes physi-
cal destruction. There are thus intrinsic qualities in material artefacts that can-
not be ignored. On the other hand, how these material factors are conceptual-
ised affects their usefulness and use. Whether or not a bomb is recognised as a 
valuable resource depends upon shared understandings of its usability and/or 
effectiveness. The constructivist synthesis thus acknowledges the importance of 
material factors, but emphasises the social process of giving meaning to them. 
The meaning attached to material objects within social processes is conceptual-
ised from the perspective of collectivities. The study of intersubjective mean-
ings – rather than the meaning attached by certain individual actors – is at the 
heart of the constructivist research agenda. 
 
The constructivist synthesis of this chapter also builds upon the postmodern 
thesis that some privileged perspectives and discourses silence other – alterna-
tive – ways to conceptualise reality. According to this idea, which is related to 
the theme of materiality, research focuses on the dominant discourses through 
which the meanings of material artefacts and deeds are ‘negotiated’ among ac-
tors. I believe that it is important to acknowledge the postmodern position vis-
à-vis positivism-rationalism that discourses wield great power in guiding or 
shaping the properties (identities and interests) and behaviour of actors. Con-
trary to the postmodern programme, constructivism holds that the pre-existing 
social and material ‘reality’ sets limits to the possibilities of discourses to frame 
objects and actions. 
  
Concerning epistemology, the constructivist synthesis rejects the positivist-
rationalist conceptualisation of secure foundations for knowledge – epistemo-
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logical foundationalism. For a constructivist, then, all knowledge is theory-
dependent and fallible. In a similar fashion, the postmodernist anti-foundational 
epistemology is rejected. What is proposed instead is a view of accumulating 
knowledge with minimal foundationalism. This means that although there are 
no secure foundations for acquiring knowledge, there are possibilities – by 
means of communication and reflective scholarly work – to evaluate the merits 
of different theory-laden knowledge claims. This notion must be accompanied 
with the qualification that scholars should be constantly on the alert and ready 
to redefine or reject what is commonly believed to be true. This epistemological 
position is best described as minimal foundationalism or epistemological rela-
tivism combined with judgmental rationalism. These questions will be ad-
dressed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
 
 
4.1. Against Brute Materialism – Ideas Do Matter 
 
Realists believe that state behavior is largely shaped by the material structure 
of the international system. ... For realists, some level of security competition 
among great powers is inevitable because of the material structure of the in-
ternational system.5
 
 
[W]hat makes a theory materialist is that it accounts for the effects of power, 
interests, or institutions by reference to ‘brute’ material forces – things which 
exist and have certain causal powers independent of ideas, like human nature, 
the physical environment, and, perhaps, technological artefacts.6
 
 
[I]t is the underlying social relations that give material disparities causal sig-
nificance.7
 
 
A common criticism presented by constructivists is Kenneth Waltz’s definition 
of structure of the international system. His formulation conceptualises interna-
tional structure through three factors: 1) the organising principle, 2) the charac-
ter of the units, and 3) the distribution of capabilities in the system.  The third 
factor is the only relevant one when trying to identify sources of dynamics in 
the system’s structure.8 Waltz’s position thus relies on actors’ material capa-
bilities. This is because two of the three structural tiers presented by Waltz 
‘drop out’, namely the anarchy of the system and the functionally undifferenti-
ated units (states). Consequently the material capabilities define the structure of 
the international system.9 
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Alexander Wendt shows that Waltz’s logic relies on an implicit assumption that 
different distributions of interests will generate different logics of anarchy. 
Constructivists also argue that while Waltz and other neorealists emphasise the 
importance of [material] military power, they pay almost no attention to the 
process of  ‘producing’ of military power.10 Neoliberal institutionalists also 
place emphasis on the material structure but note that states are occasionally 
subject to the influence of norms when they create institutions. Thus it seems 
that material forces do not explain everything in the neoliberals’ analyses, and 
ideas gain some explanatory power. But the constructivist criticism of neolib-
eral and rationalist approaches with respect to ideas in general directs its atten-
tion to the fact that ideas are still treated as objects. When ideas and actors’ in-
terests are separated from each other as rival variables, the focus is on ideas’ 
causal effects and the individualistic treatment of ideas. It is also argued that it 
is only when material facts are incapable of explaining some outcome or event 
that these ideas – norms for example – are allowed to figure in the explanation. 
Norms are then only a superstructure that rests on material facts and power. 
Ideas matter to agents only when they serve their interests.11 
 
For Wendt, who strongly criticises Waltz’s ‘materialistic’ definition of struc-
ture, the social structures are defined by three factors that differ sharply from 
those used by Waltz. For Wendt, the social structures consist of “shared 
knowledge, material resources and practices.”12 Shared knowledge is social 
and intersubjective in character, and should therefore not be understood as in-
dividual knowledge. What Wendt calls “social kinds” are not mind-independent 
of the collectivities that constitute them. They are, however, independent of the 
individuals that deal with them: “[i]ndividuals do not constitute social kinds, 
collectives do.”13 In human interaction, the collectively constituted products of 
human endeavour are reified, which means that the origins of human authorship 
are forgotten or neglected and a distinction between subject and object is made, 
even when no such distinction exists.14 
 
The importance of different material capabilities can only be understood 
through the prism of shared knowledge among agents and the practices that re-
produce or transform the system’s structure: social constructivism “concerns 
itself with the nature, origins, and functioning of social facts”.15 These social 
facts have their foundations in material brute facts16, without which we could 
never have any social facts. But this ontological prioritising of material facts 
does not imply that they are more important or more objective in nature, either 
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from an ontological or epistemological point of view. In addition, the social on-
tology of constructivism emphasises that behavioural modification is not the 
only implication of interaction. This constructivist reading of structure does not 
deny the importance of material capabilities, but sets the agenda for a broader 
understanding of the significance of different capabilities in a social setting. So-
cial structures are both the medium and an outcome in the constructivist way of 
conceptualising them.17 
 
The existence of social facts is dependent on human action, and institutions that 
are created by these actions are not worn out by continued use, but instead 
strengthened or modified by it.18 In order to study relations between states in 
the international system, one should – according to constructivist reading – 
keep in mind that these relations also reflect the way that “material is given 
meaning by the social process through which nations interact.”19 In this light, 
the individualistic approach to ideas is replaced with a social one. The accep-
tance or denial of social facts is connected to one’s view of reality. Ignoring 
social facts may lead an IR analyst to proceed as an outside observer, revealing 
the ‘true’ order of things. States, according to this view, confront the interna-
tional reality and operate within its strictures. The Opposite view – that of ac-
cepting the existence and significance of social facts – leads analysts to see that 
states and other agents make reality, not just confront it.  
 
It is not only the simple existence of agents and structures as separate ontologi-
cal components that are of interest to this study. One also needs a way to tie 
these main components (agents/states and structure of the international system) 
together: “… an ontology is a structured set of entities; it consists not only of 
certain designated kinds of things, but also of connections or relations between 
them.”20 Those who are interested in this structured set of entities are con-
fronted by the agent-structure problem. This problem arises from the under-
standing that human beings – whether as individuals or as a part of a society – 
are the driving force that accounts for events or outcomes in the world. At the 
same time we have come to realise that human actions do not take place in a 
vacuum or in a neutral environment, but instead in a setting that constrains and 
enables
 certain actions: “people make history, but not in conditions of their 
own choosing” as Karl Marx noted.21 
 
One can connect the emergence of the agent-structure problem in IR with the 
‘birth’ of constructivism. Alexander Wendt launched the public debate in an 
article published 1987 in which he criticised Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism and 
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Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-system theory. Wendt’s conclusion was that 
both neorealism and the world-system theory shared a common “approach to 
agent-structure problem: they both attempt to make either agents or structures 
into primitive units, which leaves each equally unable to explain the properties 
of those units.”22 According to Wendt, the answer to the agent-structure prob-
lem is to grant to both, agents and structures, the same ontological status. This 
line of thinking is reflected in Giddens’ observation that “the basic domain of 
study of the social sciences, according to the theory of structuration, is neither 
the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form of societal 
totality, but social practices ordered across space and time.”23  
 
For Wendt, agents and structures are “‘co-determined’ or ‘mutually consti-
tuted’ entities.”24 According to this logic, the agents, mostly states in Wendt’s 
understanding, are not conceivable as such without referring to the (social) 
structure in which they are embedded. As noted by Roy Bhaskar, “people do 
not create society ... [r]ather, society must be regarded as an ensemble of struc-
tures, practices and conventions which individuals reproduce or transform, but 
which would not exist unless they did so. Society does not exist independently 
of human activity ... but it is not the product of it.”25 One concept that is closely 
involved with mutual constitution is ‘duality of structure’, which stipulates that 
one cannot look for agents and structures as two separate phenomena (a dual-
ism), but as a duality: “the structural properties of social systems are both the 
medium
 and outcome of the practices they recursively organize.”26 
 
The constructivist emphasis on ideas does not denigrate the role of materiality 
in providing explanations. Constructivism does challenge, however, the treat-
ment of material possessions or artefacts as purely instrumental devices for 
achieving goals by their intrinsic characteristics. This has been a common way 
to conceptualise the nature of material ‘things’, such as weapons systems, in 
present-day IR studies. Another possible way of conceptualising the role of ma-
terial possessions in social relationships is to pay attention to their symbolic-
communicative role. This means focusing on the way that these artefacts and 
their use constitute the states as actors in the international system.27  
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4.1.1. Symbols 
 
The purely instrumentalist version of material factors highlights the functional 
uses that these artefacts can be put to, thereby making it possible for an actor to 
control the environment (and other actors). But if one looks more deeply, into 
the utility of these material possessions, one notes that one can find both func-
tional and symbolic aspects: functional as described above and symbolic as 
making these functional elements possible
 or by providing the actor the free-
dom to engage
 in those functional activities. The symbolic-communicative ap-
proach
 to material artefacts connects these possessions to the identity of their 
holder: they express who their owner is.28 
 
Symbols are a special case of social objects. They are “social objects used by 
the actor for representation and communication.”29 The meaning of a symbol is 
not based solely on its intrinsic properties, but is social in character. Symbols 
“join interacting people in a shared understanding of meanings”.30 They also 
“integrate the internal with the external, subjective consciousness with material 
objects. And they join physical signs with references or meanings.”31 One fea-
ture of symbols is that they represent something not inherent in themselves. 
Symbols evoke attitudes and sets of impressions and can be understood as ‘car-
riers’ of meaning and emotion.32 Different meanings and emotions are not in the 
symbol itself. They are socially constructed, i.e. they are intersubjective in na-
ture, but at a certain point of time a particular set of social meaning and emo-
tion is tied to a symbol. There is no reason to expect that meanings and emo-
tions connected to a symbol should be fixed. Symbols can be seen as vessels of 
meaning and emotion, which are constantly in the process of being reproduced 
or changed.33 
 
The expressive functions of material possessions are not based on the meanings 
that the individual gives to them, but are socially constituted and socially 
shared. In other words, it is the intersubjective agreement about these meanings 
and about agents’ shared role definitions and expectations that is of interest to 
those who engage in research from a constructivist perspective. The individual 
actor internalises these meanings in social interaction while reproducing or 
transforming those meanings by its own contribution to that interaction. In this 
way, “[m]aterial symbols play a significant role in a variety of arenas of self-
definition and other-perception”.34 
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In a similar vein, actions are interpreted within intersubjective meaning struc-
tures, and actions (practices) can thus be understood from instrumental and 
symbolic perspectives. Sending military advisors to a foreign country may be 
one way to serve the sending state’s interests directly (by for example provid-
ing know-how concerning how to defeat the enemy), but may also signal 
friendship to the recipient country or indicate resolve in an unfolding crisis, etc. 
The US engagement in Vietnam was a failure on instrumental standards (or at 
least it was framed as a failure), but it still provided some ‘symbolic utility’ by 
showing to the SU the resolve of the United States to combat the advance of 
communism even at the expense of heavy casualties. This latter symbolic read-
ing of the Vietnam war is dependent on the definitions of the national identities 
and interests of the United States and the Soviet Union. For it to make sense, 
one must see that the Cold War era, socially constructed superpower status of 
both parties led to definitions of interests that accentuated resolve and credi-
bility. Measured on these socially emergent standards the symbolic utility of 
losses of human lives makes some sense, although it does not make those 
losses very acceptable.35 
 
 
4.1.2. Speech acts, Rules, and Norms 
 
While Wendtian constructivism relies on scientific realism and agents’ prac-
tices, Onufian constructivism relies on speech act theory, according to which, 
”saying is doing”. This means that language has a performative function in ad-
dition to its representative function. Onuf’s approach has similarities to 
Wendt’s in that he stresses the relationship between agents and structure. As a 
‘third component’ between states and structure, Onuf mentions rules or state-
ments of what agents should do. Patterns of rules, and the practices related to 
them, create institutions. The difference between structure and institutions is 
that the former is something that the agents can see (observe/acknowledge by 
some means) while the latter are the locus within which agents act.36 
 
Deeds, either in the form of speech acts or physical actions, are important since 
they are carriers of meaning and thus establish (reproduce or transform) social 
reality. This is where rules come in, since meaning is dependent on the exis-
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tence of rules. Rules also turn material objects into resources
 that can be used 
in trying to achieve the agent’s interests. Rules empower certain agents, i.e. 
“they yield rule” for someone at the expense of someone else. Onuf classifies 
rules according to speech act theory into instruction-rules, directive-rules and 
commitment-rules and notes that the distinction between regulative and consti-
tutive rules is somewhat artificial, since all rules have regulative and constitu-
tive effects, i.e. they are regulative and constitutive simultaneously.37 
 
According to Onuf, then, agents confront – and constitute – the social world 
and act upon it on the basis of material ‘limits’ and meanings that are conveyed 
by rules. An agent is not making choices whether or not to comply with a single 
rule, but with a set of rules. Compliance or refusal to comply with rules is more 
or less a matter of degree. Rules not only tell the agent how to act, but also they 
construct the situation the agent faces, i.e. they facilitate the definition of the 
situation for that particular agent. Rules are not alone in influencing the possi-
bilities of agents to construct social reality with different meanings. Material 
aspects also set limits to what can be constructed by agents. In addition one 
must note that deeds do lead to outcomes that are envisioned by the doer, but 
unintended outcomes also emerge. Taking all this into consideration, Onuf’s 
point is quite similar to Wendt’s constructivism.38 
 
Friedrich Kratochwil also draws on speech act theory and the performative as-
pects of language in his formulations of IR theory. As does Onuf, Kratochwil 
accentuates the intersubjective normative content of structure that gives mean-
ing to actions. Instead of conceptualising norms and rules in the traditional 
regulative way of whether or not an agent is abiding by them, one is interested 
in how norms shape decisions and action, how norms and rules give meaning to 
action and provide a medium for communication. In analyses of human behav-
iour, norms and rules are important, but not in the sense of determining out-
comes. Research should proceed by finding the ‘used’ relevant premises (defi-
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nitions of the situation) and analysing the processes of interpretation and delib-
eration.39 
 
Much of the constructivist theorising within the field of IR has been connected 
to norms. “Norms are collective expectations about proper behavior for a given 
identity.”40 Instead of being a superstructure on top of power and interests, the 
normative structure of the international system precedes the interests of agents. 
Norms have regulative and constitutive effects (or aspects) where the former 
assign proper behaviour to held identities and the latter define those identities 
in the first place. The constitutive effects of norms also legitimise goals for 
agents and define their interests.41 In addition to having regulative and constitu-
tive effects, it is argued that norms have evaluative or prescriptive aspects as 
well. It is this “quality of ‘oughtness’”, which defines the standards of proper 
behaviour for a given identity and differentiates norms from rules.42 
 
Not all norms operate in the same way or are equally powerful. They form hier-
archical sets of norms, normative structures, and some are taken for granted 
while others remain, at least partially, debated and contested.43 The hierarchy 
of norms
 implies that some norms are more important than others and that the 
lower-level norms are embedded in higher-level norms.44 In addition, norms are 
not invalidated as soon as deviant behaviour occurs. This is due to their deontic 
character, which makes it possible to see norms more as dynamic processes 
than as passive dictums for behaviour.  Accepting a deontic definition of norms 
and proceeding with the analysis from a constructivist point of view, it is more 
reasonable to assess behavioural compliance with norms in terms of a contin-
uum than in dichotomous terms.45 
 
The way norms are created, maintained and altered is not a predetermined 
process. Since international norms are “intersubjectively shared, value based 
expectations of appropriate behavior which are shared within international so-
ciety or within a particular subsystem of international society by states”46, their 
very existence depends on the practices of states – and other agents – but their 
contents are not necessarily a result of any intentional norm-building move. 
From the perspective of states and other international agents, norms are objec-
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tive social facts. Looking at the normative structure or normative discourses in 
the international system does not mean looking for an all-encompassing answer 
that can be provided by looking at norms only.  “Norms structure realms of 
possibilities; they do not determine outcomes.”47 But bearing the constitutive 
effects of norms in mind, one should understand that many of the accepted and 
legitimate options that agents have in a certain situation arise from norms as 
‘rules of the game’. Changes in norms may have wide implications.48 Looking 
at norms in this way acknowledges that “a norm or rule is much more penetrat-
ing in constructivism than is usually the case in regime analysis.”49 Even wars 
and international anarchy imply a normative structure or norms.50
 
 
Some norms may become important by conscious design, like the widely ac-
cepted interdiction of the use of chemical weapons, but others may gain in im-
portance in the contingent process of the interaction of agents. Thus, while 
some realist and liberal approaches propose that a preponderant power (a he-
gemon) is needed for the establishment of norms, or that in order to understand 
the growing number of norms, one should look at the interest-mediation func-
tions that the norms provide. From a constructivist point of view the rationalist 
conception of norms and regimes, which understands them primarily as the re-
sult of a negotiated settlement (often in the form of an institution), is too nar-
row. However, the rationalist view that the effects of norms apply directly to 
behaviour only is also criticised. Constructivism conceptualises norms more in 
the way of having “context effects”
 than being merely an alternative to interests 
of an agent in explanations of international politics.51 These context effects are 
not confined to the international arena, but can be located also in the domestic 
politics of states. One is thus dealing with international and societal norms 
when one is interested in the effects that norms have on international politics.52 
These two sets of norms, the domestic and the international normative struc-
tures, are not separate phenomena, but are deeply intertwined in their function-
ing and effects.53  
 
In the process of norm consolidation, a threshold of institutionalisation, where 
the emerging norm has been adopted by a sufficient number of agents in the 
system, marks a ‘tipping point’. Also the nature of the agents adopting the 
emerging norm may play a role in its institutionalisation. The arrival of a tip-
ping point means that a new logic in the spreading of the norm may become sa-
lient. Socialisation is the primary mechanism of what Finnemore and Sikkink 
call a norm cascade, and belonging to a society of agents (states for example) 
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by abiding by the norm may become more important than other (for example 
domestic) factors: agent’s identities become the issue. Agents start following a 
certain norm because doing so is part of their identity, and that way they can 
join the reference group that is so important for the reproduction of their own 
identity. Internalisation implies that it is possible for a norm to become so pow-
erful that its essence is taken for granted in the system and violating it may be 
considered practically impossible. Internalised norms are not debated or even 
criticised, since it is the very nature of these internalised norms that they are 
the ‘normal context’ of practices and are almost invisible to the agents. The 
similarity of agents and their behaviour is based on ideational causation by 
norms.
54
 The process by which norms are consolidated is in no way determinis-
tic, and at any time a reversal may occur. This means that the forces described 
above as mechanisms of norm creation may bring forth new, much stronger 
norms that undermine previously generated norms or that the forces promoting 
a certain norm may weaken and the contents of the norm may be modified 
along the way. 
 
The notion of rules has already been introduced in reference to the writings of 
Onuf and Kratochwil. Having dealt with norms explicitly, I wish to state the re-
lationship between norms and rules for this study. Norms are defined here as 
collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity. Rules are 
here understood as ‘carriers’ of meaning and as media for communication in the 
international system. This distinction between norms and rules is not of essence 
in this research. If not explicitly otherwise stated, I will treat ‘norms’ and 
‘rules’
 as synonyms that refer to the social structure of the international system 
in providing possibilities for agents to understand and communicate intelligibly 
with each other. They provide possibilities for intersubjective meanings and – 
thus – operate as a social context in which agents make decisions and act 
upon the world. These acts cause outcomes that have subsequent effects on the 
composition of norms and rules, in either a reproductive or a transformative 
fashion.55 
 
 
4.1.3. Shared Knowledge and Culture 
 
So far, the concepts of shared knowledge, intersubjective understandings, nor-
mative structure, social structure, norms, and rules have been introduced in an 
attempt to describe the constructivist view of the international structure. These 
concepts are approximate synonyms, although several scholars use them in 
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slightly different ways, as has been suggested. ‘Culture’56 is still one more con-
cept that is used almost interchangeably with those listed above. It denotes a 
shared meaning structure that affects how agents (states) view their environ-
ment and themselves and thus directs their possibilities for action. Culture is a 
type of toolbox of symbols, ‘operating procedures’, and world-views that 
states mobilise together with their material resources for social action. A Cul-
ture is not a uniform or unified system, but rather a repertoire of shared ideas 
that can be mobilised in several ways.
 It is noteworthy that a culture does have 
a causal role, since actions taken by agents are chosen within a prevailing cul-
ture that limits the way that the situation facing the agent is read and what 
means are available to reach culture-affected goals.57 
 
Iver Neumann argues that the understanding of culture “as mutually condi-
tioned play between discourse and practices” would be useful for international 
relations after the linguistic turn and the needed re-emphasis on practice within 
the international system. This framing of culture emphasises the interplay be-
tween discourses (or shared meanings, intersubjective knowledge, etc.) as pre-
conditions for action and practices as “socialised patterns of action.”58 In his 
case study of the changes in the Norwegian diplomacy related to the end of the 
Cold War, Neumann concludes that: 
 
… changes in global political discourse in which diplomatic discourse is 
nested opened up the possibility for initiating new practices.59
 
 
The functioning of culture in IR, strategic studies, or security studies has not 
yet formed a distinct centre of gravity. Culture has been theorised on several 
levels however. On the international (global) level, cultural theorising focuses 
on the effects of international norms on agents (mostly states) and their prac-
tices. On a regional or transsocietal level research on culture concerns itself 
with the workings of shared world-views and norms in a geographically or ide-
ationally defined part of the world. On the state level, cultural studies have 
highlighted how norms affect national decision-making and action from a do-
mestic point of view. Finally, the effects of organisational culture are studied at 
the organisational level. What combines research on all these levels – whether 
one is concerned with the effects of international norms, the alliance dynamics 
of a region or a collection of states, the strategic culture of particular state, or 
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how organisational culture affects decision making – is reliance on the power of 
shared ideas in causing effects at the chosen level of analysis.60 
 
The different ideational labels of shared knowledge, intersubjective understand-
ing, normative structure, social structure, and culture – referred to above – may 
cause confusion due to their different usage in research. So far the presentation 
of all of these concepts has called attention to the polyphony of constructivist 
theorising. An attempt will be made in Chapter 4.4 to construct an analytical 
and a coherent apparatus that is based on existing constructivist theorising. One 
additional remark is necessary, however. When referring to the concepts of 
shared knowledge, intersubjective understanding, normative structure, social 
structure, or culture, one is not saying that the ideational element of the interna-
tional system is completely shared or that it would forms a straightforward and 
fully coherent totality. On the contrary private knowledge or contradictory col-
lective images also exist.61  Similarly, the collection of a wide array of more or 
less shared ideational elements forms a totality that is somewhat ambiguous and 
contested. It is thus possible to have different readings of this social structure – 
based on private knowledge or collective images. 
 
 
4.1.4. Epistemological Convergence 
 
All of the most frequently cited constructivist authors so far – Wendt, Onuf and 
Kratochwil – write to promote a social ontology for international relations. 
They do not share ontological claims. Wendt, for example, supports scientific 
realism and is mainly focused on practices understood as physical actions, 
whereas Onuf and Kratochwil accentuate language. They all emphasise the 
meaning that actions and physical objects have at a certain point in time. Simi-
larly they all see the agents operating not only within the social structure, but 
also on that structure, either reproducing or transforming it. The intersubjective 
structure is thus an outcome of the actions of agents, but this requires collectiv-
ity: structure, with its social and material components, is objective for any one 
agent at any one point in time.  
 
Of the three approaches, Wendt’s position is probably closest to that of the 
mainstream IR or positivist social sciences. His argument frequently confronts 
and challenges the mainstream in terms that are understandable and even ac-
ceptable to positivist scholars. This becomes even clearer when one is dealing 
with epistemology. On ontological grounds Wends is certainly not alone in 
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making reference to material factors, in acknowledging the existence of reality 
apart from the beliefs or insights of humans, or in prioritising ontology instead 
of epistemology.62 Categorising scholars is always problematic and simplifying. 
Taking into account the tradition of mainstream IR theorising and the develop-
ments within the constructivist camp during the one and half decades of its ex-
istence there is reason to believe that Wendt, Onuf, and Kratochwil share a so-
cial ontology for the study of the international relations.63 And it is precisely 
this social quality of their ontological commitments that I wish to accentuate.  
In addition to drawing mainly on Wendt’s scientific realist ontology, I would 
state that Onuf and Kratochwil are right in calling attention to the importance of 
language. A careful and thorough reading of Wendt does not support the view 
that he rejects the importance of language. Rather, language has been under-
theorised in his social theory for IR and this omission is something that should 
be taken into consideration when applying his theoretical framework in re-
search.64  
 
It is apparent that ontological claims made by a theory causes consequences for 
its epistemology. The social ontology of constructivism indicates the impor-
tance of the (social) meaning of an act. The scientific realist understanding of 
the distinction between real objects and knowledge of them is equivalent to the 
difference between intransitive and transitive worlds (or facts). In “a transitive 
dimension the object (of knowledge) is the material cause or antecedently es-
tablished knowledge which is used to generate new knowledge”. Correspond-
ingly, in “an intransitive dimension, the object is real structure or mechanism 
that exists and acts quite independently of men and the conditions which allow 
men access to it.”65 When discussing epistemology, it is the transitive dimen-
sion
 that needs to be analysed. A scientific realist would insist that knowledge 
of intransitive (real) objects is fallible and subject to change. This possible 
change does not imply a change in the intransitive facts, but rather in the social 
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processes of knowledge production. The knowledge one seeks is of the genera-
tive mechanisms or mechanisms of production of phenomena in the intransitive 
world.66 But knowledge sought in a social setting is different from knowledge 
produced by the natural sciences. Bhaskar has also pointed out the ontological 
differences between social and natural structures.67  
 
The ‘problem’ social scientists face is the one of open systems. This has direct 
implications for the capacity of social sciences to produce knowledge. Based 
on this feature (there are no closed social systems available), the function of 
social science becomes “explanatory and non-predictive”68, and especially the 
explanation of possibilities69
 becomes important. The non-Humean view of the 
causality of scientific realism has implications for the means by which knowl-
edge is generated. The deductive-nomological model for giving causal explana-
tions is rejected, or at least its position as the sole means of obtaining scientific 
knowledge is questioned by scientific realists. 
 
The shift in causality, from empirical invariances to “the idea that real causal 
mechanisms and complexes produce effects in open system”, derives from the 
social ontology of constructivism and on the epistemological argument that fo-
cusing on universal regularities in human sciences is mandated by the positivist 
need for theoretical rigour and parsimony. The existence of causal mechanisms 
points to a combination of ‘causes’, or a causal complex, that produces an out-
come. It should be noted that there is always the possibility that many different 
sufficient causal complexes can produce the same outcome. Patomäki notes 
that there are five elements of causal complexes, namely socially constructed 
actors, meaningful action, rules, resources, and practices. Relying on causal 
mechanisms – instead on Humean causality – means that reasons for actions 
must be included in the analysis.70 
 
The reference to causal mechanisms above relates to scientific realism’s under-
standing of the intransitive world as well as its unobservable mechanisms, 
which produce outcomes without exact knowledge of these causal mechanisms. 
Even without having recourse to scientific realism, but still applying construc-
tivism to understand events, outcomes, and processes in the international realm, 
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one is interested in the often non-observable social facts that are bestowed with 
meaning within the normative structure of the international system. Producing 
knowledge – explaining – entails gaining an understanding of the social struc-
ture (and material structure) of the international system and the agent’s relation 
to it and other agents.71 Whether or not constructivist scholars accept the idea 
of the world being real and existing independent of the scholars’ knowledge of 
it, their understanding of social ontology points to a conceptualisation of sci-
ence and knowledge in which knowledge claims are socially constructed, falli-
ble and contextual.72
  
 
The controversy surrounding the statement that all knowledge is based on some 
explicit or implicit ‘theory’ has subsided recently. All but the most robust em-
piricists share some form of shared understanding that theoretical views guide 
the way research is done. This consensus in favour of theory-based knowledge 
does not mean that epistemological debates have become extinct. The episte-
mological position promoted in this study – that of epistemological relativism – 
is connected to what is called judgemental rationalism: the idea that one con-
tinuously needs to be “on the alert for – indeed, to seek out – challenges to the 
prevailing construction [knowledge], and to stand ready to refine, or even reject 
that which is currently believed in favor of something else that, on examination, 
seems more reasonable and appropriate to those in the best position to make 
the judgment.”73 
 
One can argue that the epistemology discussed here so far is in contradiction to 
Wendt’s ‘approval’ of positivist epistemology. As Wendt explains his position, 
the task of scholars in natural and social sciences is to explain why something 
happens and to understand “how things are put together to have the causal 
powers that they do.” According to Wendt, the difference in material and idea-
tional (social) objects concerns differences of methodology, not epistemology. 
For him, it is possible, and indeed necessary, that the task of social science is to 
explain in causal and constitutive fashions. He states that even if one is inter-
ested in explaining only in the causal fashion, one necessarily has to engage in 
constitutive explaining: in order to answer ‘why’ questions, one has to answer 
‘what’ and ‘ how-possible’ questions, at least implicitly.74 Wendt’s point is that 
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the function of science in general is to explain and to understand and that this 
‘basic’ function is similar to both natural and social sciences. In the latter, one 
is dealing with constitutive and causal questions (problems) that both are wor-
thy of study. Therefore, the nature of the questions should determine the appro-
priate methodology. For constitutive questions one needs interpretive methods 
and discourse analysis.75 
 
It is noteworthy that the majority of theorising and problem solving from the 
constructivist perspective is done in the constitutive fashion.76 This is not to 
deny the importance of causal explanations, but to acknowledge that social (or 
cultural) structures can have effects on agents’ behaviour as well as on their 
identities and interests (i.e. properties). One should not, however, exaggerate 
the differences between causal and constitutive explanations. Adler notes that 
“constructivism subscribes to a notion of social causality that takes reasons as 
causes... norms and rules structure and therefore socially constitute – ‘cause’ – 
the things people do”.77 
 
 
4.2. Against Utilitarian Rationalism – Identities and Interests Are in Process 
 
Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism have been able to converge to the 
extent that they have because they now share very similar analytical founda-
tions. … both assume that states are rational actors maximizing their own ex-
pected utilities, defined in such material terms as power, security, and wel-
fare.78
 
 
[C]ore of neorealist theory has extended itself onto such areas as game theory 
… This idea of a common rationality reinforces the nonhistorical mode of 
thinking.79 
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Constructivists are interested in the construction of identities and interests 
and, as such, take more sociological than economic approach to systemic 
theory. ... states are not structurally or exogenously given but constructed by 
historically contingent interactions.80
 
 
There is, of course, a difference between saying that actors are self-interested 
utility-maximisers and saying that in order to study them, such an assumption is 
useful. Based on a cultural theory of human action, it is assumed in this study 
that rationalised human practices are mainly a cultural construct and that social 
practices generate universal laws and not vice versa.81 Before dealing with ra-
tionalistic IR theories below, I acknowledge that these theories do not assume 
that the model of agency they hold corresponds to actual actors in reality. In-
stead, they see that holding these rationalistic assumptions makes good sense in 
explaining international events. 
 
Neorealism and neoliberalism are rationalistic theories of IR. Descriptive of 
this standpoint is the notion that “the principle of substantive rationality gener-
ates hypotheses about actual human behaviour only when it is combined with 
auxiliary assumptions about the structure of utility functions and the formation 
of expectations.”82 Neorealism’s focus is on security in a self-help system, 
where “units worry about their survival, and the worry conditions their behav-
ior.”83 It also focuses on states’ relative gains whereas neoliberalism looks at 
institutions and absolute gains. According to neoliberalism, states create institu-
tions for several purposes, viz. to reduce uncertainty, alter transaction costs, 
provide information, stabilise expectations and make decentralized enforcement 
possible.84 Institutions are created in order to serve the interests of rational state 
agents. These interests are given in the theory by assumption. 
 
Constructivism is based on the strong foundation of rationalism developed ex-
tensively during the last decades. Some of its  views, especially regarding as-
sumptions
 behind the traditional rational IR models85 and the logic of interac-
tion have been moderated. Constructivism does not challenge rationalism in 
general86, but certain of its applications. The focus of academic interest on ra-
tionalism in the discipline of IR has been cast in utilitarian terms. This means 
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that the main thing left for the analyst has been to infer expected behavioural 
outcomes from known, pregiven preferences87.  
 
The constructivist position on rationality is somewhere between rational choice 
theory88 and postmodernism89. This means that rationality is not rejected, but 
when applied to the study of international relations, it is expanded from its utili-
tarian variants, expressed by instrumental rationalism. Constructivism chal-
lenges the ‘identity and interests by assumption’ formula of rationalistic neore-
alism and neoliberalism and adds dynamism to IR theory. Agents are seen to 
retain identities which are not given, but reproduced and transformed within the 
social structure through the actions of the agents. Interaction among agents 
causes their identities to be continuously (re)evaluated.  
 
To have an identity is, according to Wendt, “simply to have certain ideas about 
who one is in a given situation.90” The identity of an agent is rarely – or never – 
totally unproblematic or coherent. Rather, it is to a certain extent always “a 
source of stress and contradiction in both self-representation and social ac-
tion.”91 In addition, there is more than one identity for (m)any agent(s). It is the 
plurality of these overlapping and somewhat contradictory identities in different 
circumstances that results in the above-mentioned articulations of stress and 
contradiction. Which identities are adopted from among the several possible 
and accepted ones depends on the definition of the situation at hand: “the social 
construction of identity always takes place in a context marked by power rela-
tionships”.92 
 
In addition to having an identity, each state also possesses interests, which are 
also under continuous reassessment and possible transformation through social 
structures. A typical way of conceptualising these interests is via the concept of 
‘national interest’, which is often given by assumption in IR theory. Construc-
tivism, on the other hand, allows interests to change (or to stay unchanged) and 
does not take them as something to be given by assumption.93 But this does not 
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imply that interests change easily: “States are homeostatic structures that are 
relatively enduring over time. Like other cultural forms, states are self-fulfilling 
prophecies; once up and running they acquire interests in reproducing them-
selves that create resistance to disappearing of their own accord.”94 
 
Since rationalistic neorealism and neoliberalism do not consider the identities 
and interests of agents to be at stake in the interaction of those agents, they end 
up with a behavioural conception of international politics. They are interested 
in explaining behaviour either by  bracketing the formation of identities and in-
terests, thereby treating them as if they were exogenous to the process of inter-
action, or they emphasise domestic politics in the formation of identities and 
interests and leave these untouched in their IR analysis.95 In addition to focus-
ing on behaviour, constructivism is concerned with the effects that interaction 
has on the properties (identities and interests) of agents, without confining its 
analysis to the manifest behaviour.96 Thus, in Wendt’s words, “we should not 
let our admiration for rationalist methodology dictate the substantive scope of 
systemic international relations theory.”97  
 
Instrumental rationality is not the only way to characterise rationally operating 
agents. Normative rationality and communicative rationality have been intro-
duced as alternative and complementary way of looking at rationality. They 
both fit into the category of expressive rationality, because the means or 
choices an agent has in a certain situation can themselves represent the end. 
Thus, the seemingly most effective means by instrumental standards might not 
be chosen on rational grounds. Behind the notion of normative rationality lies 
the conception that normative factors can join outcome-maximising calculations 
in affecting the selection of means in a situation of choice. Communicative ra-
tionality implies the intersubjective coordination of action. According to this 
view, action should be seen not only as a way to reach a certain objective, but 
also as a signal to the others about an actors intentions (and perhaps resolve).98 
 
Normative rationality assumes that the goals actors wish to achieve do not only 
reflect the pleasure they bring, when attained, for self-interested purposes, but 
also their moral standing. Any situation that an actor faces brings with it the 
possibility of a conflict between self-interest and moral considerations. But the 
effects of moral or normative-affective factors are not limited to the behaviours 
they cause. They also provide the context in which goals are pondered, i.e. they 
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constitute the goals that are regarded by the actors to be legitimate and appro-
priate. Normative-affective factors thus influence the goals actors pursue, but 
they are especially important when actors decide about applicable or appropri-
ate means to achieve the goal(s) in question. “[N]ormative-affective factors 
shape to a significant extent the information that is gathered, the ways that it 
is processed, the inferences that are drawn, the options that are being consid-
ered, and the options that are finally chosen.” This means that in pursuing its 
goals and deciding on the means to achieve them, an actor’s instrumental ra-
tionality is not only bounded by computational and cognitive limitations, but 
also by normative-affective concerns about the legitimacy or acceptability of 
the course of action to be pursued.99  
 
Communicative rationality, with its focus on a contextual understanding of an 
agent’s situation, does not imply substantive cooperation between states and 
other agents, although communicative cooperation exists. Communicative co-
operation between agents means that they can interpret, evaluate, and even 
challenge the validity claims of others. These validity claims touch upon cul-
tural knowledge (truth), identities (sincerity), and norms (normative rightness) – 
all of which are aspects of the social structure of the international system. Being 
able to communicate and interpret each other’s speech acts, agents may or may 
not end up with a common definition of the situation and correspondingly may 
or may not adopt common or similar policies. From the point of view of com-
municative rationality, politics in the international sphere does not correspond 
to a game (as in instrumental rationality). Rather, the appropriate metaphor for 
politics is conversation.100 From the communicative perspective, rational action 
can be understood as presenting validity claims in interaction for reaching an 
understanding, recognising a “culturally ingrained preunderstanding”.101 
 
In dealing with instrumental, normative, and communicative rationality, one 
should keep in mind that all of these conceptions of rationality provide an ac-
count in which an actor takes purposeful action. In a way, instrumental rational-
ity is a part of normative and communicative rationalities, as suggested by 
Habermas. The differences between these conceptions lie in their different 
reading of the coordination of goal-directed actions. The instrumental version 
highlights expected utilities (and in a strategic action version the responses of 
other actors),  normative rationality places the emphasis on socially agreed 
methods in pursuing legitimate goals and in the communicative rationality sce-
nario a common definition of the situation by intersubjective understanding is 
the key factor.102 It is noteworthy that communicative action, in the form of ar-
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guments concerning the definition of the situation, does have (‘cause’) consti-
tutive effects in many cases, even though agents operate under instrumental or 
normative rationality.103
 
 
To proceed with empirical research on the basis of rationality as I have expli-
cated, one needs to pay attention on three important factors of rationality. First, 
rationality is closely related to agents’ interests, but those interests are not 
static and
 
are subject to transformation in social interaction. Second, the in-
terests of agents should not be linked to valued outcomes only. An agent might 
also be interested in the means to arrive at certain collective outcome. The third 
factor derives from the previous two. In certain cases it may be enough to as-
sume that states follow instrumental rationality, but making this assumption in 
all cases of international politics is not justified, at least not in order to satisfy 
the research objective of this study to provide analytical histories of emergence 
concerning military power after the Cold War. I am therefore making no other a 
priori
 assumptions concerning rationality other than what follows from the 
three factors named above, namely that rational agents pursue goals that they 
value using means that they consider appropriate. Ideas about these goals and 
means are subject to change (i.e. goals and appropriate means themselves are 
subject to change) as agents interact within the international system. What the 
agents’ goals are and which means are deemed legitimate at any point of time is 
subject to research, not to be taken on assumption. Instrumental rationality does 
not have analytical priority over expressive rationality in this study.104 
 
 
4.3. Constructivist Power Analysis 
 
The two main theses concerning materialism and rationalism presented so far 
leave considerable freedom of choice for constructivists. This becomes clear 
from the following argument, presented by Wendt as an answer to John 
Mearsheimer’s criticism of “the false promise of international institutions” pub-
lished in International Security in winter 1994/95: “I share all five of 
Mearsheimer’s ‘realist’ assumptions: that international politics is anarchic, and 
that states have offensive capabilities, cannot be 100 percent certain about oth-
ers’ intentions, wish to survive, and are rational. We even share two more: a 
commitment to states as units of analysis, and to the importance of systemic or 
‘third image’ theorizing.”105 What this answer in fact shows is that, first, con-
structivism does not reject (political) realism or many of its basic assump-
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tions106 per se, and, second, that even among constructivists, there is room for 
different kinds of IR theorising.  
 
Power-related research was not been located at the core of constructivist theo-
rising during the some two decades of explicit theoretical articulation of con-
structivism in IR. But to leave power to the realists, who most often have been 
associated with questions of power in international relations, would narrow 
down our view of the international reality.107 This being the case, it should be 
noted that realism in different forms is surely not the only IR approach that 
deals with power. All approaches or theories have something to say – and most 
of them a lot – about power in international politics. It is one thing to say that 
power matters, but another to say that power is all that matters. Since confining 
the subject matter and leaving an integral part of it to certain theories is not 
preferable, some other way has to be found to distinguish analytically between 
theories in general and the concept of power in particular. Alexander Wendt 
has suggested that when dealing with power, one should “differentiate theories 
according how power is constituted.” In this light the realist conception of 
power focuses on the brute material forces that constitute the effects of 
power.108 This framing proceeds in differentiating theories on the basis of the 
extent to which power is seen to be constituted by brute material or ideational 
forces.  
 
A related discussion of various conceptualisations of power was presented in 
Chapter 2. There I claimed that realists view power either from a resource-
based perspective, or from an outcome-oriented standpoint seeing power as be-
haviour. The combining of both above-mentioned perspectives has also been, at 
least implicitly, carried out in realist power analysis. Here I conceptualise 
power in a dispositional fashion. This will be elaborated below. 
 
The already presented constructivist tenet concerning social ontology in IR di-
rects analyses of power to focus on agents as well as on structure. An agent-
level power analysis relies on the dispositional conceptualisation of power – i.e. 
power as a transformative capacity or a capacity to effect. On the level of struc-
ture, the concepts of intersubjective knowledge, shared understandings, and 
others presented so far in this chapter frame the constructivist perspective. In 
other words, the meanings of power in general and military power in particu-
lar are socially constructed through the processes of reproduction and trans-
formation in the interaction of agents that takes place in pre-existing struc-
tural conditions. Analysing power from a constructivist perspective thus leads 
one to study the shared conceptualisations of power – the structural element – 
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and the resources and possibilities of actions that agents face in a specific con-
text – the agent-level element.  
 
In his analysis of power, Alexander Wendt also points out the importance of 
ideas and their constitutive effects on material power resources. Ideas do not 
diminish the objective quality of power when seen from the agent’s perspec-
tive, since the intersubjective meaning given to a power resource is real to the 
agent109, i.e. it is a social fact. Ideational factors are not the only ones to con-
sider when trying to focus on power. There are other factors that favour a mate-
rial understanding of power or in which material forces cause independent ef-
fects: the distribution of actors’ material capabilities, the composition of mate-
rial capabilities and geography and natural resources110. According to Wendt, 
the distribution of material capabilities, an element familiar from Waltz’s for-
mulation of international structure, influences the outcomes. When activated or 
mobilised for human purposes, the distribution of material capabilities among 
actors matters and it cannot be argued that a particular outcome is a function of 
ideational factors only. The composition of these material capabilities also mat-
ters, nowadays mainly in the form of technology. The presence of a certain 
level of technology brings certain intrinsic factors into play that have conse-
quences beyond those mediated by ideational factors.  
 
The third element in the causal understanding of material capabilities deals with 
geography and natural resources. Physical distances, certain aspects of the cli-
mate and its effects on the conditions for living, and the presence of materials 
for technological development have independent effects. Material capabilities, 
according to Wendt, “help define the possibilities for our action.”111  
 
According to Emanuel Adler power is “not only the resources required to im-
pose one’s view on others, but also the authority to determine the shared mean-
ings that constitute the identities, interests and practices of states, as well as the 
conditions that confer, defer or deny access to ‘goods’ and benefits.” Based on 
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this definition, it is those agents who can set or alter the rules of the game that 
use effective power. This conceptualisation links power with knowledge and 
both of them to the interests of agents, described in the international arena as 
national interests.112 
 
In a similar constructivist fashion, Stefano Guzzini focuses on the meaning 
given to power in international politics by diplomats. Where Guzzini writes 
that “before diplomats can count, they must decide what counts” he means that 
power [or balance of power, which is what Guzzini was writing about] is based 
on social construction and that this construction takes place in the diplomatic 
community. Diplomats more or less “share a common measure of power al-
though they would be hard-pressed to define it exactly.” In constructing power, 
diplomats try to advance the importance of those resources that they ‘master’. 
Guzzini believes that “measurement of power is a political act. The diplomats 
who represent states endowed with one particular power resource will do their 
best to enhance the latter’s value. The Soviet government’s stress on military 
factors, and not economic factors, was a case in point.”113  
 
Resources are not automatically transformed into power, but according to the 
shared interpretations concerning those resources (material and ideational) 
that yield power. In this context Guzzini emphasises the role of diplomats. 
Guzzini’s power analysis proceeds by devising a dyad of concepts – power and 
governance. The former is assigned at the agent level – as transformative ca-
pacity, or as Guzzini puts it “the capacity to transform resources that affect so-
cial interaction”. The latter refers to the structural level, or to the “capacity of 
intersubjective practices to create and mobilise dispositions.” Structural power 
– or Guzzini’s governance – is the ‘product’ that agents’ practices give rise to, 
intentionally or through unintended consequences, and which either empowers 
or disempowers agents in their interactions.114 
 
Tuomas Forsberg has developed a constructivist power analysis that focuses on 
the positive economic sanctions. He finds that “there are at least four important 
elements of socially constructed structural power: interpretive rules, behav-
ioural norms, relational identities, and definitions of the situation.“ The first of 
these elements, the rules of interpretation, refers to the recognition of power: 
“the way different objects and past instances of power are interpreted and pre-
sented become important aspects of power.“ This means that certain material 
resources do not generate power without the recognition of the actors that these 
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resources in question are conceptualised as power. Realists and constructivists 
do not understand power resources in the same way. For constructivists power 
resources that yield power do so, because they symbolise power.115  
 
Acknowledging the symbolic dimension connected to power resources, an 
identity as a certain kind of state can be acquired or objectified by the posses-
sion of material artefacts. In the field of military power, material possessions 
related to armed forces may be seen as the primary constitutive factors.116 
When this view is compared to the individual-centred approaches to IR, one 
would emphasise the symbolic, socially shared meanings of material posses-
sions and the way that these possessions operate as material symbols for iden-
tity117, without neglecting the instrumental possibilities of material factors to 
have an impact with their intrinsic properties. Thus, one should pay attention to 
social interaction in its direct and symbolic variants. 
 
Conceptualising military power from the perspective of symbols, the emer-
gence, framing, reproduction, and manipulation of symbols become central is-
sues in research: “power resources are not so important because of their inher-
ent powers, but because they symbolise power.”118 In day-to-day relations be-
tween states symbols serve as taken-for-granted media of politics because 
shared indicators of power, resolve, or hostility (to mention just a few) are 
treated as objective features of agents and/or structure. The social intersubjec-
tive character of these symbols is easily forgotten or not recognised at all due to 
their quality of representing the ‘natural’ order of things. This reified version of 
symbols as naturalised media of politics is opened up in this study and the 
emergent quality of symbols as path-dependent and context-bound
 is high-
lighted.119 Symbols are not only the means of politics however. They constitute 
also the end of politics, since manipulating them may be one way of influencing 
others.  
 
During the Cold War nuclear weapons were important means of gaining and 
maintaining status as a super-power120. The unimaginable destructive capacity 
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of the nuclear arsenals in the two blocs made little sense from a perspective that 
focuses solely on rational actors pursuing their security interests. The develop-
ment, acquisition, and ability to deliver those nuclear devices, doubtless pro-
vided the two protagonists with formal status (identity) as a superpower. The 
Cold War era hostilities between the superpower-centred military-ideological 
blocs took place on the symbolical level in addition to the physical level that 
has been emphasised so much in research. Similarly one can see the Cold War 
era détente and dialogue between superpowers as a symbolic move to ac-
knowledge the mutually recognised legitimacy of the ‘other’ as an opponent. 121 
 
The fact that some third-world countries place tremendous financial burdens on 
their economies by buying modern weapon systems beyond their ‘effective’ 
means of using them shows symbolic politics at play. Of course it is sometimes 
difficult to show that certain military hardware is not the best used money in 
instrumental terms, but one can with reasonable accuracy show that some mod-
ern systems are purchased because they symbolise sovereignty and modernity 
of the state. Wendt and Barnett maintain that in the global military culture, so-
phisticated military technologies in the form of advanced weapon systems have 
become appreciated more (in terms of modernity and status) than would be ex-
pected solely on their instrumental value. Elites in the third world “have been 
conditioned by this [global military] culture to attach symbolic value to such 
technologies, to see them as a preferred means for addressing security prob-
lems.”122 
 
The behavioural norms, the second of Forsberg’s structural elements of power, 
refer to norms on how to use power and how to confront the actions of the 
powerful (and also how to deal with the actions of the less powerful). The be-
havioural norms are the ‘rules of the game’ that tell the actors how they might 
deal with different situations.123  
 
The identities of the actors give them an understanding of their position in a so-
cial relationship (in international politics). What Forsberg calls relational identi-
ties, one of the elements of socially constructed structural power, is also accen-
tuated by Wendt: To analyse “the social construction of international politics is 
to analyse how processes of interaction produce and reproduce the social struc-
tures ... that shape actors’ identities and interests and the significance of their 
material contexts.”124 A good example of the understanding of actors’ identities 
is the (mutual) distinction between great and small powers. it is noteworthy that 
an actor can take on several identities, depending on the situation at hand. Al-
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though identities may and do change over time, they are based on social and 
material interaction. The interests of actors are formed on the basis of identi-
ties. They are defined in the process of defining situations.125 
 
Morgenthau defined interests as power, while for Waltz the distribution of ca-
pabilities (power) determined outcomes within the international system while 
holding state interests constant. Wendt criticises these formulations by noting 
that interests should not be taken as given by definition, as Morgenthau and 
Waltz did. Wendt’s remarks on power do not deny the importance of the distri-
bution of capabilities that are so important to Waltzian neorealism. What they 
do deny is the treatment of states’ interests as given and permanent. Although 
during the Cold War the situation might have been best described by realism 
(whether by classical realism or by neorealism), this was only a historically 
contingent situation with a unique distribution of interests within the interna-
tional system. For Wendt “power only explains what it explains insofar as it is 
given meaning by interest.”126  
 
The last element of socially constructed structural power presented by Forsberg 
relates to definitions of the situation127, which “have effects of power. They tell 
what sort of power is significant, what identities to adopt, and what norms are 
relevant.“128 The shared definition of the situation is often based on a routine 
interpretation of events – the Cold War being an example of a rather stable and 
routine way to conceptualise the international situation in general – at least until 
recently. The Cold War was a cultural construct, in which the enmity between 
the two ideological poles constituted the identities and interests of agents in any 
particular policy-relevant situation. The US and the SU acted according to their 
socially constructed Cold War era identities and interests, helping thus to sus-
tain the notion of the Cold War.129 But this routine quality of many shared defi-
nitions of situations does not cover all aspects of the way international agents 
come to terms with the prevailing ‘reality’ of the international system. As 
Wendt has noted, sometimes “situations are unprecedented in our experience, 
and in these cases we have to construct their meaning, and thus our interests, 
by analogy or invent them de novo.”130 
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Thus, a shared definition of the situation does not emerge automatically – upon 
the command of the powerful. Rather, a particular interpretation of the situation 
may become dominant due to the efforts of one or several agents, but this pre-
vailing interpretation of the situation emerges out of interaction, and in the 
process of defining the situation, the social structure of the international system 
– the shadow of history – plays on important role. Historical examples and les-
sons facilitate certain framings of the situation – a process that Guzzini de-
scribes as “governance through collective memory”.131 In addition, power rela-
tions within the international system may change with the changing shared 
definition of the situation.132
 An internationally shared definition of a ‘New 
World Order’ empowers norms, rules for recognising power, and identities that 
differ from those of ‘the Cold War’133 or ‘the Global War on Terror’. Similarly 
the shared understanding that ‘a genocide’ was underway in Sudan in 2004, 
rather than it being ‘an internal matter of a sovereign state’ had direct policy 
implications for the international society.  It is important to note that all of the 
four elements of constructivist power analysis listed above – rules of interpreta-
tion, behavioural norms, relational identities, and definitions of the situation – 
are based on shared understandings, not just one actor’s self-image or its image 
of the others. These shared understandings are not necessarily or even most of 
the time co-operative and they can emerge through confrontation as well as 
through cooperation.   
 
Agents define a particular policy-relevant situation in interaction, and may 
eventually arrive at a shared definition or at a more or less contested one. One 
assumption guiding this research is that the notion of ‘the Cold War era’ was 
widely accepted.134 It is also assumed that during the Cold War era, the proc-
ess of reproducing – rather than transforming – the social structure
 of the in-
ternational system  (the logic of a hostile and threat-penetrated superpower 
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confrontation) was the rule rather than the exception.135 From this perspective, 
the widely acknowledged end of the Cold War was a “reproduction crisis, 
where the context is perceived as contradicting the originating conditions of a 
practice”.136 This reproduction crisis questioned the matured Cold War era 
identities, the shared rules and norms, as well as the shared understandings of 
war and military power.  
 
 
4.3.1. Power and Military Power Defined 
 
Power is a widely and wildly used concept in IR. The variety of meanings 
given to it in IR research is impressive. Usually, it is equated with control, 
causing intentional effects on others, and the possibility to prevail in a conflict. 
Understanding it as a capacity to cause effects makes it possible to study inter-
national politics in a broad way.137 Power does not have to be exercised in or-
der to become an object of research. The anticipated reactions of others are 
also included in this definition, thus allowing the view that power is based on 
resources, both material and nonmaterial. In constructivist analysis, power is 
not something externally measurable or simply the sum of subjective evalua-
tions of different agent; instead power is socially constructed by practices.138 
Whether some agent is seen to be powerful depends on material capabilities 
and shared understandings in the international system. Power is seen to be ac-
quired by the possession of those resources of power that symbolise power. 
The rules that define what counts as power or which resources come to symbol-
ise power emerge and become meaningful in the interaction of agents and by 
virtue of their intersubjective understanding that some resources yield power 
more that others.  
 
The constructivist framing of power makes it possible to understand power not 
only in a zero-sum way as negative power, where the power holder gets some-
one to do something he would not have otherwise done, but also in a positive 
fashion, where the end result might be mutually beneficial. To make the link be-
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tween systemic and domestic levels, strategic resources can be conceptualised 
as those resources that are understood as important to the advancement of the 
actor’s interests and the possession of which an actor is trying to increase 
and/or the significance of which the actor is trying to advance in the shared un-
derstandings in the international system. If the importance of these strategic re-
sources is intersubjectively shared among agents, they may be labelled power 
resources.  
 
Moving on to military power, the traditional (realist) perspective emphasises 
armaments, personnel, money spent on defence, and level of military technol-
ogy139. One could also add a more ambiguous (non-material or not easily opera-
tionalisable) category of status or prestige into the equation of military power, 
although more in a sense of portraying military power in the first place than as 
factors constituting it. The way that realism arrives at these indicators of mili-
tary power comes from history and common sense: states have learned that in a 
conflict-prone world they cannot trust each other and that the way to bolster 
one’s own power is to rely on increasing one’s military capabilities. The way 
that this (simple) learning takes place is assured by the rationality of the states 
in question.  
 
From a constructivist perspective, military power depends on the existence of 
military force, but does not equal it. Military power stresses the political rela-
tionship between actors where military force accentuates military capabilities. 
The notion that “the use of military force represents the breakdown of military 
power”140 offers a starting point for the constructivist argument concerning the 
nature of power in general and military power specifically. Constructivism 
would add to this notion that future conceptions of military power are affected 
by current social and material structural conditions and subsequent actions, 
including the use of force.  
 
Military power, as a sub-category of power, is understood here as being con-
stituted in and given meaning by, the continuous interaction of states related 
to the organising, maintenance, or use of armed forces in the international 
arena. Using a constructivist perspective and defining military power as a ca-
pacity to cause effects by means of organising, maintaining, or using armed 
forces
 will avoid the main problem with the mainstream power analysis141 con-
cerning the reduction of military power to material military capabilities. This 
would make it possible to arrive at an understanding of military power that is 
related to the evolving process of reproducing or transforming agents’ identi-
ties, interests, and the collective symbolic meanings by means of interaction be-
tween agents. The U.S.-led war against Iraq in 1991 under a U.N. mandate may 
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have changed the symbolic value attached to different capabilities (weapon sys-
tems, personnel, etc.) in generating power, but it may also have changed the 
way states see the possibilities of intervening into the affairs of others militarily 
or the way that they identify themselves with others, which in turn has conse-
quences for the way they see their interests within the international system.  
 
While the international arena is the venue where agents ‘define’ (i.e. reproduce 
or transform) the resources that symbolise power (power resources), it is at the 
domestic level that an agent (a state) defines those power resources that it tries 
to acquire and accumulate and whose importance it tries to advance in the in-
ternational arena (i.e. the strategic resources). In other words, the standards of 
power are set by the intersubjective understandings of states in the interna-
tional arena
 and those understandings form the basis for developing the re-
sources necessary for the advancement of the state’s interests.  
 
 
4.4. Stating the Constructivist Argument 
 
Much of the difference that constructivist theory provides is based on ontology. 
Ontological conceptions direct researchers’ explanatory interests, and the con-
structivist challenge to materialism and utilitarian rationalism in general and 
neorealism or neoliberalism in particular is largely based on the ontological dif-
ference and its consequences for the substance of theoretical explanatory work. 
From this, a picture of international politics emerges in which “rational actors 
maximizing a utility function rooted in material interests cannot adequately ac-
count for observed behaviors by state actors.”142 
 
 
4.4.1. General Framework 
 
[T]he task of power analysis is not to measure but to reveal the structures of 
meaning.143
 
 
The constructivist ontology of mutual constitution between agents and structure 
provides the basis for this theoretical research. Neither ontological component 
is reduced to the other. In this study, the structure of the international system is 
composed of three elements that Alexander Wendt calls shared knowledge, ma-
terial capabilities, and practices144. In a way, the era after the Cold War has re-
opened shared knowledge as an object of study when defining power in the in-
ternational system145. Based on this, the distribution of material capabilities has 
effects because of the meanings generated by the social structure (shared 
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knowledge or culture) of the system, reproduced or transformed by practices. 
The main features of this shared knowledge in the international arena are 
norms, rules for recognising power, and a shared set of identities and subse-
quent interests. The position and relationship of the last two in the list of shared 
knowledge is more complex than the statement above gives credit for. Agents’ 
identities operate at the agent level, influencing agents’ interests, but a set of 
identities, an identity matrix, which is more or less shared among the agents 
within the system is also part of the shared knowledge described previously. 
Similarly, a shared set of acceptable interests is a structural property that is 
subject to reproduction or transformation. The interests of an individual agent 
are for analytical purposes agent-level properties as well. This distinction be-
comes necessary in undertaking empirical research, since procedures that affect 
the policies (practices) chosen by an agent are dependent on system-level struc-
tural causes as well as on domestic political causes. Both need to be addressed 
when providing analytical histories of emergence – historically sensitive expla-
nations of international events.146  
 
Actions of states and other agents are socially constituted and made meaningful 
by the structure of the international system. As rational agents pursue goals that 
they value using means that they consider appropriate, the socially constituted 
goals and means for achieving them are defined in interaction with other agents. 
When an agent commits an act, there may be conscious and unconscious rea-
sons for that particular action, although rationalistions of the ‘chosen’ act may 
differ from these reasons. Once committed, the act will have consequences for 
future structural conditions of actions – through the dialectical mechanisms of 
reproduction or transformation described earlier in this chapter. The conse-
quences of an action may be intended, but it can also have unintended conse-
quences. It is therefore the case that conscious and/or unconscious reasons for 
action may lead to intended as well as unintended consequences. These conse-
quences will influence future possibilities of action. As has been explained, the 
extent to which definitions of the situation are shared may vary from actor to 
actor and thus may lead to different interpretations of possibilities for action. 
Similarly, norms and rules do not form a totally conformable social structure 
that can be interpreted unambiguously. Rather, norms and rules are at least par-
tially contradictory, and thus meaningful action by an agent is bound to be in-
consistent with some elements of the social structure. 
 
The outlined relationship between agents and structure has at least two conse-
quences for empirical research. First, the structural conditions of action need to 
be understood as material causes of outcomes, which means that structure – in 
its social and material qualities – makes many actions possible and at the same 
time structure makes some actions more preferable or expected than others. 
Second, the structural implications get their salience in the meaningful action 
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of agents: the reasons that agents have for committing certain actions are the 
efficient causes of outcomes. Explanation thus entails knowledge about the 
meanings that agents assign to their actions in a social setting. Since this re-
search is interested in the redefinitions of military power in a timeframe of a 
more than a decade, the focus is on the transformation of structural constitutive 
rules of military power. To be able to provide an explanation of the changes in 
these constitutive rules after the Cold War, empirical research needs to address 
the causally efficient reasons of agents in different instances that relate to the 
use or publicly criticised non-use of military means to cause effects in addition 
to the structural ‘causes’ or components that made the action possible. These 
causally efficient reasons are presented as interests in Figure 4.1. 
 
So far, some terminological tensions have arisen in the conceptualisation of the 
structure of the international system. Such concepts as social structure, idea-
tional structure, normative structure, culture of the international system, and 
shared knowledge have been used synonymously throughout this text – as ar-
ticulated by several constructivist scholars. Referring to Figure 4.1, which pre-
sents the agent-structure framework of this research, the core concepts will 
need to be redefined next in order to avoid further difficulties and to facilitate 
empirical research based on the framework that has been developed in this 
chapter. Now the concept of international structure will be used here to refer 
to the whole structural component of the international system. It is constituted 
by two components: social structure and material structure of the international 
system. The material structure is embedded in the social structure. The 
constitutive elements of the social structure are the ‘ideational’ components of 
norms, rules for recognising power, an intersubjective set of identities and an 
intersubjective set of interests. These ideational components are dependent on 
the prevailing definition of the situation, which is intersubjective in nature. If 
the situation is not perceived similarly by all agents (i.e. the definition of the 
situation is not shared)147, then several ‘semi-intersubjective’ definitions may 
prevail. The least shared definition of the situation is one where every agent has 
its own definition of the situation, and none is shared by any other agent. If this 
is the case, then definition of the situation is not a matter of social structure, but 
rather an individual agent-level phenomenon. In such a case the effects of the 
social structure become less important and more explanatory power is trans-
ferred to the domestic, i.e. agent, level.148 
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The material structure of the international system is given meaning by the so-
cial structure. It consists of the material resources (capabilities) that are distrib-
uted within the system. The components of material structure have intrinsic 
powers of their own, which means that material resources constituting the ma-
terial structure may have causal  effects. Their effects are not, however, only 
causal in nature. Instead, because they are embedded in the emergent social 
structure of the system, material resources also have constitutive effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. The Constructivist framework of this research149 
 
In terms of Figure 4.1 above, the international structure is a framework for ac-
tion. It consists of a “particular combination of thought patterns, material condi-
tions and human institutions” and “has a certain coherence among its ele-
ments.”150 
 
 
4.4.2. Methodology and Methods 
 
The methods that should be used by constructivists in social scientific research 
are not largely agreed upon151. Nevertheless, many scholars admit that one 
should not make fixed rules in advance that result in the rejection of certain 
methods just because they are not suitable. Instead, one should be question-
driven and acknowledge the usefulness of both causal and constitutive theories 
(or methodologies), with their different research questions. In the case of causal 
explanation, why-questions may be answered, but in order to answer them we 
should get to know the reasons that made the why possible. For this, one can 
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search for generative mechanisms (causal complexes). This sort of argumenta-
tion, proposed by Wendt, does not deny the possibility of using ‘positivist 
methods’, but encourages doing so only when the research problem requires 
that.152 
 
Concerning military power, constitutive and causal explanations have signifi-
cant differences that will influence formulation of the research questions. The 
difference between constitutive and causal explanations is in fact one of the 
features that have animated the research agenda of this study. Positivist causal 
explanations of military power lead to equating or converging military power 
with military force. Causal explanations provide interesting insights and knowl-
edge that are conducive to a problem-solving perspective. From this causal per-
spective, what constitutes military power, is a matter of definition, and then the 
task of researcher is to explain outcomes based on this premise. An ‘exact’ or 
‘correct’ definition of military power is significant since research results are 
highly dependent upon it.  
 
Constitutive explanations of military power do not begin with a definition. 
They rather end with one.
 The way that intersubjective conceptualisations of 
military power are formed or emerge is the goal of research. Similarly how cer-
tain ‘key’ resources and past actions are bestowed with significance and im-
portance in constituting military power
 is part of the research object, instead of 
one of the research premises. Constitutive explanations of military power, I ar-
gue, bring politics back into the strategic analysis.  
 
Furthermore, I find distinction made by Guba and Lincoln between methodol-
ogy
 and methods quite credible. The former is understood as an “overall strat-
egy for resolving the complete set of choices or options available to the in-
quirer”, where as the latter are “tools and techniques”. The point Guba and 
Lincoln make is that while research from positivist and constructivist paradigms 
can rely on similar tools (methods), the way that these tools are used, and the 
way information provided by these tools is used, varies depending on the para-
digm: Although “it may be not possible to label an individual a positivist simply 
because he or she is using survey instrument, or a constructivist simply because 
he or she is conducting an interview, those persons know (or should know) 
from which paradigm they operate, and that knowledge has significant conse-
quences for the ways in which those tools are used.” From this perspective, one 
could read Wendtian constructivism in such a way that one is free to use all 
possible methods in order to gain knowledge, but one should also acknowledge 
that the paradigm one is operating within guides the use of these methods and 
how acquired information is dealt with.153 
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To study power in general and military power in particular from a constructivist 
perspective is to challenge the dominant, realist-based understanding of power. 
This move includes a new framework for power and a differing understanding 
of the international system and its structure. The systemic aspect of my study 
has been presented in Figure 4.1. In order to address the criticism that the struc-
turation theory is not capable of dealing with agents and structures in empirical 
research, I shall use a model of morphogenetic cycles. This will facilitate a 
study of agents and structures consecutively on a temporal axis, without losing 
the mutually constitutive logic154 of agents and structures. This methodology 
simplifies the reality of continuous reproduction or transformation of structure 
and its recursive effects on agents on the one hand, but it enables one to pro-
ceed with the logic of mutual constitution on the other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. The methodology of morphogenetic cycles155 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
ism, but that these methods are applied differently (= different methodology) due to the dif-
ferent guiding principles of their paradigm. It is noteworthy that differentiating between 
methods and methodology can cause confusion due to the general habit of using them as 
synonyms. 
154
 Note that when Margaret Archer criticises Giddens’ structuration theory of central con-
flation, she observes that “the general principle of mutual constitution is entirely unobjec-
tionable.” See Archer (1995), p. 87. I subscribe to the general principle of mutual constitu-
tion, relying on morphogenetic cycles as a methodology for research.  
155 Modified from Carlsnaes (1992), p. 260. See also Archer (1995), p. 76 and 82. 
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The morphogenetic methodology chosen for this study of military power points 
to the importance of international structure and agents operating within the in-
ternational system. Focusing first on the former and then on the latter is an ana-
lytical choice that makes empirical research possible. It enables us to see the 
evolution of the international system, and military power in it, as a process. 
This dynamic process is evolving without a predetermined direction and realis-
ing this makes one understand that the task of empirical constructivist research 
is to give an explanation not only of the things that have happened, but also of 
the possibilities that are open in certain periods of interest during this process. 
Explanations provided by constructivist accounts of IR do acknowledge the 
historical path of events and their effects on the present conditions of the inter-
national system156, but they also note that actions taken by agents are continu-
ously directing that historical path into the future, although in many (or most) 
cases without any conscious ‘grand design’. The morphogenetic methodology 
thus acknowledges the importance of agents and practices, but does not ad-
vance an explanatory format that conceptualises outcomes as resulting solely 
from individual decisions and actions. Rather, the way that the order of events 
affects outcomes at a particular time is introduced into the explanation.157 
 
The constitutive research questions of this study point to the importance of in-
terpretation and thus understanding158. Relying on morphogenetic methodology, 
I will emphasise the interpretive, qualitative methods that aim at understanding 
the causal mechanisms that underlie the changing meanings of military 
power.159  
 
This approach resonates with what Margaret Archer calls an “explanatory for-
mat [that] consists in providing analytical histories of emergence.” This means 
that in order to explain certain outcomes, one makes reference to generative 
mechanisms and “concrete contingencies which intervened to produce particu-
lar outcomes.” From the perspective of morphogenetic cycles, analytical histo-
ries are narratives that consist of three phases. The first phase, structural condi-
tioning, brings forth the circumstances (material and ideational) that agents con-
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 March and Olsen (1998), p. 959; Archer (1998b), p. 375. Also in Archer (1995), p. 165. 
The term explanation as it is used here shares a similarity with what King, Keohane, and 
Verba call  “to provide an insightful description of complex events”. See King and Keohane 
and Verba (1994), p. 44. 
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 See Aminzade (1992). 
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 On understanding, see for example Hollis and Smith (1991b), pp. 1-15, 68-91, 198-216. 
Concerning the distinction between explaining and understanding in social sciences and IR, I 
would categorise my research as an effort to understand. Drawing on Martin Hollis’ views, I 
stress the importance of social structures (rules) and the practices (decisions) of actors. See 
Hollis and Smith (1991b), p. 203. 
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 On interpretation, understanding and thick description, see for example Denzin (1989), 
pp. 48-124. On p. 72: Interpretation “sets forth the meaning of the event, statement or proc-
ess. In understanding, a person grasps the meaning of what has been interpreted.” The italics 
are mine. Note that morphogenetic cycles do not necessitate interpretive understanding. See 
Archer (1995), p. 327. 
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front in their interactions. The second phase, social interaction, is conditioned 
by the first one, but not determined by it. In this phase of the narrative, agents 
interact and their powers concretely come to play. The last phase, structural 
elaboration, refers to that part of the narrative where structural conditions are 
either reproduced or transformed via agents’ interactions (in phase two). This 
type of analytical history of emergence is not predictive. Rather, it is explana-
tory in a retrodictive form. It is in contrast to historical narration due to a (criti-
cal / scientific) realist insistence on unobservable generative mechanisms. Simi-
larly it is in contrast to ‘positivist grand narratives’ since analytical histories are 
sceptical of regularities in social sciences and endorse “intervention of contin-
gencies” as well as the corrigible nature of these histories.160 
 
From a broader perspective than morphogenetic cycles, analytic narratives are 
sensitive to the sequence of events and assign causal power to temporal con-
nections among actions. Practices of states or other agents in the international 
arena are not viewed as independent cases of value/interest maximisation or op-
timisation that should be analysed to discover correlations. The notion of path-
dependence
 
implies the importance of previous actions, and therefore of pre-
vious structural conditions, in understanding the meaning of a particular ac-
tion.
 Historical, non-linear evolution cannot thus be overlooked when explain-
ing social action, since social action takes place within a temporal dimension. A 
search for meaning, sequence, and contingency replaces the search for univer-
sality and predictive laws in explaining social action. The inclusion of historical 
trajectories into the explanatory framework does not mean that in order to con-
struct a scientific explanation one should rely on a single developmental path 
that is contextualised based on present conditions. Instead, historically situated 
actions should be conceptualised within reversible (and multiple) trajectories, 
where the emergence, development, and disappearance of these trajectories in-
form the process of international politics: present conditions were achieved due 
to the temporal process of structural conditioning and agents’ practices. At any 
point in time the path might have been different161 due to agents’ actions and 
subsequent structural transformations.162  
 
The research strategy outlined above resonates with what David Dessler calls a 
positivist particularising research strategy or a reconstructive explanatory ac-
count, where “the researcher explains an event by detailing the sequence of 
happenings leading up to it. … The event is explained as the end-point of a 
concrete historical sequence.” The point of demarcation between this research 
and Dessler’s reconstructive account of explanation is found in the latter’s 
treatment of component laws. According to Dessler, “reconstructive accounts 
explain by showing that the event in question was to be expected in the circum-
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 Archer (1995), pp. 326-7, 343-344, quotes on p. 327, 343. See also Tilly (1981), p. 62. 
161
 In other words, there are suppressed historical alternatives. See Tilly (1981), p. 212-213. 
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 Aminzade (1992), especially pp. 456-458, 462-467; See also Trachtenberg (1991), pp. 
261-262. 
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stances in which it occurred.”163 From my perspective, this statement is plausi-
ble only if the event in question was one of several possible events to be ex-
pected in the circumstances in which it occurred. In other words, meaningful 
action by an agent, leading to an outcome, may have conscious and uncon-
scious motives and may have intended as well as unintended consequences. In-
stead of focusing on causal conjunctions (in addition to the reconstruction of 
the historical pathway), the chosen research strategy accentuates sufficient but 
unnecessary causal complexes that produce outcomes.164  
 
In order to provide explanations in the form of causal complexes and relying on 
morphogenetic methodology, I will pay attention to the following explanatory 
elements and their relationship: socially positioned actors, norms and rules of 
the international system, resources (social and material), and historically struc-
tured meaningful action (practice).  
 
The research methods of this study are qualitative. The empirical part of this 
research will be devoted to a case study of the process of continuous reproduc-
tion or transformation of definitions of military power after the Cold War. The 
methodological choice outlined above points to the importance of a deep his-
torical understanding of the events to be explained. In order to explain social 
action one has to take into account the meanings that actors attach to their so-
cial reality, being themselves a part of that social reality. A deep and penetrat-
ing analysis of actors’ actions and meanings can justify the use of case study 
methods and in some cases – depending on the research questions – even make 
one prefer them.165 
 
Good social scientific theories “outline a process that tells a story”.166 Qualita-
tive case study methods enable one to concentrate on social action in a more 
flexible and deeper way than quantitative analysis and thus – from the perspec-
tive of this research – make it possible to trace the ‘development’ of political 
definitions of military power in the post Cold War era.167 The case study in Part 
III of this study draws upon process tracing, which is a “method for identifying 
and testing causal mechanisms.” It is applicable especially in case studies since 
it can shed light on the process through which causal mechanisms operate by 
mapping out causal paths that correspond with the outcome of the case study. 
Instead of trying to aggregate variables into single indices, case studies that use 
process tracing highlight the qualitative treatment of variables. Process tracing 
analyses “data on the causal mechanisms, or processes, events, actions, expec-
tations, and other intervening variables, that link putative causes to observed 
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effects.” It is intellectually linked to historical explanation, but is distinguished 
from it by its analytical theoretical focus. Relying on theoretically directed indi-
vidual case studies that provide explanations of the social world, process trac-
ing enables one to make causal inferences within the chosen case as it identi-
fies the causal chain that instantiated the phenomenon in question.168 
 
Using process tracing to explain outcomes entails shedding light on the process 
or sequence of events that instantiated the outcomes in question. It does not re-
ject the idea of equifinality – the idea that several causal paths may lead to the 
same outcome – and in combination with cross-case comparisons, it can un-
cover different causal paths that lead to same outcome. Including causal 
mechanisms into causal inferences and combining process tracing methods with 
case studies is one way to lessen the dependence of research on assumed states 
of affairs (but not to eliminate these assumptions). The rational choice theory’s 
formula of ‘black boxing’ actors and understanding causality by causal effects 
only provides explanations that are scientific and in many respects valuable. 
The decision to apply qualitative research methods – case study, process trac-
ing – and open the black box169 of actor’s identity and motivation arises from a 
different conceptualisation of the relationship between theory an practice and 
from different research interests that animate the research. 
 
Analysing social structure, which gives meaning to the material structure, proc-
ess tracing forms the base of locating existing norms, rules of power, sets of 
shared identities and interests, as well as intersubjective definitions of the situa-
tion. International military discourse (military treaties, declarations, doctrines 
and speeches of main security political actors) is interpreted and conceptualised 
according to speech-act theory, where stating something is not only meant to 
communicate some fact or policy to the ‘audience’ but also to affect the way 
that the situation is conceptualised by the receiver. This means that speech acts 
are indeed equivalents of deeds (actions) in the international arena. There are 
thus two ‘sets of meanings’ that are of interest in this study: one at the level of 
the international system (the intersubjective, social structure), the other at the 
level of the agents (how the situation is conceptualised and what is intended by 
the action).  
 
On the level of social structures, I am interested in more or less shared norms, 
rules of power, as well as in the identities and interests of agents. To make in-
terpretations of these aspects of social structure at some point of time, I will 
analyse the possibly shared definition of the situation and subsequently the ac-
cepted conduct within the international system. One way to analyse this social 
structure, is to see how agents publicly define the situation and to what degree 
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 The ‘black box model’ focuses primarily on the relationship between input and output, 
leaving the transformation processes that operate between them untouched. Thus it fails to 
identify the underlying causal mechanisms. Cf. Chen (1990), p. 18. 
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this situation is perceived similarly by the agents. The nature of the military 
discourse within the system (e.g. whether there is an intersubjective idea of 
who is militarily powerful, what the role of military material and armed forces 
for agents is, or how/under what conditions it is legitimate to use force), can be 
analysed in  the same terms. The key question is to what extent these aspects of 
the social structure are shared, i.e. to what extent is there intersubjective 
agreement on these matters. 
 
The next move is to connect practice to these aspects of the social structure by 
morphogenetic methodology.170
 
This means that actions are contextualised 
and given meaning.
 One then continues this interpretation of the social struc-
ture and subsequent interpretation of the actions embedded in it thus making a 
‘feedback-loop’ from the action to the structure. In this process it is the task of 
the researcher to establish the action points, i.e. those actions or sets of actions 
that are deemed important for the research and which make the morphogenetic 
cycles methodology useful.171 To facilitate my empirical research, I will focus 
on those instances of international practices (or publicly voiced lack of them) 
that, from the perspective of my theoretical framework, have bearing on the 
way that military power is given meaning. This means that the continuous proc-
ess of the mutual constitution of structure and agents – where practices are the 
link from the latter to the former – will be examined from the perspective of the 
use or the debated non-use of military force by the west. This ‘limited’ vision 
of the world is necessary for practical reasons and is based on methodological 
choice.172 
 
In making interpretations of the ‘content’ of the social structure, agents’ ex-
pressed shared views of acceptable or ‘right’ behaviour and/or expressed 
shared reading of the situation reveal some norms which are shared. Similarly, 
justifications of disputed actions can be seen to represent the legitimate norms 
of the social structure. The rhetoric of international politics that is intended to 
legitimate action that is considered to be ‘wrong’, controversial or doubted, 
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points to those intersubjective understandings that the international society 
shares.173  
 
In addition to the shared definitions of the situation and norms within the social 
structure, the rules for recognising power and their subsequent change are also 
analysed. This brings power resources and power outcomes into focus from a 
symbolic perspective. These power rules are in many instances more invisible 
than definitions of the situation and norms, which become apparent in public 
discourse and dialogue between agents. The existence and effects of these rules 
for recognising power are inferred from past occasions of the exercise of power 
within the international system. These occasions show how some agent has 
been able to utilise or develop some resources or has accomplished some de-
sired outcomes such that these exercises of power symbolise the power of that 
agent. It is also possible that some resources (material or immaterial) become 
widely understood as military power resources (and thus symbolise military 
power) due to the way that they have been framed in the international context 
even without them having been ‘actually’ used. Similarly to the language of se-
curitization and its conceptualisation of existential threats, a resource or some 
resources may symbolise power and thus have effects if it is widely shared that 
the resource in question yields power even if there is no equivalent ‘intrinsic’ 
quality in the resource itself: certain resources may be ‘militarised’ in speech 
acts.  
 
As certain resources and outcomes become intersubjectively viewed as being 
more and more central to the definition of power, certain resources and out-
comes symbolise power more than others. Any agent holding those valued re-
sources is seen to possess power. It is the intersubjective understanding con-
cerning these resources and outcomes that creates power. In other words, they 
symbolise power. 
  
Regarding the material structure, nothing compels one to choose qualitative or 
quantitative methods a priori. The analysis can proceed once the rules of 
power (part of the social structure) have been identified. Resource analysis is 
based on the existing catalogues of military material, manpower, and spending, 
as well as on declarations and speeches concerning the modernisation of exist-
ing force structure and the development and fielding of new capabilities. This 
means that one has to state the preceding instances of power that effect the 
way that military power is conceived of currently: one thus contextualises 
military power up to a certain  point in time and grants the historical path of 
events some explanatory status.
 Analysing the material structure that has bear-
ing on the intersubjective definition of military power within the international 
system includes statistical data. The formula for making these mathematical op-
erations has to be understood as a social construct that is continuously repro-
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duced or transformed by emergent consequences (mostly unintended) of 
agents’ collective actions. 
 
 
4.5. Research Questions – First Formulation 
 
The constructivist framework presented so far directs the focus of this study 
through the following tenets: 
 
1. The international realm has two dimensions: one material and the other 
social. The social domain gives meaning to the material domain. This re-
lationship was neglected in the mainstream realism-dominated IR studies 
throughout the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has provided access 
to the social character of international politics – the very ‘essence’ of 
politics. 
 
2. States do not possess predetermined and static identities. Their identities 
are social constructions that are reproduced or transformed in interac-
tion. Identities are thus in flux. 
 
3. States do not possess predetermined and static interests. Their interests 
are also social constructs that are tied to the identities of actors and so 
the social structure. To claim that states always maximise power or secu-
rity is to reify some state’s interest at a particular time – the Cold War 
era for example. 
 
4. States and other agents are disposed to certain expressions of identities 
and interests that are viewed as possible under the prevailing structural 
conditions. In addition to the material inhibitions and constraints of the 
international structure, socially shared norms and rules empower agents 
and make certain expressions of identities and interests more likely than 
others. The international structure thus constrains, but also enables, ac-
tions that reproduce or transform this structure. 
 
Based on these general constructivist assumptions, I can make three construc-
tivist assumptions concerning military power in the international system: 
 
5. As norms, identities, and interests change, international actors (states) 
reformulate the meaning of military power within the community that 
they are operating in. Shared understandings concerning military power 
are thus not (re)defined in a vacuum, but within a ‘wider’ set of norms 
and shared understandings that emerge in interaction.  
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6. Military power is a historical construct and has no universal or eternal 
qualities. Shared conceptualisations of military power are affected not 
only by the development of new technologies and changes in the distri-
bution of material resources, but also by the changes in the shared un-
derstandings concerning military threats, military objectives (interests), 
and means. Actors redefine military power over and over again through 
actions and practices that are overtly or implicitly military. 
 
7. With regard to military capabilities, one should not only focus on the 
functional aspects of these capabilities (i.e. how they can be used di-
rectly to cause effects), but also on their symbolic aspects, i.e. how pos-
sessing/developing certain capabilities moulds the identity of their owner 
and the entire social structure of the international system. 
 
Based on these constructivist premises, I put forward the following research 
questions: 
 
1. How have shared western conceptualisations of war changed after the 
end of the Cold War? 
 
2. What are the constituent elements of military power in the contemporary 
international system, especially from a western perspective?  
 
3. How did these military (research question 2) capabilities become repre-
sentative of military power? In other words, through which processes 
have Cold War era conceptualisations of military power been trans-
formed in the post-Cold War era? 
 
In order to answer the above-mentioned research questions, the following hy-
potheses are examined: 
 
1. In the wake of the Cold War the shared western conceptualisations of 
war have undergone a change.
 This change has been expressed in a 
shift from territorial defence to new mission of war. This hypothesis will 
be elaborated in Chapter 5.  
 
2. Changes in shared conceptualisations of war imply also a change – or 
‘pressure’ for a change – in shared conceptualisations of military 
power.  
 
3. In the post-Cold War redefinitions of military power, the role of the 
United States has been the most significant, although it has not been in 
the position to dictate the post-Cold War era rules of the international 
system or shared definitions of military power.174 
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Combined with a morphogenetic methodology, the constructivist theoretical 
framework of this study points to a qualitative case study approach for the em-
pirical discussion of military power in Chapters 6-8. This means that the theo-
retical framework defines the analytical aspects of a case that will provide an-
swers to the three research questions stated above. In doing so, the theory-
laden quality of observation is acknowledged, as is also the need to explicitly 
state the effects of theoretical preconceptions that guide case selection and re-
search design.175 Cases in this research are understood as “analytical construc-
tions. They are made, not found; invented, not discovered.”176 
 
With the ‘end of the Cold War’ – it is argued here – one can question whether 
the rules of the international system that evolved from the latter parts of the 
1940s until the beginning of the 1990s are still be relevant in the day-to-day 
politics of states in the 1990s and in the beginning of the new millennium.177 
Without assuming that entire Cold War era can be comprehended on the base 
of some fixed and uniform rules that lasted unchanged for some forty-five 
years, the path-dependent methodology chosen for this study – morphogenetic 
cycles – facilitates an analytically feasible way to conceptualise the ‘birth’ and 
‘maturation’ of the relatively stable Cold War era rules of the international sys-
tem – especially from the perspective of the superpowers: 
 
[T]he Cold War could be said to have been path dependent. American efforts 
to deter the Soviet Union through alliances, military buildups, forward de-
ployments and threatening rhetoric, represented the ‘lesson of Munich’ and 
were implemented by leaders who had witnessed the failure of appeasement 
in the 1930s. Appeasement was a reaction to the horrors of World War I and 
the revisionist belief, that gained wide credence in the 1930s, that Wil-
helminian Germany might have been restrained more effectively by a policy 
of reassurance. From Moscow’s perspective, attempts to extend Soviet con-
trol as far as possible were motivated in part by the expectation that World 
War III would have the same cause as World War II: a crisis if capitalism that 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
using military force within a state were expressed by US Secretary of Defence Les Aspin in 
1994: “A new consensus among Americans on using force in the post-Cold War era will not 
emerge overnight.” Annual Report to the President and Congress by Secretary of Defense 
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duction and transformation by practices, such a shared redefinition is possible, and even 
likely. It will not be determined by any single agent, although one or some will be ‘better’ 
positioned than others in this process of redefinition.  
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would prompt a restored Germany, backed by the Anglo-Americans, to attack 
the Soviet Union.178 
 
From the military perspective of this study, the notions of military power – 
whether centring on deterrent nuclear forces or on mechanised conventional 
forces – were challenged by the evolution of the ‘new’ international social 
structure of the 1990s. This became manifest in the early 1990s, when academ-
ics and national policymakers started debating the meaning of the end of the 
Cold War for nations, alliances and the discipline of IR and strategic studies. 
Such phrases as “The End of History”179, “The New World Order”180, “The 
Clash of Civilizations”181 and “The New Strategic Environment”182 all reflect 
the challenging of the rather widely shared rules of the Cold War in the first 
part of the 1990s. 
 
The sudden end of the cold war overturned the political truths of the postwar 
world – truths by which experts had interpreted and understood this world. It 
raised the issue that there might be still deeper forces at work in the relations 
of nations, forces that might invalidate the political truths believed to govern 
the postwar world. At the very least, the events of 1989 pointed to the need 
for looking anew at the world, a task for which the expert, even if willing to 
do so, might not be the best party.183
 
 
Chapter 5 expresses explicitly the linkages between the end of the Cold War, 
the shared and transformed conceptualisations of war in the post-Cold War era, 
as well as the shared understandings of military power through the lenses of the 
changing nature of war. The research questions will then be refined and ‘tested’ 
against a case study on military power.   
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5.  ELABORATING THE FRAMEWORK FOR 
ANALYSING WAR AND MILITARY POWER IN THE 
POST-COLD WAR ERA 
 
  
Chapter 4 spelled out the general constructivist perspective on international 
politics. The essence of this perspective is that in order to understand inter-
national politics, one needs to focus on agents’ practices within the struc-
tural framework that influences their activity. Contrary to some other main-
stream approaches, constructivism centres its attention on the social struc-
ture of the international system in addition to the material structure. Chap-
ter 4 also postulated – in the form of a research hypothesis – that in order to 
approach shared understandings of military power in the international sys-
tem, one can conceptualise shared understandings concerning war – or the 
institution of war – as an instrument when making the analytical move 
from the general social structure towards military power. In other words, 
particular historically sensitive determinants of military power are be-
stowed with meaning in a wider conceptual set of shared ideas – shared 
understandings concerning the nature and essence of war. According to the 
theoretical apparatus developed in this chapter, discourses of war and re-
lated elements of the material structure define possibilities for discourses 
of military power. An attempt is made here to move down from the level of 
international structure (social and material) towards a more analytically 
relevant structure of meaning concerning war and military power. In doing 
so, this chapter draws on the constructivist conceptualisation of war as an 
institution of the international system. It also draws on Thomas Kuhn’s 
concept of ‘paradigm’. 
 
The realist thesis that the more or less evident threat of war within the an-
archical international system characterises the universal ‘environment’ of 
states’ actions is parsimonious, and as a problem-solving premise it offers 
possibilities for a multitude of research questions and answers. However, 
the advantages of assuming an universalistic logic of the international sys-
tem – and the role of war within it – are somewhat compromised when 
evaluating the effects of assumptions on research results: when assump-
tions are correct, then scientific research provides valuable knowledge – 
even for policy-making purposes. But when the assumptions guiding re-
search are flawed or wrong, the scientific guise of the research may legiti-
mate dubious research results that offer flawed pieces of knowledge and 
poor advice for policymaking. The epistemological problem concerning the 
non-existence of universal foundations for evaluating knowledge and truth 
complicates this even further. It is therefore the guiding principle of this 
study that the problem-solving premises of realism concerning war and 
military power are questioned. This does not mean, however, that war or 
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military power has a less important role in the constructivist synthesis pro-
vided in this chapter. 
 
According to the constructivist understanding, war as social activity is an 
institution of the international system. The possibility of distinguishing war 
from general violence, murder, or genocide implicitly acknowledges that 
there are certain constitutive rules that define war vis-à-vis other forms of 
physical violence.1 And according to the constructivist reading of interna-
tional politics, these constitutive – and regulative – rules of war are negoti-
ated within the international system through agents’ interaction in the 
presence of pre-existing rules of war.  
 
The institution of war is a human product, but one which is not controllable 
by individual agents and which escapes these agents by acting back on 
them.2 Some agents – often conceptualised as great powers – are better po-
sitioned than others in a “historical system of rules”3 to achieve their inter-
ests and indeed to effect a redefinition of the rules. 
 
States change the rules by demonstrating, through their words or their ac-
tions, that they are withdrawing their consent from old rules and bestow-
ing it upon new ones, and thus altering the content of custom or estab-
lished practice. The operational rules observed by great powers …  are re-
scinded or changed when these powers show by what they do or say that 
they no longer accept them, or regard their boundaries or limiting condi-
tions as having changed.4 
 
 
5.1. From Institution to the Kuhnian Notion of Paradigm  
 
The juxtaposition of the constructivist understanding that war is a changing 
institution of the international system and the abrupt end of the Cold War 
suggests that a quick and fundamental redefinition of war is possible if ac-
tors agree that their external strategic environment is undergoing rapid and 
far-reaching transformation. This line of thinking is similar to the Kuhnian 
idea of paradigms and scientific revolutions that was introduced in philoso-
phy of science in the 1960s. 
 
Thomas Kuhn coined the concept of ‘paradigm’ in The Structure of Scien-
tific Revolutions (1962). The main point of the book was to advance an un-
                                               
1
 In the words of John Searle, “War … is a war only if people think it is a war.” Searle 
(1995), p. 89. 
2
 See Archer (1995), pp. 174-175. Concerning institutions, see Berger and Luckmann 
(1984), pp. 70-85.  
3
 Bull (1985), p. 55. On great powers, see pp. 200-229. 
4
 Ibid., p. 73. 
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derstanding of the development of science that parted from the traditional 
cumulative understanding of knowledge production. Kuhn’s thesis was that 
instead of accumulating knowledge little by little, scientific revolutions 
change the whole worldview of scientists and that after the revolution – or 
more correctly in conjunction with it – a new basis for science is formed by 
the scientific community. This worldview – a paradigm – serves to define 
the shared core of the discipline’s researchers. Eventually, a paradigm will 
become unstable as anomalies accumulate, and they cannot be neither ex-
plained by it nor can they be assimilated into it. Thus the seeds for a new 
revolution are planted by the paradigm itself. The comfortable time of 
normal science5 then turns into a revolution6 and extraordinary science7, 
and  the formation of a new paradigm. “Led by a new paradigm, scientists 
adopt new instruments and look in new places. Even more important, dur-
ing revolutions scientists see new and different things when looking with 
familiar instruments in places they have looked before.”8 
 
Kuhn emphasised the importance of the research community in creating a 
paradigm. In this respect, assumptions and the worldview inherent in any 
paradigm should not be understood as the acceptance of certain kind of fi-
nal truth, but as recognition of the issues worth investigating, acceptable 
methods for the study of those issues, and possible results of an inquiry 
agreed by the research community. In a way, a community of researchers 
and their competence are implied by a paradigm.9 
 
While Kuhn’s paradigm formulation addressed philosophy of science ques-
tions concerning natural sciences for the most part, he also mentioned the 
possibility of ‘transferring’ his paradigm conceptualisation to other fields 
of social enquiry.10 War can be seen as conceptualised by the shared con-
sensus of actors within the international system – above all its most impor-
tant actors, the states.11 A ‘paradigm of war’12 would consist of shared un-
                                               
5 
”Normal science … is predicated on the assumption that the scientific community 
knows what the world is like.” Kuhn (1975), p. 5. 
6
 ”Scientific revolutions … are the tradition-shattering complements to the tradition-
bound activity of normal science.” Ibid., p. 6. 
7
 ”[N]ormal science repeatedly goes astray. And when it does – when, that is, the pro-
fession can no longer evade anomalies that subvert the existing tradition of scientific 
practice – then begin the extraordinary investigations…” Ibid., p. 6. 
8
 Ibid., quote on p. 111. For a criticism of Kuhn’s paradigm conceptualisation see for 
example Masterman (1970), pp. 61-65. Masterman argues (p. 61) that Kuhn uses the 
word paradigm in “not less than twenty-one different senses”. 
9
 Guzzini (1998), p. 12; Kuhn (1975), pp. 10-22, 176-181. 
10
 Kuhn (1975), pp. 208-210. 
11
 A paradigm of war is not without ‘direct’ link to the practice of war. Owens has noted 
that the part of “preparing for war is to understand it. What is the nature of war? What is 
the character of war? Will war in the future be like war in the past?” Owens (1998), p. 
63. 
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derstandings concerning those threats that may/should be countered with 
war; the ‘nature’ of war; and the way to organise armed force in order to 
wage war. A paradigm of war would mean a shared outlook in relation to 
the nature and use of physical violence in the international system. Actors 
adherent to a different paradigm of war would conceptualise war in differ-
ent ways. Different paradigms would lead to different rationales of waging 
war and different modes of operation in warfare.  
 
When transferring the paradigm framework for the conceptualisation of 
war, the role and ‘nature’ of anomalies – the Kuhnian seeds of scientific 
revolution – is also worth considering. As Kuhn pointed out, the gradual 
emergence of anomalies starts to blur the boundaries of the paradigm. 
When ‘enough’ recognised anomalies emerge that cannot be assimilated 
within the existing scientific paradigm, and when an alternative candidate 
for a new paradigm is promulgated, then a paradigm shift occurs.13 Apply-
ing Kuhn’s logic to the subject of war, when prevailing conceptions of war 
are challenged in so many ways that the existing paradigm of war founders, 
and when an alternative conception of war is promulgated, a change in the 
paradigm of war becomes possible. The promulgation of a new paradigm 
of war is not expected to occur via a formal process during which agents 
consciously and intentionally redefine war. Rather, a paradigm shift occurs 
when enough agents – in many cases unintentionally – ‘accept’ new rules 
of war that emerge in an implicit process of more or less incremental 
change of the pre-existing rules of war. This process of incremental change 
may, however, accelerate or slow, or it may even erupt, resulting in a sud-
den and explicit formulation of a new paradigm of war. The latter comes 
about when the recognised anomalies and the resulting tensions between 
them and the (pre-)existing paradigm of war facilitate agents’ explicit ac-
knowledgment that an essential transformation of the rules of war has actu-
ally taken place. Thus, the process of formulating a new paradigm of war is 
at best only partially controllable by intentional efforts of particular agents. 
Similarly, in the process of paradigm development by anomaly assimila-
tion, and the subsequent revolution that leads to a paradigm shift, acknowl-
edged ‘needs’ and ensuing attempts to steer the emergence of a new para-
digm are made possible by the accretion of anomalies. The process of para-
digm shift is thus hardly ever the result of an explicit conscious effort. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
12
 It could also be called the ‘military paradigm’ or the ‘paradigm of warfare’. Paul 
Herman speaks for example of a “paradigm in military affairs”. See Paul Herman 
(1996), p. 27. For an explicit ‘paradigm of war’ articulation, see Raitasalo and Sipilä 
(2004). For similar constructs of war – without referring to a paradigm – see e.g. van 
Creveld (1991), Warden (1995), Schneider (1995), Lind (2004), Toffler and Toffler 
(1993), Lynn (2003). 
13
 Kuhn (1975), pp. 77-106. 
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The anomalies referred to above can be understood as conceptualisations of 
threats, understandings of the nature of war, and conceptions of military 
power that challenge the existing paradigm. These challenges are mani-
fested in practical situations during wars and related discourses. Anomalies 
will become identifiable, when discourses related to war and concrete 
events in war do not conform to expectations. As an example from the Cold 
War era, the discourse on asymmetric war – and its tangible manifestations 
in Algeria, Vietnam, and Afghanistan to name few – was anomalous vis-à-
vis the Cold War era paradigm of war, but was assimilated into and par-
tially neglected by it due to the highly centred focus on possible nuclear 
war and mechanised conventional war by large armed forces. Since the ma-
jor agents of the Cold War (particularly the superpowers, but also the mili-
tary alliances they led) conceptualised asymmetric war as sporadic, less 
threatening, and not suitable for their own purposes, it remained at the 
margins of the Cold War era paradigm of war.  
 
When transferring the Kuhnian understanding of the growth of knowledge 
from philosophy of science to the more tangible domain of international 
politics and war, one should be aware of what Kuhn says about the nature 
of paradigms: “though quantum mechanics (or Newtonian dynamics, or 
electromagnetic theory) is a paradigm for many scientific groups, it is not 
the same paradigm for them all.”14 Similarly, in a conceptualisation of war 
within the framework of paradigms, a shared paradigm of war does not im-
ply a total agreement among adherents of the paradigm with respect to all 
aspects of war defined by the paradigm. It does imply, however, a ‘general’ 
shared conceptualisation of war. The following Kuhnian understanding of 
the institution of war through the concept of a paradigm of war is based on 
three conceptual and two material factors. According to the constructivist 
logic presented so far, the main – although not exclusive – emphasis will be 
on the conceptual factors that assign bestow elements with meaning. 
 
The first element of a paradigm of war – the shared conceptualisations of 
threats and risks ‘necessitating’ the preparation for war  – does not refer to 
any particular threat or risk faced by an individual actor. Rather, it refers to 
the ‘nature’ of threats or projected risks15 that agents (states) conceptualise 
demanding the organising, equipping, training, and even using armed force 
                                               
14
 Ibid., p. 43. 
15
 See Adam and van Loon (2000), pp. 2-3 “The essence of risk is not that it is happen-
ing, but that it might be happening. … One cannot, therefore, observe a risk as a think-
out-there – risks are necessarily constructed. However, they are not constructed on the 
basis of voluntary imagination … For social scientists, perceptions of risk are intimately 
tied to understandings of what constitutes dangers, threats and hazards and for whom.” 
(Original italics). See also Levitas (2002), p. 201 “the common discourse of risk brings 
the future into a calculative relation to the present.” In other words, a risk denotes a 
dangerous future scenario. 
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against. The shared conceptualisations of threats and risks are thus a more 
general type of threat and risk classification than the rather specific threat 
perceptions of an individual state or an alliance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Elements of a paradigm of war16 
 
During the Cold War, the shared conceptualisations of threats were charac-
terised by large mechanised armed forces of a state or a military alliance 
attacking under the auspices of an ideological confrontation that coloured 
the practical conduct of international politics regardless of the issue in 
question. The Cold War era was – it is assumed in this study – a threat-
based social context for agents as the ‘other’ represented a clear and pre-
sent danger on the existence of the ‘self’. A Threat was clear, concrete, and 
monolithic – despite the rather abstract ideological level of threat ‘above’ 
the more concrete threat posed by the hostile policies and the existence of 
massive armed forces of the opposing coalition. With the end of the Cold 
War there is the possibility that the threat-based social context has evolved 
into risk-based one – an international system with less pressing and mono-
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 Modified from Raitasalo and Sipilä (2004). I first probed the idea of a paradigm-
framework for understanding war in Raitasalo (2002). 
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lithic existing threats that gives rise to more dangerous and numerous 
risks. In this study these risks are understood as socially constructed dan-
gerous future scenarios.17 
 
The analytical difference between threats and risks is based mostly on their 
temporal divergence. Threats are something facing agents now, while risks 
are some possibilistic future scenarios that may – if realised – affect agents 
in the future.18 This temporal difference19, however, does not mean that one 
is more ‘important’ than the other in designating possible policy recom-
mendations: both have their place and need to be taken into consideration 
when analysing a paradigm of war. After all, threats and risks are both so-
cial constructions – although the possibilities for the construction of risks 
are mostly based on existing threats. It would simply be ‘difficult’ to con-
struct a risk that had no link to existing threats whatsoever. In addition to 
the temporal difference between threats and risks, it has been suggested 
that because of globalisation, the risks faced today “cannot be calculated 
with any degree of certainty”.20 This holds particularly if contrasted with 
the Cold War era ‘stable’ threats. 
 
The second element of a paradigm of war – the shared conceptualisations 
of the nature of war – relate to the questions of under what circumstances 
war is a legitimate – and thus a ‘possible’ – option for an actor and when 
waging war, which means are legitimate. Conceptualisations of the nature 
of war thus answer the questions of when (in which circumstances) to wage 
war and how. It has already been noted that threats and risks are social con-
structions. So are the ‘rules’ of war, described above as shared conceptuali-
sations of war. In this context, rules refer to the taken-for-granted nature of 
contemporary warfare and the natural, effective, and legitimate means that 
should serve the purposes of war. During the Cold War, war was conceptu-
alised as an instrument that would be directed against other states and their 
armed forces. War was the means for deterring and stopping the spread of 
the opposing ideology. The use of weapons of mass destruction (chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons) was contemplated and even threatened in 
                                               
17
 Note that this study does not posit that the future has become ‘objectively’ more dan-
gerous than was the case during the Cold War. Rather, it is argued, as the end of the 
Cold War ‘removed’ many of the old and consolidated threats, future risks have become 
more central in the agents’ assessments of their environment than was the case during 
the Cold War.  
18
 Beck (2000), p. 214: “The concept of risk reverses the relationship of the past, present 
and future. …We are discussing and arguing about something which is not the case, but 
could happen if we were not to change course.” 
19
 See van Loon (2000), p. 166 ”risks imply a certain uncertainty, a contingency of con-
ditions, actions and effects that are therefore spatially and temporally fragmented.” 
20 Coker (2002), p. 60, also on p. 59: “It is a commonplace belief of our times that we 
think we are subject to risks that are potentially more catastrophic because they are 
global.” 
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the published declarations of the superpowers, but remained outside the 
practical conduct of war and shared understanding of legitimate warfare.  
 
The third element of a paradigm of war is related to the shared conceptu-
alisations of military power, i.e. rules of recognising military power that 
assign military power to agents. It is based on shared conceptualisations of 
what makes states and other agents militarily powerful – based on past ac-
tions (warfare, military operations), demonstrated capabilities (demonstra-
tion of harnessing and procuring ‘developed’ systems), and declared per-
formance of armed forces – responding to the prevailing shared conceptu-
alisations of threats and risks, as well as shared conceptualisations about 
the nature of war. This element of military power within the paradigmatic 
understanding of war is the main focus of this study. As constructivist 
‘logic’ related to the shared conceptualisations of military power has al-
ready been expressed in depth in the previous chapter, further analysis of 
this aspect of the paradigm of war is not necessary here.  
 
The remaining two elements of a paradigm of war – the prevailing level of 
technology and the distribution of material resources – concern for the 
most part material aspects of waging war. Technology and resources – and 
their distribution in the international system – set limits for possible actions 
taken in the international system.21 The intrinsic qualities of material as-
pects within a paradigm of war are not denied, but their dependence upon 
the meaning bestowed to these material aspects is at the heart of my analy-
sis. The difference between war and random violence can be located within 
the complex of implicit and explicit rules related to war (including interna-
tional humanitarian law) that define war at any particular point of time. 
Similarly, the link between asocial intrinsic qualities of technological arte-
facts and resources as well as socially meaningful resources of war (weap-
ons, information systems etc.) is generated when these material elements of 
war are bestowed with meaning in the interactions of actors. The process of 
assigning meaning to material objects is not, however, a unidirectional 
process: Weapons “do not grow in a vacuum. Even as they help shape ideas 
concerning the nature of war and the ways in which it ought to be fought, 
they themselves are the product of those ideas.”22 In the paradigmatic for-
mulation of war, it is the three conceptual elements – shared 
conceptualisations of threats and risks, shared conceptualisations about 
the nature of war, as well as shared understandings about military power – 
that bestow these ‘material’ elements of war – technology and resources – 
with meaning.   
 
                                               
21
 See Wendt (1999), pp. 109-113. 
22
 van Creveld (1991), p. 32. 
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The paradigm of war formulation, with its focus on the different conceptual 
factors, implies a layered view of the reality of war. This means that the 
effects of the three conceptual elements are not similar in every respect. 
There is a difference of ‘depth’ between them, in the sense that some 
shared understandings form a foundation for the other – more superficial or 
less-deep – understandings. According to the framework of this study, the 
shared conceptualisations of threats and risks operate at the ‘deepest’ level. 
The socially constructed threats and future-related risks assign ‘demands’ 
for the agents’ preparations and execution of war. What kinds of objectives 
are sought in waging war and which means are used in combat, depend on 
the threats and risks facing agents. Similarly, the constitutive elements of 
military power are dependent on the views of contemporary and future war-
fare, which in turn are derived from the threats and risks agents see them-
selves confronted with.  
 
This view of a paradigm of war as a layered set of shared understandings 
does not imply that some of the elements of a paradigm of war are more 
important than others in analysing historically specific understandings of 
war. The hierarchical relationships between different conceptual factors of 
a paradigm of war are based on analytical categories. Similarly, the rela-
tionships between different conceptual factors operate both ways – not just 
from the deeper (e.g. threats and risks) level upwards (e.g. shared concep-
tualisations of the nature of war). Thus, in order to analyse a paradigm of 
war, all three conceptual factors – and the two material factors – need to be 
included in the analysis. 
 
The analytical choice of accentuating ideational elements within a para-
digmatic understanding of war does not imply that ideas related to war 
change with ease. As Alexander Wendt notes, “cultures tend to reproduce 
themselves once created.”23 Whether shared conceptualisations of war dur-
ing the Cold War era among the western states has changed after the end of 
the Cold War cannot be answered by merely pointing to the demise of the 
Cold War. Rather, whether a change in the paradigm of war has occurred – 
a revolution in the conceptualisation of war – is an empirical question, ne-
cessitating theoretically informed research. The partial answer provided in 
Chapters 5.3 through 5.5 is only preliminary and to some extent inconclu-
sive. It is presented only to illustrate the possibilities for analysis using a 
constructivist framework of a paradigm of war. The main emphasis of this 
research is the process of (re)constructing military power in the post-Cold 
War era – analysed from a constructivist perspective and relying upon the 
framework of the paradigm of war. As Figure 5.1 shows, understandings of 
military power are conceptualised here as one ideational category within a 
larger conceptual framework – the paradigm of war. In the language of 
                                               
23
 Wendt (1999), p. 134. 
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those who wish to refrain from using a ‘Kuhnian description of war’, the 
meaning of military power is defined within the international system in the 
presence of pre-existing shared understandings of military power which 
are either reproduced or transformed by agents’ practices. The prevailing 
shared definition of military power can be conceptualised to be part of a 
larger set of shared understandings concerning war. 
 
It is noteworthy that according to the ‘paradigm of war’ perspective, each 
agent makes practical policy decisions, taking into consideration questions 
of geography, material resources, level of technological development, na-
ture of domestic politics, etc. As a result, certain states prepare for expedi-
tionary warfare by large mechanised formations, while others develop terri-
torial defences against such an attack, or they engage in guerrilla warfare as 
a way to blunt the advantages in numbers and technology that massed 
armed forces have vis-à-vis adversaries with less resources and lower level 
of technological development. The mere existence of divergent conceptu-
alisations of national defence and the subsequent practical defence policy 
doctrines does not, however, mean that a generally shared conceptualisa-
tion of war does not exist, particularly in a culturally definable community 
like the west. Rather, many of these seemingly divergent (national) concep-
tualisations have their genesis in these shared understandings concerning 
war – as national responses to threats and risks identified by the shared 
paradigm.  
 
 
5.2. Paradigm and Discourse 
 
The above-mentioned Kuhnian understanding of a paradigm of war ac-
knowledges differences between paradigms within the sphere of science 
and the exercise of physical violence. The most visible difference concerns 
communication between paradigms. While Kuhn maintained that commu-
nication between scientific paradigms is possible, there is no guarantee that 
attempts to communicate between incommensurable paradigms will suc-
ceed. In the case of war it is possible to assume that the ability of one para-
digm to show its excellence vis-à-vis another could at least partially be 
found in the practical outcome of a war. But it is noteworthy that even a 
total defeat of an actor would not lead one to conclude automatically that 
the winning side’s paradigm of war was superior: since paradigms are at 
least partially incommensurable24, the aims of warfare might be such that 
                                               
24
 “Like the choice between competing political institutions, that between competing 
paradigms proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of community life. … 
Each group uses its own paradigm to argue in that paradigm’s defense. …The normal-
scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only incompatible but 
often actually incommensurable with that which has gone before.” Kuhn (1975), p. 94, 
193. 
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the losing side does not consider even a total defeat as a sign of an inferior 
paradigm.  
 
Relying on a constructivist theory of IR and analysing war and military 
power from a Kuhnian perspective of paradigms, the end of the Cold War 
can be conceptualised as a possible paradigm-changing event – a change in 
a leading paradigm of war in the international system or as the emergence 
of recognised anomalies and the subsequent onset of extraordinary warfare. 
This is because the shared Cold War era rules of ideological spheres of in-
fluence, hostility between the two alliances, constant preparations for large-
scale military confrontations, and even possibly a nuclear war, seemed to 
come to an end with the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union.25 
The problem that states faced with the dissolution of Cold War era rules of 
the international system and its accompanying paradigm of war was that 
they had to come to terms with new rules in the absence of any clear guid-
ing principles.26 The 1990s and the following first years of the 21st century 
can be conceptualised as a competition between various new candidates for 
the new definitions of the international system, its operating logic and the 
paradigm of war within its sphere. Competition (or lack of consensus) in 
this context means the coexistence of several views – many of which have 
been contradictory – concerning the nature of the new international system 
and its rules of war. The emphasis on this lack of consensus during the 
post-Cold War era does not mean, however, that the starting point of sub-
sequent brief analysis of the western conception of war is an actual para-
digm shift or the inception of one. Rather, emphasising the emergence of 
divergent and conflicting conceptualisations of the character of the interna-
tional system, the institution of war, and military power with the demise of 
the suppressive elements of the Cold War era means arguing for the possi-
bility of fundamental change in the social structure of the international sys-
tem. The extent to which this fundamental change has taken place – if at all 
– is a matter of empirical scientific enquiry.  
 
                                               
25 On the Cold War era conceptualisations of war and military power see van Creveld 
(1991), p.1: “The armed forces of these states [a handful of industrialized states: the 
United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies in NATO and the Warsaw Pact], par-
ticularly those of the two superpowers, have long served the rest as models and, indeed, 
as standards by which they evaluate themselves.”  See also ibid., pp. 2-18. 
26
 The notion of ‘the beginning of the post-Cold War era’ is as indeterminate as the no-
tion of ‘the end of the Cold War’. Different analysts or statesmen will define it differ-
ently. For the purpose of this research, it is obvious that a date or an exact year is not 
very relevant. Rather, the shared idea that spread around the globe with the turn of the 
decade of 1980s/1990s that the Cold War is over was the starting point for assessing the 
possible paradigm shift concerning war in the post-Cold War era; Adelman (2002, p. 
11) for example, has described the end of the Cold War as “one of these recurring illu-
sionary turning points within theories of progress”. 
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Looking at the situation during the 15 years after the Cold War  – the 1990s 
and the first years of the new millennium – one can locate several themes 
or discourses that have redefined international system and specifically what 
some conceptualise the paradigm of war. These themes have sprung up 
from two major sources: the political practices within the international sys-
tem and academic discussion about the character of the post-Cold War era. 
Concentrating on the possible articulation of a new paradigm of war, the 
actual use or debated non-use of military force is a possible way to identify 
the characteristics of the post-Cold War era paradigm of war and thus make 
it possible to compare it with the Cold War era conceptualisations of war to 
detect a possible paradigm shift.  
 
The above-mentioned reference to discourses is influenced by what Iver 
Neumann calls “a simple model of culture as a mutually conditioned play 
between discourse and practice”27 in his 2002 Millennium –article. Neu-
mann argues that after the linguistic turn, the discipline of IR needs a prac-
tice turn. Neumann proposes a model of social action in which narrative 
discourse and discursive practices are integrated through their dynamic in-
terplay. According to Neumann, Discourse analysts ”have consistently 
grappled with the dilemma of how to reconcile meaning and materiality, 
discourse and practice. … discourse refers to preconditions of action and 
practice to socialised patterns of action.”28 
 
Parallel to the redefinition of war and military power in the post-Cold War 
era, the term discourse is conceptualised in this study as a social practice 
that constitutes reality. In analysing shared conceptualisations of war and 
military power in the post-Cold War era, both the material (or practice-
related) and linguistic aspects of discourses are highlighted in this study. 
This means that the term discourse applies not only to ‘linguistic’ factors, 
such as speech acts and texts (and on the level of social structure the ‘idea-
tional’ factors, such as shared meanings or collective understandings), but 
also on those practices and/or material conditions that are interpreted 
through these ideational filters or lenses and which also shape the nature of 
these shared meanings and understandings. Political practices (diplomatic 
initiatives, military operations or the application of military pressure as ex-
amples) do not only causally cause observable outcomes, but also operate 
as communication and influence the prevailing discourses through repro-
duction or transformation.  
 
As long as people act in accordance with established practices, they con-
firm a given discourse … The possibility exists that people will not act in 
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 Neumann (2002), p. 627. 
28
 Ibid., p. 629, 631. 
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accordance with a given practice, in which case established discourse will 
come under strain.29 
 
Practices are thus intelligible and possible due to the existence of dis-
courses, but they are not determined by them. It is possible to transform the 
order-constituting and subject positions-creating aspects of discourses by 
practices, although the habit of doing things, the facilitative aspects of 
common structures, and the intentional resistance to discourse change by 
some agents – ‘discourse policing’ – may provide significant opposition to 
transformation.30 The ability to control discourses – either by transforming 
or maintaining the existing discourses – implies the power to frame the 
situation for other agents and the appropriate, natural, courses of action.  
 
Similarly, the linguistic – or discursive – elements of a discourse do more 
than only communicate. They constitute social reality and thus give mean-
ing to material factors. Discourses do not, however, operate on a purely 
linguistic level. They are affected by practices, agents by their actions redi-
rect – or reproduce – the future path of the discourse. Discourses cannot 
thus be detached from their historical (discursive-practical) contexts or 
from their origins. Citing the current ‘War on Terror’ as an example of the 
intertwined relationship between discourse and practice, Richard Jackson 
has noted that: 
 
The practice of ‘war on terrorism’ in its military and political dimensions 
would not be possible without the accompanying language or discourse of 
counter terrorism: discourse and practice, in other words, are interdepend-
ent or co-constitutive.31 
 
When focusing on the idea of transforming discourses by practices – either 
by physical actions or speech acts – the debate over the ‘content’ of the 
discourse on the War on Terror is highlighted along with the outcomes of 
agents’ activities against terrorists. Regarding power, the discourse-based 
focus includes not only the question of who has the most power in the 
struggle against terrorists, but also the question of who is (are) in the posi-
tion to define the meaning of terrorism, the War On Terror, and thus the 
determinants of military power in the ‘new’ war. 
 
According to political realism, the context-effect of the universal logic of 
anarchy causes system-level outcomes or directs the possibilities of indi-
vidual states to act. From the constructivist perspective of this study, the 
context of international system needs to be studied in order to make indi-
vidual agent’s choices intelligible. The notion of international anarchy – 
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 Ibid., p. 637. 
30
 Ibid., pp. 636-648. 
31
 See Jackson (2004), p. 2.  
  
128 
combined with some other assumptions – is not sufficient to explain inter-
national outcomes. Using the language of the general constructivist frame-
work presented in Chapter 4 and the Kuhnian paradigm framework for un-
derstanding war, shared understandings concerning war in general and 
military power particularly are negotiated within various war-related dis-
courses. These discourses thus limit the possibilities that states and other 
agents have for understanding war within the international system – and 
thus these discourses constitute the actual manifestation of war in interna-
tional politics. 
 
 
5.3. Emerging Anomalies – The Post-Cold War Era Challenges to the 
Sedimented Cold War Paradigm of War 
 
The baseline for the analysis of the shared western understandings of war 
during the post-Cold War era can be located in the Cold War paradigm of 
war. This ideational totality is related to Clausewitzian thinking, although 
in many instances there is a difference between what Clausewitz actually 
said and how what he said has been interpreted.32 Nevertheless, the 
‘Clausewitzian’ view of war has attracted a lot of attention from scholars 
and practitioners alike.33 Carl von Clausewitz wrote about the Napoleonic 
wars in the beginning of the 19th century and his posthumously 1832 pub-
lished book Vom Kriege is still today the point of reference in estimations 
of western definitions and understandings of war. Its influence is not lim-
ited to the western audience only. Today’s familiar definitions of war as 
“an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will”, and  “continuation of 
political intercourse, carried on with other means” were promulgated by 
Clausewitz.34 The ’traditional’ view of war that represented the Cold War 
era conceptualisations of war – drawing heavily upon Clausewitz – sees 
war as an instrument of the state in the pursuit of its interests. In other 
words, war is an instrument of states’ rational policies, among other means, 
although the nature of war has not been characterised on rationalistic terms: 
‘friction’ and the ‘fog of war’ describe the unforeseeable character and the 
element of surprise inherent in waging war.  In addition to its instrumental 
nature, war has been conceptualised as a universal phenomenon, explain-
able by a universally ‘true’ theory of war.35  
                                               
32
 E.g. Lynn (2003), p. 215; Keegan (1993), pp. 3, 46-49. 
33
 Concerning the link between Cold War era conceptualisations of war and 
Clausewitzian thinking, see e.g. Holsti (1996), pp. 5-6. See also p. 14: “This [the 
Clausewitzian conception of war as organized combat between the military forces of 
two or more states] is the model of war enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, 
in collective defense organizations like NATO, and in the definitions of war and aggres-
sion in international law.” 
34 Clausewitz (1989), p. 75, 87 (quotes). 
35
 On the Clausewitzian philosophy of war, see Rapoport (1968), pp. 13-15. On p. 60: 
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During the Cold War, the ideological rivalry between the two superpower 
blocs armed with nuclear weapons led to a two-fold shared conceptualisa-
tion of war. On the one hand, the existence of nuclear weapons and the de-
velopment of nuclear deterrence theorising meant that a nuclear war re-
mained possible. Its consequences would have been unimaginable and lit-
erally incalculable. On the other hand, the view of conventional war – more 
tangible and imaginable than a nuclear war – was based on large-scale 
clashes of mechanised armed forces on the battlefield. This view was force-
oriented, accentuating mass (quantity) and terrain, and was based on the 
hypothetical possibility to separate the battlefield from the civil society. 
The shared Cold War era conceptualisations of war had their genesis in 
Clausewitz, focusing on war via armed forces trying to win decisive battles 
on a demarcated battlefield.36 The nuclear threat environment, superpower 
rivalry, and the intra-alliance dynamics overshadowed the significance of 
smaller scale, ‘peripheral’, and unconventional combat scenarios.37  
 
When thinking about war, we usually conjure up the image of two coun-
tries arraying their military forces against each other, followed by combat 
between distinctively designated, organized, and marked armed forces. 
                                                                                                                                         
“In details the Neo-Clausewitzian view differs from the classical Clausewitzian doctrine 
but agrees with it in essentials. … The essential similarity between the modern and the 
classical forms of Clausewitzian philosophy of war is rooted in the basic conception of 
war as a political instrument and in the tacit assumption that the national interests of a 
state are clearly discernible and, in very large measure, identified with the power of a 
state vis-à-vis other states.” See also Keegan (1993), p. 48. 
36
 Franzen (2002), pp. 5-9; Ralston (2002). See also Annual Report of the Secretary of 
Defense Dick Cheney to the President and Congress (1991), p. v, which contains a post 
facto US conceptualisation of Cold War era war and threats involving s: “a massive 
invasion into Western Europe by Warsaw Pact that could easily escalate into global 
war.” See also Cassidy (2003), pp. 135-136, where he makes the point that “during the 
first half of the 20th century the [US] Army exhibited a long-term trend toward the 
emergence of the ‘massive armed force’”. Cassidy maintains that the ‘lessons’ of WW 
II further validated this view of war, as “victory had been achieved by harnessing and 
unleashing massive amounts of materiel.” 
37
 Owens (1998), p. 64: “Vietnam was fought in accordance with an economic and 
quantitative paradigm of conflict arising from nuclear deterrence theory. … Central to 
McNamara strategy for Vietnam was the application of technological solutions to mili-
tary problems and the employment of quantitative methods to measure progress.” See 
also Lock-Pullan (2003), p. 135; Jablonsky’s conceptualisation of the Cold War as “the 
long twilight conflict that kept attention on the core relationship between the superpow-
ers and only occasionally on the periphery in the so-called Third World” implies the 
minor effects that Low Intensity Conflicts and other ‘non-western’ wars had on shared 
superpower dominated conceptualisations of war in the two main blocs of the Cold 
War. Jablonsky (1994b). See also Kaldor (2001). On various conceptualisations of war 
in the US, see Holsti (1991), pp. 286-295 and Cassidy (2003). On Cold War era myopia 
and ethnocentricity related to the analysis of war, see Holsti (1996), p. 13. On the mis-
match between eastern and western conceptualisations of war and the reality of war, see 
van Creveld (1991), pp. ix-x, 25-32.  
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The purpose of fighting is to destroy the adversary’s capacity to resist and 
then to impose both military and political terms on the defeated party. … 
War defined as a contest of arms between sovereign states derives from 
the post-1648 European experience, as well as from the Cold War.38 
 
In 1987 the Western European Union (WEU) continued to describe the se-
curity situation in Europe and the threats facing Western Europe in a simi-
lar fashion: 
 
We have not yet witnessed any lessening of the military build-up which 
the Soviet Union has sustained over so many years. The geostrategic 
situation of Western Europe makes it particularly vulnerable to the supe-
rior conventional, chemical and nuclear forces of the Warsaw Pact. This is 
the fundamental problem for European security. The Warsaw Pact’s supe-
rior conventional forces and its capability for surprise attack and large-
scale offensive action are of special concern in this context.39 
 
Similarly – after the end of the Cold War – the 1994 (US) Annual Report to 
the President and the Congress by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin ex-
plained:  
 
During the Cold War, American military planning was dominated by the 
need to confront numerically superior Soviet forces in Europe, the Far 
East, and Southwest Asia.40 
 
At the national European level it has been argued in a similar fashion – in 
retrospect – that the planning and operations of the Cold War era British 
Armed Forces were determined by the Cold War era rules of the interna-
tional system: 
 
The circumstances of the Cold War, including the capabilities of the War-
saw Pact forces, determined that UK Armed Forces had to be structured – 
                                               
38
 Holsti (1996), p. 1. 
39
 Platform on European Security Interests (1987). 
40
 Annual Report to the President and the Congress by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin 
(1994), p. 5 (quote). Concerning the shared Cold War era understandings of the interna-
tional system and war related to the nuclear realm, see ibid., pp. 7-8: “Nuclear Posture 
Review [started in October 1993] will form the foundation that shapes America’s nu-
clear posture in the post-Cold War world. … Does the Unites States still need triad? 
How many weapons systems will remain on permanent alert? The Cold War provided 
one set of answers to these questions, but the new strategic environment requires its 
own carefully considered approach.” (my italics). See also Report on the Bottom-Up 
review (1993), p. 1: “The Cold War is behind us. … The threat that drove our defense 
decisionmaking for four and a half decades – that determined our strategy and tactics, 
our doctrine, the size and shape of our forces, the design of our weapons, and the size of 
our defense budgets – is gone. … How do we structure the armed forces of the United 
States for the future?” 
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and equipped – to conduct high intensity conflict. They had to pose a 
credible nuclear threat if need be, as well as being prepared to resist an as-
sault in overwhelming numbers, by an opponent who was equally, if not 
better equipped. Confronting a superpower required superpower weap-
onry of ever increasing sophistication.41 
 
 
5.3.1. The End of the Cold War 
 
The path for the rewriting of western Cold War era paradigm of war was 
first cleared by the general agreement concerning the end of the Cold 
War.42 In the late 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s the discourse 
concerning the end of the Cold War started to become widely accepted.43 
With the demise of the superpower confrontation and the quick erosion of 
the bipolar international system – features that were characterising the Cold 
War era rules of the international system – states and other international 
agents found themselves in a situation where the old rules of the interna-
tional system were being questioned and new or altered rules had to be fig-
ured out.44 However, this rule-setting process has not been a formal one. 
Rather, it has been a conjoint process of agent-level and system-level dis-
cussion concerning the ending of the Cold War era, the ‘nature’ of the new 
international system, and the adjoining policies ‘needed’ to promote 
agents’ interests in this ‘new’ – still vaguely defined – international system. 
Similarly, agents gauged future policy prospects and formulated related 
visionary statements and policies in order to mould the evolving system 
into one that would be beneficial for them. The immediate post-Cold War 
era was a generally acknowledged time of transition, while the end point of 
                                               
41 Garden and Ramsbotham (2004), p. 10 (my italics). 
42
 On the end of the Cold War as a discourse, see e.g. Walker (1997), p. 64: “The reign-
ing Cold War orthodoxies had become widely offensive long before 1989, but the pos-
sibility of capturing complex historical and structural transformations in a single year of 
exhilaration also offered a glorious chance to rehabilitate the longing for a tabula rasa, 
the blank slate of the ‘new world order’.” Campbell (1998), p. 15 has remarked that “the 
very act of proclaiming the end of the cold war serves to write history in such a way that 
the cold war becomes an era the understanding of which is not problematic.” 
43
 Among the signals that the end of the Cold War had occurred were, among other 
things, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unification of Germany and its membership in 
NATO, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and eventually the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. 
44
 Rules of the system refer here to constitutive norms of the system. With the transfor-
mation of these rules, the nature of the system changes. See e.g. Koslowski and Kra-
tochwil (1995), pp. 127, 134-139, 144-159. See also Nye and Owens (1996), p. 26: 
“The set of fuzzy guidelines and meaning the Cold War once provided has been re-
placed by a deeper ambiguity regarding international events. … With the organising 
framework of the Cold War gone, the implications are harder to recognize, and all na-
tions want to know more about what is happening and why to help them decide how 
much it matters and what they should do about it.”; See also Shalikashvili (1995).  
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this process of transition was not in sight. The process of revising the Cold 
War era rules of the international system in general, and war and military 
power in particular, was troubling as states had become accustomed to be 
able to apply the rather formal and sedimented Cold War era rules of war 
and the recognition of military power.  
 
The end of the Cold War was thus also the beginning of the process – both 
implicit and explicit in nature – of reconceptualising the ‘logic’ of the in-
ternational system, the nature of war in it, and the determinants of military 
power. Concerning the latter, the simultaneously occurring 1991 Gulf War 
also challenged the Cold War era understandings of military power – at 
least in part. Especially the increasing role of advanced information tech-
nology became the focal point in estimations of future determinants of mili-
tary power, although the war in the Gulf was conceptualised and waged in 
a rather familiar Cold War era way: large-scale mechanised armed forces 
fighting decisive battles.  
 
By the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War was a reality, but the post-
Cold War era was characterised by uncertainty, ambiguity, and questions 
concerning the nature of the ‘new’ system. As the Charter of Paris for a 
New Europe (1990) declared: 
 
The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended. We declare 
that henceforth our relations will be founded on respect and co-operation. 
Europe is liberating itself from the legacy of the past.45 
 
Similarly, the 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States ex-
plained: 
 
[T]he Cold War is over … We have entered a new era … This new era of-
fers great hope, but this hope must be tempered by the even grater uncer-
tainty we face. … We need to consider how the United States and its allies 
can best respond to a new agenda of political challenges.46 
 
 
5.3.2. The Revolution in Military Affairs  
 
In addition to the discourse concerning the end of the Cold War, another 
apparent discourse concerning war and particularly military power after the 
Cold War has been the post-Gulf War (1991) debate about the Revolution 
                                               
45
 Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990). 
46
 National Security Strategy of the United States (1991), p. 1 (my italics). Note that 
even as recently as 1995, the National Security Strategy of the United States opened 
with following words: “A new era us upon us. The Cold War is over.” See A National 
Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (1995), p. 1.  
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in Military Affairs (RMA). It has been mostly an American debate, but it 
has also had an effect on Europe and other developed states that wish to 
operate in tandem with the United States in the military field. The underly-
ing assumption beneath the RMA thesis ever since the 1991 war has been 
that rapid technological change is revolutionising the way that states wage 
war: Better sensors and increased possibilities to analyse information, as 
well as enhanced communications systems, enable armed forces to see the 
battlefield to an unprecedented degree. When combined with high-tech 
precision weaponry, a revolutionary military force can decisively defeat 
any adversary while protecting itself with a sophisticated mix of technical 
and operational features. The possibility to limit collateral damage and 
casualties is one feature of RMA that has been influencing decisions to use 
military force in the post-Cold War world.47  
 
The idea beneath the Revolution in Military Affairs parallels Kuhn’s notion 
of scientific revolutions. First, there is a time of more or less stable concep-
tualisation of war and following technologies, doctrines, organisations and 
training systems. Then – as a consequence of the lessons learned from pre-
vious wars or from intellectual innovation – this ‘old’ way of conceptualis-
ing war is questioned. This questioning may lead to an alternative percep-
tion of war and the role of the military. What war is and how it should be 
waged come to be understood in a different manner. Similarly, new ideas 
of how to prepare for war against new potential belligerents emerge. The 
revolution means a period of transition from the confines of an old para-
digm to the fuzzy outlines of a new one. The overlap between the old and 
the new paradigms – the latter of which begin to emerge out of the prob-
lems that actor(s) face(s) due to the framing of war of the old paradigm – is 
a period of extraordinary warfare, where the objectives and methods of 
waging war are mixed and do not conform to either of the paradigms com-
pletely. Heidi and Alvin Toffler have proposed that the 1991 Gulf War was 
an example of extraordinary warfare where the attacking coalition (mostly 
the US) waged war by the dictates of two different paradigms – the second 
and the third waves of war. The newest mode of wealth production and ac-
cumulation – information – is producing the third time revolutionary 
change in warfare. Or at least so the Tofflers claim.48 
 
In addition to the effects of information technology on military power, the 
increasing influence of high technology upon increased public awareness of 
                                               
47
 See e.g. Krepinevich (1994a), pp. 40-41; Sloan (2002), pp. 3-17. 
48
 See Kuhn (1975), p. 6; Toffler and Toffler (1993). ” What is not clearly understood 
even now is that the United States and its allies simultaneously fought two very differ-
ent wars against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. … One war in Iraq was fought with Second 
Wave weapons designed to create mass destruction. … the other war was fought with 
Third Wave weapons designed for pinpoint accuracy, customized destruction, and 
minimal ‘collateral damage’”. See p. 64, 67. 
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global events became manifest during the 1991 Gulf War – the first war 
seen live on television. The trend in the 1990s was towards more and more 
real-time media coverage of military conflicts. As General Wesley Clark, 
the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe during NATO’s war in Kosovo, 
noted:  
 
In Vietnam the battlefield was isolated in space and time from the policy-
makers at home…. It took years for the media to build the reporting net-
works … In the 1990s, all of the information age technologies were avail-
able – satellite transmission of TV imagery, fax, the internet, a plethora of 
long-distance phone lines, and cellular telephones. … The new technolo-
gies impacted powerfully at the political levels. … New technologies also 
changed warfare for the military. … the world would certainly be present 
on every battlefield where western forces were engaged.49 
 
Similarly, the British Statement on the Defence Estimates (1994) noted 
that: 
 
In a world made smaller by technological progress and instant media cov-
erage, conflicts, as well as humanitarian disasters, are no longer remote 
but are brought to us each day.50 
 
Public knowledge of the situation on the ground in the military conflicts of 
the post-Cold War era has increased with the development of communica-
tions technologies and the active role played by the mass media – particu-
larly the western news networks. The ‘CNN effect’ or ‘CNN factor’ repre-
sents the post-Cold war reality that citizens are increasingly aware of ongo-
ing military conflicts, although the information given to them is controlled 
– or even distorted – by the adversaries. In addition, the willingness of 
western governments and militaries to justify military intervention via mass 
communications media has increased. The legitimacy of humanitarian mis-
sions and interventions has been enhanced by revelations of human suffer-
ing. The mass media have also emphasised the ‘effective’ use of military 
firepower in such a way as to avoid casualties and damage during opera-
tions.  
 
 
5.3.3. Asymmetric Warfare 
 
The discourse of asymmetric warfare has challenged the suggestion that 
advanced information technology and related changes in doctrines, organi-
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 Clark (2001), pp. 8-9. Clark notes that already during the US Operation against 
Manuel Noriega in Panama in 1989, the presence of the media was indicative of its fu-
ture effects. This was exacerbated during the 1991 Gulf War and in Somalia in 1992. 
50
 Statement on the Defence Estimates (1994), p. 7. 
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sations, and training of the armed forces will lead to a new mode of war-
fare. Accordingly, the asymmetric response to the RMA thesis has been 
presented as the ‘counterrevolution in military affairs’ by asymmetric 
means. According to the discourse of asymmetric warfare, the Revolution 
in Military Affairs does not provide universal unambiguous advantages in 
warfare, in cases when the adversary does not conceptualise war in terms of 
the RMA thesis.51 An asymmetric response to RMA means that an actor 
uses unconventional methods of warfare from the actor’s own perspective 
and thus refuses to accept the rules of war that have been set by those ac-
tors that engage according to the RMA.52 Examples of asymmetric re-
sponses to RMA are exemplified by terrorist attacks on the home turf of an 
RMA adversary, the use of weapons of mass destruction, and non-
compliance with international humanitarian law.53 In addition ‘traditional’ 
guerrilla tactics over a long period of time are thought to blunt strategies to 
exploit RMA. The operations in Haiti and Somalia have been mentioned as 
examples of asymmetric conflicts in which the western reliance on the 
RMA has not produced the envisioned outcomes of the RMA thesis. In ad-
dition, the technology gap between the belligerents in the wars in Chechnya 
has been used to criticise the technologically biased RMA thesis.54 Simi-
larly, the recent problems that western states have faced during the stabili-
sation and reconstruction phases in Afghanistan and Iraq have proved less 
than flattering for those who have hailed the potential advantages of ad-
vanced military technologies. 
 
This notion of asymmetric warfare could be understood as one manifesta-
tion of differences in paradigms of war. The ‘traditional’ Cold War era 
form of asymmetric conflict emerged in the form of guerrilla warfare 
against large mechanised armed forces that relied on up-to-date technology. 
                                               
51 Peters argues: “No matter how hard we try to take our world with us, we will find we 
sometimes must fight the enemy on his ground, by his rules.” Peters (1995-6) (my ital-
ics). 
52
 See e.g. Krepinevich (1994b), p. 20: Given “the likely overwhelming U.S. superiority 
in the traditional, or conventional, measures of military power, America’s adversaries 
will have great incentives to adopt a very unconventional approach.” 
53
 See e.g. Chandler (1998), 225-227. On asymmetric responses in general, see 
Schoomaker (2004).  
54
 On the ‘Counterrevolution in Military Affairs’ and the examples of Somalia, Haiti, 
and Chechnya, see McCabe (1999). In addition to the already mentioned examples of 
Vietnam and Afghanistan, IR research has also concluded that in asymmetric conflicts 
the ‘powerless’ have a good chance of succeeding. Ivan Arreguín-Toft (2001) has 
shown in a statistical study that during the period 1950-1998, only 45% of asymmetric 
conflicts were won by the powerful. This represents a reduction compared to 1800-
1998, when some 71% of similar conflicts were won by the powerful. On defining 
asymmetric conflicts, see for example Paul (1994), p. 20, where he stresses the “unequal 
overall military and economic power resources.” He says that the “discrepancy ratio 
between the initiator and the defender in power terms is generally 1:2 or more.” 
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The discrepancy between the overwhelming military power of the United 
States and its lack of success in Vietnam is a telling example: unable to 
wage war on US terms55, the North Vietnamese relied on an indirect strat-
egy of prolonging the conflict and asymmetric tactics to disrupt the US 
forces in circumstances that made small guerrilla forces very effective 
against the well-armed, large, and modern armed forces of the US.56 De-
spite the Cold War era superpower humiliations in Vietnam and Afghani-
stan, the lessons drawn from those wars – especially Vietnam – were ar-
ticulated in terms of the then ongoing east-west confrontation: The US 
“Army’s intellectual rebirth after Vietnam focused almost exclusively on a 
big conventional war in Europe – the scenario preferred by the US military 
culture.”57 
 
Related to the increasing importance of asymmetric warfare in the western 
understandings of contemporary war has been the post-Cold War era fear 
concerning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
their delivery systems. In the first half of the 1990s, it was mostly within 
the emerging regional perspective – ‘irresponsible’ states that might seek to 
counter US military preponderance through the easiest and only way possi-
ble: WMDs – that non-proliferation and counterproliferation were concep-
tualised. Terrorism was also part of the equation, but in practical terms it 
received less attention than e.g. Iraq and North Korea – the rogue states of 
the day.58 At the heart of the US Defense Counterproliferation Initiative 
(Presidential Decision Directive PDD/NSC 18, 1993), was the “drive to 
develop new military capabilities to deal with this new threat” [of WMD 
proliferation].59 By the time the 1990s were coming to a close, the threat of 
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 Or rather on terms that were defined by developed ’western’ states. For an example of 
a non-conventional response to conventional warfare, see e.g. Cassidy (2004), p. 82. 
56
 On ”How the Weak Win Wars”, see Arreguín-Toft (2001).  
57
 Cassidy (2004), p. 74. Cassidy relies on the concept of (national) military culture, 
which he conceptualises as a set of institutional beliefs concerning warfare. Accord-
ingly, for “most of the 20th century, the US military culture generally embraced the big 
conventional war paradigm and fundamentally eschewed small wars and insurgencies.” 
Ibid., p. 75. See also Cassidy (2003). 
58
 See e.g. Aspin (1993) “During the Cold War, our principal adversary had conven-
tional forces in Europe that were numerically superior. … But today it is the United 
States that has unmatched conventional military power, and it is our potential adversar-
ies who may attain nuclear weapons. … And it is not just nuclear weapons. All the po-
tential threat nations are at least capable of producing biological and chemical agents.” 
(My italics). 
59
 Ibid.; On the danger presented by the proliferation of WMD proliferation, see e.g. 
Report on the Bottom-Up Review (1993), p. 2. This danger was referred to by Secretary 
of Defense Les Aspin as the “number one threat” identified in the Bottom Up Review. 
See Aspin (1993). 
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terrorism in general and in connection to WMDs particularly had evolved 
into a more serious and urgent matter.60  
 
 
5.3.4. New Wars 
 
The manifestation of wars as new wars during the 1990s – and already in 
the 1980s – has been highly problematic for many developed states in their 
attempts to comprehend and mould the post-Cold War international order.61 
New wars – mainly ethnic-religious conflicts – do not fit the Cold War era 
conceptualisations of wars particularly well. With the below-the-state-
agent emphasis explicitly posited in the discourse on new wars, the content 
of that discourse has not been new. During the Cold War, the concept of 
‘Low Intensity Conflict’ (LIC) was used to describe this ‘new’ feature of 
warfare. Symptomatic of these LICs were their location in the non-
developed world, irregular fighters (terrorists, guerrillas, civilians), and 
non-reliance on high-technology weapons.62 Similarly, civil wars and guer-
rilla warfare have been in the international vocabulary for decades. As 
Kalevi J. Holsti has noted: 
 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the forms of armed combat 
have diversified to the point where we can no longer speak of war as a 
single institution of the states system. … The uses of force for political 
purposes range from intifadas, terrorism, and guerrilla wars, through 
peacekeeping interventions, to conventional set warfare between organ-
ized armies.63 
 
Conceptualising the emergence of new wars as a challenge to the Cold War 
era paradigm of war during the 1990s and in the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury does not mean denying the existence of non-state actors in Cold War 
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 See e.g. Fact Sheet: Combating Terrorism – Presidential Decision Directive 62 
(1998); A National Security Strategy for a New Century (1998), pp. 6-7,11-12; A Na-
tional Security Strategy for a Global Age (2000), pp. 2-3, 22-25. 
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 Kaldor (1999). See e.g. pp. 1-2: “[D]uring the 1980s and 1990s, a new type of organ-
ized violence has developed, especially in Africa and Eastern Europe, which is one as-
pect of the current globalized era. I describe this type of violence as ‘new war’.” New 
wars “involve a blurring of the distinction between war (usually defined as violence 
between states or organized political groups for political motives), organized crime 
(violence undertaken by privately organized groups for private purposes, usually finan-
cial gain) and large-scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by states or 
politically organized groups against individuals).” (My italics)  
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 See van Creveld (1991), pp. 18-32, 57-62; Olson (1989), p. 75: “The United States 
faces an era of great uncertainty in dealing with the challenges of low-intensity con-
flict.” Cohen (1986); Also the concepts of ‘privatised wars’, ‘informal wars’, ‘post-
modern wars’, and ‘degenerate warfare’ have been used to describe ‘new wars’. See 
Kaldor (1999), pp. 2-3. 
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 Holsti (1991), pp. 272-273. 
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era conceptualisations of war. Rather, it means that the ‘content’ of the dis-
course on new or non-traditional wars did not have a significant role in the 
leading western paradigm of war during the Cold War. The developed 
states in the west – and the somewhat less developed states in the east – did 
not have LICs at the centre of their combat scenarios in general, although 
they might have done so on several particular occasions – in the aftermath 
of Vietnam for example. In addition, global interconnectedness has intensi-
fied during the last couple of decades, providing a medium for the contesta-
tion of the states’ monopoly of legitimate organised violence.64 
 
We are entering an era, not of peaceful economic competition between 
trading blocs, but of warfare between ethnic and religious groups. Even as 
familiar forms of armed conflict are sinking into the dustbin of the past, 
radically new ones are raising their heads ready to take their place. Al-
ready today the military power fielded by the principal developed societies 
in both ‘West’ and ‘East’ is hardly relevant to the task at hand; in other 
words, it is more illusion than substance. …the plain fact is that conven-
tional military organizations of the principal powers are hardly even rele-
vant to the predominant form of contemporary war.65  
 
Looking at the RMA debate from the perspective of new wars, its techno-
logical and state-centric focuses seem to emanate from Cold War era con-
ceptualisations of war, which emphasised national and alliance-based 
armed forces as well as harnessing the linearly developing technology for 
added military effectiveness and lower own casualties. Kaldor shares the 
view “that there has been a revolution in military affairs, but it is a revolu-
tion in the social relations of warfare, not in technology, even though the 
changes in social relations are influenced by and make use of new technol-
ogy.”66 
 
 
5.3.5. Humanitarian Interventions 
 
The ‘emergence’ of new wars in the 1980s and 1990s is related to the em-
phasis on humanitarian justifications for intervening militarily in affairs of 
other states under the auspices of ad hoc reinterpreted rules of the interna-
tional system – mainly related to sovereignty and norms concerning univer-
sal human rights. These operations have mostly been multinational in char-
acter. Simplifying somewhat the complex issue of defining and categoris-
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 Kaldor (1999), pp. 4-5. 
65
 Van Creveld (1991), p. ix, 20. On the changing nature of wars in the post-Cold War 
era, see also Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-
General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (1995), para-
graphs 10-22. 
66 Kaldor (1999), p. 3. Kaldor contrasts new wars with the old ones by focusing on the 
goals of war, modes of warfare and related financing. See pp. 6-9. 
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ing different manifestations of war, and the reasons that different agents 
have given for using physical violence, it can be argued that as the fre-
quency of ‘new’ large-scale violence increased or stayed on a high level 
after the Cold War, conventional threats faced by developed states dis-
solved and the effects of modern communications technology brought 
global affairs into the living rooms of average people, the humanitarian use 
of military force became a real possibility – or even a necessity. As the 
1994 (US) Annual Report to the President and Congress by the Secretary of 
Defense Les Aspin explained: 
 
The current debate over whether, when, or how the United States should 
use force in the post-Cold War era has taken place largely in the context of 
ongoing crises in Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti.67 
 
After the 1991 Gulf War, an optimistic vision emerged concerning the pos-
sibilities of legitimate coalition warfare to quell the potentially emerging 
conflicts that had been suppressed by the Cold War for several decades. 
The operations mandated by the UN Security Council (Resolution 
688/1991) in the northern and later southern parts of Iraq were the first 
post-Cold War examples of the humanitarian use of military force with a 
UN mandate.68 Despite the fact that Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime was 
not prevented from repressing domestic opposition violently in the imme-
diate aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, these first post-Cold War era hu-
manitarian operations were able to sanction state behaviour through the le-
gitimate use of force.69 The optimistic visions of a New World Order and 
hopes of a peaceful post-Cold War era were soon shattered after the 1991 
Gulf War. US-led high-technology coalition warfare proved not to be the 
answer to all humanitarian crises in the world. The cases of Somalia70 and 
the bloody disintegration of most of Yugoslavia71 – and particularly the 
problems that the west had in resolving these conflicts – showcased the 
                                               
67 Annual Report to the President and Congress by the Secretary of Defense Les Aspin 
(1994), p. 8. 
68
 On August 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
Cease-fire Monitoring Group was established in Liberia, where civil war had erupted in 
1989. This first post-Cold War humanitarian intervention was legitimated retroactively 
by UN Security Council resolutions 788 (Nov 1992) and 866 (Sept 1993) by describing 
the disorderly situation in Liberia as “a threat to international peace and security”. See 
The Responsibility to Protect (2001), pp. 81-84; United Nations Security Council Reso-
lution 778 (1992) (quote). 
69
 It is noteworthy that the UN Security Council did not mandate the no-fly zones over 
Iraq. 
70
 About Somalia, see e.g. DiPrizio (2002), p. 71, 75; Weiss and Collins (2000), pp. 81-
85. 
71
 On the breaking up of Yugoslavia, see e.g. DiPrizio (2002), pp. 103-145. 
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multitude of problems related to military interventions in the post-Cold 
War era.72 
 
The prevention of genocide73 in central Africa, first in Rwanda and later in 
Burundi, proved to be a military task that the well-equipped and well-
trained western armed forces seemed to be unable to handle, at least with 
the minimum level of casualties that ordinarily would have been a prereq-
uisite for such operations. Having been motivated by manipulated ethnic 
differences, tensions, and a rift, the atrocities in Rwanda and Burundi were 
something that the western policymakers and western armed forces were 
not prepared for.  Without frontlines and identifiable combatants, ‘ordinary 
people’ with clubs, knives, and small arms were responsible for the atroci-
ties. As representatives of new wars in the aftermath of the US ‘Somalia 
experience’, the conditions of genocides in Rwanda and Burundi were such 
that western states were not prepared to effectively engage in them until the 
bloodshed had already died down.74  
 
Although the end of the 1990s witnessed few successfully conducted hu-
manitarian interventions – most notably in Kosovo75 and East-Timor76 – the 
western lessons learned from the 1990s were mixed and confusing at best. 
There was certainly an increasing degree of public pressure and even will-
ingness to intervene, at least when the conditions for low-casualty opera-
tions were there. Similarly, the flow of information concerning large-scale 
human rights violations around the world surged during the first post-Cold 
War decade.  
 
Taking a quick look at the above-mentioned cases of widely accepted or 
purported humanitarian uses of armed force, and the timeframe of their 
manifestation, might lead some to describe the 1990s as the decade of hu-
manitarian interventions – although the list of ‘cases’ chosen above did not 
include all cases of multilateral intervention in the post-Cold War era.77 
Whether or not the description of the 1990s as the decade of interventions 
is appropriate, it can be argued that a lively discussion ensued during the 
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 The Responsibility to Protect (2001), pp. 84-97, 117. 
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 With the deteriorating situation in Rwanda in 1994, many states hesitated to use the 
term ‘genocide’, as their inactivity would then have been intolerable under the auspices 
of the 1948 Genocide Convention. The Responsibility to Protect (2001), p. 100. 
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 It is noteworthy that in 1994 the conditions for intervention in Haiti were favourable 
and the Clinton administration did intervene there in the late summer 1994 as a leading 
power of a multinational force under UN Security Council resolution. See UN Security 
Council Resolution 940 (1994).  
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  On Kosovo, see e.g. Allin (2002), pp. 47-67; DiPrizio (2002), pp. 130-145. 
76
 See e.g. The Responsibility to Protect (2001), pp. 114-117; UN Security Council 
Resolution 1264 (1999). 
77
 For a more thorough list of interventions after the Cold War, see Appendix 1. 
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first decade of the post-Cold War era on the humanitarian use of armed 
force.  
 
 
5.3.6. The War on Terror 
 
Although the implementation of humanitarian interventions has not been 
confined to the 1990s, the parameters of the new millennium’s discourse on 
humanitarian interventions underwent a transformation, after the terrorist 
attacks on the eastern coast of the United States on 11 September 2001. In 
the US, the conduct of the terrorist attacks and the ensuing response to 
them – the War on Terror – has been described in terms similar to those 
used to describe the tectonic shift from the Cold War era to the post-Cold 
War era. As the 9/11 Commission Report stated: 
 
In the post-9/11 world, threats are defined more by the fault lines within 
societies than by territorial boundaries between them. … National security 
used to be considered by studying foreign frontiers, weighing opposing 
groups of states, and measuring industrial might. To be dangerous, an en-
emy had to muster large armies. Threats emerged slowly, often visibly, as 
weapons were forged, armies conscripted, and units trained and moved 
into place.78 
 
On September 20 2001 President George W. Bush declared a War on Ter-
ror in his address before a joint session of the Congress.79 He later elabo-
rated on the meaning of this new war:  
 
While the threats to America have changed, the need for victory has not. 
We are fighting shadowy, entrenched enemies, enemies using the tools of 
terror and guerrilla war.80 
 
We are a nation at war. America must understand we’re at war. … This 
generation of Armed Forces has been given two difficult tasks, fighting 
and winning a war and, at the same time, transforming our military to win 
the new kind of war. … Defeating this enemy [terrorism] requires fighting 
a different kind of war, what we call the first war of the 21st century. … a 
war we are going to win.81  
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 The 9/11 Commission Report – Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (2004), pp. 361-362. Note also that still in June 2001 
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asserted that in the post-Cold War era “the 
new and different threats of the 21st century have not yet fully emerged, but they are 
there.” After three months the threats of the 21st century emerged. See Rumsfeld (2001). 
79
 Bush (2001b). 
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 Bush (2001c), p. 1777 (my italics). 
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The implicit definition of war within the discourse on War on Terror de-
parts radically from the Cold War era conceptualisations. Terrorist organi-
sations and even individual terrorists have been added to the list of threats 
and even ‘warring parties’ in addition to states – nowadays mainly under 
the labels of failed (failing) states and rogue states. Subsequently, the very 
nature of war is claimed to have changed. The traditional distinction be-
tween war and peace – never completely clear – has become even more 
confused and a grey area of no-war and no-peace has emerged between the 
conventional boundaries of war and peace. Simultaneously, war and crime 
appear to be converging on the boundary between domestic and foreign 
security domains.82 In addition, the War on Terror is global in nature. As 
President Bush has explained: “No nation can be neutral in this conflict”.83 
 
The promulgation of the War on Terror as a new kind of war has relied on 
the ‘lessons of Vietnam’ – the lessons that were not drawn – or if they were 
drawn, they were not espoused ‘properly’ in the aftermath of the Vietnam 
War.84 Now, thirty years later, the lessons of Vietnam are a stark reminder 
of how old-fashioned conceptualisations of war may lead to defeat – even 
when a superpower is confronted with a third-world opponent. As President 
Bush explained: 
 
We learned some very important lessons in Vietnam. Perhaps the most 
important lesson that I learned is that you cannot fight guerrilla war with 
conventional weapons. That’s why I’ve explained to the American people 
that we’re engaged in a different type of war.85 
 
The changing nature of war within the discourse of War on Terror has also 
been implicitly expressed in a shift from a threat-based conceptualisation of 
international system towards a risk-based set of possible future scenarios. 
In order for the threat not to materialise, pre-emptive wars against ‘ob-
served’ risks need to be waged within the general framework of the War on 
Terror: “[W]e must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities 
and objectives of today’s adversaries.86 
 
In addition, the American discourse on War on Terror is being explicitly 
linked to the leading military power discourse of the 1990s – the Revolu-
                                               
82 Lutterbeck (2004), p. 63. 
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 Bush (2001h), p. 1605. 
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 See Cassidy (2003), p. 131. 
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 Bush (2001g), p. 1456 (my italics). 
86
 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002), p. 15 (quote). See 
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tion in Military Affairs. The new kind of war – the first war of the 21st cen-
tury – calls for a revolution in the military as war becomes protracted, con-
ducted within the territory of many states, and directed against targets that 
need to be engaged rapidly, precisely, and effectively by means of new 
weapons and innovative means of using them. According to President 
Bush, the need to transform the US Armed Forces was obvious before 11 
September 2001. However, to succeed in the new kind of war – the War on 
Terror – new thinking and new modes of warfare are needed. And accord-
ing to the President, this can be delivered by the Revolution in Military Af-
fairs: 
 
America is required once again to change the way our military thinks and 
fights. … Yet we are finding new tactics and new weapons to attack and 
defeat them. This revolution in our military is only beginning, and it 
promises to change the face of battle. … [A]n innovative doctrine and 
high-tech weaponry can shape and then dominate an unconventional con-
flict.87 
 
 
5.3.7. The Privatisation of War 
 
The process of the privatisation of war has also reinforced the blurring of 
the traditional boundary between war and peace. While the discourses of 
new wars and asymmetric wars have mostly been focusing on the ‘other’ 
side of war – i.e. the involvement of non-state actors as belligerents and the 
non-traditional means of war – the growth of the privatised military indus-
try in the wake of the Cold War has been mostly a western phenomenon.88 
This growth has occurred despite the fact that a large percentage of the ser-
vices of private military firms related to providing security and even wag-
ing war have been provided in the third world. 
 
The global confrontation of the Cold War and its massive military estab-
lishments have been winding down; instead we find ourselves in a world 
of small wars and weak states. … At the same time, in developed coun-
tries, the private sector is becoming increasingly involved in military and 
security activity. States and international organisations are turning to the 
private sector as a cost effective way of procuring services which would 
once have been the exclusive preserve of the military.89 
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The post-Cold War outsourcing of traditional military missions for im-
proved effectiveness and lower costs is linked to declining defence budgets 
and an increased need to harness high technology systems. Thus the proc-
esses of privatisation, outsourcing, and competition – labelled here as the 
privatisation of war – have been very much linked to other proposals con-
cerning modernisation, transformation, and financial savings by eliminating 
redundant military capabilities, streamlining bureaucratic processes, and 
rewriting the post-Cold War era western definitions of war. 
 
[N]ew technologies are now emerging that will dramatically increase the 
capabilities of our forces. In the coming years, therefore, the Department 
[of Defense] must increase funding for procurement to ensure our contin-
ued technological superiority in the future. … Outsourcing, privatisation 
and business re-engineering offer significant opportunities to generate 
much of the savings necessary for modernization and readiness.90 
 
The process of privatising war – or the traditional military tasks of the 
armed forces – has been explicitly connected to the development of ad-
vanced military systems. Savings have been called for, as these new sys-
tems have proved to be highly expensive. The end of the Cold War and the 
simultaneously increasing importance of high technology systems made the 
privatisation of war possible. In addition, related to the end of the Cold 
War, the rising frequency and destruction caused by new wars, and the 
equivalent change in the nature of civil wars have increased the business 
possibilities of privately operated military companies. This development 
has been connected to the publicly expressed need for humanitarian inter-
ventions in ‘difficult’ locations and situations that have been only vaguely 
– if at all – connected to the direct security interests of the intervening par-
ties. Together these developments have caused a shift – albeit partial – in 
the focus of war from the traditional referent object of state-operated mili-
tary establishment toward the private sector. 
 
While the trend of shifting supporting military missions to the private sec-
tor – military ‘outsourcing’ – has been under way for at least a decade, the 
increased scope of the privatisation of war did not surface publicly until the 
recent US-led campaigns in Afghanistan (2001-) and Iraq (2003-). This 
means that new military activities have been ‘transferred’ to the private 
sector, including military training, logistical support, protection duties, and 
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 Improving the Combat Edge Through Outsourcing (1996) (my italics). See also An-
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ultimately actual fighting – while at the same time increasing the share of 
privately executed missions vis-à-vis the missions carried out by the ‘ac-
tual’ militaries. As The Guardian reported in December 2003, “Private 
corporations have penetrated western warfare so deeply that they are now 
the second biggest contributor to coalition forces in Iraq after the Pentagon 
… the proportion of contracted security personnel in the firing line is 10 
times greater than during the first Gulf War” in 1991.91 Similarly, a study 
published in 2002 revealed “the existence of at least 90 private military 
companies that have operated in 110 countries worldwide.”92 
 
 
5.4. Defining War in the Post-Cold War Era: Reproduction and Transfor-
mation 
 
For the purpose of analysing shared understandings concerning war within 
the international system in the post-Cold War era, the previous subchapter 
has identified seven discourses that are conceptualised here as defining the 
western paradigm of war in addition to the Cold War era paradigm of war. 
 
1) Discourse concerning the end of the Cold War, which challenged the 
remnants of the rule structures and shared conceptualisations of war 
as well as of military power left after the Cold War, but did not offer 
a direct alternative to them. 
 
2) Discourse of new wars, which are mainly intrastate rather than inter-
state in nature. Ethnic, religious, and nationalistic wars all fall within 
this categorization of post-Cold War new wars. 
 
3) Discourse related to humanitarian interventions, which has been 
animated by the emergence of new wars and the possibilities of the 
developed world to intervene in these wars using modern technology 
and causing minimal ‘collateral damage’. In addition, the unprece-
dented volume of real-time media coverage of large-scale humanitar-
ian catastrophes has raised public awareness and thus the pressure 
for intervening militarily in the ongoing new wars. 
 
4) The Revolution in Military Affairs, the leading American discourse 
concerning war and military power in the 1990s. It is understood to 
be premised on the development of information technology and sub-
sequent innovative doctrines and organisations of armed forces. 
 
                                               
91
 Traynor (2003). 
92
 Making a Killing: The Business of War (2002). 
  
146 
5) Discourse of asymmetric war, which has been animated by the 
American RMA discourse. Asymmetric war has been described as a 
counterrevolution in military affairs or a response to RMA by inno-
vating at the paradigmatic level. The discourse of asymmetric war 
has also decried the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to 
‘rogue states’ and terrorist organisations, as well as their illegal trade 
by international organised crime. 
 
6) Discourse concerning the privatisation of war – a western-centric 
discourse describing the eroding of the traditional state-agents’ mo-
nopoly on the means of violence via outsourcing functions that 
facilitate warfighting and in some instances the waging of war itself. 
 
7) War on Terror, which was launched in the aftermath of the 2001 ter-
rorist attacks on US soil. It can be understood as the most recent pur-
poseful attempt by the US Bush administration to define the interna-
tional system in a new way and to promote a conceptualisation of 
war in which the opposing party may be something else than a state. 
 
Taken together, this study assumes that the foundation of the Cold War era 
paradigm of war and the seven above-mentioned discourses represent the 
main tenets regarding the intersubjectively shared knowledge concerning 
war in the post-Cold War era international system – particularly from the 
western perspective. My task now is to gain access to the way in which war 
has been conceptualised at a particular time by a specified group of actors –
the developed western states – by empirical study of international politics 
through the prism of these discourses. Analysis of the influence of these 
discourses on the conceptualisations of war should take note of the fact that 
the ‘influence’ of individual discourses has varied over time. For example, 
at the time of the Gulf War, the discourse of the end of the Cold War was 
having a major influence upon the shared understandings of the interna-
tional system’s rule structure and the discourse of RMA was just beginning 
to gain momentum. The discourse of the War on Terror did not have any 
influence at that time; although terrorism had been conceptualised as a pos-
sible future risk, it was not yet a threat. The temporal overlap of the post-
Cold War discourses of war is presented in Figure 5.2. The chronological 
very crude overview is offered only to facilitate the presentation of an ana-
lytical framework for understanding war in the post-Cold War era. 
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Figure 5.2. Temporal overlap of post-Cold War era discourses of war 
 
It is obvious that these discourses have a differing degree of referential 
overlap93 concerning different aspects of war. Some of these discourses 
deal with those threats and risks that necessitate preparations for war  – for 
example the discourses concerning War on Terror, humanitarian interven-
tions, and asymmetric wars. In others, the main focus is on the ‘nature’ of 
war, i.e. questions of what kinds of acts constitute war and for what gener-
ally accepted purposes it is legitimate to wage war. Discourses related to 
the privatisation of war, new wars, humanitarian interventions, and the War 
on Terror are examples of these discourses. Furthermore, some discourses 
pay attention to the constituent elements of military power by focusing on 
the way armed force(s) should be organised, equipped, and trained for war 
– the Revolution in Military Affairs, asymmetric war, and War on Terror. 
Beneath all these different aspects of war are remnants of the Cold War era 
thinking. In the ‘new era’ of unpredictability and turbulence, all activity 
that makes a break with the past, nevertheless uses it as a yardstick or a 
point of reference in defining the new approach to war. In most cases this is 
done implicitly, but if an individual agent’s perspective becomes socially 
shared  – even in a modified form – then war is incrementally redefined by 
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actions that may have had only instrumental purposes. With the passing of 
time the influence of the Cold War thinking will likely continue to wane, 
especially when the accepted shared conceptualisation of the contemporary 
international system makes a break with the Cold War.  
 
 
Table 5.1. Constituent elements of a post-Cold War paradigm of war94 
 
Table 5.1 is presented above as an aid in grasping the possible ‘effects’ of 
the overlap of the above-mentioned Cold War era paradigm of war and the 
subsequent seven post-Cold War era discourses of war. The table describes 
the primary zones of referential overlap between different discourses by 
presenting the different elements of a paradigm of war that are influenced 
by the discourses through the processes of reproducing or transforming the 
Cold War paradigm of war. As Table 5.1 reveals, when more than one ele-
ment of a paradigm of war is located within a particular discourse, the ele-
ments are presented on an ordinal, not a cardinal scale. 
 
In addition to indicating the partially overlapping quality between the dis-
courses of war, Table 5.1 also shows the extent that they touch upon differ-
ent aspects of war. It is noteworthy that Table 5.1 says nothing about the 
‘strength’ of the influence that the different discourses exert on the aspects 
of war that are listed. For example the potential effects that the discourse 
on War on Terror may exert on shared conceptualisations of military power 
are not by definition weaker than the effects of RMA. In the case of the 
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 Modified from Raitasalo and Sipilä (2004). It is noteworthy that the discourses are 
not presented in order of importance. Rather, the Cold War era paradigm is the starting 
point from which the post-Cold War era paradigm of war emerged.  
Discourses related to the post-
Cold War paradigm of war 
The elements of a paradigm of war 
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1. Cold War era paradigm of war ‘Shadow of history’; threats, nature of 
war, armed force 
2. ‘End of the Cold War’ Undermining the ‘usability’ of the 
Cold War era paradigm of war 
3. ‘Humanitarian interventions’ 1. Nature of war  
4. ‘New wars’ 1. Nature of war  
5. ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ 1. Military power 2. nature of war  
6. ‘Asymmetric wars’ 1. Nature of war  2. threats 
7. ‘Privatisation of war’ 1. Nature of war 
8. ‘War on Terror’ 1. Threats 2. nature of war 3. military 
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former, military power is the third element in the list of primary effects 
while in case of the latter it is the first. The ranking of the importance of 
primary effects induced by any particular discourse in Table 5.1 is not 
comparable to other discourses – it only shows the ranking of effects within 
that particular discourse. Based solely on Table 5.1, inter-discourse com-
parisons are thus not possible. 
 
Although all of the above-mentioned discourses touch upon several aspects 
of the ‘paradigm of war’ framework, there is also some variation in their 
perspectives. For example the discourse on new wars conceptualises the 
nature of war from the perspective of physical violence between mainly 
non-state actors such as ethnic groups, clans, or criminal groups. The dis-
course on humanitarian interventions conceptualises the same topic mainly 
from the perspective of the intervening parties, i.e. why, when, how, and 
where to intervene? The realities of war are practically the same for both 
discourses, but they differ in their focus.  
 
Concerning the use of armed force within the international system, the les-
sons and effects of the post-Cold War era have not formed a coherent pat-
tern in progressing from the 1991 Gulf War to the 2003 war in Iraq. In ret-
rospect, these lessons were drawn somewhat differently depending on the 
circumstances in each case described briefly above. Similarly, the lessons 
have touched upon different aspects of war. The path from the post-Cold 
War era conceptualisation of war and military power to the present day un-
derstandings has not been direct or natural. Rather, many contradictory 
forces on different levels95 have affected this path. This means that the ac-
tual use of force or the lack of it in publicly debated circumstances hase 
had different effects on different aspects of war and military power. Natu-
rally, each lesson learned influenced the succeeding definition of the situa-
tion, political decisions related to the use of armed force, and the actual use 
of armed force to achieve politically defined objectives. In addition, past 
lessons may be reinterpreted in new situations – as the example of evoking 
the lessons of Vietnam in the context of the War on Terror shows. ‘New’ 
emerging discourses (War on Terror as an example) not only interpret real-
ity as revealed in new information. They also reinterpret old facts in a new 
way. Discourses constitute reality and frame the situation for those in-
volved.  
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 According to the constructivist perspective on the layered set of shared conceptualisa-
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Table 5.2.  Some lessons and effects of the use of military force upon the   
                   shared western conceptualisations of war and military power in  
                   the post-Cold War era96 
                                               
96
 In the case of Rwanda, mostly the lessons of non-use or late use of military force. 
Event / war Lessons learned / influences on shared western under-
standings of war and military power 
The Gulf War 1991 1. Shift from global to regional conventional wars. 
2. The ‘birth’ of RMA as a discourse of military power. 
3. First post-Cold War use of military force in humanitarian 
missions (after war). 
Somalia 1992- 1. Example of emerging new wars. 
2. Asymmetric warfare between western (US) troops and 
local ‘forces’. 
3. Humanitarian military intervention. 
4. Challenge to the emerging RMA-thesis. 
Rwanda & Burundi 
1994 
1. Example of emerging new wars. 
2. Challenge to the idea of humanitarian military interven-
tion. 
3. Challenge to the emerging RMA-thesis. 
Haiti 1994 1. Example of emerging new wars. 
2. Humanitarian military intervention. 
Bosnia - 1995 
               1995 - 
1. Example of new wars. 
2. Humanitarian military intervention. 
3. Long process of stabilisation / reconstruction. 
4. presumed success of the RMA thesis after three years of 
indecisive action. 
Afghanistan & Sudan / 
Infinite Reach 1998 
1. New wars. 
2. Military force against terrorism. 
3. The use of RMA capabilities. 
Iraq / Desert Fox 1998 1. The use of RMA capabilities. 
Kosovo 1999 1. Example of new wars. 
2. Humanitarian military intervention. 
3. Long process of stabilisation / reconstruction. 
4. Presumed Success of the RMA thesis. 
East-Timor 1999 1. Example of new wars. 
2. Humanitarian military intervention. 
Afghanistan 2001- 1. War on Terror: the use of military force against terrorists 
and states / regimes that harbour them. 
2. Initial success of the RMA thesis / quick capitulation of 
the Taliban regime. 
3. Asymmetric war. 
4. Long process of stabilisation / reconstruction. 
5. The use of private contractors by the occupying forces. 
Iraq 2003- 1. Initial success of the RMA-thesis/ quick capitulation of the 
regime. 
2. Asymmetric war. 
3. Long process of stabilisation / reconstruction. 
4. The use of private contractors by the occupying forces. 
5. Battle of the War on Terror. 
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The lessons learned after every war, intervention, peace support operation, 
military operation other than war, or crisis management operation help 
shape the shared view concerning the nature of war and the utility of mili-
tary power in incremental ways. Although some cases have been more sig-
nificant than others, all instances of the actual use of military force or the 
public debate concerning the absence of such use have either reproduced 
(‘strengthened’) or transformed the shared knowledge concerning war and 
the role of military power. Even so, the shared view concerning war and 
military power – part of the social structure of the international system in 
this study – is never fully shared. Different degrees of tensions and contra-
dictory viewpoints existed throughout the 1990s and exist even today.97 
 
 
5.5. Transformation vs. Revolution 
 
In contemporary analysis of war, the paradigm framework proceeds from 
notions of continuity and change. As one element of the current process of 
defining war, the Cold War era paradigm provides the element of continu-
ity through the process of reproduction. This means that the starting point 
for post-Cold War estimations of war is expressed by those conceptualisa-
tions of war that became rather stable and accepted during the Cold War 
era decades. Any changes in these conceptions during the some 15 years 
after the demise of the Cold War can be explained through rigorous empiri-
cal analysis of the identified seven discourses of war. These discourses pro-
vide possibilities for change by path-dependent transformation of the Cold 
War era social structure. It is also possible, however, that these discourses 
of war have reproduced rather than transformed the Cold War era 
paradigm. In that case, it can be stated that the post-Cold War era paradigm 
does not refer to a new paradigm of war – actualised by a revolution that 
changes shared understanding or war in fundamental ways – but rather to 
the way that war was conceptualised already during the Cold War, although 
in a slightly modified form and through the lenses of an analytically de-
fined, ‘new’ temporal phase. 
 
The shift from the Cold War era shared understandings of the character of 
threats as massed heavy conventional forces attacking in Europe towards 
post-Cold War era shared understandings of a wider spectrum of threats 
and risks, ranging from states to non-state actors and transnational organi-
sations has not been unidirectional. In addition, the increasing importance 
of non-state threats did not occur suddenly after the end of the Cold War. 
Rather, the conceptualisations of threats that were shared during the Cold 
War, as well as international policy practices in the 1990s have influenced 
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the evolutionary path concerning shared conceptualisations of threats. The 
end of the Cold War moved the widely shared threat of large-scale conven-
tional attack in Europe to the background. Simultaneously, already existing 
but previously less accentuated threats begun to loom larger. Regional con-
flicts with sophisticated and massed heavy armed forces begun to appear 
more likely and threatening than a global-scale military confrontation. The 
lessons learned from the 1991 Gulf War pointed towards the articulation of 
regional – but still traditional – threats posed by conventional state-agents, 
possibly with large-scale massed armed forces. In addition, the prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction and their potential use in regional con-
flicts also moved up in the ladder of post-Cold War era threats – another 
lesson from the Gulf War.  
 
Concurrently, but at the beginning with less emphasis, various forms of 
Low Intensity Conflicts – terrorism, subversion, insurgencies, and narcotics 
trafficking – were acknowledged more than was the case during the super-
power focused Cold War. This all happened within a couple of years after 
what is generally accepted to be the demise of the Cold War – although the 
effects of the ‘shadow of the Cold War’ and the 1991 Gulf War did ‘fa-
vour’ state-level threat perceptions with conventional armed forces – at 
least in the immediate aftermath of the demise of the Cold war.98 
 
Although the shadow of the Cold War conceptualisations of threats came to 
be expressed through the concept of regional conflicts, discourses concern-
ing asymmetric wars and new wars have directed these shared Cold War 
era conceptualisations related to the character of threat from the supremacy 
of the state and military alliances towards an ever broader definition of 
what constitutes a threatening agent. These discourses call for a framework 
of war that accentuates non-state actors as belligerents and sources of 
threats and risks. As has been already emphasised, asymmetric conflicts 
and terrorist acts certainly occurred during the Cold War, and for centuries 
before that, but they did not guide the western conceptualisation of the na-
ture of threats to a very large extent. In the wake of the Cold War, a variety 
of asymmetric threats emerged to fill in the perceived threat vacuum cre-
ated by the sudden demise of the Soviet Union. Drug cartels, international 
organised crime, and terrorism expressed the asymmetric threats of the 
1990s – alongside the ‘traditional’ and ‘real’ large-scale regional wars.99 
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Before 11 September 2001 very few terrorist attacks were deemed to re-
quire a militarised response. Throughout the 1990s, western armed forces – 
and in particular the US armed forces – prepared to be used – and were 
used – against transnational threats, but it was only after 9/11 and the sub-
sequently declared War on Terror that terrorism became the principal en-
emy. Although the legitimacy of the post-9/11 US-led War on Terror has 
not been universally accepted, the discourse of the War on Terror has ac-
cepted that transnational non-state agents are de facto objects of warfare. 
 
The logic of the discourse on the War on Terror is based on the risk of fu-
ture terrorist attacks – possibly with biological, chemical, or nuclear weap-
ons. This risk must be eliminated before it can turn into an explicit threat. 
Because the enemies in this new war are mostly national and transnational 
terrorist organisations, the waging of this new war is taking place within 
the domestic and international systems. Although all wars have ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’ implications, the effects of War on Terror depart somewhat 
from the Cold War era conceptualisations of war, primarily because the 
War on Terror is open-ended to an unprecedented degree. If the aim is to 
stop terrorist attacks by military and non-military means, nothing could 
succeed unless the objectives of war are redefined. As was the case with 
Cold War era deterrence, it is impossible to show why something (today a 
terrorist attack) does not happen. And if the goal is to halt or reduce the in-
cidence of terrorist attacks, and the accepted means to do that are military 
in nature, then the War on Terror will continue whether there are terrorist 
attacks or not. Nobody can say when the war will be over, as a future ter-
rorist attack will always be a possibility. The War on Terror thus relies on a 
similar ‘logic’ to that employed in the Cold War era discourse on deter-
rence: it articulates the ‘other’ and the appropriate means to counter it, with 
no means to verify the correctness of its assumptions. The difference be-
tween these discourses is that deterrence was a means of avoiding warfare, 
while the War on Terror is a militarised campaign to defeat the enemy and 
to prevent the risk of terrorism from turning into a threat (i.e. the traditional 
‘clear and present danger’). In addition, while deterrence was devised for 
countering a clear and present threat, the American War on Terror seeks to 
take pre-emptive military action. The possible wider international accep-
tance of the War on Terror – as expressed by the US – would mean that the 
‘other’ is defined on the basis of something that may happen in the future. 
This would be a shift from the Cold War era threat-based international sys-
tem into a post-9/11 era, risk-based international system.100 
 
How to approach terrorism after 11 September is a hotly debated issue in 
the west. The US has adopted policy of active and pre-emptive use of force 
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– unilaterally if necessary – around the globe to counter the threat, and es-
pecially the risk of future WMD terrorism. The European approach to the 
use of military force has been more conservative and cautious. While ter-
rorism now tops the list of threats to national and EU security in Europe, 
the legitimacy of collective military action has been accentuated: the role of 
the UN and its Security Council has been pivotal in the European military 
responses to terrorism. Similarly, in order to have an effect on the threats 
and risks associated with terrorism, the European perspective has been less 
inclined to use military methods in tackling the underlying root causes of 
terrorism.  
 
Concerning the legitimate objectives and means of war – i.e. shared con-
ceptualisations about the nature of war – the Cold War paradigm has been 
challenged in least in two respects. First, discourses on new wars, asym-
metric war, and the War on Terror have redefined the shared conceptualisa-
tions regarding the objectives of war and the means employed by ‘new’ 
belligerents. The Cold War era focus on superpower military dynamics 
suppressed the role of asymmetric wars in defining shared conceptualisa-
tions of war. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the deterrence re-
gime that was institutionalised over time after the Second World War, a 
different set of war-defining manifestations in the international system is 
now possible. The primary focus of post-Cold War era conceptualisations 
of war is on unconventional agents using unconventional means.  
 
In addition to the rather neglected discourse on asymmetric wars during the 
Cold War, the recent discourse on the War on Terror has also challenged 
the previous understandings about the belligerents in war today, and thus 
also introduced ‘new’ goals and means of war – provided that terrorist or-
ganisations, individual terrorists, and states that support terrorist organisa-
tions can be thought of ‘legitimate’ adversaries in a war. The influence of 
these three discourses concerning the objectives and means of war is two-
faceted. On the one hand, with the emergence of new non-state agents as 
accepted parties to contemporary war, their goals and means have been in-
jected into the process of defining generally shared understandings of 
agents’ objectives and means. If terrorist organisations and other similar 
parties can be accepted as legitimate belligerents, the goals of such agents 
and the means of asymmetric attacks can be accounted for, although not 
necessarily rendered acceptable or legitimate. On the other hand, discourses 
on new wars, asymmetric war, and War on Terror exert influence upon 
those factors that allow these new agents to be conceptualised as enemies 
and the responses that the traditionally accepted belligerents – states and 
their armed forces – make to the new exigencies of war. Combating ‘new’ 
agents with ‘old’ means may not be effective or at all possible. Thus the 
shared acceptance of the asymmetric nature of most post-Cold War era 
wars (including traditional asymmetric war, new wars and terrorism) rather 
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than the prominent state-centric Cold War era paradigm of war, would 
mean that the objectives and subsequently means of war are being rede-
fined, by no means always intentionally.   
 
Focusing on the latest manifestation of asymmetric wars – the War on Ter-
ror – some effects outside the US are already visible. First, throughout the 
world – and particularly in the developed west – terrorism has been de-
scribed as the most dangerous ‘new’ threat, or risk, that requires the use of 
military force under certain conditions. The UN-mandated war against the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan (2001-) serves as an example of terrorist 
affiliation and support given to terrorist organisations being given as le-
gitimate reason for waging war against a state, its regime, and some named 
individuals residing in the state.  A second example of the influence of the 
War on Terror on rewriting the rules of war can be seen in the increasing 
international interagency co-operation between state security authorities in 
order to combat terrorism. The ‘new’ means of combat fall between the 
traditional boundaries of law enforcement and military engagement. In fact, 
one visible sign of the influence that the discourse of the War on Terror has 
had on the new definitions related to war is connected to the addition of 
‘interagency cooperation’ to the notion of ‘combined and joint’ military 
operations. Jointness and the combined (multinational) nature of military 
operations started to gain in importance in the 1990s – as the discourse on 
the Revolution in Military Affairs became the most significant war-
defining phenomenon in the western world – particularly in the US.  The 
concept of the War on Terror blurs the boundaries of law enforcement and 
warfare. 
 
The second set of discourses having an effect on the conceptualisations of 
the objectives and means of war comprises discourses on humanitarian in-
terventions and the Revolution in Military Affairs. They have conceptual-
ised war mainly from the western perspective. The RMA discourse has 
emphasised the possibilities of ‘rewriting’ the rules of war by exploiting 
new technologies and the new ideas regarding the transformation of mili-
tary organisations and operational concepts. The discourse on humanitarian 
interventions has stressed the possibilities and the need for intervening 
militarily – i.e. by waging war – for the purpose of spreading human rights 
and democracy, although not totally without politically defined instrumen-
tal reasons. Together these two discourses have shifted the post-Cold War 
focus away from large-scale clashes of national armed forces on a demar-
cated battlefield – seen from either a national or alliance-wide perspective – 
and the defence of national (alliance) territory in opposition to peace en-
forcement, crisis management, peace support operations, etc. From the per-
spective of these two discourses, wars have become smaller and of shorter 
duration, although the post-war stabilisation and restructuring phases seem 
to continue indefinitely.     
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Finally, still concerning the shared understandings of the nature of war, the 
western discourse related to the privatisation of war has introduced military 
outsourcing from the western perspective into contemporary warfare. What 
started as a result of the post-Cold War era pressures to cut military expen-
ditures and to make the militaries more cost-effective by transferring mili-
tary support services to private firms has developed into a multi-billion dol-
lar military business on a wide array of missions ranging from waging war 
to logistical support and military training.  
 
The third element of a paradigm of war refers to shared conceptualisations 
of military power.  Although it is the primary focus of this study in Chap-
ters 6, 7, and 8, some preliminary suggestions can be made in this context. 
First, the Revolution in Military Affairs has been the most visible and dis-
cussed phenomenon related to the redefinition of military power in the 
post-Cold War era. The RMA debate has very strong American origins – 
despite the fact that its intellectual roots are in the Soviet Union of the 
1970s and 1980s. Despite its main orientation toward the US, it has not re-
mained detached from Europe,101 where it is seen mainly through the lenses 
of American dominance in modern military technology and the ability of 
the Europeans to cooperate with the US in future military operations (inter-
operability). As a supplement to the British defence White Paper – Strate-
gic Defense Review (1998) stated:  “Leaving aside the academic debate on 
whether or not a revolution is underway, it is clear that exploiting these 
technologies will lead to significant improvements in military capabil-
ity.”102 The nature and scope of wider reformulations of military power due 
to the American RMA initiative need further analysis.  
 
Increasing the professionalisation of the militaries involves a tendency – at 
least among developed western states – towards smaller, more deployable, 
and more lethal expeditionary armed forces. Together with the increased 
emphasis on multinational (combined) and inter-service (joint) operations, 
this trend toward increased professionalisation of the military emphasises 
the capability to gather, analyse, and diffuse an increasing amount of in-
formation. It also highlights the need for interoperability with other na-
tional and foreign forces via joining in the information network. Networks 
– instead of platforms – have become a ‘standard’ for assessing military 
might in the Post-Cold War era. 
 
Second, the changes that have taken place during the post-Cold War era in 
shared threat and risk perceptions have also had an influence on concep-
tions of military power. Terrorist attacks on the eastern coast of the US and 
the subsequently declared War on Terror seem to have led American au-
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thorities to reassess their priorities with respect to threats and the nature of 
war, as well as to military doctrine, procurement, and force structures. 
While this new thinking has not been embraced by Europe, the profiling of 
international terrorism as a threat and the declining standing of traditional 
military threats have challenged the Cold War era – as well as the immedi-
ate post-Cold War era – determinants of military power. In order to be able 
to combat new enemies effectively, new tools and new ways to use them are 
necessary. 
 
Analyses of the two ‘materially constituted’ elements of a paradigm of war 
– technology and resources – during the post-Cold War era have to reckon 
with the RMA discourse. Indisputably the development and procurement of 
technologically sophisticated modern communications and weapons sys-
tems have facilitated new military operations after the Cold War despite the 
fact that some core elements of RMA were developed and even used during 
the Cold War era.103 However the mere existence of new technological in-
struments and related operational concepts, organisations, and training sys-
tems does not mean that high-tech warfare automatically be paramount in 
contemporary or future shared conceptualisations of war. Many states can-
not harness modern technology to such an extent, and high-tech warfare is 
even less probable on the part of non-state agents. Although there are some 
or even many incentives for less developed states and even non-state agents 
to develop and purchase high-tech weaponry104, the technologically centred 
understandings of war (understood as military engagement) will by defini-
tion work against them.  The uneven distribution of material resources am-
plifies this division into agents that have a good reason for defining war via 
technology and resources on the one hand and agents that that ‘must’ come 
up with alternative definitions of war on the other. 
 
The preceding brief analysis of the post-Cold War era paradigm of war via 
Cold War era conceptualisation of war and the seven post-Cold War era 
discourses of war indicates that a paradigm change may be taking place, 
although the brevity of the analysis does not provide a clear and unambigu-
ous answer to that question. To provide a more profound and better articu-
lated answer to that question would demand additional research. Answering 
this question is not necessary, however, for an analysis of post-Cold War 
era (re)definition of military power. As the ‘paradigm of war’ model 
frames the analysis of military power for this study and as such operates as 
an intermediary tool between the general constructivist framework and a 
more precise analytical framework for a post-Cold War era analysis of 
military power, a definite answer to the question regarding possible sudden 
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post-Cold War era paradigm shift is not necessary here. Leaving this ques-
tion aside, it can be stated that the post-Cold War era discourses of war can 
be conceptualised as anomalies of the Cold War paradigm of war – to use 
Kuhnian language. The emergence of anomalies does not automatically 
signify a paradigm shift, since, as was previously stated, social structures 
become sedimented over time and are more easily reproduced than trans-
formed.105   
 
It can be assumed, then, that states would be inclined to subsume the 
emerging anomalies within the prevailing Cold War paradigm of war rather 
than ‘accept’ the idea that a sudden change – a revolution – has taken place 
that would change the foundation of their conceptualisations, preparations, 
and policies related to war. Based on the assumption of tacit paradigm 
transformation – instead of revolutionary paradigm shift – the post-Cold 
war discourses of war have challenged the Cold War era tradition of con-
ceptualising war, and thus the prevailing conceptions of military power 
within the international system. This transformed paradigm is still con-
nected to the conceptualisations of war during the Cold War, but has 
opened up new military problems and related solutions, and it has changed 
the shared set of conceptualisations related to military power. It is notewor-
thy, however, that the articulation and the degree of ‘sharedness’ of this 
transformed paradigm does not form an unambiguously understandable to-
tality. Tensions remain and the degree of sharedness varies. As has been 
noted in articulating the framework of this study, it is assumed that within 
the developed and (post)industrial west, the tensions of (re)conceptualising 
war and military power are less urgent than within the international system 
as a whole. 
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Table 5.3.  Western post-Cold War era discourses of war and the related 
shared understandings concerning the elements of a western 
paradigm of war 
 
 
5.6. Research Questions – Amendments 
 
The assumptions, research questions, and hypotheses animating this study 
have been presented in Chapter 4.5. With the explicit articulation of a 
‘paradigm of war’ framework, some additional remarks are now in order 
Elements of a 
paradigm of war 
Elements of the western 
paradigm 
Related western dis-
courses of war 
1. Threats Regional ‘rogue’ states, 
Non-state agents: terrorists, ma-
nipulation of ethnic and religious 
identities, 
Proliferation of WMD, 
Failed/failing states. 
End of the Cold War; 
New wars; 
Asymmetric war; 
War on Terror 
2a. Legitimate goals of 
war 
Self-Defence, 
Humanitarian purposes, 
Crisis management, 
[Counter-terrorism], 
[Regional stability]. 
 
End of the Cold War, 
Humanitarian interven-
tions, 
Revolution in Military 
Affairs, 
[War on Terror]. 
2b. Legitimate means 
of war 
Minimising friendly casualties, 
Minimising civilian casualties 
and collateral damage, 
Coalition warfare, 
Conventional forces. 
Revolution in Military 
Affairs, 
Humanitarian interven-
tions. 
3a. Missions, organisa-
tions, and operational 
concepts of the armed 
forces 
Quick initial military victory with 
overwhelming force, 
Stabilisation and reconstruction, 
Professional forces, 
Smaller, more agile forces, 
Interoperability. 
Revolution in Military 
Affairs, 
Humanitarian interven-
tions, 
Privatisation of war 
(military outsourcing). 
3b. Procurement: 
weapon systems, etc. 
High-technology solutions, 
Networked Capabilities, 
Interoperability, 
Long-range capabilities, 
Rapid deployability/mobility, 
Increased protection. 
Revolution in Military 
Affairs. 
4. Level of Technology Rapid and far-reaching increases 
in the development of informa-
tion technologies. 
Revolution in Military 
Affairs. 
5. Distribution of ma-
terial resources within 
the international sys-
tem 
American preponder-
ance/unipolarity. 
End of the Cold War, 
Revolution in Military 
Affairs. 
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concerning the research design. This move is necessary, as the specific 
framework for moving ‘down’ from the general notions of shared knowl-
edge or intersubjective knowledge of the international system toward 
shared understandings of war and military power have been explicated in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Concerning the nature of military power, this research assumes – according 
to the logic related to the partial overlap of different discourses of war – 
that some discourses of war have been more important than others in the 
intersubjective process of defining military power in the post-Cold War era. 
In other words, some discourses have focused more on those aspect of war 
that are related to the implicit assessments of military power that actors 
(mostly still states) need in their day-to-day operations or politics. In this 
regard, the Cold War era conceptualisations of military power are a possi-
ble starting point. They serve as a foundation for the emerging post-Cold 
War era conceptualisations of military power. Another possibly important 
defining discourse has been that associated with the Revolution in Military 
Affairs, which has concentrated on the rapid transformations of military 
means – an important aspect of military power. The other discourses that 
this study conceptualises as part of the process of delineating war in the 
post-Cold War era – those associated with the end of the Cold War era, 
asymmetric war, new wars, humanitarian interventions, the War on Terror, 
and the privatisation of war – have had their influence mostly on other as-
pects of today’s paradigm of war than military power. Their influences 
have been the most important in the way that the nature of war in the post-
Cold War era has been defined; in defining those circumstances in which 
the use of physical violence is conceptualised to be legitimate; and in de-
lineating the parties or belligerents in a contemporary war. They are all, 
however, connected to the shared conceptions of military power as they 
frame who fights, how, and for what purposes. Figure 5.3 presents the spe-
cific framework of this study. It is a more detailed version of figure 4.1, 
which presents the general constructivist framework, Figure 5.1, which pre-
sents the paradigm of war model, and Table 5.1, which summarises the 
post-Cold War era paradigm of war elements. 
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Figure 5.3.  Framework for analysing military power from a constructivist   
                    ‘paradigm of war’ perspective 
 
The shared understandings of military power can be conceptualised as one 
integral part of a larger internationally shared outlook on war – a paradigm 
of war. The highly celebrated end of the Cold War and the subsequent dis-
courses concerning the Revolution in Military Affairs, new wars, humani-
tarian interventions, asymmetric warfare, War on Terror, and the privatisa-
tion of war are all part of a conceptual process of defining war and military 
power in the post-Cold War era. 
 
• During the Cold War a specific understanding of war centred 
around nuclear weapons and conventional mechanised armed 
forces evolved, along with a related understanding concerning 
military power. This understanding was widely shared 
throughout the international system (although not by all). 
 
• The end of the Cold War presents a ‘possibility’ for reformula-
tion of the rules constructing military power in the interna-
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tional system. Although the shared views in the system may 
change without such a dramatic external cause, social struc-
tures are relatively enduring and become sedimented over 
time. 
 
• Whether or not a ‘new’ definition of military power evolves is 
more or less a matter of international consent. If no ‘new’ 
shared view of military power evolves out of the practices and 
rhetoric of international agents, the ‘old’ view is more or less 
reproduced, although it may be questioned as long as no new 
shared view arises to make it obsolete. 
 
It is now time to apply this theoretical framework to a case study that could 
be understood to challenge or modify the Cold War era definitions of mili-
tary power. The chosen case can be conceptualised as a representative of 
the practice of post-Cold War era international politics and the academic 
research agenda of IR and strategic studies. It concerns the debate that has 
evolved around the concept of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 
mainly in the 1990s from a western perspective. The nature of the case 
chosen for this study is analytical, which means that the theoretical frame-
work will guide the empirical research.  
 
This research is based on the assumption that the United States – the indis-
putable sole military superpower in the current international system – has 
been in a dominant position in its ability to set the agenda of military power 
in the post-Cold War era. This assumption does not – however – constitute 
a claim that the United States has implemented an intentional project to 
‘control’ or influence conceptualisations of military power. Rather, its in-
fluential role is due to its vast resources to develop military systems, its 
global interests (often advanced using military force), and the other states’ 
recognition of its peerless superpower status. The possibility that several 
US administrations have been able to control military power discourses in 
the post-Cold War era needs empirical study.  
 
The very brief examination in Chapter 5 of the post-Cold War era dis-
courses related to war and military power have at least partially supported 
the assumption of the importance of the US in shaping shared definitions of 
military power. The succinct description in Chapter 5 of the post-Cold War 
era use of physical violence from the point of view of westerns states, and 
the subsequent analytical categorisation of seven different war-related post-
Cold War era discourses, are of course not sufficient to assess the US role 
in the process of redefining military power after the end of the Cold War. 
That task is taken up in Part III of this study. The above-mentioned brief 
summary of war-related events and the subsequent analytical distinction 
made between different war-related discourses should be understood as a 
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framework that I will use to examine ways to approach the US role in the 
international post-Cold War era redefinition of military power. 
 
On the basis of the above-mentioned theoretical premises of this study, one 
additional research question will be presented in addition to those articu-
lated in Chapter 4.5:  
 
[4.] How has the American discourse concerning the Revolution in Mili-
tary Affairs affected contemporary western understandings of mili-
tary power? 
 
In addition, the articulation of the ‘paradigm of war’ framework in Chapter 
5 leads to the following additional hypothesis: 
 
[4.] The ‘American Revolution in Military Affairs’ has significantly affected 
the way that military power is conceptualised within the international sys-
tem, and especially within the western international community. Of the 
seven previously described post-Cold War discourses of war, the Revolu-
tion in Military Affairs has explicit links to the reproduction and transfor-
mation of shared understandings concerning military power.  
 
Before undertaking the case study of RMA in Chapters 7 and 8, the follow-
ing chapter will address the second research question related to identifying 
the constituent elements of military power in contemporary international 
system, especially from a western perspective. In addition, an answer will 
be provided to the question of what core issues/capabilities constitute 
militarily power. This empirical groundwork of Chapter 6 will operate as 
the foundation for the case study concerning RMA and will enable me to 
trace the processes involved in the changes that have been taking place in 
the post-Cold War era shared conceptualisations of military power. With 
this foundation, I can address research questions related to the genesis of 
contemporary determinants of military power (research question 2) and the 
role of RMA discourse in post-Cold War era western definitions of military 
power (research question 4). Chapter 6 will also facilitate the evaluation of 
the post-Cold War era restructuring of national western armed forces and 
the role that the RMA discourse has played in it (research question 3). 
 
Chapter 6 identifies the contemporary – post-Cold War and post-9/11 – 
constitutive elements of military power in the west. This is done through an 
analysis of the latest official defense-related documents, speeches, and 
comments from the United States, NATO, and the EU. In Chapter 6 I will 
show how the shared western understanding concerning military power can 
be accessed through qualitative analysis of documents that describe the 
contemporary international security environment and formulate national or 
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alliance-wide policies regarding the current and projected future use of 
military forces within the international system. 
 
Chapter 7 deals with the RMA debate as the leading military power dis-
course after the end of the Cold War. It examines the way that the debate 
started and picked up momentum as the Cold War era ‘reality’ was sub-
jected to criticism in the early 1990s and the role of the military and uses of 
military power were reappraised. Chapter 7 takes into account the theoreti-
cal literature concerning RMA that has been produced during a decade or 
so as well as the actions ‘major’ western states106 that have a) responded to 
the ‘new reality’ in the military and political fields, and b) thereby created 
(transformed and reproduced) this ‘reality’.  
 
Chapter 7 probes into the process of development of American conceptu-
alisations of military power from the 1991 Gulf War until the end of 2004 – 
some three years after the attacks of 11 September and eighteen months 
after the American-led invasion of Iraq. Chapter 8 will trace the develop-
ment of RMA thinking in the west by examining the transformation of 
NATO and the EU military posture. Concerning NATO, focus will be 
placed on the transformation of the Cold War era military alliance towards 
a post-Cold War era ‘out-of-area’ security organisations and towards 
counter-terrorist military operations after 11 September. In addition, the 
role that RMA thinking has had in the ‘development’ and ‘maturation’ of 
the post-Cold War alliance is explored. Concerning the EU, the develop-
ment of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), as well as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) will 
be analysed through the prism of the American RMA and the simultane-
ously occurring transformation of NATO. 
                                               
106
 The perspective is state-centric due to the fact that in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
states have been the major developers and users of military power. 
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6. SHARED WESTERN UNDERSTANDINGS OF 
MILITARY POWER TODAY 
 
 
Everyone agrees that Cold War legacy forces are a waste of money 
 
- Lord George Robertson, 2003 
 
 
The preceding chapter presented a framework for understanding shared 
western understandings of war and military power. The chapter also 
analysed the post-Cold War era shared western understandings related to 
war – under the heading of a paradigm of war, postponing an analysis of 
the post-Cold War era shared western understandings of military power 
until Part III. However, an additional hypothesis was made at the end of 
Chapter 5 that the American-led discourse on RMA has been the most 
influential western military power discourse assigning military power to 
agents. This statement should not be read deterministically to focus only 
upon the discourse of RMA and its constitutive effects on post-Cold War 
era military power. Rather, the important role of the RMA discourse for the 
western understanding of military power needs to be contextualised in the 
wider picture of the post-Cold War era shared conceptualisations of war 
and the other constitutive elements – discourses – of war that have defined 
the threats that require preparing for war, the nature of contemporary armed 
conflicts, and the guidelines for developing national and alliance armed 
forces. 
 
In order to analyse the effects of the RMA discourse on contemporary 
shared western definitions of military power this chapter will explicate 
contemporary – post-Cold War and post-9/11 – shared western 
understandings of military power. The following analysis is based on the 
study of recently published security and defence related documents issued 
by the US, NATO, EU and also WEU, that reflect these agents’ 
understandings related to war and military power. As will become apparent 
in the following analysis, the west does indeed have a shared understanding 
of threats and determinants of military power. 
 
The sources of the following analysis – politico-strategic documents, 
declarations, and high-level official speeches – reflect the theoretical 
framework presented in Chapters 4 and 5. They are consulted here because 
military power is defined in a continuous political process of interaction – 
in the ‘presence’ of pre-existing definitions of military power. Shared 
understandings concerning military power can bee inferred from these 
documents as they explicitly state national and western interpretations of 
the international security situation, the role of armed force in the world, and 
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the guidelines for developing national and alliance armed forces in order to 
wield military power. They also present contemporary western 
interpretations of specific situations where armed force has been used and 
shed light on shared western lessons learned from these conflicts.  
 
Spelling out this shared western view of military power at this stage will 
lay the foundation for the case study in Part III. Ultimately, Chapters 7 and 
8 aim at explaining the processes through which the west has ‘arrived’ at 
the prevailing shared understandings of military power and how these 
shared understandings have affected or have been conceptualised to affect 
the organisation, procurement, training, and operations of western armed 
forces in the post-Cold War era. 
 
 
6.1. Describing Constituent Elements of Contemporary Western 
Understanding of Military Power – General Metrics 
 
In attempts to approach contemporary shared definitions of military power, 
the most apparent and accepted theme touches on the process of 
transforming national armed forces. This theme of transformation does not, 
however, describe contemporary understandings of military power in 
detail. Rather, transformation refers to a post-Cold War era process through 
which contemporary estimations of military power are made intelligible. In 
other words, those willing to preserve or increase their military power in 
the globalised and unpredictable international system, perceive a need to 
transform their Cold War era armed forces to match ‘new’ existing and 
emerging threats and risks to national interests. According to the logic of 
transformation, the drastically changed security landscape necessitates a 
profound transformation in the means of power and/or security – armed 
forces being one of them.  
 
In the US, the theme of military transformation has been advocated at the 
highest political level. George W. Bush explicitly embraced the idea of 
transforming the military when campaigning for the Presidency in 1999.1 In 
addition, after becoming President, he began to implement the promised 
transformation of the US Armed Forces by assigning the Secretary of 
Defence the task of creating the military of the future.2 In line with these 
presidential ‘instructions’, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review report 
assigned the transformation of the armed forces and the entire Department 
                                               
1
 Bush (1999) “I intend to force new thinking and hard choices. The transformation of 
our military will require a new and greater emphasis on research and development. … I 
know that transforming our military is a massive undertaking.” 
2
 Bush (2001a); Bush (2001d). 
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of Defense a key role in protecting and bolstering US military power in the 
‘new era’ of the 21st century: 
 
Today’s force structure … is the baseline from which the Department will 
develop a transformed force for the future. … Just as U.S. forces have 
transformed in the past, the process of fundamental transformation to 
sustain U.S. military advantages, meet critical operational goals, and 
dominate future military competitions has begun. The Department of 
Defense has embarked on an ambitious transformation of U.S. military 
forces to meet such challenges. As this transformation effort matures – 
and as it produces significantly higher output of military value from each 
elements of the force – DoD will explore additional opportunities to 
restructure and reorganize the Armed Forces. The purpose of 
transformation is to maintain or improve U.S. military pre-eminence in 
the face of potential disproportionate discontinuous changes in the 
strategic environment.3 
 
Or as Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld noted in 2003: 
 
Transformation is not an event – it is a process. There is no point at which 
the Defense Department will move from being ‘untransformed’ to 
‘transformed’. … Our goal is to set in motion a process of continual 
transformation, and a culture that will keep the United States several steps 
ahead of any potential adversaries.4 
 
The United States has not been alone in this process of transforming the 
military. Within the context of NATO, transformation is the large 
framework through which several innovations related to force structures 
and capabilities are being implemented: 
 
[W]e commit ourselves to transforming NATO … We have therefore 
decided to: a. Create a NATO Response Force (NRF) … b. Streamline 
NATO’s military command arrangements. … The strategic command for 
transformation, headquartered in the United States, and with a presence in 
Europe, will be responsible for the continuing transformation of military 
capabilities and for the promotion of interoperability of Alliance forces.5 
 
The Prague Summit [November 2002] approved a blueprint for the 
transformation of NATO capabilities based on three pillars: the NATO 
Response Force, new command arrangements, and the Prague Capabilities 
Commitment. … The NATO Response Force (NRF) is an essential 
element of our overall transformation.6 
                                               
3
 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), pp. 22-23, 30 (my italics). 
4
 Annual Report to the President and the Congress by Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld (2003), p. 8, 68. (Originally in a speech on May 14, 2003, original italics). 
5 NATO Press Release (2002b) (my italics). 
6
 NATO Press Release (2003). 
 170
The United States military isn’t the only force going through a 
transformation. NATO is also going through a transformation. … at the 
Prague Summit … NATO nations agreed that a transformation was 
needed to meet the new challenges of the 21st century.7 
 
With the progressive framing of the European Union’s Defence dimension 
– a process that picked up speed in the late 1990s – the development of the 
Union’s military capabilities also reflects this transformational thinking:  
 
To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to 
enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and 
more effective use of resources are necessary.8 
 
It is noteworthy that the military capabilities of EU and NATO are based 
mostly on national contributions. Regardless, the political and operational 
frameworks provided by the Union and NATO highlight the shared 
understandings within Europe and more broadly within the west concerning 
the important role of transformation in constituting military power. This 
despite the ‘fact’ that the both the Union and NATO have noted the 
difficulties in ‘delivering’ transformation by building those military 
capabilities that the post-Cold War era is understood to require.9 
 
Of course the idea of transforming armed forces and other defence-related 
structures does not in itself tell much about the direction, breadth, or 
permanency of this process of transformation. It rather highlights the 
shared understanding that the old or existing armed forces are considered to 
be incapable of handling contemporary and particularly future security 
challenges. The accepted idea of this needed transformation also implies 
that the determinants of military power are changing – or have already 
changed: agents capable of implementing this process of transformation 
swiftly and comprehensively are thought to be well positioned in the 
military struggles of tomorrow.  
 
A theme ‘beneath’ this needed transformation can be located in the 
changed security environment of post-Cold War era. First, the end of the 
Cold War allowed states and alliances to reduce their military forces and 
expenditures in view of the expected lower level of threats. Second, the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September have been conceptualised to represent a 
‘new’ threat – at least in the west – which requires a military response – at 
least in part. Even before the terrorist attacks of 11 September it was 
                                               
7
 NATO – Allied Command Transformation (2004) (my italics). 
8 A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy (2003), p. 12 (my 
italics). 
9
 See e.g. Nato Press Release (2002c), especially paragraphs 5 and 7; Nato Press 
Release (2003). 
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generally accepted that the post-Cold War era security landscape differs 
radically from the Cold War era one. As NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept 
framed it: 
 
The dangers of the Cold War have given way to more promising, but also 
challenging prospects, to new opportunities and risks. … The last ten 
years have also seen, however, the appearance of complex new risks to 
Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, 
economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.10 
 
Similarly, few months before 11 September, President George W. Bush 
stated at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council that it was necessary to 
 
change our thinking to meet the demands of a new age. The Cold War is 
over … but the world faces new kinds of threats. … nuclear, biological, 
and chemical weapons, … technology for ballistic missiles to deliver 
them. … cyber terrorism. We must work together to deter and address all 
these unconventional threats. To do this we must reassess old 
assumptions.11 
 
With the 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA, these ‘new’ security concerns 
became exacerbated. The attacks have had an enormous symbolic impact in 
addition to the large number of casualties and the large-scale destruction in 
New York and Washington DC. Within the shared western definitions, the 
symbolic aspects of these attacks were linked to the ‘new’ understandings 
of threats to national and alliance security and the subsequent actions 
needed to confront this threat. Within the US administration the meaning of 
11 September has been characterised as the beginning of a new era – an era 
of increased unpredictability, the possibility of large-scale destruction on 
the soil of the United States, and a new emerging logic of the international 
system – a logic requiring an active and even assertive use of military force 
globally. These changes have since then been connected to the need to 
reconfigure the functions and the means of the armed forces: 
 
The nature of the Cold War threat required the United States – with out 
friends and allies – to emphasize deterrence of the enemy’s use of force… 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, our 
security environment has undergone profound transformation. … new 
deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists.12 
 
                                               
10
 NATO’s Strategic Concept (1999). 
11
 NATO Speeches (2001). 
12 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002), p. 13 (my 
italics). 
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The dramatic transformation of America’s strategic environment demands 
an equally dramatic transformation of how we prepare the force.13 
 
Within NATO 9/11 proved also to be transformational. The post-Cold war 
era with its lower level of military threats – if compared to the Cold War 
era – came to a close as terrorism was conceptualised to be a threat 
requiring military countermeasures. 9/11 also invigorated the process of 
creating usable military capabilities among the European allies in order to 
address the new and emerging security threats of the post-Cold War era.  
 
The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States 
demonstrated both the capability of a determined enemy and the 
vulnerability of Alliance members to large-scale terrorist attacks. … 
NATO and its member nations face real threat from terrorism and 
countering that threat will, in most circumstances, be time critical. … The 
Alliance needs to be prepared to conduct military operations to engage 
terrorist groups and their capabilities, as and where required, as decided 
by the North Atlantic Council.14 
 
Similarly, within the context of the European Union, the post 9/11 
definitions of threats and needed new military capabilities marked a shift 
from the general description of the international environment or of the 
missions of the national armed forces during the Cold War or even during 
the post-Cold War era. 
 
Beyond its borders, in turn, the European Union is confronted with a fast-
changing, globalised world. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, it 
looked briefly as though we would for a long while be living in a stable 
world order, free from conflict… The eleventh of September has brought a 
rude awakening. The opposing forces have not gone away: religious 
fanaticism, ethnic nationalism, racism and terrorism are on the increase.15 
 
Our traditional concept of self-defence – up to and including the Cold War 
– was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line 
of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of 
proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become 
ever more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are 
neglected – as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should 
be ready to act before a crisis occurs. … Active policies are needed to 
counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture 
that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.16 
                                               
13
 Annual Report to the President and the Congress by Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld (2003), p. 71. 
14
 NATO’s Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism (2003) (my italics). 
15
 Presidency Conclusions – Laeken European Council Meeting (2001). 
16
 A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy (2003), p. 7, 11 (my 
italics). 
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Under guidance of the PSC [Political and Security Committee] work 
continues on the necessary scenario’s preliminary to the definition of the 
military requirements to fulfil the 2010 horizon, taking into account the 
terrorist threat.17 
 
The emphasis on the changed security landscape and the related need to 
transform – or in the case of the EU to create – military capabilities 
according to new definitions of threats does not say much about the 
‘content’ of shared understandings of military power. Rather, this emphasis 
describes the wider framework through which military power has been 
conceptualised. The ‘existence’ of post Cold War and post-9/11 era new 
threats and the ‘need’ for a process of military transformation as a response 
to these ‘exigencies of reality’ have been conceptualised through the lenses 
of new missions, new capabilities, and new organisations in the western 
discourses of war and military power. Accordingly, the western estimations 
of 21st century military power – mostly implicitly expressed – emphasise 
the changing nature of threats and the role of modern technology. 
Regarding the latter, particularly technology related to information 
gathering, processing, and delivery has been emphasised. The ‘old’ 
technology of industrialised nations is now considered ineffective and a 
wasteful utilisation of resources, and ‘new’ technologies of the post-
industrial information societies are understood to enable efficient 
operations with minimum material and human sacrifice and economic 
burden.18 
 
Throughout history warfare has assumed the characteristics of its age and 
the technology of its age. Today we see this trend continuing as we move 
from industrial age warfare with its emphasis on mass to information age 
warfare which highlights the power of networked distributed forces and 
shared situational awareness. … Within this wider context of military 
transformation, network-centric warfare is one of the key concepts for 
thinking about how we will operate in the future.19 
 
 
6.2. From General Metrics to Particular Manifestations of Military Power 
 
Power has already been defined as a capacity to cause effects. 
Correspondingly, military power in this study is understood as the capacity 
to cause effects by means of organising, maintaining, or using armed 
                                               
17
 Declaration on European Military Capabilities (2004), paragraph 7. 
18
 See e.g. Robertson (2003). NATO’s Secretary General noted in 2003 that “everyone 
agrees that Cold War legacy forces are a waste of money, and that we need forces that 
are far more mobile and flexible than those of the past. … The first challenge is the 
continuing modernisation of our military capabilities.” 
19
 Annual Report to the President and the Congress by Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld (2003), p. 82 (originally by Paul Wolfowitz, July 2001). 
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forces. In order to grasp today’s shared definitions of military power within 
the international systems and particularly among the western states, four 
elements related to the overall conceptualisation of military power are 
presented. The first two elements, viz. threats and the nature of warfare, 
relate to the shared understanding concerning the nature of the 
contemporary international system where military power is ‘acquired’ and 
maintained. These elements frame the ‘playing field’, the reality of 
international system where military power is applied. They represent two of 
the three conceptual elements of a paradigm of war as explicated in the 
previous chapter. Threats already faced and the nature of contemporary 
military conflicts tell agents which types of military actions are likely to 
take place and thus the kind of military operations that must be prepared 
for. The other two elements concerning shared conceptualisations of 
military power – the organising principles and the equipping of armed 
forces – are ‘answers’ to the problems posed by the nature of contemporary 
and future military threats and military missions. They guide policymakers 
and the militaries as to how to operate under current and future 
international situation – how to develop the armed forces, their 
organisation, operational concepts, and training, as well as what kind of 
weapons systems20 to procure. 
 
In order to analyse conceptualisations of military power, all of the above-
mentioned elements must be taken into consideration. Military power goes 
‘beyond’ material possibilities – set forth by level of technology and the 
distribution of resources – as the purposes and the nature of military action 
guide the practical manifestations of organising, procuring, and training the 
armed forces.  Military power becomes intelligible through a 
comprehensive analysis of 1) threats that require military preparations, 2) 
the nature of contemporary military conflicts, and 3) the possibilities to 
organise armed forces for the achievement of goals that are set in 
international and domestic political interaction. The interest in analysing 
threats and the nature of military conflicts in contemporary assessment of 
military power arises out of the widely shared understanding that a new, 
post-Cold War and post-9/11 security landscape requires prioritisation of 
different aspects of military activity and reconsideration of the sedimented 
Cold War era conceptualisations of military power.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
20
 The concept of ‘weapons systems’ is often used to refer to all those materially based 
systems that the armed forces use in their efforts to prepare for and wage war. 
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Elements  Cold War era Post-Cold War era 
Threats Large-scale forces, 
Massed mechanised 
forces 
Non-state belligerents, 
Terrorism, ‘Rogue’/failing 
states, Regional conflicts 
Military missions, 
Nature of warfare 
Territorial defence, 
Large-scale high-
intensity warfare 
Humanitarian interventions, 
Crisis management, Small-
scale precise strikes, Civil-
military cooperation, 
Military operations other 
than war, Regional high-
intensity warfare 
Armed forces Division-based, Separate 
services, Large forces, 
Hierarchical command 
structure, Relatively high 
tolerance for casualties 
Flexible organisations, 
‘Jointery’, Small forces, 
‘Flat’ command structure, 
Rapid deployability, 
Relatively low tolerance for 
casualties 
(Weapons) systems Emphasis on quantity, 
Designed for use in 
mechanised battle, 
Mass-produced, Heavy 
Technologically developed, 
Emphasis on quality, 
Information-based, 
Networked, ‘Smart’ systems, 
Precise effects, Mobility, 
Versatility, 
Light(er), rapid 
Deployability 
 
Table 6.1. Elements of an analysis of military power 
 
 
While it is essential to frame any analysis of military power with the 
adjoining threats and the nature of contemporary warfare, the elements of 
military power analysis fall in practice into the two latter categories of 
Table 6.1, namely the shared understandings concerning the principles 
according to which armed forces are organised and equipped. Analysing 
these two categories makes it possible to draw plausible inferences 
concerning those material and immaterial resources that symbolise military 
power.  
 
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report outlined a broad US vision 
related to the basic building blocs of military power vis-à-vis the new 
strategic environment: 
 
The ongoing revolution in military affairs could change the conduct of 
military operations. … For the United States, the revolution in military 
affairs holds the potential to confer enormous advantages and to extend 
the current period of U.S. military superiority. Exploiting the revolution in 
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military affairs requires not only technological innovation but also 
development of operational concepts, undertaking organizational 
adaptations, and training and experimentation to transform a country’s 
military forces. … Transformation results from the exploitation of new 
approaches to operational concepts and capabilities, the use of old and 
new technologies, and new forms of organization that more effectively 
anticipate new or still emerging strategic and operational challenges and 
opportunities and that render previous methods of conducting war 
obsolete or subordinate.21 
 
According to US DoD estimates, the transformation of armed forces is to 
be achieved, then, through the exploitation of the Revolution in Military 
Affairs. This transformation can be carried out – according to the 2001 
QDR – through innovation in technology (new, mostly information-based, 
systems) operational concepts (how to conceptualise war fighting), 
organisations (how to organise armed forces), as well as in training and 
experimentation (how to ‘test’ innovative concepts, technologies and 
organisations, and how to train forces according to new concepts, 
technologies and organisations). Regarding the ‘practical’ manifestations of 
these US-defined new constituent elements of military capability, the QDR 
mentions rapidly deployable forces, i.e. expeditionary capability, “globally 
available reconnaissance, strike, and command and control assets”, 
capabilities for information and space operations, special operations forces, 
“joint C4ISR architecture”, and precision strike capabilities.22  
 
In the NATO framework, the 1999 Strategic Concept highlights effective 
engagement capability, survivability, mobility, and sustainability for the 
attainment of alliance-wide interoperability in multinational operations. 
The Strategic Concept envisions that these broad goals can be achieved 
through the exploitation of advanced technology and the quality of 
personnel.23 Moving from these broad goals and principles of successful 
military operations, more ‘concrete’ transformational capabilities have 
been framed as technologically advanced and rapidly deployable 
expeditionary forces; smaller and more flexible organisations; command, 
control and communications capabilities; intelligence capabilities; strategic 
sealift and airlift capabilities; air-to-air refuelling capabilities; and precision 
weapons.24 
                                               
21
 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 6, 29. 
22
 Ibid., pp. 25-26, 30, quotes on p. 26, 30 
23 NATO’s Strategic Concept (1999), paragraph 53d. Also in Washington Summit 
Communiqué. See NATO Press Release (1999a). 
24
 Ibid. See also NATO Press release (2002b), NATO Press release (2003), Robertson 
(2000), and Robertson (2004). See also remarks by General Kujat, chairman of the 
NATO Military Committee on 21 October 2003: “The war against global terrorism is a 
multi-front campaign… Such a conflict may, and will require new weapons, more and 
new forms of intelligence gathering and increases in special forces and covert 
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Within the process of developing the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP), the Helsinki Headline Goal (1999)25 and the associated 
collective capability goals related to command and control, intelligence, 
and strategic transportation have been formulated in close cooperation with 
WEU and NATO procedures. The Petersberg crisis management tasks that 
formed the foundation of the development of EU’s military capabilities 
were indicative of the importance accorded to expeditionary operations. 
According to the 1999 Helsinki European Council, particular attention 
would be devoted to “deployability, sustainability, interoperability, 
flexibility, mobility, survivability and command and control”. The creation 
of the EU’s military dimension – under the broad heading of the ESDP – 
resembles NATO’s post-Cold War development and transformation 
processes, and the link between NATO and the EU has been explicitly 
expressed and emphasised in several European Council declarations and 
conclusions. Although the EU is directed to be capable of military action in 
situations where NATO is not involved, reliance on NATO capabilities, 
planning processes, and initiatives has guided the Union’s military 
development.26 Concerning operational capabilities deemed to be in need of 
rapid development, the EU has identified strategic air and sea transport 
capabilities, air-to-air refuelling capabilities, the number of deployable 
troops and special forces units, space based assets, strategic intelligence 
capabilities, precision weapons, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).27 
 
Thus, under the auspices of a general framework of force transformation as 
well as in response to new and emerging threats in the global international 
system, the exploitation of advanced technology – accompanied by 
conceptual and organisational changes – and responding to the threats of 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction have formed the ‘strategic axis’ 
around which estimations of needed force structures, organisations and 
capabilities have evolved. In analysing post-Cold War and post-9/11 
western conceptualisations of military power, it is this convergence of the 
possibilities of advanced technologies and the exigencies of terrorist and 
WMD threats that make these conceptualisations meaningful. The ‘old’ 
                                                                                                                                         
operations. Traditional allies of the United States, as well as new ones, will have to 
make similar changes to become more agile, more lethal and expeditionary.” Kujat 
(2003). 
25
 To have a military force of up to 50,000-60,000 persons deployable in 60 days for the 
period of at least 1 year capable of the Petersberg tasks, with accompanying political 
and military bodies, modalities for consultations and cooperation with NATO and other 
states, as well as non-military crisis management mechanisms. See Presidency 
Conclusions - Helsinki European Council Meeting (1999); Audit of Assets and 
Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations (1999). 
26
 See e.g. Presidency Conclusions – Helsinki European Council Meeting (1999) (also 
quote); Presidency Conclusions – Cologne European Council Meeting (1999). 
27 Presidency Conclusions – Nice European Council Meeting (2000); General Affairs 
and External Relations 2509th Council Meeting – External Relations (2003), p. 15. 
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technologies and threats have not ceased to exist, but they are becoming 
more and more irrelevant in contemporary assessments of military power. 
As has been stated over and over again during the last decade or so, the 
Cold War is over and the accompanying assumptions or conceptualisations 
need to be rethought.28 
 
In making contemporary day-to-day estimations of military power in the 
western countries, the capacity to deploy fighting forces and related 
equipment to faraway ‘theatres’ rapidly is one of the most important 
elements. The ‘reality’ of post-Cold War and post-9/11 globalised world – 
with the proportional increases in new wars ‘calling for’ western responses 
through humanitarian interventions and crisis response operations as well 
as the emergence of the international terrorist threat ‘requiring’ military 
responses – has shown to western governments that the capability for rapid 
military action across the globe is necessary and indeed preferable.29 In 
order to respond to the new exigencies of rapid deployability, there are 
several options available: forward stationing of forces and/or materiel, 
strategic air and sea transport capabilities, and the development of 
technologically sophisticated long-range military instruments that are 
capable of being used from thousands of kilometres away. 
 
The second distinguishing feature in the contemporary estimations of 
western military power is related to the increased technological 
sophistication of materiel in the use of the armed forces combined with the 
diminishing need for mass by replacing the quantity of manpower with the 
quality of materiel. Western thinking was already moving from quantity 
towards quality during the Cold War, but contemporary assessments of 
effective and responsive armed forces are based increasingly upon high 
technology. As was noted in the preceding chapter, this trend has been 
strongest in the US, but is present also in Europe. The belief in the ‘power’ 
of high technology has been expressed for example in the NATO Prague 
Capabilities Commitment, the attempts to “exploit” and harness the 
Revolution in Military Affairs by the US DoD, and the progressive framing 
of the EU’s military capability by stressing interoperability with NATO 
and its strongest member – the US.30 Increases in the speed of operations, 
                                               
28
 See e.g. Robertson (2003); NATO Speeches (2001). 
29 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002), pp. 1, 5-7, 13-
16; Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), pp. 4-6, 42-43. On p. 43: “The defense 
strategy rests on the assumption that U.S. forces have the ability to project power 
worldwide.”; NATO’s Strategic Concept (1999), paragraphs 10, 13, 20, 24, 29, 31, 48, 
49, 52, 53, 54, 59; A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy 
(2003), pp. 3-5, 7, 11-14; Declaration on European Military Capabilities (2004), 
paragraphs 3, 6-7, 9-17, 22-24. 
30
 NATO Press Release (2002b); Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p.3, 6, 
quote on p. 6; The National Security of the United States of America (2002), p. 29-30; 
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growing amounts of more accurate information, connectivity of different 
kinds of systems into networks, increases in the precision of weapons, 
possibilities to deploy troops and equipment, protection provided to 
combatants, and new possibilities of politico-military decision-making – all 
these are derivatives of the general technological advances that have had an 
impact on domestic policy as well as on the process of globalisation. It is 
noteworthy that the increased perceived need for rapid global deployability 
of western armed forces and the swiftly advancing information technology 
are not independent processes, but inseparably intertwined.  
 
The effects of technology on the western conceptualisations of military 
power are manifold. First, technology is to provide useable information in 
the form of early warning, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and 
for the purpose of targeting. Second, technology is to provide assistance for 
the effective use of information available by filtering, analysing, and 
processing the available information. This is to ensure that efficient and 
‘correct’ decision-making will anticipate the enemy respond. Third, 
technology is assumed to provide more effective means of influencing the 
enemy – ranging from information operations to physical destruction of 
targets. Precision weapons have been the most representative example of 
this technological aspect of warfare, although a multitude of means have 
been developed under the rubrics of electronic warfare and information 
operations – most intensively following the end of the Cold War and the 
simultaneously waged 1991 Gulf War. Fourth, new high technology is to 
provide better protection to friendly combatants by the development of 
protective materials, the efficient use of information, increasing numbers of 
unmanned systems, and the development of long-range capabilities. 
 
The role of information technologies in contemporary determinants of 
military power are conceptualised through the increasing digitalisation of 
the battlefield. Expressed somewhat optimistically by US Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld, “Our preeminent global intelligence capability is the 
foundation of U.S. military power.”31 Information technology provides this 
global intelligence capability through a multitude of space, air, sea, and 
land-based sensors; communications media; high-powered computer 
systems with highly developed software applications and adjoining 
operating terminals for battlefield use. The United States has the primary 
role in developing and building worldwide information networks for 
warfare, but their use is designed to be accessible to other alliance and 
coalition partners – depending on the situation at hand. Instead of a 
                                                                                                                                         
Presidency Conclusions - Helsinki European Council Meeting (1999); Presidency 
Conclusions – Nice European Council Meeting (2000), Annex I to Annex VI; Audit of 
Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations (1999). 
31
 Annual Report to the President and the Congress by Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld (2003), p. 78. 
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hierarchical command structure, where information flows from top to 
bottom and is filtered at every step along the way, ’flatter’, net-centric 
information architecture describes one of the post-Cold War and post-9/11 
key determinants of military power.32  
 
A third feature of contemporary estimations of military power, closely 
connected to the two previously mentioned features, is the emphasis on 
flexible, rapidly operational joint military organisations that are capable of 
contributing to multinational (combined) operations. The requirement of 
transporting combat forces far away in a brief period of time and the 
emphasis on technological sophistication converge in the need to be able to 
organise armed forces into small units with relatively light – though very 
lethal – equipment. The need for long-range rapid deployability and the 
increasingly expensive, high-technology-based procurement programmes 
have directed shared views away from manpower-intensive attrition 
warfare scenarios into technology-intensive operations. These operations 
are conceptualised as combined operations, in which several national forces 
cooperate interoperably. In addition, national armed forces have been 
professionalised owing to the ‘nature’ of post-Cold War era interventions, 
as the Cold War era conceptualisations of battles between massed 
mechanised forces have given way to smaller-scale contingencies.  In 
addition, the increasing development and procurement of high technology-
based systems within armed forces require better-trained soldiers. In this 
process of increasingly combined professionalised operations, the United 
States leads the way in setting common standards for interoperability, as it 
is furthest down the road to transforming its military capability.33 
  
A fourth attribute of contemporary military power assessments is the added 
emphasis on long-range logistics capabilities. As operations are becoming 
more and more expeditionary in nature – being transferred further away 
from home or friendly territory – the capability to support fighting forces in 
distant locations is becoming a high-value function. In addition, the 
increasing complexity of high technology systems and the rising reliance 
                                               
32
 Ibid., pp. 78-80, 152; NATO Press Release (1999a): ”Defence capabilities will be 
increased through improvements in the deployability and mobility of Alliance forces, 
their  sustainability and logistics, their survivability and effective engagement 
capability, and command and control and information systems. …we endorse the [North 
Atlantic] Council decision to begin implementing…and to develop the C3 system 
architecture by 2002 to form a basis for an integrated Alliance core capability allowing 
interoperability with national systems”. 
33
 Annual Report to the President and the Congress by Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld (2003), pp. 42-4; Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 33; 
Presidency Conclusions – Helsinki European Council Meeting (1999), Annex 1 to 
Annex IV; NATO’s Strategic Concept (1999), paragraphs 29, 52, 53c, 53d, 53g, 54-6, 
61; Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations 
(1999). 
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on high technology platforms places mounting pressures on combat support 
troops and operations.34 Operational long-range logistical capabilities also 
lend support to the need to be capable of sustaining operations indefinitely 
– from years to even possibly decades – as recent experiences in the former 
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, for example suggest. 
 
The contemporary – post-Cold War and post-9/11 era – shared western 
understandings of military power are presented in Table 6.2. It suggests the 
idea that the ‘new’ international security environment ‘necessitates’ or 
‘facilitates’ new definitions of military power. Therefore, as so far 
confirmed by the brief analysis of main western documents related to 
military security, transformation of the armed forces is depicted as the 
framework for contemporary assessments of military power. 
Transformation is divided into four constitutive elements – expeditionary 
capability, the exploitation of information technology, interoperability in 
multinational operations, and long-range logistical capability – that capture 
those aspects of military affairs that endow agents with military power 
from a western perspective. These four constitutive elements are divided 
further into several indicators of military power. These indicators are 
suggestive in nature and are presented only for highlighting the possible 
avenues of contemporary, problem-solving35 military power analysis, 
which begins with a definition and operationalisation of military power and 
then tries to deal with some related problem, e.g. the question of 
differences in military power between agents. This means that the research 
conducted here to conceptualise contemporary politically defined military 
power provides a basis for further, ‘traditional’ military power analysis by 
explicating the processes through which the Cold War era understandings 
of military power have evolved and by suggesting some indicators that may 
be of use in analysing military power from a problem-solving perspective.  
                                               
34
 NATO’s Strategic Concept (1999), paragraphs 53d, 59; Quadrennial Defense Review 
Report (2001), p. 30, 35, 56; Presidency Conclusions – Nice European Council Meeting 
(2000), Annex I to Annex VI; Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis 
Management Operations (1999). 
35
 On problem-solving theory, see Cox (1986), p. 207-210.  This research leans more 
toward critical theory, whose goal is to end up with a shared understanding (definition) 
of politically defined military power and its genealogy (historical path of ‘evolution’). 
On p. 210 Cox notes that the “perspectives of different historical periods favor one 
[problem-solving theory] or the other [critical theory] kind of theory. Periods of 
apparent stability or fixity in power relations favor the problem-solving approach. The 
Cold War was one such period. In international relations, it fostered a concentration 
upon the problems of how to manage apparently enduring relationship between two 
superpowers.” Accordingly, the end of the Cold War may be regarded as an opportunity 
to launch a political process of redefining military power. It also identifies a point in 
time when power relations underwent a change. From the perspective of critical theory, 
discovering the process by which military power was redefined in the post-Cold War 
era is an interesting research problem. 
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Applying Table 6.2 to the constructivist power framework presented in 
Chapter 4, transformation and its constitutive elements have consequences 
on at least four levels. First, concerning the shared rules for recognising 
power, transformation implies that in order to possess military power vis-à-
vis others one should have armed forces that differ from those of the Cold 
War and immediate post-Cold War era. The four constitutive elements of 
transformation with the respective indicators in Table 6.2 delineate these 
rules for recognising power, i.e. how states and other actors identify power. 
In the contemporary international system strategic transport capabilities, 
precision weapons, computer-based sensors and weapons systems, stealth 
platforms, professionalised armed forces, etc. symbolise military power and 
thus aid statesmen and others in assessing power by rules of thumb – 
practically totally without codified explicit rules of recognising power. 
These transformation-related rules for recognising power are shared 
interpretations of mostly post-Cold War era uses of military force and 
different military capabilities in operations that have been deemed 
‘successful’ or representative of contemporary international security 
environment.36  
 
Second, concerning the norms of the international system, transformation 
of armed forces and especially the changing nature of the international 
security landscape imply the increased legitimacy of intervening militarily 
in the affairs of other states and acting militarily against non-state actors. 
Its implications for the changing normative structure of the international 
system during the 1990s and in the beginning of the new millennium are 
also manifest in operations for the restoration of stability, bringing stark 
human rights abuses to an end, and preventing large-scale crimes against 
humanity. This does not, however, imply freedom of military action with 
global consent in all cases, as the wars in Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2003) 
have demonstrated. 
 
                                               
36
 It is suggested here that the events of 9/11 have for their part also had an important 
impact (of reproduction and transformation) on the revised rules of recognizing power 
that began to be rewritten after 1990. 
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Table 6.2. General indicators of contemporary military power  
 
 
 
 
 
Constitutive elements of military power Indicators of military power 
“Transformation” by exploiting RMA 
 
   1. Expeditionary capability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   2. Exploitation of information technology  
• network centric warfare 
      capabilities 
 
 
 
 
• precision weapons 
 
 
 
 
 
• space-based capabilities 
 
 
 
• survivability 
 
 
 
 
3. Interoperability for combined  
   operations 
 
 
 
4. Long-range logistical capability, 
sustainability 
 
 
Air- and sea transport 
capabilities, 
air-to-air refuelling capabilities, 
number and deployment time of 
deployable / rapidly deployable 
units 
 
 
Degree of platform integration,  
C4ISR capabilities, 
deployable HQ elements, 
number / ratio of unmanned 
platforms  
 
 
Ratio of precision/’dumb’ 
weapons, 
available number / variety of 
precision weapons and delivery 
platforms 
 
Available satellite systems 
 
 
 
Stealth-platforms, high-
technology materials 
 
 
 
Number/ratio of units available 
for combined operations, 
degree of professionalisation 
 
 
Air- and sea transport 
capabilities, 
combat search and rescue 
capabilities 
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Third, concerning identities of actors, transformation is the main distinctive 
characteristic of a modern (or post-modern) developed state with up-to-date 
armed forces in assessments of military power. Massive military machinery 
with vast financial resources equipped, led, trained, and organised 
according to the Cold War threat scenarios and missions is not indicative of 
the ability to deal effectively with new threats in the post-Cold War and 
post-9/11 world. Those who are in the process of transforming their armed 
forces and are capable of participating in combined operations are ‘leading 
the way’ and are thus interpreted to be militarily more advanced and 
powerful than their untransformed counterparts. Those capable of investing 
extensively in transformation and the capabilities that facilitate it are 
hierarchically positioned on a higher level than those, who can carry out 
only small-scale or moderate transformation and the accompanying 
procurement, organisational, conceptual, and training-related 
modifications. Similarly, those willing to maintain or acquire a great power 
status are expected to be capable of far-reaching military transformation 
and thus able and even willing to conduct military operations in far-away 
locations. In other words, transformation of the Cold War era armed forces 
and defence establishments by joining the Revolution in Military Affairs is 
a prerequisite for the identity of a great power or a superpower.37 Those 
actors that are not able or willing to fulfil these requirements fall to the 
category of lesser powers, among whom the ‘ranking’ of military power 
can be done at the general level according to the logic ‘determined’ by the 
rules for recognising power. 
 
Fourth, concerning the shared interpretation of the situation, the end of the 
Cold War and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 are the main benchmarks used by 
western states to evaluate the new global security situation and the related 
‘demands’ for military preparations and investments. The depiction of a 
more turbulent, unstable world with multiple new smaller-scale threats 
accentuates different military capabilities than the Cold War era view of a 
high-intensity – but stable – conflict between the superpower blocs. 
Transformation of the defence establishments and the armed forces by 
accentuating modern information technology, expeditionary capabilities, 
multinational operations, long-range logistical capability, and sustainability 
is one among several possible means to respond to the prevalent shared 
interpretation of the situation within the international system. If the shared 
interpretation of the global security situation evolves in the direction of 
increased hostility and becomes widely viewed to be more threatening (e.g. 
according to the Bush administration’s War on Terror rhetoric and actions 
after September 2001), the restrictiveness of norms against the use of 
military force will be relaxed, the identities of states and other agents may 
become more threat-based than community-based, and the ‘usability’ of 
                                               
37
 See Gongora and von Riekhoff (2000), p. 7, 13. 
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military force will increase. In such a situation the importance of military 
power will increase and other forms of power will be on the decline. It is 
noteworthy, however, that actors ‘struggle’ for the shared interpretation of 
the situation continuously in many issue areas (for example in the UN 
security council concerning the situation in Iraq in the latter part of 2002 
and the beginning of 2003, before the US-led war against Iraq began) and 
that individual practice-related definitions of the situation in most cases do 
not have any fundamental effect on the general shared interpretation of the 
international security situation.38 
 
 
6.3. Military Power Today – General Trends 
 
The analysis of official politico-strategic documents and high-level 
speeches in the west during the last few years reveals that understandings 
of faced threats, the nature of conflicts affecting the west, and the 
determinants of military power have indeed changed from those of the Cold 
War era. Regarding the conceptualisation of military power, the vague 
notion of transformation describes contemporary efforts to restructure the 
military within states and NATO in order to be better positioned to deal 
effectively with contemporary and future conflicts. The notion of 
transformation and the related need to be better prepared to counter post-
Cold War threats also marks the creation and development of EU’s defence 
dimension. In addition to the ‘historical break’ caused by the end of the 
Cold War and the subsequent ‘reopening’ of the shared definition of 
military power, the events of 9/11 have also been widely interpreted as a 
fundamental redefinition of the international system. While the end of the 
Cold War was more ambiguous in nature – the ending of an era did not 
suggest the ‘nature’ of the era succeeding it – the post-9/11 era has been 
cast in rather uniform terms, especially in the developed west. This despite 
the fact that methods to be applied in the post-9/11 international 
environment have remained somewhat contested. 
 
The two historical events – the end of the Cold War and 9/11 – can be 
conceptualised as two main international incidents that frame today’s 
shared western understandings of military power through the conceptual 
lenses of transformation. As a move away from the ‘old’ and increasingly 
irrelevant elements of military power of the Cold War and even immediate 
post-Cold War era, transformation signifies the creation of ‘new’ and 
relevant capabilities that match the emerging threats and the nature of 
                                               
38
 As has been stated already, this study proposes that the end of the Cold War (as a 
process of several years) was one such fundamental ‘event’ which led to transformed 
interpretations of the international security situation. Here, the attacks of 11 September 
are conceptualised as a possibly fundamental ‘event’ that may have large-scale effects 
of western definitions of the global security situation and thus of military power.   
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contemporary and visioned future conflicts. In assessments of military 
power from a transformation perspective, it is those who have already 
succeeded in this process of transformation, or those who are embracing 
transformation rapidly  – in relation to others – that are well positioned. 
 
As transformation of the defence establishments and armed forces is 
increasingly accepted to be necessary, logical, and even compulsory, those 
agents that are in the position to call the tune are better positioned than 
others in applying this process in their own transformation efforts. It is 
noteworthy, however, that those who are in the position to set or influence 
the generally accepted transformation agenda are not only privileged by 
having the best possibilities to implement transformation. They are also 
privileged by having the better possibilities to frame transformation from 
their own perspective, emphasising those qualities that they excel at.  
 
While the process of transformation describes the general pattern of 
assigning recognised military power in the west – and more generally 
within the international system – reliance on advanced technology can be 
located at the crux of the western transformation efforts and the projects to  
(re)create usable military capabilities in the emerging post-Cold War and 
post-9/11 international system. Expeditionary operations – the ‘new’ form 
of western military operations and warfare – are more possible than before 
due to the rapid development of high technology. Particularly the increased 
effectiveness of long-range military systems, the decreasing size of weapon 
systems, the shrinking of military units, as well as the high technology 
means of force protection make these military capabilities possible that 
favour the development of expeditionary operations. Military units are 
more mobile than they used to be and it is easier to transport them even to 
faraway locations. In addition, the systems at the disposal of armed forces 
can be operated day or night – with increasingly precise success on targets 
that can be located farther away than before.  
 
In addition, the increasingly multinational nature of today’s military 
operations – a trend particularly of the 1990s – has placed strong accent on  
interoperability. Although NATO as a military alliance has sought to 
standardise its forces, methods, and military systems for decades, the 1990s 
revealed the difficulties of conducting combined operations – even at the 
low end of the military spectrum. Nevertheless, being a part of a 
multinational military operation requires that national armed forces can 
interface. In addition to the effects of advanced technology – e.g. in the 
fields of command and control, equipment maintenance, or munitions – the 
accumulating effects of combined operations have been felt in tactics and 
operational art, organisational and command structures, logistics, and 
training. 
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7. THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AS THE 
LEADING AMERICAN MILITARY POWER 
DISCOURSE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
 
 
The form of any war-and it is the form which is of primary interest to men 
of war-depends upon the technical means of war available. … Victory 
smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not 
upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur. In this 
period of rapid transition from one from to another, those who daringly 
take to the new road first will enjoy the incalculable advantages of the 
new means of war over the old. 
 
    - Giulio Douhet, 19421 
 
In the analysis of contemporary western understandings of war and military 
power, the debate revolving around the concept of Revolution in Military 
Affairs cannot be overlooked. RMA and associated concepts have been 
probably the most frequently used in strategic studies, as well as in theoris-
ing concerning the nature of war and military power in the ‘new’ globalised 
post-Cold War world.2 More precisely, the emergence of the RMA dis-
course – or debate – can be linked to the 1991 Gulf War and the post-Cold 
War era search for new security architectures and arrangements throughout 
the international system. The RMA debate was the offspring of the possi-
bilities of ‘new’ information-based warfare and changed security perspec-
tives that necessitated new threat assessments by the main protagonists of 
the Cold war and other actors as well. This discussion fed on the ideas pre-
sented already in the 1970s and 1980 in the Soviet Union – under the con-
cept of Military-Technical Revolution3 – and drew also on the debate 
within historical studies concerning Military Revolutions – a debate that 
has been going on ever since the seminal article by Michael Roberts in 
1956.4 
 
While RMA attracted a lot of attention during the 1990s, the pattern of this 
strategic discourse has been similar to the ‘founding’ of strategic studies 
and subsequent strategic discourse of deterrence during the Cold War: it 
has been mostly an American enterprise, led by its comprehensive and 
well-established defence community, which has dominated the field ever 
                                               
1
 Douhet (1983) [1942], p. 6, 30. 
2
 E.g. Gray (2002), p. xiii, 1. Gongora and von Riekhoff (2000), p. 1: “The notion that 
we are engaged in a revolution in military affairs (RMA) is part of common knowledge 
among defense and military analysts.” Cf. Metz (2000), p. 1: “A ‘revolution-centric’ 
perspective on the development of war emerged among American strategic thinkers in 
the 1990s.” 
3
 E.g. FitzGerald (1991). 
4
 Roberts (1995) [1956]; Rogers (1995). 
 188
since its establishment shortly after the Second World War.5 It is notewor-
thy that the RMA debate has not been confined to the American academic 
strategic community. It has been an important element in the efforts of the 
US Department of Defense and Armed Forces from the Clinton administra-
tion onwards to transform the military establishment. In addition, the RMA 
has been debated outside the US, and its policy implications are expressed 
in shared western understandings of military power. This will be explicated 
further in this chapter and the next. At this point it is worth mentioning ex-
plicitly that this study is conducted with the assumption that the RMA de-
bate, which has its centre of gravity in the US defence community, has been 
the leading western strategic discourse concerning military power after the 
Cold War. As such, it has had decisive influence on how states conceptual-
ise military power and how they transform their armed forces accordingly. 
 
The underlying approach in the majority of articles and monograph con-
cerning RMA is based on the understanding that the Revolution in Military 
Affairs is an ‘objective condition’ operating in the international system and 
that states must adapt to it or be prepared to suffer the consequences.6 Ac-
cording to an alternative – constructivist – reading of the RMA, the current 
level of technology faced by individual actors could be seen as an objective 
fact from the actor’s perspective, but that reading would not make the de-
terministic jump from possibilities of technology to war via self-help logic 
of the international system. From a constructivist framework, the meaning 
of the Revolution in Military Affairs, and of military technology, is based 
on intersubjective understandings that exist within the international system. 
It therefore does not have an essentialist quality, a proper definition that 
would be applicable across history. In other words, questions related to 
how states collectively understand the meaning of the RMA and how this 
understanding affects their practices form the focus of the constructivist 
framework. 
 
The Revolution in Military Affairs can, then, be understood as a process of 
(re)defining the role that the military is to have in the international system 
and how war is conceptualised. As a discourse concerning the nature and 
use of military force, it can be understood as a constitutive element in the 
meaning of military power after the Cold War. In general RMAs may have 
technological origins or may be affected by technology, but according to 
the constructivist framework of this study, Revolutions in Military Affairs 
                                               
5
 Gray makes a distinction between deterrence theorising and RMA debate due to the 
fact that the former was ahistorical in nature while the latter is ”inescapably historical, 
as are its policy outcomes.” Gray (2002), p. 83, footnote 2. While this statement has a 
lot of merit, I would accentuate the similarities between these two strands of strategic 
theory concerning their leading nature in strategic discourse of their times. See also 
Gongora and von Riekhoff (2000), p. 15. 
6
 For an example, see Davis (1996), p. 51. 
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are first and foremost rapid and profound transformations of the social 
structure of the international system. This change is caused by actors’ prac-
tices that are embedded in the pre-revolutionary social structure. This rapid 
and profound transformation may originate not only from the intentional 
policies of one or more actors, but also from the unintentional conse-
quences of actors’ actions. The key is that a new, transformed intersubjec-
tive understanding concerning military power and war emerges. 
 
The academic and political discourse concerning RMA that emerged after 
the Gulf War can be seen as a struggle for the meaning of military power 
and war to the degree that differences exist concerning the meaning and 
implications of the RMA. This means that different (national) decision-
makers formulate their views on the role that the military is to have in the 
current international systems. When these agents interact, a shared view 
may arise as an intersubjective understanding concerning the RMA and 
military power.  
 
That the nature of war and military power are socially constructed means 
that in order to understand their meaning, they need to be contextualised 
and their (r)evolutionary nature needs to be understood. According to the 
morphogenetic methodology and the path-dependent view of contemporary 
political definitions and actions, certain events become important in so-
cially shared definitions concerning international politics. The demise of 
the Cold War – and its shared social structure concerning the meaning of 
military power – and the simultaneous overlap of the Gulf War provided a 
basis for a transformed shared definitions of war and military power. There 
was not – however – anything in the ‘lessons learned’ from the Gulf War 
that should automatically have come to be understood similarly throughout 
the world. Different countries in different geographical situations with dif-
fering political and economic circumstances did not come to view the Gulf 
War as a ‘new’, ‘revolutionary’ or ‘paradigm-changing’ war, nor was it in-
evitable that the outcome of one overwhelmingly asymmetric war would be 
viewed as a model for transforming conceptions of the nature of war or the 
organisation or doctrine of armed forces. William Perry noted already in 
1991 that no one “should be deluded into believing that the military capa-
bility that can easily defeat an army with 4,000 tanks in a desert is going to 
be decisive factor in a jungle or urban guerrilla war.”7 
 
 
7.1. Main Tenets of the RMA Theorising 
 
One of the problems related to the RMA debate concerns the multitude of 
meanings and concepts that have been used in an effort to depict the chang-
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 Perry (1991), p. 81. 
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ing nature of warfare in the post-Cold War era. This proliferation of con-
cepts and meanings is the essence of the RMA debate and as such it is a 
very familiar condition within the discipline of international relations. It is 
not – however – a very familiar condition within strategic studies. Debated 
have certainly taken place concerning the ‘right’ policies – for example the 
debate between American nuclear ‘minimalists’ and ‘maximalists’ – but 
less so concerning the ‘right’ meaning of a high-concept, in this case the 
RMA. 
 
The three ‘main’ concepts that relate to the RMA debate of this study are 
often presented in a hierarchical form. These concepts are Military-
Technical Revolution (MTR), Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and 
Military Revolution (MR). Although there is no unanimous agreement on 
the meaning and relationship of these concepts, the general view is that the 
lowest level of a hierarchical intellectual construct, Military-Technical 
Revolution, is concerned with the impact of technological innovation on 
the changing nature of war. Much of the RMA debate is at this level. Of the 
three levels in the RMA debate, MTRs cause profound transformation in 
the means of waging war, mainly within the ‘old’ paradigm of war. The 
middle level, the RMA, deals with the changing nature or conduct of war. 
It may have technological underpinnings, but in order for an RMA to oc-
cur, doctrinal and organisational transformations are essential. The effects 
of RMAs are wider and more far-reaching than those of MTRs’, since the 
framework of war changes: “the crucial element in most RMAs is concep-
tual in nature.”8 A paradigm shift in the way war is conceptualised charac-
terises the RMA. The highest level of Military Revolutions refers to the 
changes in the political, social, and cultural domains – changes that have 
unpredictable and uncontrollable qualities. Military Revolutions “recast the 
nature of society and the state as well as of military organisations.”9 
 
The hierarchical model of the three RMA-related concepts does not apply 
precisely in analysing the historical evolution of RMA theorising. This 
means that although it may be useful to separate MTR, RMA, and MR 
from each others as described above, many analyses have been conducted 
from an alternative perspective. Taking part in the RMA debate with MTR 
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 Murray (1997), p. 70. Also in Peters (1995): Machines, “no matter how magnificent, 
do not of themselves constitute a revolution. True revolutions happen, above all, in the 
minds of men.” 
9
 Murray (1997), p. 71. See also Toffler and Toffler (1993), p. 32 “A military revolution 
[occurs]… when an entire society transforms itself, forcing its armed services to change 
at the every level simultaneously – from technology and culture to organization, strat-
egy, tactics, training, doctrine, and logistics. When this happens, the relationship of the 
military to the economy and society is transformed, and the military balance of power 
on earth is shattered.” On the differences between MTR and RMA, see Tilford (1995), 
p. 6. 
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as an organising concept does not automatically mean an emphasis on 
technology alone. Conceptual oscillation and ‘development’ concerning 
MTR/RMA/MR can easily be seen in the work of one of the leading RMA 
theorist writing from 1992 to 2002. Andrew Krepinevich wrote an assess-
ment for the Office of Net Assessment in 1992 concerning Military-
Technical Revolutions, conceptualising them to comprise innovative tech-
nology, military systems evolution, operational innovation, and organisa-
tional adaptation. In 1993 he changed the concept from MTR to RMA, 
mainly in order to avoid the technological bias already inherent in the MTR 
conceptualisations of the day. Later Krepinevich has adopted the concept of 
Military Revolution to avoid the intellectual “baggage of being associated 
with Soviet usage of the term [RMA].”10 
 
The basic idea behind all theorising concerning on RMA lies in the notion 
that profound changes in warfare have been brought about by one or sev-
eral factors. Many analysts favour an understanding of an RMA brought 
about by technological development, mostly in the information technology 
sector. The argument behind a technologically oriented RMA is that the 
dawn of the Information Age – with its enhanced detection, communica-
tion, and strike capabilities – is causing profound transformations in how 
wars are fought and their objectives. A wider perspective on an RMA high-
lights that a true revolution is caused by the confluence of doctrinal, organ-
isational, and technological innovation. Seen from this angle, technological 
innovation in itself is insufficient to produce a revolution if not combined 
with new doctrine and organisation, i.e. an innovative use of the new tech-
nology. Technology provides only means to an end, and technological 
breakthroughs by themselves facilitate thus only more efficient tools for 
traditional purposes.11 
 
The dichotomy between a technology-oriented and a wider perspective on 
an RMA is a very simplifying conceptual basis for further analysis. Al-
though some scholars focus almost all their attention on the technological 
dimensions of an RMA, almost everyone in the debate takes doctrinal and 
organisational factors into consideration; at least they are mentioned even 
though they often are subordinated to technological factors.12  
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 Krepinevich (1997); Krepinevich (2002a), quote on p. ii; Krepinevich (2002b) 
[1992]. 
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 E.g. Krepinevich (1994b); Owens (1998). 
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 Herman, Paul (1994), p. 94. 
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7.2. The Genesis of the Post-Cold War Era RMA Discourse 
 
The RMA debate, which had been going on for more than a decade, did not 
emerge from a vacuum. Its intellectual and practical roots lie in the Cold 
War era international system. The concept of ‘Military-Technical Revolu-
tion’ is of Soviet origin. The development and use of precision-guided mu-
nitions was seen already in Vietnam in the early 1970s. The doctrine of 
combining air power with attacking ground forces in deep strikes was a 
way for the US and its allies to respond to the threat that was seen to ema-
nate from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, the above-
mentioned Cold War era ‘RMA-related factors’ fell under the shared rule 
structure of an antagonistic bipolar world order in which almost all interna-
tional political events were conceptualised from the perspective of super-
power rivalry. Avoiding World War III was one of the core tenets of the 
Cold War era rule structure.13 Realising that even a small-scale military 
conflict between the superpowers might erupt into a nuclear war was con-
ductive to agreement on commonly accepted procedures for superpower 
conduct in the form of crisis management (especially after the Cuban mis-
sile crisis) and deterrence. In all, the three constituent elements of interna-
tional system were “agreed aims, appropriate structure, and commonly ac-
cepted procedures”.14 
 
Although the end of the Cold War and the subsequent events during the 
Gulf War facilitated the emergence of the American RMA discourse, the 
process leading up to the inclusion of the RMA as one of the most impor-
tant factors of transforming the US military did not begin until the 1970s. 
On the military side, it was the frustration of ‘winning the battles but losing 
the Vietnam war’15 that led to the painful but obviously necessary new as-
sessment of military doctrine. The overthrow of the Shah in Iran, the Soviet 
conventional military build-up in the 1970s, the Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan and the declining number of active US soldiers after Vietnam 
were also pushing the US to redirect its policy concerning conventional 
forces. The events in Iran showed the problems inherent in relying on for-
eign militaries to compensate for American fighting power. Combined with 
the strategic defeat in Vietnam and the increased amount of operational So-
viet weapon platforms in Europe, military operations needed to be re-
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thought in addition to tackling the long-range project of developing and 
procuring new weapon systems.16 
 
The Field Manuals of the US Army from the year 1976, 1982 and 1986 re-
flect the reorientation that took place in the Army’s orientation toward bat-
tle at a time when the RMA debate had not yet begun. The doctrine of Ac-
tive Defense (1976) returned the American focus from Vietnam to Europe. 
This move followed the US strategy of Nixon Doctrine, which identified 
the Soviet threat as the main focus of US national security. Active Defense 
tackled the problem of Soviet superiority in Europe and devised the con-
cept of ‘first battle’. It was derived from the western inferiority in troop 
strength in Europe, the long time needed in order to mobilise and transport 
US troops from the continental US to the European theatre, as well as the 
increased pace and deadliness of modern warfare. The shift was from supe-
riority of materiel and manpower in a war of attrition to a more combined 
arms approach to winning the decisive first battle near the frontline. Active 
Defense was heavily criticised for its neglect of the operational level of 
war, its over-emphasis on defense, its limited view of Soviet methods of 
attack, its over-concentration on the European theatre, and its style of pre-
scribing a proper way to wage war instead of granting a measure of flexi-
bility and initiative to field commanders.17 
 
The US Army’s doctrine of the AirLand Battle was promulgated in 1982 
and ‘developed’ in 1986. While the 1976 doctrine of Active Defense con-
tained a chapter on Air-Land Battle (chapter 8), the 1982 FM 100-5 Opera-
tions signified a significant change in the conceptualisation of the levels of 
war, its increased appreciation for the human dimension of warfare in addi-
tion to platforms, its balance of offence and defense in operations, and its 
increased demands for joint Army and the Air Force operability. The Air-
Land Battle doctrine (of both 1982 and 1986) was based on the intellectual 
foundations of Active Defense, but responded to many of the criticisms that 
the previous Army doctrine had attracted. One of the important moves was 
to focus on the operational level rather than on the tactical (and strategic) 
level, as had been the case with Active Defense. The revolutionary princi-
ple of AirLand Battle was the idea of joint operations on the ground and in 
the air for the purpose of destroying advancing enemy forces in deep battle 
engaging “enemy reserves, fire support elements, command and control 
facilities, and other high-value targets beyond the line of contact”.18  
 
The post-Vietnam – and the post-Lebanon [terrorist attacks of 1984, which 
killed 241 US marines] – reorientation of the US military was expressed 
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rather unambiguously under the rubric of the ‘Weinberger doctrine’, which 
stressed achievable political and military aims vis-à-vis committed forces 
in the pursuit of national interests in operations that had public acceptance. 
Although this ‘doctrine’ was expressed by the Secretary of Defense Casper 
Weinberger in a 1984 speech on the conditions of US military combat op-
erations, the 1982 Field Manual FM 100-5 Operations had already outlined 
the content of the Weinberger doctrine.19 A few years after its inception, 
the Weinberger doctrine was directing the US preparations for the  inter-
vention in Panama and the 1991 Gulf War. After these successful cam-
paigns, its conceptual grip on the US conceptualisations of the nature of 
war and the requirements of military power was strengthened.  
 
The western – particularly American – RMA debate, which had its main 
momentum in the 1990s, was thus not without practical predecessors dur-
ing the Cold War. The US Armed Forces did innovate on the doctrinal 
level for reasons of technological change, the lessons learned from previous 
wars (especially the 1973 Arab-Israeli War), political strategy, and the 
Vietnam experience. The 1991 Gulf War and the following air wars of the 
1990s were conducted according to doctrinal, technological, and organisa-
tional ‘basic infrastructure’ that had been developed and built during the 
Cold War – and thereafter. As a result, while the RMA debate was con-
ducted during the post-Cold War era, the shadow of the Cold War signifi-
cantly influenced its conceptualisation, argumentation, and ‘development’. 
The way that war and military power had been conceptualised within the 
international system for half a century (some would argue that for several 
centuries) did not change overnight. The intellectual devices at our disposal 
are part of the sedimented social structure of the international system and 
domestic cultures, and changes in them are not necessitated by geopolitical 
changes in the world system – at least not in the short run.  
 
 
7.3. Towards Critical Mass – The Emergence of the RMA with the Demise 
of the Cold War and the Execution of Operation Desert Storm  
 
The diminishing degree of confrontation between the superpowers and the 
growing budget deficit in the US during the late 1980s pointed to the possi-
bility – or a need – to reassess future military threats and force structures in 
the United States. The 1990 approved Base Force concept was based on the 
assumption that a 25 percent cut in US military’s force structure was possi-
ble while still meeting the US security and defense needs in the light of the 
new security realities despite the fact that the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet 
Union had not yet disintegrated. The Base Force was a move to adjust to 
lower force levels and  new threat assessments. It was a move from concep-
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tualising international conflict as a global confrontation between the super-
power blocs and a defense policy of global containment to threats posed by 
regional conflicts between large mechanised regional armed forces and a 
defense policy of regional forward presence and rapid power projection.20 
 
The emergence, acceptance, and execution of Base Force was a process of 
reconfiguring the force structure, strategy, and defence planning of the US 
Armed Forces in the immediate post-Cold War period. It was the first 
phase of a military adjustment in the new international system.21 Its aim 
was to get rid of the specific policies and force components that belonged 
to the heritage of the Cold War. Base Force was not revolutionary in the 
sense of making a clear break with Cold War era military strategy.22 
Rather, it resembled more a “Cold War-minus approach”23, which promul-
gated US military objectives in reaction to changing international circum-
stances and the economic situation of the United States that the Cold War 
era perspective on war and military power could not be envisioned from. 
 
The 1991 Annual Report to the President and the Congress by Secretary of 
Defense (later Annual Defense Report) Dick Cheney was released in Janu-
ary, during operation Desert Storm. The report reflected the dual challenge 
that the US was facing at that time: the end of the Cold War and subsequent 
need to rethink global challenges, as well as the ongoing war against Iraq. 
Although the report did not present lessons learned from the ongoing war, 
it did reflect thinking that could be considered RMA-related: using a ‘sys-
tem of systems’ approach to improve the Army’s combat capability, high-
lighting the importance of deep attack as well as of command and control, 
stressing leap-ahead technologies and smart weapons, and accentuating the 
technological edge of the US.24 The closest reference made related to a 
RMA in the report was formulated in the following manner: 
 
[I]t is apparent that in the years ahead we will need to strengthen our tech-
nological edge. … The importance of maintaining a strong research and 
development program in the Department cannot be overemphasized. 
Technology has revolutionized the battlefield time and time again. To 
match potential adversaries’ strength in numbers, the U.S. has always re-
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lied upon its technological edge and this proven concept must be contin-
ued.25 
 
In the statutory report of the Secretary of the Army, modernisation of the 
Army was also presented using the rhetoric of the RMA framework: 
 
Modernization is more than developing and fielding of advanced weapons 
and equipment. It also includes developing production and sustainment 
bases as well as doctrine, organizations, and training plans to support 
these advanced weapons.26 
 
The 1991 Gulf War had a tremendous impact on the thinking and theoris-
ing concerning warfare in the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century. 
One of the most influential RMA proponents in the US, William Perry, 
pondered in the fall 1991 issue of Foreign Affairs the meaning of the “revo-
lutionary advance in military capability” that the new military systems pro-
vided for the US Armed Forces. The edge that the US enjoyed in the war 
was provided by – according to Perry – “revolutionary new military tech-
nology”. With the advent of post-Cold War era reductions in military per-
sonnel and budgets, Perry suggested – or insisted – that the US needed to 
continue its efforts to explore new military technology, test prototypes, and 
selectively modernise its armed forces.27 
 
The August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States also stated 
the importance of developing new defense technology and to support these 
technologies by innovating in the fields of doctrine and organisation: 
 
We must be able to move promising research through development to 
rapid fielding when changes in the international environment require. … 
We will have to build some systems, as the early production effort is a vi-
tal component of technology development. Production, even in limited 
numbers, will also facilitate the development of innovative doctrine and 
organizational structures to make full use of the new technologies we 
field.28 
 
The National Military Strategy of the United States, released in January 
1992, marked a shift from the global military confrontation to a more re-
gional orientation, a process that had been going on and prepared from the 
late 1980s and which was in place in the Base Force concept. The main ef-
fort in devising a new military strategy for the post-Cold War era appears 
to have been preoccupied mostly with cutting force structure as a response 
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to changes in the international security environment and to budgetary 
strains. The role of technology was conceptualised as offsetting quantita-
tive advantages of potential adversaries by enhancing combat effectiveness. 
Technology was also a key element in avoiding conflict casualties. The 
Gulf War was mentioned as an example of regional conflicts that the strat-
egy accentuated. The role of high-technology weapon systems in the Gulf 
War was noted29, but with the qualification that future conflicts might not 
resemble Operation Desert Storm. The Military Strategy of 1992 did not 
explicitly espouse technical revolution as a source of fundamental change 
in warfare although it advocated the continued maintenance of the “qualita-
tive edge” and the advancement of technology as a “national security 
obligation”.30 
 
The February 1992 Annual Defense Report by Dick Cheney – the first An-
nual Defense Report after the end of the Gulf War – made the link between 
success in the Gulf War and the military technological revolution official. 
In addition, the lessons of the Gulf War were seen to provide proof of the 
benefits of a technological edge vis-à-vis potential enemies: 
 
The Gulf War provided the world with a vivid demonstration of the revo-
lution in military technology that is shaping the nature of warfare. … In 
large part this revolution has resulted from the development of new tech-
nologies, … The exploitation of these new technologies promises to 
change the nature of warfare significantly.31 
 
[T]he United States must continue to maintain a technological edge over 
potential adversaries. … as was demonstrated in Operation DESERT 
SHIELD/STORM, a technological edge enables us to prevail quickly. 
Maintaining this technological edge requires a continuing emphasis on 
technological superiority.32 
 
The important role of airpower in the Gulf War was connected to the 
changing nature of war via technological development. In his statutory re-
port to the 1992 Annual Defense Report, Secretary of the Air Force Donald 
Rice accentuated the combination of precision weapons and stealth tech-
nology. In addition, the use of space was deemed “a watershed event” in 
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modern warfare.33 Concerning the developments in technology and the 
changing nature of war, his statement was the most outspoken of the 1992 
report: 
 
Simply put, airpower technology has finally caught up with airpower the-
ory. We have witnessed a revolution in warfare.34 
 
The US Department of Defense’s official Final Report to Congress – Con-
duct of the Persian Gulf War, released in April 1992, also accentuated the 
technological lessons of the war. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney 
noted in his overview that: 
 
[H]igh-technology systems vastly increased the effectiveness of our 
forces. This war demonstrated dramatically the new possibilities of what 
has been called ‘military-technological revolution in warfare’. … In large 
part this revolution tracks the development of new technologies such as 
the microprocessing of information that has become familiar in our daily 
lives.35 
 
By 1992, there was an official understanding – at least within the US De-
partment of Defense – that the Gulf War was representative of the new 
post-Cold War era conflicts and that the nature of warfare would be heavily 
affected by revolutionary technological development. This technology-
centred view of war was not seen only as an accurate description of a gen-
eral transformation in the nature of warfare – although this was the most 
visible and loudly voiced facet of post-Cold War era warfare. The techno-
logically biased conceptualisation of war was also linked to the ability of 
the US to shape and manage the post-Cold War era security environment, 
since no state or other agent was seen to be in the position to match the 
technological capabilities ‘needed’ for (post)modern warfare.36 
 
 
7.3.1. Technological Lessons of the Gulf War 
 
The seemingly obvious lesson learned from the 1991 Gulf War was that 
armed forces relying on technologically developed modern weapon sys-
tems can defeat opposing mechanised armed forces precisely, swiftly, and 
with relatively low levels of collateral damage or friendly casualties. The 
                                               
33
 Ibid., pp. 124-127, quote on p. 124. 
34
 Ibid., p. 124 (my italics). 
35
 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress (1992), p. xx (my italics). 
36
 See e.g. Annual Report to the President and the Congress by Secretary of Defense 
Dick Cheney (1991), p. viii, 6; Annual Report to the President and the Congress by Sec-
retary of Defense Dick Cheney (1992), pp. v-ix; Annual Report to the President and the 
Congress by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney (1993), p. v, ix, 1. 
 199
Gulf War was thought to be the most visible example of the decisive im-
pact of information technology on warfare – at least proponents of techno-
logically based RMA have raised it to the revolutionary pedestal. This de-
spite some cautionary remarks soon after the end of the war.37  
 
William J. Perry – the later US Secretary of Defence – noted in the fall of 
1991: 
  
In Operation Desert Storm the United States employed for the first time a 
new class of military systems that gave American forces a revolutionary 
advance in military capability. Key to this capability is a new generation 
of military support systems-intelligence sensors, defense suppression sys-
tems and precision guidance subsystems-that serve as ‘force multipliers’. 
… A significant part of that edge [U.S.’s edge versus Iraq] can be attrib-
uted to the revolutionary new military technology used by U.S. forces for 
the first time in Gulf War.38 
 
Similarly, the Interim Report of the Committee on Armed Services, House 
of Representatives stated that: 
 
The effective use of high technology was a key reason for both the high 
level of performance of air and ground forces, and the minimization of al-
lied casualties. … High technology has not only irrevocable changed the 
results of warfare, it has changed the process.39 
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One of the most decisive ‘new’ military instruments in the Gulf War were 
precision-guided munitions.40 During the war, video imagery was shown by 
the attacking coalition in press conferences in order to highlight the effi-
ciency of strikes and the limited nature of unnecessary suffering inflicted 
on non-combatants. In addition to being part of the campaign to influence 
the adversary – Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – these images of precise engage-
ment served an important political function: they conveyed a message to 
the citizens of the attacking coalition and to an international audience that 
the war against Iraq was not causing any unnecessary suffering to the Iraqi 
civilians and that the soldiers of the attacking coalition were backed up by 
advanced technology in order to avoid casualties. The ability to use preci-
sion weapons by the attacking coalition was actually very limited, as was 
the proportion of precision weapons vis-à-vis traditional ‘dumb’ bombs 
(only some 7% of total ordnance was precision guided).41 Nevertheless, 
these weapon systems (laser-guided bombs, cruise missiles, ground attack 
missiles) became one important symbol of modern warfare and the success 
of the attacking coalition. 
 
In addition to the conventional aircraft that were able to deliver precision-
guided weapons, stealth aircraft  (F-117A) and low-observable long-range 
cruise missiles (TLAM, CALCM) were representatives of ultra high-tech 
warfare during the Gulf War.  They proved to be valuable assets in attack-
ing strategic targets, especially around Baghdad, where collateral damage 
had to be minimised in order to keep the world public opinion from becom-
ing even more critical. The stealth fighter was also representative of the hi-
tech solution to the problem of protecting attack aircraft that were operating 
in enemy airspace – force protection through high technology. In addition 
to their ‘instrumental value’ as efficient weapon systems, they also had 
high symbolic value. These weapon systems represented the sort of military 
power that only a superpower could develop, procure, and use. Many of the 
limitations of the F-117 and the long-range cruise missiles did not surface 
in the public discourse.42 This can be explained in part by the need of a 
warring party to highlight its successes in its attempts to affect the outcome 
of war. In addition, stealth systems were developed secretly, relied on ‘fu-
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turistic’ images of weapons, and supposedly had qualities that were not 
previously deemed possible by the general public. They were modern 
weapon platforms and systems that were ‘easily’ accepted as efficient tools 
of war and pointed to the future of combat. Evaluated together, the ‘revolu-
tionary’ development in precision-guided munitions and stealth aircraft (air 
forces more generally) prior to the Gulf War led to the often taken-for-
granted notion that the war against Iraqi forces in 1991 showed – finally – 
the ‘true’ capacity of airpower to achieve decisive results in war.43  
 
The third theme, which was elevated above others during and after the Gulf 
War, was command and control, a term that has broadened recently to in-
clude battlespace awareness and control, represented by several acronyms 
including C2, C3, C3I, C4I, ISR, and C4ISR. The possibilities of acquiring 
data by multiple sensors, processing information, assessing acquired infor-
mation and turning it into knowledge, as well as distributing this knowl-
edge and combat orders through out the battlefield were all part of the 
command and control concept.44 
 
The fourth lesson of the Gulf War was the combination of results achieved 
by Information Warfare and the military use of space. Much of what tran-
spired in the Gulf in the form of the  ‘information war’ was also a part of 
above-mentioned improved ‘Command and Control’ capabilities and pos-
sibilities, i.e. the impact that the attacking coalition could achieve by 1) col-
lecting more near real-time information about the enemy than deemed pos-
sible in earlier wars and by 2) being capable of processing and exploiting 
this information was deemed revolutionary. Space-based sensors, commu-
nication and GPS satellites, as well as computers, made this feature possi-
ble. In addition, in order for western forces to be effective and to avoid 
casualties, Iraq was to be denied its own information-gathering, processing, 
and exploitation efforts. Similarly the information systems of the attacking 
coalition were to be defended against possible Iraqi attacks. This was 
achieved by a mix of physical destruction and non-destructive information 
operations.45 
 
In combination, these themes formed the core of a post-Gulf War, techno-
logically oriented RMA perspective. The importance of combining the ef-
fects of development in these areas of warfare with the changing nature of 
the post-Cold War era were well stated by Admiral William Owens: 
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“…building the force of the future requires harnessing the revolution in 
military affairs (RMA) brought about by technological leaps in surveil-
lance, command and control, and longer range precision guided muni-
tions.”46  
 
The potential advantages inherent in new technologies of war – which were 
hailed by many during and after the Gulf War of 1991 – did not provide the 
sole rationale for the emergence of the RMA within the US defence estab-
lishment. In addition, the threat of being unwilling or unable to devise such 
revolutionary technology was also used as an argument in the technologi-
cally biased RMA debate. The underlying logic of this proposition was that 
the U.S. military “must identify, develop, and integrate critical emerging 
technologies, or face the risk that the next military revolution will take 
place elsewhere – perhaps in a country hostile to America.”47 In addition, 
the idea that Americans have a “deep fascination with technology for its 
own sake”48 has been proposed to capture the technologically oriented con-
ceptualisation of the RMA in the US – particularly during the years follow-
ing the 1991 Gulf war. 
 
The argument that sees a potential threat in failing to engage in the devel-
opment of new technologies for warfare implies a necessity to control or 
master Revolutions in Military Affairs. This leads to the logical conclusion 
that RMAs are not taking place ‘out there’ – in the external environment – 
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but are actually something that actors can have an influence upon. RMAs 
could thus be influenced by visions that actors (today mostly states and 
armed forces) have and pursue in their strategies for evading possible fu-
ture threats.49 
 
The technological emphasis of the “American Revolution in Military Af-
fairs”50 manifests itself not only in technological issues of warfare, but also 
in the primary explanatory status given to technology in transforming the 
way that the Unite States conceptualises war and the role that armed forces 
are to play in the international system. In other words, technology is the 
engine of transformation of warfare, while the questions of when and how 
to use armed force and in what composition are derivatives of the possibili-
ties of technology. The nowadays much criticised technological approach 
to the RMA was expressed by Admiral William Owens in 1994: “We cur-
rently lack a firm consensus on two dimensions of this American revolu-
tion. The first is what it means, more specifically, for military organization 
and doctrine. The second is what it means for U.S. foreign policy and our 
role in the world.”51 The danger inherent in the technological approach is 
that it risks turning politically formed strategy of states into a technology-
driven procurement project.52 
 
 
7.3.2. The Post-Gulf Strengthening of the RMA Thesis 
 
The technological emphasis of the RMA debate in the post-Gulf War years 
did not emanate solely from the technologically intriguing and publicly 
much touted, efficient weaponry that – on the surface at least – brought 
easy victory for the attacking coalition against the fourth largest armed 
force in the world that Iraq possessed before the war.53 It had its intellectual 
predecessor in the military-technical writing of the Soviet Union in the 
1970s and 1980s. Combining the availability of this concept with the seem-
ingly technical resolution of the Gulf war prompted a technologically ori-
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ented perspective on warfare in the American defense establishment. This 
is not to say that technology was all that the emerging American 
MTR/RMA literature centred upon, but the emphasis was on technology.54  
 
Within the US Department of Defense, the Office of Net Assessment 
(ONA) released a report by Andrew Krepinevich in July 1992 entitled The 
Military-Technical Revolution – A Preliminary Assessment. A force behind 
the assessment was the Director, Office of Net Assessment, Andrew Mar-
shall, who had been following Soviet theorising on the subject since the 
mid-1970s. With the end of the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War, Marshall 
decided to have his office evaluate whether the Soviet theorising concern-
ing a Military-Technical Revolution (MTR) and the changing nature of fu-
ture war was possible and indeed occurring.55 The report formulated an ex-
plicit definition of a Military-Technical Revolution: 
 
A Military-Technical Revolution occurs when the application of new 
technologies into military systems combines with innovative operational 
concepts and organizational adaptation to alter fundamentally the charac-
ter and conduct of military operations.56 
 
The four elements of MTRs – technology, systems, operational concepts, 
and organisation – are based on the realisation that technology in itself is 
not sufficient to bring about a true revolution. A technological edge is pro-
vided by better information gathering, processing and communication, bet-
ter munitions, and new simulation techniques. To capitalise on this edge, 
technology should be incorporated into military systems and munitions. To 
realise the actual combat potential of these systems, new methods for em-
ploying them are needed. These come in the form of new operational con-
cepts, doctrine and tactics: “In a sense, when a military-technical revolution 
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occurs, the ‘rules of the game’ [war] are fundamentally altered.” Organisa-
tional innovation was also characterised as one key to successful MTRs, 
although the potential of militaries for innovation is portrayed as being 
somewhat limited. In addition to advocating changes in force structure, the 
report also suggested acquisition innovation and interservice integration.57  
 
The historical data used in the report relied also on the period between the 
First and the Second World Wars. Andrew Marshall conceptualised this 
period as a time of considerable military innovation and could thus provide 
answers now that the protracted Cold War was over and the Defense De-
partment was being called on to rethink its approach to threats, nature of 
war and structure of its armed forces. By resting its argument on the Soviet 
theoretical framework of MTR and historical analogy, the Office of Net 
Assessment released a study that became not only the best known study of 
the Office, but also an influential one – giving direction to the American 
RMA debate of the 1990s.58 
 
In the 1993 Annual Defense Report, technological edge, “leading-edge 
weapon systems”, and “revolutionary technologies” were noted as means 
for developing effective military forces to deal with existing and future 
warfighting scenarios as well as to shape the future international security 
landscape. The 1991 Gulf War was still the primary inspiration for the pri-
ority status granted to science and technology (S&T) in the report. The 
S&T-related lessons of the Gulf War touched upon stealth technology, in-
formation gathering and processing, as well as on precision strike capabili-
ties. These and other possible critical battlefield technologies were to be 
identified and pursued vigorously.59 Thus, by the time that the Clinton 
administration took office, the idea of a post-Cold War Revolution in 
Military Affairs – driven by advanced information technology – was being 
established within the Defence Department and throughout the defence 
establishment. 
 
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin released the Report on the Bottom-Up Re-
view (BUR) in October 1993. The Review was conducted by the Clinton 
administration in order to assess the post-Cold War and post-Soviet Union 
security environment and to provide guidelines for a new defense strategy, 
force structure, and the Department’s modernisation programs. Although 
the Report has been best known for its ‘Win Two Nearly Simultaneous Ma-
jor Regional Conflicts’ formulation, it continued the Defense Department’s 
promulgation of technologically oriented revolution in warfare. This de-
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spite the fact that the conflict environment at the time that the Bottom-Up 
Review Report was published had already departed from the traditional 
western conventional war scenarios.60 This was drastically revealed by the 
simultaneous killing of 18 US soldiers in Somalia, which had consequences 
at the strategic level when US troops were withdrawn from Somalia in the 
following several months. Nevertheless, the Report on the Bottom-Up Re-
view stated: 
 
The technological revolution now taking place has a number of implica-
tions… The revolution in weapons technology suggests that we must re-
examine our concepts for employing certain weapons – tanks, aircraft, 
missiles, and the like – on the battlefield.61 
 
The BUR conceptualisation of war could be described as ‘Cold War mi-
nus’, which means that the Cold War era view of formally organised 
massed armed forces of the superpower blocs battling each other until deci-
sive victory had metamorphosed into a post-Cold version of formally or-
ganised technologically developed armed forces of the superpower (US) 
and its allies battling a regional adversary with formally organised, massed 
armed forces until decisive victory. This one-sided view of war turned al-
most a blind eye to the other, but by means no less important or less lethal, 
side of the ‘new’ or emerging ‘reality’ of western war – humanitarian in-
terventions as a response to civil wars, ethnic and religious conflicts, etc. 
Thus by the end of 1993 the new technological aspects of warfare were 
generally accepted and vigorously investigated and developed in the US, 
while the political or strategic aspects of post-Cold War era warfare – the 
direct and indirect consequences of the end of the Cold War – were more or 
less reproduced as they were during the Cold War. The BUR’s only visible 
modification to the strategic-political aspects of warfare in the move from 
the Cold War era into the post-Cold War era was the splitting of the con-
ceptualisation of one large-scale global-level military confrontation into 
two large-scale regional military confrontations. In the mid 1990s, the other 
increasingly relevant ‘forms’ of warfare – new wars and Low Intensity 
Conflicts – were still considered less threatening – as they had been 
throughout the Cold War. They were thus less important in the US concep-
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tualisations of the types of wars that the armed forces were projected to 
fight, and the combat capability in these kinds of wars a derivative of the 
capability to prevail in Major Regional Conflicts.  
 
The January 1994 Annual Defense Report by Les Aspin stated that infor-
mation dominance – established by exploitation of space – was important 
for future operations. Lessons for this came from the Gulf War – “the first 
space war” fought by the US. The relationship between new technologies 
and a fundamental alteration of modern warfare was described in potential 
terms: the actual realisation of “the Revolution in Modern Warfare” was 
deemed conditional.62 
 
Driven primarily by improvements in information collection, processing, 
and transmission technology, this revolution could have an impact upon 
military operations.63 
 
Looking at the above-mentioned official documents, defence-related re-
ports, and unofficial articles written by influential members of the US de-
fence establishment, one can conclude that the period between the 1991 
Gulf War and 1994 was characterised by increasing legitimacy and accep-
tance of the RMA concept as a general phenomenon within the interna-
tional system and as the guideline for restructuring the US Armed Forces in 
the coming years. The policy implications were still somewhat vague, but a 
consensus was beginning to form regarding the crucial importance of new 
technologies and the revolutionary changes that they were about to cause 
within the military sphere.  This process of consensus building drew mostly 
on the new and emerging possibilities of warfare brought to the fore by the 
developments within information technologies in general and the 1991 Gulf 
War particularly. It was also facilitated by the changed security situation 
that became apparent with the dissolution of the Warsaw pact and the So-
viet Union, although the large-scale political-strategic ramifications related 
to redefining war in the post-Cold War period did not materialise. 
 
During the first five post-Cold War years, the Cold War era habit of ‘over-
looking’ Low Intensity Conflicts or civil wars continued despite the in-
creasing emergence of well-publicised new wars. Even though the United 
States did intervene militarily in some of those non-traditional conflicts – 
e.g. in Somalia and Haiti – the formerly sharp Cold War era focus on the 
super-power confrontation moved towards conventional regional war – as 
an updated post-Cold War era version of the preceding sedimented threat of 
a Warsaw Pact attack on the west. During the mentioned period between 
1991 and 1994, the US conceptualisation of war and military power resem-
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bled that of the Cold War era very closely – with a gradually increasing 
emphasis on the role of military technology. This emphasis grew out of the 
highly publicised lessons of the first western war in the post-Cold War era 
– the Gulf War. 
 
The Gulf War fitted rather easily into the American conceptualisations of 
war that were inherited from the Cold War era. With the inception of a 
post-Cold war era regional strategy, only the degree of potential adversar-
ies’ capabilities changed: they decreased dramatically. The immediate post-
Cold War era threats were much the same as before – only the scale of the 
threat diminished. Similarly, war was conceptualised between states and 
their formally organised armed forces. Correspondingly, the battlefield was 
the scene of a struggle between opposing conventional armies. The emerg-
ing technological emphasis of the post-Cold War and post-Gulf War era 
was related particularly to the determinants of military power. Confronted 
with traditional kind of threats and problems, as well as with the increasing 
calls for military action, advanced technology became the key for distin-
guishing post-Cold War era warfare from Cold War era warfare. 
 
 
7.4. The Tipping-point 
 
The concept of the Revolution in Military Affairs was explicitly advanced 
in the February 1995 Annual Defense Report by William Perry. In the 
document, it is formulated as a potential:  
 
The Department is examining whether recently fielded and emerging 
technologies, in combination with organizational and operational changes, 
will produce dramatic improvements in military effectiveness, the so-
called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).64 
 
This notion of a potentially emerging RMA was connected to the explicitly 
stated notion of past revolutions in military affairs that had come about 
through the convergence of new technologies, innovative operational con-
cepts, and organisational adaptation – fundamentally altering the conduct 
and character of military operations. The key to this potential RMA was 
identified in information technology – gathering, processing, and dissemi-
nating information in near-real time terms. Information technologies – to-
gether with precision capabilities (which obviously have been developed 
due to the developments in information technology) – were seen to have 
consequences for the way that war is conducted. Similarly, information 
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technologies, in the form of advanced simulations, were conceptualised in 
the report to affect training, doctrine, and tactics. 65 
 
The potential nature of the RMA in the DoD’s 1995 position is clear from 
several statements by William Perry, Deputy Defense Secretary John White 
and Undersecretary of Defense, Paul Kaminski. In March, Kaminski’s pre-
pared statement referred to the Defense Department’s studies of a Revolu-
tion in Military Affairs. In June, William Perry pointed out in his speech 
the need to harness the technological revolution for national security pur-
poses. In September, White discussed the US Armed Force’s modernisation 
programme in language familiar from previous RMA propositions. For 
him, modernisation meant new weapons, vision, doctrine, planning, and 
training. His emphasis was on jointness.66 
 
In October 1995 Undersecretary of Defense, Paul Kaminski stated explic-
itly – in his prepared remarks at the 12th National Logistics Symposium and 
Exhibition – a view of the RMA as a DoD vision. He said: 
 
Today, America has precision strike capability due to a vision some 20 
years ago. Today, we are developing a vision for other major changes in 
warfare – it is called the Revolution in Military Affairs, or RMA.67 
 
Thus, what begun as a series of ‘objective’ observations of the emerging 
post-Cold War era international reality in general and war particularly, was 
transformed in Kaminski’s remarks into a goal-directed activity of chang-
ing the nature of warfare in order to favour the US. This framing of the 
RMA as a vision spelled out the US DoD’s understanding of the nature of 
future warfare and the means of arriving there – although still in embryonic 
term. The explicit route to be followed was not presented in a concrete 
way. Rather, it was the acceptance of the RMA as a conceptual base that 
was offered at this time. 
 
At the Presidential level, the pronouncement of the US Armed Forces’ 
transformation through an RMA took place already in 1995, although more 
in passing than actively promulgated. President Clinton remarked on the 
important role of Admiral William Owens in the development of the 
American RMA as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he 
nominated General Ralston as Owens’ successor. President Clinton praised 
Owens’ “crucial role in shaping our forces to fight as a joint team, and the 
superlative leadership he provided in harnessing the information and tech-
nological revolution to our current and future defense posture will ensure 
                                               
65
 Ibid., part IV. 
66
 Kaminski (1995a); Perry (1995b); White (1995). 
67
 Kaminski (1995b). 
 210
that our military will remain the best in the world as we enter the 21st cen-
tury.”68  
 
The March 1996 Annual Defense Report by William Perry took an ap-
proach similar to that of the previous report in 1995. At this stage, the De-
partment of Defense was still stating that it was not sure whether an RMA 
was going to happen or not. It was still mentioned as a potential. What was 
different in the 1996 Report was its reference to the conceptual develop-
ment of an RMA. According to the 1996 report, two ideas contributing to 
the possible RMA were long-range precision strike capability and the in-
formation war. The revolutionary aspect in the RMA was conceptualised 
by the profound nature of transformation, not by its speed.  
 
The 1996 report went on to say that “advantages in technology are funda-
mentally altering the conduct of modern warfare.”69 Having previously de-
fined RMAs according to the profundity of changes in warfare – not by 
their rapidity – the 1996 report implied an RMA was actually underway 
under way and the explicit statement that the Department of Defence must 
examine whether “the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs”70 will be 
produced by technological, organisational, and operational changes, was at 
least in part compromised. These conflicting, or at least ambiguous, state-
ments can be seen as recommendations for organisational and operational 
transformation, since the existence of fundamental transformation of tech-
nology and the advent of current RMA are stated as facts in the report, 
though in an obscure fashion.71 
 
What was called a DoD vision of future warfare almost a year earlier72, was 
expressed in more concrete terms in the US Armed Forces Joint Vision 
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2010, distributed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in June 1996.  
It was formulated to be “the conceptual template for how America’s Armed 
Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage 
technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint 
warfighting.”73 It did not mention the Revolution in Military Affairs even 
once, but contained conceptual formulations concerning the transformation 
of US armed forces from a technological, operational, and organisational 
perspective. Later it became framed as the key effort for exploiting the 
RMA and as the guide for the DoD’s future preparations. Joint Vision 2010 
was technologically centred, although it addressed questions concerning 
training and leadership:  
 
In sum, by 2010 we should be able to enhance the capabilities of our 
forces through technology. … To exploit the enormous potential of tech-
nology, we must develop in a systematic manner the full range of required 
enhancements. This process must begin with a new conceptual framework 
for operations.74 
 
The general objective of Joint Vision 2010 was to achieve “full-spectrum 
dominance” in four operational concepts – dominant manoeuvre, precision 
engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics. These op-
erational concepts were – as the citation above suggests – derived from 
technological development, especially from the field of information tech-
nology, which makes information superiority possible. What ‘linked’ Joint 
Vision 2010 to RMA – besides the fact that DoD proclaimed later in the 
1997 Quadrennial Defense Review Report that its efforts to exploit RMA 
have been guided mostly by Joint Vision 2010 – were its guidelines con-
cerning implementation. In order to achieve future capabilities and full-
spectrum dominance via the four new operational concepts, the armed 
forces needed new doctrine, training, organisation, and technology (mate-
riel).75 Without referring to the RMA directly, Joint Vision did implicitly 
espouse it and, as would become evident later, Joint Vision was raised to be 
the ‘exemplar’ of a new emerging US paradigm of war. In November 1996 
– a few months after the release of Joint Vision 2010 – Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili use the term RMA and 
spoke of its effects on the US military: 
 
And our military will be influenced by what some call a ‘revolution in 
military affairs, … The good news is that we are on the leading edge of 
that revolution.76 
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By the end of 1996 the nature and effects of a possibly emerging RMA 
were still somewhat ambiguous. Despite being called the DoD vision of 
future warfare, and despite the guidance provided by the Joint Vision 2010, 
the move from a general level notion of an RMA toward actually applying 
it in order to transform the Armed Forces’ way to think, fight, procure, and 
train was still vague. As the 1996 published Final Report of the Defense 
Science Board Task Force Tactics and Technology for 21st Century Mili-
tary Superiority77 stated – reflecting the increasing acceptance of the gen-
eral RMA thesis: 
 
Today, there is great potential for profound improvement, particularly 
from new operational concepts and tactics enabled by the revolution in in-
formation technology.78 
 
There is a good chance that we can achieve dramatic increases in the ef-
fectiveness of rapidly deployable forces if redesigning the ground forces 
around the enhanced combat cell proves to be robust in many environ-
ments. There is some chance that this will lead to a true revolution in mili-
tary affairs”.79 
 
The potential nature of the RMA described in the Defense Science Board’s 
report was also reflected in its recommendations to explore new joint con-
cepts, develop critical systems and technologies, and establish a Joint Ex-
peditionary Task Force to be the lead agent for further development. Mak-
ing these happen – the report argued – would possibly lead to a true Revo-
lution in Military Affairs.80 
 
The newly appointed Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, stated in 
March 1997 that: 
 
[W]e want to prepare our military forces for the uncertain types of threats 
that they’re going to face tomorrow. That means that we’re going to go 
forward with what we call the Revolution in Military Affairs by investing 
in leap-ahead technologies and developing the tactics and the doctrine to 
sustain them.81 
 
The 1997 Annual Defense Report by William Cohen – released in April – 
enshrined the concept of the RMA explicitly to the DoD’s official policy, 
although it was used in a dual sense. The first meaning of the concept RMA 
expressed by Cohen’s report was that of RMAs as recurring historical phe-
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nomena which occur due to convergence of technological development and 
organisational as well as operational innovation – ‘independently’ of ac-
tors’ decisions and practices. This was the understanding of RMAs that had 
been the point of reference in earlier DoD documents. From this under-
standing, RMAs happen ‘objectively’ and those who do not adapt to them 
will pay a heavy price on the battlefield. The second meaning of RMAs 
made explicit in Cohen’s report is that of a vision. According to this view, 
RMAs do occur historically and actors do have to adapt to their exigencies, 
but RMAs receive their content from actors, and the latter either mould 
way that this (r)evolutionary process proceeds or they are the first to take 
the lead in understanding and exploiting the RMA process.  
 
Although the two meanings of RMA are of course interrelated, the logic 
behind them is different: one sees the world as it is and thus calls for 
adjusting one’s behaviour to the demands of the situation, while the other 
presupposes that the future is made – or at least affected – by conscious 
decisions of instrumental actors. The fact that both logics were presented in 
the report leads to the question of whether or not the RMA was already 
underway, or was it going to be set in motion by conscious contemporary 
decisions.  
 
The 1997 report is a further move towards a more explicit and open formu-
lation of the RMA as a condition and a vehicle for the transformation of the 
US Armed Forces. The “emerging Revolution in Military Affairs” or “this 
ongoing revolution” is still not espoused unequivocally in a coherent way, 
but the move away from the “so-called Revolution of Military Affairs” lan-
guage of the 1996 report is clear enough. In addition, the underlying logic 
of the 1997 report is that it is the US Department of Defense that should be 
the driving force behind the full-fledged revolution by converging techno-
logical, operational, and organisational innovation. The need for such a role 
for the Department – and specifically for the US Armed Forces – originated 
in the post-Cold War era environment. Contemporary and future military 
challenges, combined with budgetary constraints, accentuated the need to 
fundamentally improve the warfighting capacity of the US armed forces.82 
 
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of May 1997 – mandated by the 
Force Structure Review Act – identified the continued exploitation of the 
Revolution in Military Affairs as part of the DoD’s commitment to prepare 
for an uncertain future with a ‘shape-respond-prepare’ strategy. A month 
earlier, in the form of the 1997 Annual Defense Report, Secretary of De-
fense William Cohen’s presentation of the RMA was more in the nature of 
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conceptual clarification than actually harnessing the RMA for military 
transformational purposes.83 According to the 1997 QDR: 
 
Just as earlier technological revolutions have affected the nature of con-
flict, so too will the technological change that is so evident today. This 
transformation involves much more than the acquisition of new military 
systems. It means harnessing new technologies to give U.S. forces greater 
military capabilities through advanced concepts, doctrine, and organiza-
tions so that they can dominate any future battlefield.84 
 
The information revolution is creating a Revolution in Military Affairs that 
will fundamentally change the way U.S. forces fight. We must exploit these 
and other technologies to dominate in battle. … For several years, the 
U.S. military and DoD have been engaged in a variety of efforts to exploit 
the RMA. … The path we have chosen strikes a balance between the pre-
sent and the future … it invests in the future force with a focused mod-
ernization plan that embraces the Revolution in Military Affairs, and in-
troduces new systems and technologies at the right pace.85 
 
In the gradual process of integrating the RMA concept into official defence 
policy from 1995 onwards, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Report brought 
it into fruition. It was in this document that the RMA was ‘accepted’ as one 
of four main cornerstones of the DoD’s preparation for the future. This was 
a shift from the 1997 Annual Defense Report’s view of the RMA. The 
DoD’s decision “to leverage new technologies to harness the Revolution in 
Military Affairs through new operational concepts, new doctrine, and, ul-
timately, organisational changes”, was deemed essential in the QDR. The 
uncertainty of the future was depicted as demanding a transformation of the 
military for which the RMA was to be the medium. The components of the 
RMA – technology, operational concepts, and organisation – had already 
been presented already in the 1995 Annual Defense Report,86 but then they 
were conceptualised as part of a possible or a so-called Revolution in Mili-
tary Affairs. In the 1997 QDR they were presented as components of an 
ongoing revolution that needed to be exploited in order to transform the 
military87 to be better suited for future operations while also being capable 
of operating against contemporary threats.88 
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The third document within the US defence establishment published in 1997 
to state explicitly the need to modernise the Armed Forces by exploiting 
the Revolution in Military Affairs was the 1997 National Military Strategy. 
The document made the distinction between transformation – which was to 
be evolutionary in essence due to the needs of addressing contemporary 
security challenges and of preparing for the future – and the RMA. Despite 
this distinction, the understanding of transformation as the process of har-
nessing new technology, concepts, doctrine, and organisations meant that 
transformation, as it was described in the document, was synonymous with 
commonly held RMA conceptualisations.89 
 
1997 can be considered as the year in which the RMA was incorporated 
into the official security and defence policy of the US. In addition to the 
aforementioned documents, the National Security Strategy for a New Cen-
tury, released in May 1997, also echoed the themes of the RMA – although 
without directly referring to it. The strategy called for new operational con-
cepts, capabilities, technologies, and organisations. It also espoused the 
idea of modernising the US Armed Forces – that had come to rely on tech-
nology inherited from the 1970s and 1980s – by balancing between con-
temporary concerns and future threats. The goal was, as described by the 
National Security Strategy, “to maintain the technological superiority of 
U.S. forces.”90  
 
During the analytically chosen RMA tipping point between 1995 and 1997, 
the lessons Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia were read in light of 
RMA. After all, it was the use of airpower and precision weapons that had 
made the cessation of hostilities possible. Ground troops were necessary 
only after the offensive phase was over and Bosnia had to be stabilised. 
According to US Secretary of Defence, William Perry, the Bosnian cam-
paign was: 
 
[A] rare instance where by combination of exclusive use of precision 
guided ammunitions and very strict rules of engagement we conducted this 
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massive campaign with no collateral damage, no damage to civilians, no 
collateral damage of any kind.91 
 
It was one of the most effective campaigns of the sort that has ever been 
launched. Every target that was specified by the NATO air commander, 
every target was destroyed, and most amazingly, there was absolutely no 
collateral damage.92 
 
The eventual success in Bosnia, and the lessons drawn from the campaign, 
were linked to two distinct, but interrelated processes in the post-Cold War 
international system. First, the Bosnian conflict was one of an increasing 
number of ethnic and religious conflicts in the post-Cold War world. The 
need to do something in order to stop or at least reduce gross human rights 
violations and the killing of civilians was high – especially since the con-
flict took place in Europe. Even the lessons of Somalia and Rwanda – 
which were not flattering to the RMA argument – supported the idea of in-
tervening militarily in some new wars.93  Second, the lessons of the success 
in Bosnia were directly related to the post-Gulf War western accentuation 
of revolutionary military technology that facilitated the implementation of 
Operation Deliberate Force as an air campaign – with little risk of friendly 
casualties and limited collateral damage. While Operation Desert Storm 
was cited with hindsight as ‘proof’ of the RMA thesis when confronted 
with the ‘traditional’ type of conventional war, the lessons of Operation 
Deliberate Force provided preliminary ’proof’ for the success of the RMA 
thesis in humanitarian operations. This was so at least when the adversary 
was interested in reaching a peace agreement after having been convinced 
of the grim prospects of continuing with the war. Thus whenever the inter-
ests of the US favoured the humanitarian use of military force, the ‘RMA 
elements’ of the Armed Forces would be called upon to deliver the ex-
pected outcome.  
 
 
7.5. Cascade  
 
The exploitation of RMA, as formulated in the QDR and earlier in 1997 by 
Secretary Cohen, meant that US forces were to dominate any future con-
flict that they might be part of. RMA was a “leap into the future”, a choice 
of an approximated desired future and a general path to achieve it. This 
leap necessitated a move beyond post-Cold War era thinking and recognis-
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ing the uncertain nature of future.94 In the 1997 QDR, Joint Vision 2010 
was referred to as “a plan for military operations of the future”, “a concep-
tual umbrella for other long-range visions and plans”, and a “blueprint for 
our future military operations”. It was described to have been the key effort 
to exploit the ongoing RMA and also to guide “the department’s prepara-
tions for the future”. What was called for in 1997 was additional develop-
ment of Service visions, operational concepts, organisational configura-
tions, and training to realise the potential of the RMA.95 
 
In the DoD’s assessment, Joint Vision 2010 was a mid-term force trans-
formation template. Its four new operational concepts – dominant maneu-
vre, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protec-
tion – built upon an integrated system-of-systems would provide means to 
“end the battle quickly on our [US] terms.” Implementing Joint Vision 
2010 by conceptual development, experiments, and exercises conducted by 
the Services in the latter half of the 1990s was not the end of the RMA, but 
rather a beginning. For the revolutionary transformation to be completed, it 
was assessed that a long-term approach was needed – a time span from 15 
to 25 years. 96 
 
In November 1997 Secretary of Defense William Cohen released the De-
fense Reform Initiative Report, which sought to ignite “a revolution in 
business affairs” within the Department of Defense in order to approach the 
management techniques and leadership of American corporations and mar-
ketplace. The idea behind this initiative was to free resources to achieve a 
Revolution in Military Affairs and to completely transform the DoD. The 
realisation of the RMA was represented as being conditional on the success 
of the “concomitant revolution in the support activities of defense”.97 
 
The National Defense Panel98 (NDP) provided Secretary of Defense Wil-
liam Cohen with the Transforming Defense – National Security in the 21st 
Century Report in December 1997. It envisioned transformation of the 
military in its operational concepts, force structures, equipment, procure-
ment, and support structure. Concerning the RMA the report noted: 
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We are on the cusp of a military revolution stimulated by rapid advances 
in information and information-related technologies. … Those who can 
exploit these opportunities – and thereby dissipate the ‘fog of war’ – stand 
to gain significant advantages.99 
 
[T]he emerging military revolution seems destined to present the U.S. 
military with challenges and opportunities that are fundamentally different 
from those of today.100 
 
In comparison to the 1997 QDR, The National Defense Panel Report 
placed more stress on the need to take rapid concrete action to transform 
the US military. Beneath this need for transformation lay the RMA – as one 
of four key trends101 that are changing the world – which posed challenges 
and opportunities for DoD’s preparations for future conflicts. In sum, the 
view that the report took concerning the RMA was similar to that of the 
1997 QRD. As a response to the NDP Report, Secretary Cohen expressed 
his interest in the panel’s proposition of accelerating military transforma-
tion by exploiting the Revolution in Military Affairs more aggressively. In 
order to coordinate the DoD’s approach to transformation and the RMA, 
Cohen asked Deputy Secretary of Defense to chair an RMA oversight 
council, which was given the role of reviewing the Department’s transfor-
mation activities and to monitor its RMA efforts.102  
 
The 1998 Annual Defense Report by William Cohen emphasised – in con-
formity with 1997 QDR – the exploitation of the Revolution in Military 
Affairs as part of the Department’s transformation strategy in the face of an 
uncertain future. In this context it was valued to be a “crucial” aspect of the 
Department’s transformation strategy.  The 1998 report was the first An-
nual Defense Report to devote one chapter solely to the Revolution in Mili-
tary Affairs and the following two chapters to a description of the DoD’s 
efforts to pursue an RMA. It was also the first report in which the RMA 
was presented in the first chapter of the report, “The Defense Strategy and 
the National Security Strategy”.103 
 
The RMA was treated in the 1998 report mostly in the form of a vision. 
Most of the text concerning the RMA formulated what the DoD believed to 
be the essence – or the “backbone” – of the current Revolution in Military 
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Affairs. It then focused on how the Department and the US Armed Forces 
have been and should be involved in technological, conceptual, and organ-
isational innovation. In the report, the essence of the current RMA was lo-
cated in information superiority. In addition to the possibilities of modern 
information processing, the importance of Joint Vision 2010 and succeed-
ing Service visions were highlighted as concrete guides through which the 
DoD was transforming the US Armed Forces. The Revolution in Military 
Affairs was not just something that the Department of Defence adapted to; 
it was something that the Department was creating or implementing.104 The 
view of the RMA as a vision can be connected to the ‘need’ to transform 
the US military. This becomes evident in the way that transformation and 
RMA were almost synonyms in the 1998 report. 
 
The Department’s efforts to transform U.S. military forces for the 21st 
century have thus far focused on establishing a process that will effec-
tively merge quality fighting forces, leading edge technologies, and opera-
tional concepts … to promote the integrated development of new opera-
tional capabilities. A key element that distinguishes this transformation ef-
fort from a more traditional evolution of military capabilities is the con-
current development of new concepts and doctrine, as well as organiza-
tional configurations that will maximize the utility of new technologies.105 
 
The above text suggests that practical transformation efforts can be defined 
by the development of technology, operational concepts – later leading to a 
new doctrine – and organisational configurations. This transformation is 
characterised as goal-directed action by the Department of Defense. Since 
RMA is defined in the same terms of technological, operational, and organ-
isational transformation, it is difficult to see any difference between the US 
military transformation and how the Revolution in Military Affairs is con-
ceptualised in the 1998 report.  
 
The Revolution in Military Affairs was elevated to the 1998 National Secu-
rity Strategy for a New Century, released in October. The strategy followed 
the QDR framing of the RMA and conceptualised the exploitation of the 
RMA as a key to the transformation of the Armed Forces in order to in-
crease its warfighting effectiveness and efficiency: 
 
The military challenges of the 21st century, coupled with the aging of key 
elements of the U.S. force structure, require a fundamental transformation 
of our military forces. … To meet the challenges, we must transform our 
forces by exploiting the Revolution in Military Affairs. … we can maintain 
our technological superiority and replace Cold War-era equipment with 
new systems capable of taking full advantage of emerging technologies. 
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With these advanced systems, the U.S. military will be able to respond 
rapidly to any contingency, dominate the battlespace and conduct day-to-
day operations much more efficiently and effectively.106 
 
To support this transformation of our military forces, we will work coop-
eratively with the Congress to enact legislation to implement the Defense 
Reform Initiative, which will free up resources through a revolution in 
business affairs. … The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Revolution 
in Business Affairs are interlocking revolutions: With both, and only with 
both, we will ensure that U.S. forces continue to have unchallenged supe-
riority in the 21st century.107 
 
If the 1997 QDR and the 1998 Annual Defense Report institutionalised the 
use of the RMA as a vessel for US military transformation within the De-
partment of Defense, the 1998 National Security Strategy legitimated this 
approach with the signature of the President of the United States. The un-
certain future of the post-Cold War era – less than one decade ole – was 
depicted to demand the transformation of the US Armed Forces. The in-
strument for this transformations process was located in the process of the 
RMA, which the military establishment thought needed to be exploited and 
harnessed. In addition, the National Security Strategy emphasised the inno-
vative development and articulation of capabilities, technologies, and or-
ganisational structures.108  
 
The process of consolidating the above-mentioned approach to the RMA 
within top defence authorities in the US continued in the 1999 Annual De-
fense Report. Whereas the previous report had moved the concept of the 
RMA into the spotlight in US defense strategy (chapter 1), the 1999 report 
‘elevated’ it to the introductory message of the Secretary of Defense: “Our 
budget enhances support of the Revolution in Military Affairs that is al-
ready reorienting our tactics, concepts, doctrines, organizations, and 
equipment in accordance with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s 
Joint Vision 2010.”109  The report also continued the gradual conceptual 
development of the RMA and provided an instrumental view of what 
RMAs mean for the US DoD. It highlighted that RMAs are made by con-
scious efforts and thus accentuated achievement, realisation and exploita-
tion of them:  
 
A Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) occurs when a nation’s military 
seizes an opportunity to transform its strategy, military doctrine, training, 
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education, organization, equipment, operations, and tactics to achieve de-
cisive military results in fundamentally new ways.110 
 
The same ‘logic’ of the current RMA was revealed by William Cohen in 
his June 1999 speech at the Pentagon Acquisition and Logistics Reform 
Week Kick-off: 
 
Of course, this stunning array of technology and talent, this so-called 
Revolution in Military Affairs, did not come to us by chance or luck. It 
came to us by choice and by leadership.111 
 
Being incrementally more focused on the conceptual aspects of RMAs than 
the report a year earlier, the 1999 Annual Defense Report also developed its 
approach of implementing the current Revolution in Military Affairs via 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Vision 2010. The realisation of the concep-
tual template of Joint Vision 2010 was also ‘elevated’ from the earlier – 
1998 report – version of “leading to a more effective joint force” to its abil-
ity to focus and channel “the entire Department’s innovation, energy, and 
resources towards a single long-term goal. … [It] will lead to a revolution-
ary increase in joint force effectiveness.” The report noted that the task of 
fulfilling Joint Vision 2010 was given in 1998 to United States Atlantic 
Command (USACOM) as the executive representative for inter-Service 
joint concept development and experimentation.112 This move was not 
made in order to bypass the Services of the US Armed Forces, since they 
were assigned with the task of experimentation within their core competen-
cies. This move was portrayed as a “landmark event” in the “DoD’s exten-
sive RMA-related efforts”. 113 
 
The 78-day war in Kosovo, from 24 March to 10 June 1999, was portrayed 
by the DoD as evidence of the success in changing the way that the US was 
conducting military operations and exploiting the Revolution in Military 
Affairs. This success was measured in the downing of only two aircraft af-
ter some 37,000 sorties, the extensive use of precision-guided munitions to 
limit collateral damage and increase effectiveness, and the use of advanced 
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communications systems to transmit live footage from unmanned aerial 
vehicles to command posts in the theatre and even in the continental US. 114 
Even during the war over Kosovo, the RMA was advocated by name: 
 
We have what we call a Revolution in Military Affairs. We are now doing 
more and more experimenting, integrating high technology into the way in 
which we conduct our military operations. You’re seeing just part of that 
take place over Kosovo today.115 
 
William Cohen forged an explicit link between Kosovo and RMA in 1999 
when he addressed the lessons learned from operation Allied Force. Kos-
ovo taught the US that the Revolution in Military Affairs was truly chang-
ing the face of war and that the tenets of RMA ware applicable to large-
scale conventional wars, as well as to humanitarian interventions in order 
to restrict the effects of new wars. In his opinion, 
 
what we were able to achieve through this [Kosovo] campaign reminds all 
of us that the revolution in military affairs is fundamentally changing the 
way in which we fight. … In Operation Desert Storm, … , there were only 
a handful of sophisticated aircraft that could carry precision-guided muni-
tions, … In Kosovo, nearly all of our fighters could deliver these devastat-
ing weapons.116 
 
The ‘RMA lessons’ of Kosovo were thus presented as the newest manifes-
tation of a series of developments within the military technological sphere 
in the post-Cold War era. The familiar place to start the history of the RMA 
was the 1991 Gulf War. Then, moving on to newer manifestations of the 
RMA in the battlefield, Bosnia, and Desert Fox (four-day air campaign in 
Iraq, December 1998) were mentioned. The case of Kosovo fitted this nar-
rative of progressive manifestation of the Revolution in Military Affairs 
very well.117 
 
In addition, the experience of Kosovo uncovered and surfaced – once again 
– the technology gap between the US and other NATO members. The dif-
ferences in the degree of technological sophistication of Armed Forces in 
the US and elsewhere caused increasing worry within the US defence 
community. Being disappointed in the RMA-related decisions and actions 
by other western governments, Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated 
that despite the shared rhetoric concerning transforming militaries to meet 
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the challenges of today and the future within NATO, there seemed to be no 
subsequent action to actually implement such changes outside the US.118 
 
The effect of the war over Kosovo was thus twofold with regards to the 
western and particularly US definitions of military power. First, the result 
of the war – military victory without ground troops – strengthened the ar-
gument of those who had envisioned or accepted the RMA perspective. Af-
ter all, the use of sophisticated air power by means of almost real time sens-
ing, command and control, as well as high reliance on precision-guided 
munitions were all indicative of the arrival of the RMA to the battlefield of 
the end of the second millennium. Second, the distinctively US-dominated 
operation highlighted the meagre possibilities of the Europeans to exploit 
RMA for the purpose of fighting despite the fact that almost ten years had 
passed after the Gulf War – the ‘paradigm-changing war’ that had provided 
the most explicit and clearly articulated lessons for the post-Cold War era.  
 
The 1999 National Security Strategy for a New Century, released in De-
cember 1999, made a similar incremental move from the previous National 
Security Strategy of 1998. The 1999 National Security Strategy not only 
stated the need to exploit the RMA, but added a conceptual characterisation 
of force transformation that was based on the RMA framework: 
 
Transformation of our military forces is critical to meeting the military 
challenges of the next century. Exploiting the revolution in military affairs 
is fundamental if U.S. forces are to retain their dominance in an uncertain 
world. … Transformation extends well beyond the acquisition of new 
military systems – we seek to leverage technological, doctrinal, opera-
tional and organizational innovations.119 
 
Thus by the end of 1999, the full spectrum of official US national security 
documents had espoused the concept of the RMA and advocated its exploi-
tation for the purpose of transforming the Armed Forces and the DoD. 
What had started as a study of the Soviet concept of the Military-Technical 
Revolution and its potential applicability to the post-Cold War world less 
than a decade earlier, was now being used to enable the DoD to transform 
its ‘tools’, modes of operation, and mentality to ‘fit’ the new post-Cold 
War world. In addition, the RMA was to shape the nature of the future in-
ternational system in general and warfare particularly. In retrospect, the end 
of the 1990s was truly the apex of the explicit conceptual acceptance of 
RMA in the US.   
 
In the 2000 Annual Defense Report by William Cohen the role of RMA is 
clearly visible, but its ‘conceptual novelty’ has clearly diminished, and no 
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noteworthy effort is made to define RMA in the document – it is a taken-
for-granted concept that is simply referred to. In the 2000 report, the role 
that the RMA has for the DoD is spelled out bluntly, without much concep-
tual clarification:  
 
Transformed military forces are needed because the strategic environment 
is changing; they are possible because of the Revolution in Military Af-
fairs (RMA).120 
 
The balance between conceptual development and practical implementation 
of the RMA in the 2000 report tips in favour of the latter. After the practi-
cal description and guidance for future operations given in earlier reports, 
the 2000 report shows that a clear critical mass has been reached concern-
ing practical policy and actions taken to implement the RMA.121 At the 
same time, the need to justify and develop the concept of the RMA has al-
most evaporated. This does not mean that the RMA had lost its crucial role 
in transforming the US military and conceptualising war and military 
power, but only that this role has become self-evident. The transformation 
of the armed forces by exploiting the RMA was beginning to become 
sedimented in the US defence circles. 
 
In Joint Vision 2020, which was published in 2000 the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff set out to develop the conceptual template for the 
transformation of US armed forces. It relied heavily on Joint Vision 2010, 
but emphasised intellectual innovation. Material superiority alone, it decla-
red, was not sufficient. “Of greater importance is the development of doc-
trine, organizations, training and education, leaders, and people that effec-
tively take advantage of the technology.”122 
 
While the information revolution was described as causing profound 
changes for military operations in Joint Vision 2020, the inability to foster 
innovative operational concepts, organisations, and training were seen to 
constitute a risk of not being capable of capitalising on the qualitative and 
quantitative changes of the information environment.  Joint Vision 2020 
shifted the focus from technology to the conceptual level of innovative 
ideas. Like its predecessor, it did not use the term Revolution in Military 
Affairs in a description of the security environment or in spelling out the 
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guidelines for force transformation. It did capture the RMA logic of pro-
found transformation of future military operations due to technological, 
organisational, conceptual, and training-related changes.123 
 
At the end of 2000 – in October after the USS Cole incident – Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen stated once more the need to create, develop, and 
exploit the RMA in order to transform the US Armed Forces despite the 
fact that no other country was understood to be capable of “taking us [US] 
on head-to-head”124 and that future threats would be mostly asymmetric in 
nature. Cohen pointed out that the US was now “in the process of revising 
the way in which we think about conflict” and that it had to have a revolu-
tion in military affairs.125 
 
Like its predecessor, the 2000 National Security Strategy for a Global Age, 
released in December, noted the need to exploit the RMA in order to trans-
form the Armed Forces. Although transformation did not equal technology 
in the document, it was stated that in order to maintain the “best-trained, 
best-equipped, most effective armed forces in the world”, superior technol-
ogy must be developed and exploited “to the fullest extent”.126 The strategy 
also voiced a concern for the technology gap between the US and its allies. 
Interoperability and a policy of assisting the “more technically advanced 
friends and allies” especially in command, control, and communications-
related capabilities was highlighted. The May 2000 Defense Trade Security 
Initiative – which was aimed at improving the interoperability of allies and 
coalition partners – and NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative were both 
conceptualised in the document as programmes to bolster the warfighting 
capabilities of US allies and thus to catch up with the US in exploiting the 
RMA.127 
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The 2001 Annual Defense Report by Secretary of Defense William Cohen 
– the last annual report by the Clinton administration, published in January 
2001 – built on the previous conceptual development of RMA and incorpo-
rated Joint Vision 2020 as the mid-term template for conceptual and practi-
cal development for the Services and the Joint Forces Command – trans-
formed from USACOM to USJFCOM in 1999.128 The taken-for-granted 
instrumental nature of the RMA concept is obvious from the report, which 
refers to the “now widely accepted precepts of the RMA”. 129  
 
Through the RMA the Department will harness new and emerging tech-
nologies as quickly as possible to provide U.S. forces greater military ca-
pabilities through advanced concepts, doctrine and organization so they 
can dominate any future battlefield.130 
 
Thus, during the 1990s a shared idea of new military means to match the 
new security reality developed in the US. This new era in US military his-
tory was described more by Somalia, Rwanda, and Kosovo than by Berlin 
or Cuba. While the Cold War view of traditional conventional war still 
loomed at the background – in a modified post-Gulf War form of regional 
large-scale conventional war – the increasing need for military operations 
throughout the globe facilitated a technologically centred focus on war. 
That would serve the traditional large-scale conventional war well – should 
the spectre of a great power confrontation happen to raise its head. The 
Revolution in Military Affairs – as explicated in the US during the 1990s – 
was thus an ‘easy way out’ in the post-Cold War redefinition of war and 
military power. It provided a rationale for the radical transformers of the 
US Armed Forces, as well as for those who still saw the traditional threats 
of state-sponsored massed armed forces – whether in China, North Korea, 
Iraq or elsewhere – to constitute the most imminent and present threat. As 
a general idea for increasing the efficiency of the military, the RMA thus 
seemed to provide tools for smaller scale contingencies and peace opera-
tions – the ‘new’ or ‘emerging’ forms of post-Cold War era warfare – as 
well as for major theater warfare. 
 
 
7.6. New Momentum to Transformation in the Post-9/11 Era 
 
RMA-related themes have been explicitly stated by President George W. 
Bush. Even before he was elected president, George W. Bush stated in a 
speech at the Citadel in September 1999: 
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My third goal is to take advantage of a tremendous opportunity – given 
few nations in history – to extend the current peace into the far realm of 
the future. A Chance to project America’s peaceful influence, not just 
across the world, but across the years. This opportunity is created by a 
revolution in the technology of war. Power is increasingly defined, not by 
mass or size, but by mobility and swiftness. … This revolution perfectly 
matches the strengths of our country – the skill of our people and the supe-
riority of our technology. The best way to keep peace is to redefine war on 
our terms.131 
 
And he stated the same message – the project of redefining war on US 
terms – several times his inauguration in after January 2001.132 President 
Bush also gave Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, the task of imple-
menting a “comprehensive review of the Unites States military”133 and to 
challenge the status quo in military affairs by beginning to create: 
 
the military of the future – one that takes full advantages of revolutionary 
technologies.134 
 
The Bush administration’s idea of keeping the peace by redefining war on 
US terms is explicitly connected to the revolution in military technology 
and the related transformation of the US Armed Forces.  The statement im-
plies that the opportunities of advanced technology will be global in nature 
and that by developing these new capabilities, the United States will be in 
the position to set the rules of future wars throughout the international sys-
tem. Transformation of the US Armed Forces via the RMA not only redi-
rects the domestic US defence efforts, but also a way to affect the nature of 
future wars within the international system by crafting the new rules of war 
and thus new determinants of military power.   
 
The launching of the War on Terror135 is increasingly dominating US mili-
tary planning, preparations, procurement, and deployments, especially after 
the nominally successful autumn campaign against the Taliban regime in 
2001. In addition, the War on Terror and its consequences have had a 
heavy impact on US domestic politics and on practically all US interna-
tional engagements. The new war mentality, brought to bear by the shock-
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ing surprise attacks of 9/11 has caused the US to toughen its stance in do-
mestic and international affairs. It has also led the US to rewrite its Na-
tional Security Strategy – particularly concerning the ‘rules’ of using mili-
tary force.136 As the President explained in his State of the Union Address 
in January 2002: 
 
My budget includes the largest increase in defense spending in two dec-
ades … because while the price of freedom and security is high, it is never 
too high – whatever it costs to defend our country, we will pay it. … 
America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are protected from at-
tack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home.137 
 
The Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001 was published a few weeks 
after the attacks of 11 September. For most of the time of its preparation, 
however, it had been guided by the President’s call to draw up a new strat-
egy and transform the military. The time of the review’s preparation and 
completion was described as “a crucial time of transition to a new era.” In 
emphasising transformation, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report 
moved away from the ‘two major theater war’, threat-based strategy and 
took a capabilities-based approach to defense. This was a shift from identi-
fying which actors were posing threats in the future in favour of anticipat-
ing “the capabilities that an adversary might employ to coerce its 
neighbours, deter the United States from acting in defense of its allies and 
friends, or directly attack the United States or its deployed forces.”138  
 
In its treatment of the RMA, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 
recalled historical lessons learned about the effects of revolutionary techno-
logical developments and then explained the possibilities of the ongoing 
RMA: 
 
History has shown … that new military technologies can revolutionize the 
form of military competition and the nature of armed conflict in ways that 
render military forces and doctrines of great powers obsolescent. … The 
ongoing revolution in military affairs could change the conduct of mili-
tary operations. … For the United States, the revolution in military affairs 
holds the potential to confer enormous advantages and to extend the cur-
rent period of U.S. military superiority. Exploiting the revolution in mili-
tary affairs requires not only technological innovation but also develop-
ment of operational concepts, undertaking organizational adaptations, 
and training and experimentation to transform a country’s military 
forces.139 
                                               
136
 See The National Security Strategy of the Unites States of America (2002). 
137
  Bush (2002a) (my italics). 
138
 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), pp. iii-vi, 1-16, quotes on p. iii, 14. See 
also Rumsfeld (2002a). 
139
 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), p. 3, 6 (my italics). 
 229
Concerning the transformation of the US armed forces, the Report stated:  
 
Transformation results from the exploitation of new approaches to opera-
tional concepts and capabilities, the use of old and new technologies, and 
new forms of organization that more effectively anticipate new or still 
emerging strategic and operational challenges and opportunities and that 
render previous methods of conducting war obsolete or subordinate. … 
Because transformation is highly path-dependent, choices made today 
may constrain or enhance opinions tomorrow.140 
  
Transformation was the leading theme of QDR 2001. It was present also in 
many of the 1990s Annual Defense Reports and the 1997 QDR, but now – 
so it was stated – the transition to a new post-9/11 strategic era, the reorien-
tation of defense strategy, and the revolutionary possibilities of technologi-
cal change and of other components of the RMA, also required a transfor-
mation of the Department of Defense as well as of the US Armed Forces. 
In the 2001 QDR the conceptualisation of a RMA – and its role in trans-
forming the DoD and the military – was similar to that expressed in the 
2000 and 2001 Annual Defense Reports. The RMA was an accepted taken-
for-granted concept that included technological, organisational, operational, 
and training-related components. RMA was also used as a concept in order 
to demonstrate the possibilities or necessities of military transformation. 
Exploiting the Revolution in Military Affairs enabled the transformation of 
the armed forces and thus retained the military ‘edge’ or “asymmetric ad-
vantages”141 of the United States.142 
 
The QDR’s shift from a threat-based model to a capabilities-based ap-
proach in defence planning suited the logic of transforming the military 
through a RMA. The capabilities-based model requires that the US “main-
tain its military advantages in key areas while it develops new areas of 
military advantage and denies asymmetric advantages to adversaries.” This 
approach to defence planning suggests that the US Armed Forces should 
innovatively adapt existing capabilities to new circumstances, as well as 
develop new military capabilities.143 
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President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address highlighted the new 
challenges of the post-9/11 security environment and the related need to 
harness expensive technology in the global War on Terror. The case of Af-
ganistan – the ousting of the Taliban regime in the autumn of 2001 – was 
still fresh in the memory of most people, and the White House lessons 
learned from the first phases of the campaign in Afghanistan accentuated 
the use of precision weapons, sophisticated high-technology air power, and 
expeditionary operations: 
 
Afghanistan proved that expensive precision weapons defeat the enemy 
and spare innocent lives, and we need more of them. We need to replace 
aging aircraft and make our military more agile to put our troops any-
where in the world quickly and safely.144 
 
The cataclysmic events of 11 September 2001 were also clearly reflected in 
the 2002 Annual Defense Report by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
– the first Annual Defense Report issued by the George W. Bush admini-
stration. In the 1990s the momentum for transformation of the military was 
found mainly in the RMA. According to the 2002 Annual Defense Report, 
21st century defence planning would have to concentrate on complexity, 
dangerousness, and surprise in dealing with security issues. The newly ar-
ticulated security framework was visible in the table of contents of the 
2002 annual report. The first three chapters were named “Reassessing the 
Security Environment”, “Charting a New Strategic Course” and “Fighting 
the War on Terror”. The change from “U.S. Defense Strategy”, “The Mili-
tary Requirements of the Defense Strategy” and “Employing U.S. Forces to 
Implement the Defense Strategy”, or equivalent titles in the latter part of 
the 1990s, was heavily influenced by the events of 11 September.145 
 
Although the terrorist attack on American soil gave rise to a new security 
environment, the role of the RMA in the DoD’s transformation process was 
not compromised. Concerning the RMA, the attacks and the subsequently 
declared War on Terror only elevated the importance of previously articu-
lated notions of asymmetric threats. In addition, they provided ‘proof‘ of 
the dangers posed by failed states and non-state actors. Repeating the idea 
of QDR 2001, the underlying understanding of an “ongoing revolution in 
military affairs” was stated in the form of “changing the conduct of military 
operations.”146 The elements of the RMA – technology, operational con-
cepts, organisation, and training – were not challenged by the 2002 annual 
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report. Rather, the prospects that future enemies could frustrate the RMA 
appeared to have more credibility in the aftermath of 9/11:  
 
Although U.S. military forces enjoy advantages in many aspects of armed 
conflict, the U.S. will be challenged by adversaries that possess or seek 
capabilities and design novel concepts to overcome those advantages.147  
 
According to the report, the War on Terror required that the DoD’s trans-
formation efforts should be accelerated. The 2002 annual report raises 
transformation to a higher priority than the RMA. Transformation is inten-
tional activity on part of the DoD to counter future challenges and potential 
threats. It touches upon conceptual, cultural, and technological elements. 
RMA was conceptualised as a medium of transformation – a global process 
that would have effects on the nature of wars and future military operations 
– which, if exploited and harnessed, would have worldwide effects on war-
fighting and thus on military power:148 
 
Transformation is fundamentally about redefining war on our terms by 
harnessing an ongoing revolution in military affairs. As the President has 
said, “This revolution is only beginning, and it promises to change the 
face of battle.” Through an iterative process of transformation and work-
ing with our friends and allies, we will attempt to shape the changing na-
ture of military competition and cooperation.  … 
As President Bush stated in December 2001, our approach in Afghanistan 
has proven “that an innovative doctrine and high-tech weaponry can shape 
and then dominate an unconventional conflict. The brave men and women 
of our military are rewriting the rules of war with new technologies and 
old values like courage and honor.”149 
 
Explaining his office’s policy on transformation and the Revolution in 
Military Affairs after the ‘success’ in Afghanistan in the beginning of 2002, 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld expressed a comprehensive frame-
work for the transformation and the RMA. For Rumsfeld, the Revolution in 
Military Affairs was not only new military technology in the form of new 
weapon systems, but also “new ways of thinking, and new ways of fight-
ing.” He framed the battle for Mazar-e Sharif in Afghanistan in the autumn 
of 2001 as a “transformational battle” indicative of the innovative combina-
tion of new and old weapons, as well as new ways of using them. For 
Rumsfeld, this transformation could not be achieved without new capabili-
ties delivered by the RMA and without new conceptualisations of war. And 
in order to make sense of the contemporary ‘reality’ of war, Rumsfeld sug-
                                               
147
 Ibid., p. 11 (ch. 1). The possibility of asymmetric response had been mentioned prior 
to the 2002 Annual Defense Report. See e.g. A National Security Strategy for a New 
Century (1997), p. 12.  
148
 Ibid., pp. 67-68 (ch.  6). 
149
 Ibid., pp. 67-68 (ch. 6) (my italics). 
 232
gested the importance of understanding the profound meaning of 9/11: 
“The war on terrorism is a transformational event that cries out for us to 
rethink our activities”.150 
 
The 2003 Annual Defense Report drew upon the lessons of the wars in Af-
ghanistan (2001-) and Iraq (2003-) and concluded that speed characterises 
the new, transformed mode of warfare that the US DoD was seeking to re-
alise. In order to achieve new levels of speed in redefined warfare, intelli-
gence and precision engagement needed to be improved. Within the larger 
framework of the ongoing War on Terror, transforming the Armed Forces 
to meet changed contemporary and future asymmetric threats was the main 
line of argument in the 2003 report. The main vehicle for achieving these 
goals was to develop joint warfighting capabilities by devising and testing 
new operational concepts, new ways to use and evaluate training exercises 
and experiments, and by investing in the research, planning and develop-
ment of new advanced military systems. The Report accentuated a change 
in the culture of the US defense community – doing and thinking differ-
ently and by analysing how ‘traditional’ conceptualisations might be rede-
fined. This applied also to the embracing of a joint military culture as op-
posed to the service-centric culture of the Cold War and the immediate 
post-Cold War eras.151 In this ‘cultural context’, the report cited President 
George W. Bush’s 1999 campaign speech about redefining war on US 
terms, i.e. through advanced technology.152 
 
The 2003 Annual Defense Report emphasised the number and character of 
transformed capabilities within DoD. However, this transformation did not 
have a definite goal that can be reached. Rather, as seemed to be the case 
with War on Terror, transformation of the Defense Department in general 
and the armed forces particularly meant a continuous process of innovation 
within the sphere of defense and an ability to be in the position to 
(re)define the confines of warfare not just for the US armed forces, but 
more widely within the global international system.153 
 
In August 2004 President George W. Bush announced a major US troop 
realignment around the world. The central theme of this realignment was 
the return home of some 60,000-70,000 uniformed soldiers from their over-
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seas bases around the world – mostly from Europe and Asia. According to 
Bush, the logic behind this move came from the end of the Cold War and 
the subsequent need to prepare the military to deal with the “new dangers 
associated with rogue nations, global terrorism, and weapons of mass de-
struction.”154 President Bush presented the transformation of the US Armed 
Forces, supported by the global restructuring of the force, as an adaptation 
to the new post-Cold War and particularly post-9/11 international security 
environment. Accordingly, the Cold War era strategy of relying on a large 
number of forward-deployed heavy forces was even more irrelevant.155 The 
avenue for change – through the process of military transformation – was 
made possible by heavy reliance on new technologies of war: 
 
Over the coming decade, we will deploy a more agile and more flexible 
force, … We’ll take advantage of the 21st century military technologies to 
rapidly deploy increased combat power. The new plan will help us fight 
and win these wars of the 21st century.156 
 
The intention to combine modern technology, transformation of the armed 
forces, and the purposeful redefinition of war was stated explicitly by 
George W. Bush in his speech few month before announcing the US troop 
realignment process in August 2004. In developing the line of argument of 
redefining war on US terms through technology proposed already in 1999, 
Bush stated at the US Military Base of Fort Lewis in June 2004 that: 
 
This is a different kind of war, … as we fight the war [on terror] to protect 
America, we are transforming our forces and investing in the future. … 
The soldiers of Fort Lewis are serving the frontlines of the war on terror, 
and you’re on the cutting edge of military transformation, and I thank you 
for that. … Fort Lewis is also home to many of our Nation’s Special Op-
erations forces, who are redefining war on our terms.157 
 
This statement presents the George W. Bush administration’s conceptuali-
sation of 21st century warfare and the related conceptualisations of military 
power. This conceptualisation had been ‘developing’ since the administra-
tion came to power. It was first premised on the notion of post-Cold War 
era military transformation through the exploitation of modern technology. 
This was sought to retain and increase the military edge that the US Armed 
Forces clearly enjoyed in the aftermath of the Cold War and had been 
brought to the fore by the 1991 Gulf War and many subsequent conflicts of 
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the 1990s. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the momentum for transform-
ing the military emanated not only from the ‘new’ security situation of the 
post-Cold War era and the possibilities offered by the technological sophis-
tication of military materiel. Increasingly the process of military transfor-
mation were associated with the ‘dramatically altered’ security landscape 
of the post-9/11 world, instead of with the post-Cold War era. The techno-
logical foundation of the RMA – at the heart of military transformation – 
was well suited to serve the post-9/11 military transformation and the new 
American version of the rules of war. After all, military technological so-
phistication as well as the culture of developing adjoining operational con-
cepts and probing into various organisational models developed primarily 
within the United States and provided one possible logic to the responses in 
the aftermath of the 9/11.  
 
Under the auspices of the War on Terror, the war in Afghanistan (October 
2001-) seemed to confirm the ‘correctness’ of the DoD RMA policy. As 
Secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld explained in January 2002: 
 
[J]ust before Christmas I travelled to Afghanistan… I met with an ex-
traordinary group of men, the Special Forces who’d been involved in the 
attack on Mazar-e Sharif. … From the moment they landed in Afghani-
stan, they began adapting to the circumstances on the ground. They 
sported beards and traditional scarves. They rode horses… Here we are in 
the year 2002, fighting the first war of the 21st century, and the horse cav-
alry was back and being used, but being used in previously unimaginable 
ways. It showed that a revolution in military affairs is about more than 
building new high tech weapons, though that is certainly part of it. 158 
 
The adversary in this war was unconventional in nature, as was the imple-
mentation of the war campaign. Instead of massing heavy forces to invade 
the country, a small number of troops with technologically developed mate-
riel proved to be successful. The troops were not only using technically de-
veloped systems, but also innovative approaches to warfighting. In addi-
tion, the proportion of Special Forces soldiers and ‘paramilitary’ intelli-
gence operatives was high. Local warlords were bribed and bought to join 
the US-led war effort in order to oust the Taliban-regime. Within months, 
the intensive and offensive war effort was over. Irregular resistance and 
unconventional attacks, as well as instability were still left to be dealt with. 
 
Concerning the RMA, the above statement by Donald Rumsfeld highlights 
two features. First, transformation via the RMA was still applicable in the 
post-9/11 world despite the fact that non-state agents were becoming more 
important. Second, while the post-Cold War and post-Gulf War American 
discourse on RMA can be characterised as ‘resilient’ or even sedimented, 
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it is not static. What began as a technologically-centred discourse of war-
fare between states has turned into a more comprehensive approach to war-
fare, involving the fundamental transformation of conceptual as well as ma-
terial factors. While the role of technology has been – and is still – strong 
in the US conceptualisations of the RMA, the post-9/11 American dis-
course on the RMA has made a slight shift from technological emphasis 
toward conceptual innovation.  
 
It is noteworthy that while the George W. Bush administration has been 
vigorously campaigning for the transformation of US Armed Forces 
through the exploitation of the RMA, this policy orientation is quite com-
patible with the general American RMA discourse that begun in the early 
1990s and which gained momentum in the mid-1990s. Without the pro-
gressive framing of the RMA by the two successive Clinton administra-
tions, the possibilities for embarking upon a ‘transformation through RMA’ 
formula’ would have been more restricted, if at all possible. The argument 
left for the Bush administration in general – and Donald Rumsfeld particu-
larly – was that previously the project of transforming the military had not 
received the attention, resources, or determination required by the realities 
of the post-Cold War international system.159 This seemed particularly true 
after 9/11. 
 
The launching of the overarching global War on Terror and the related 
practical policies of the US have reflected attempts to have other nations 
and international bodies embrace the American conceptualisations of con-
temporary international threats and the related means to counter them 
within the international system. The raising of terrorism to the top of the 
list of risks, the emphasis on the global nature of terrorism and the required 
cooperative international actions against it, and the categorisation of states 
as being either with the United States or against it in the global war on ter-
ror160, are all expressions of the attempts by the United States to pipe the 
military tune in the aftermath of 9/11. Framing the international security 
situation though global terrorist threats and War on Terror, the transfor-
mation of the Cold War-style armed forces and the exploitation of military 
technology is a ‘logical’ response by the US according to its conceptualisa-
tion of the international security landscape.  
 
At the same time that RMA thinking has become more and more ‘accepted’ 
and taken for granted in the US, the policy of exploiting the possibilities 
offered by RMA has now been codified under the heading of military trans-
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formation. This suggests the increasing irrelevance of the conceptual and 
material structures associated with the military during the Cold War. Mili-
tary transformation has become the process of adjusting to the changes in 
the international security situation and of moulding it through a process of 
redefining the rules for the use of military force. With the sudden, unex-
pected, and dramatic redefinition of the international system after the at-
tacks of 9/11, the five-year process of RMA-based transformation offered a 
logical foundation for security and defence policy reformulations. First, the 
already existing and potential RMA-based means for using military force 
within the international system proved to be in high demand wherever ‘tra-
ditional’ large-scale warfare was still a possibility, but ‘lower level’ opera-
tions in terms of scale and casualties seemed to be on the increase. Second, 
the stark contrast between the traditional post-Cold War era threats161 and 
the post-9/11 era terrorist threats pointed to the need to radically redefine 
warfare and the use of armed force within the international system after the 
terrorist attacks. Being committed to military transformation for about half 
a decade before the events of 9/11, the redefinition of the international se-
curity landscape that took place in the end of 2001 and repeatedly thereaf-
ter fitted well into the existing – but still somewhat ‘slow’ – process of re-
defining the roles, missions, and operating procedures of the US Armed 
Forces. After all, the process of military transformation had its genesis in 
the post-Cold War era understandings about the need to change the rules of 
military activities in a new international system.  
 
After 9/11, a new logic emerged – or was constructed – in favour of trans-
formation and the RMA. Now that war was taking place on US soil, the 
urgency of correctly defining the new international security environment 
was highlighted. When linked to this redefinition of the situation, the proc-
ess of military transformation seemed more important than ever. 9/11 de-
livered an unsuspected and devastating blow to the American intelligence 
and defence communities – as well as to the general public, and decisive 
measures were called for. And after the publicly promulgated War on Ter-
ror – the Bush administration’s definition of the post September 2001 situa-
tion – accelerating and redirecting the already ongoing process of transfor-
mation provided a possible solution to the problem of terrorist attacks. Af-
ter all, in logical terms transformation implies a move from something ‘old’ 
and outdated to something ‘new’ – reflecting the shift from the post-Cold 
War era towards post-9/11 era. 
 
Because we do not know who our adversaries may be either in the near 
term of the long term; or how they may choose to fight; but because we do 
know that modern technology is available to our adversaries or potential 
                                               
161
 These post-Cold War era threats were mostly the same as the Cold War era threats, 
with the modification that a superpower confrontation was not considered to be a threat. 
 237
adversaries, as readily as it is available to us; and because we know that as 
a democratic society we are vulnerable to attack: We decided to pursue 
our strategy for transformation in a way that would provide our combatant 
commanders with what we are calling a portfolio of capabilities.162 
 
And the RMA has had a natural role to play in the post-9/11 military trans-
formation. After all, the idea of transformation by exploiting the RMA was 
already well established. Now it simply had to be implemented effectively 
and quickly. 
 
While military transformation and the Revolution in Military Affairs have 
been depicted to provide means to fight the ongoing War on Terror, the 
process of transformation also transcends it. As Deputy Secretary of De-
fence Paul Wolfowitz explained: 
 
[E]ven as we fight this war on terror, potential adversaries scrutinize our 
methods. They study our capabilities. They seek our weaknesses. They 
plan for how they might take advantage of what they perceive as our vul-
nerabilities. So, as we take care of today, we must invest in tomorrow. We 
are emphasising multiple transformations that, combined, will fundamen-
tally change warfare in ways that could give us important advantages.163 
 
The Bush Administration defined the international security situation after 
9/11 from the perspective of the global War on Terror. The global War on 
Terror has operated as a conceptual device through which the norms and 
rules of the international system, as well as the rules for recognising mili-
tary power, have been reassessed and changed. The designation of the 
global War on Terror as the most important framework for US security and 
defence policy has led to assertive, vigorous, and even aggressive use of 
military force throughout the world in situations where terrorism is thought 
to be threatening the US – directly or indirectly. The 2002 National Secu-
rity Strategy explicitly expresses the US view of the normative elements of 
the international social structure: the US is permitted and even compelled 
to use force against terrorists, terrorist organisations, and states that aid 
them. The norm of non-intervention – already weakened throughout the 
1990s by the discourse on humanitarian interventions – is overridden 
whenever the threat of terrorism is viewed as undermining US national se-
curity. The rules for the multilateral use of force in interventions short of 
‘traditional’ large-scale wars have also been reinterpreted. The accentuation 
of unilateralism164 – the ability and willingness to use military force alone – 
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and the willingness to use military force in pre-emptive ways have been 
affected by the framework adopted for the War on Terror. 
 
Within the framework of the War on Terror, current American understand-
ings regarding the rules for recognising power emanate from the Cold War 
era and particularly from the rapid development of advanced information 
technologies after the Cold War and the associated ‘new’ ways to concep-
tualise warfighting through new operational concepts and novel forms of 
organising forces. The RMA discourse seems to be at the core of the 
American rules for recognising military power, it has paved the way to the 
development and deployment of precision weapons, almost real-time 
C4ISR, the exploitation of space, network-centric warfare, and the like. 
According to the prevailing view, especially after the accession of power 
by the George W. Bush administration, it is advanced military technology 
that offers military power. Those not capable or willing to exploit new 
technology and to transform their armed forces, are conceptualised as in-
creasingly irrelevant states in the new military environment of the 21st cen-
tury. 
 
Despite the current tight coupling of the War on Terror on the one hand and 
the military transformation through the RMA on the other, the general 
definition of the situation in terms of a War on Terror may pose future chal-
lenges to the RMA approach, though not so much to the general notion of 
military transformation. The second phase of the global War on Terror, the 
war against Iraq (2003-), has demonstrated that the link between the tradi-
tional conceptualisations of war between states and the RMA is not yet ob-
solete. The initial invasion of Iraq – when the adversary was the Iraqi 
Armed Forces – was successful. It was completed quickly, and with mini-
mal friendly casualties, by relying on ‘traditionally’ organised heavy forces 
that were equipped with high-tech ‘RMA-materiel’. After major combat 
operations were declared to be over – on May 1st 2003 – the stabilisation 
and reconstruction phase of the war has been riddled with difficulties. The 
seemingly easy victory over Iraq has turned into a conflict of indefinite du-
ration. Irregular resistance through using unconventional and illegitimate 
means has challenged the occupying powers, as well as the established em-
bryonic local Iraqi security forces and political structures. Although tech-
nologically developed systems – coupled with new operational concepts 
and organisations – do provide possibilities for tackling the emerging ir-
regular resistance in Iraq, the general tenets of the RMA have not been 
strengthened by the events in Iraq after summer 2003. Similarly, in tandem 
with the increasing number of security problems faced in Iraq, the continu-
ing instability and poor security situation in Afghanistan has raised new 
                                                                                                                                         
actual use of military force unilaterally by the George W. Bush administration are de-
partures from the multilateral-centric policies of the preceding US administrations. 
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concerns about the possibilities for success in operations where an outside 
power tries to bring about a regime change in the target country. This in-
creasing concern is not particularly flattering to the general tenets of the 
RMA – as explicated during the 1990s. 
 
 
7.7. Conclusions – The Development and Maturation of the RMA in the 
Official Policies of the United States 
 
Concerning the definition of the international security situation – part of the 
general framework of this study presented in Figure 4.2 – three separate, 
but overlapping periods related to US defence policy can be discerned from 
the late 1980s until the end of 2004. These understandings of the interna-
tional system generally and the role of armed force in the system in particu-
lar are conceptualised as analytical categories for the purpose of under-
standing and analysing US policies in the post-Cold War era. The first of 
these is the apparent end of the Cold War, which promised the prospect of a 
New World Order, in which multilateral military action led by the US 
would have a positive influence upon the security environment of the ‘new’ 
uncertain security environment. This understanding that the Cold War had 
come to an end acknowledged the highly uncertain nature of the future in-
ternational system and accentuated the transformation of the threats facing 
states. It was more a collection of ideas what the international system was 
not anymore than a coherent conceptualisation of existing ‘new’ realities. 
The New World Order was one – as yet unrealised – American projected 
vision of the post-Cold War era. 
 
Within several years after the demise of the Cold War the second discerned 
definition of the international security situation in the US started to emerge. 
Termed here the ‘humanitarian use of force’ definition, the entire 1990s 
were seen as related somehow to a debate concerning the use of military 
force for non-traditional purposes. Although not many direct military inter-
ventions were carried out in the 1990s, military force was used several 
times in missions that aimed at stopping atrocities, providing relief and aid 
to oppressed people, and preventing human rights abuses from escalating. 
This development begun during the George H. Bush administration, but 
experienced its apex during the Clinton presidency.  The most optimistic 
views of the multilateral use of force for humanitarian purposes did not live 
for long, but continued – as they still do today – to play an important part in 
the US decisions to use military force in the 1990s. It is noteworthy that 
even though the heading of ‘humanitarian use of force’ serves here as an 
analytical category, the US and other western states did not enthusiastically 
intervene whenever needed or possible. Rather, this heading reflects the 
responses of the US to the international environment during the first decade 
after the Cold War.   
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Advocacy of the humanitarian use of military force was already in decline 
when the George W. Bush administration came to power in 2001, for the 
distinction between vital and important national interests on the one hand 
and humanitarian interests on the other had already been made in the mid-
1990s. Guided by a different outlook on the US situation in the world, and 
exacerbated by the 9/11 soon after the inauguration of George W. Bush, the 
third post-Cold War era definition of the international security situation 
‘emerged’, characterised here as the ‘global War on Terror’. According to 
this view, the United States is under attack, and in order to respond to this 
attack, military force needs to be used decisively, aggressively, and even 
before any concrete threat arises. This led to the official promulgation of 
the unilateralist pre-emptive National Security Strategy of 2002.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. The sequential and somewhat overlapping US definitions of the                
                    international security situation related to the organising and the  
                    use of armed force after the Cold War 
 
During the ‘end of the Cold War’ phase (1990~1996) the nature of the in-
ternational system thus remained obscure, uncertain, and as dangerous as 
before. After the 1991 Gulf War, the element of continuity in the conceptu-
alisations of war became manifest: the RMA would bring about advantages 
in the conduct of traditional conventional war between states – even if the 
Cold War era model of superpowers battling in Europe and Asia had been 
replaced by a regional conventional war focus. Contrary to the rather re-
produced shared understandings of the nature of war in the regional war 
focus, the implications of the RMA for military power were more transfor-
mative than reproductive. The military signifiers of mass and terrain were 
challenged or modified as the information technology based RMA prom-
ised unprecedented efficiency, deadliness, and protection against the en-
emy. During the ‘end of the Cold War’ phase, the RMA-related themes 
emerged and developed mostly as conceptual devises and as visions of fu-
ture warfare. The academic and military communities brought the concept 
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of the RMA to the fore and kept it there. With the maturation of the RMA 
discourse the top defence decision-makers adopted the scholarly RMA 
concept into ‘quasi-official’ and, finally, official defence policies. This 
high-level acceptance of RMA and its official promulgation took place dur-
ing the implicit shift from the ‘end of the Cold War’ phase to the era of 
‘humanitarian use of military force’. 
 
While the most optimistic ideas about humanitarian interventions had 
proved to be too ‘idealistic’ by the mid 1990s, the media-driven public 
awareness of new humanitarian catastrophes and the fact that some of these 
were taking place in Europe increased the pressure within the west in gen-
eral and the US particularly to do something to stop large-scale ethnic and 
religion-based violence. In addition, the lessons of the 1991 Gulf War had 
showed to a wide audience that the ‘tools’ for humanitarian interventions 
existed and made almost ‘casualty-free’ fighting possible. 
 
During the ‘humanitarian use of military force’ phase (1992-2001) the 
RMA discourse was embraced officially within the US DoD and by the 
President. During the overlapping period with the ‘end of the Cold War 
phase’ – from 1992 to approximately 1996 –a consensus developedwithin 
the defence establishment concerning the meaning of the RMA for the 
United States and for the future of warfare. The emerging humanitarian and 
other ‘low-level’ military challenges of the era emphasised the ‘new’ fea-
tures of the post-Cold War era. The conceptual grip of the Cold War era 
mentality started to fade. The RMA provided a vision of military means to 
be used in instances where small-scale or humanitarian military action was 
deemed necessary, and possible. In addition, the RMA offered to provide 
effective means to deal with any emerging large-scale high-intensity con-
flicts so that the US could retain and increase its military edge against con-
ventional threats.  
 
The unsuccessful intervention in Somalia and the failure to intervene in 
Rwanda did not challenge the developing RMA logic of technologically 
defined warfare and military power. Rather, these conflicts challenged the 
immediate post-Cold War era vision of a New World Order and assertive 
use of military force for humanitarian purposes in solving ethnic and reli-
gious conflicts. Similarly, the ethnic violence connected to the breaking-up 
of Yugoslavia and the difficulties in resolving the related conflicts did not 
directly or explicitly challenge the technological RMA focus that was be-
ginning to materialise in concrete terms. In Bosnia, Operation Deliberate 
Force was conducted according to the 1991 Gulf war logic of lethal and 
precise air power. While the emerging RMA premises were not cast in 
doubt by lessons from Somalia, Rwanda, or Bosnia, the ‘accepted’ reasons 
and goals of military interventions – i.e. war – did undergo a process of 
change due to the difficulties or failures associated with these conflicts.  
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The goals of humanitarian interventions were thus debated and were scaled 
down in the mid 1990s – at least if compared to the visions that were 
brought forward in the aftermath of the Gulf War and the emerging con-
flicts in former Yugoslavia. The proposed methods of intervening in possi-
ble warfighting scenarios were, however, based on the ‘heritage’ of the 
Cold War and the lessons of the 1991 Gulf War. Maintaining large mecha-
nised conventional fighting forces and developing high technology com-
mand and control and weapon systems, as well as integrating them into a 
system of systems seemed to respond to the need to prevent or limit casual-
ties to friendly forces and to local people. If interventions were necessary, 
the ‘only’ way to undertake them would be by exploiting advanced tech-
nology that facilitates discriminatory use of force while keeping most of the 
intervening troops out of harm’s way. Particularly the lessons of Bosnia – 
where air war was a ‘substitute’ for the use of ground forces165 – were con-
ceptualised to support the RMA thesis originating from the Gulf War.166 
The most acknowledged symbol of RMA warfare – the use of precision 
weapons – climbed from some 7% of the ordnance used in the Gulf to 
about 70% in Bosnia.167  
 
Once the US – and western – lessons of the post-Cold War era warfare 
were assimilated within the RMA discourse, it became possible to describe 
the ‘new’ post-Cold War era determinants of military power as a ‘Cold 
war plus’168 approach. During the first decade of the post-Cold War era, 
the US military capability had to be operable against traditional large-scale 
conventional enemies (a two major theater war capability) and it also had 
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 As US Secretary of Defence William Perry noted, ”… I do not believe that the Bos-
nian war poses a threat to U.S. interests grave enough to risk the lives of thousands of 
troops. … So we will not commit ground forces to the conflict in Bosnia.” Perry 
(1995a). 
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 It is noteworthy that the air campaign of Operation Deliberate Force was not the only 
factor in the ‘successful’ termination of the armed conflict in Bosnia and diplomatic 
negotiations that culminated in the Dayton agreement. The success of the summer 1995 
Croat-Bosnian ground offensive against the Bosnian Serbs and the diplomatic opera-
tions also affected the outcome. From western (NATO’s) perspective, the usefulness of 
air warfare by politically sensitive, precision-guided munitions – in combination with 
diplomacy – was decisive.  
167As the 1991 Gulf War and the 1995 Operation Deliberate Force were quite different 
types of wars, the relative amount of precision munitions used cannot be interpreted in a 
straight forward manner to mean that the operation in Bosnia was ten times ‘more 
RMA’ than the Gulf War. 
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 Note that the already proposed ’Cold War minus’ approach relates to the western 
conceptualisations of the nature of war in the post-Cold War era. The scope of war has 
diminished (the global confrontation has changed into regional, but still large-scale, 
conflicts) in the post-Cold War era, while this ‘Cold War plus’ approach is related to the 
shared understandings of military power – as the domain of military power (the variety 
of military tasks assigned to the armed forces) has been widened in the post-Cold War 
era to include ‘new’ types of military operations. 
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to provide means to engage in a wide variety of smaller-scale contingency 
operations. It was these latter military operations – not only humanitarian 
interventions, but also many other smaller-scale interventions and opera-
tions – that started to emerge and call for action to an unprecedented de-
gree. Still, with the early conclusion that post-Soviet Russia would not 
launch a conventional attack in Europe, the ‘major theatre war’ construct 
influenced US assessments of military power: “Fighting and winning major 
theater wars is the ultimate test of our Armed Forces”.169 The RMA dis-
course provided possibilities for the promulgation of a defence strategy that 
highlighted the traditional – but more and more improbable – Cold War era 
warfare but also acknowledged the emerging new manifestations of war – 
and the western responses to them. After a critical mass of RMA discourse 
had emerged – by the mid-1990s – it provided ample opportunities and 
possibilities for the declaration and development of a defence strategy and 
guidelines for the development of the US Armed Forces in an era which 
lacked the strategic imperatives of the Cold War. In a way, the implicit shift 
from a threat-based approach to defence towards a capabilities-based ap-
proach took place already in the early 1990s. Donald Rumsfeld later codi-
fied this explicitly into the defence strategy of the United States  – in the 
aftermath of 9/11 in 2001.  
 
The adoption of the RMA into the official defense policy of the United 
States in the latter part of the 1990s and subsequent attempts to export 
RMA into a larger international understanding concerning military power 
and war in the post-Cold War era were not based solely on the changing 
security landscape that came about in the late 1980s and 1990s. Think 
tanks, research centres, and the US Armed Forces started to envision future 
trends in warfare in the early and mid-1990s. Often relying on the Gulf 
War for inspiration or reference, this RMA-related literature offered a view 
of future military power and war, and by the late 1990s the idea of a Revo-
lution in Military Affairs was widely accepted – at least within the US de-
fense community. The adoption of the RMA into the vocabulary of Annual 
Defense Reports from 1995 onwards – and National Security Strategies 
from 1998 onwards – was made ‘possible’ by the preliminary groundwork 
done by the strategic community in their discussion of the RMA. After the 
Revolution in Military Affairs had become the ‘essence’ of post-Cold War 
era strategic discourse, incorporating it into official defense policy was a 
logical next step, although it was not the only possible one.  
 
Harnessing the RMA as a tool for transforming the military in the post-
Cold War era processes of redefining war, conflict, and military power also 
provided new possibilities for the US. Since the massive Soviet threat was 
gone, the role of the armed forces was changing throughout the interna-
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 A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (2000), p. 27. 
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tional system and in the US particularly. Being increasingly confronted 
with ‘new’ conflicts and wars in the post-Cold War era, explicit calls for 
humanitarian uses of military force – although not unanimous, especially 
after some sour experiences of action in Somalia and inaction in Central 
Africa – were made possible by the opportunities that the RMA discourse 
provided. It was the promise of a fundamental increase of military effec-
tiveness, low(er) levels of casualties, and diminished collateral damage that 
brought about the convergence of the post-Cold War era ‘new realities’ of 
war and the RMA discourse. Similarly, being the forerunner in the concep-
tual development of the RMA and the only undisputable (military) super-
power with unrivalled resources, the visionary statements concerning future 
warfare through technologically centred RMA framework made a great 
deal of sense in US domestic policy circles. In addition, a more broadly ac-
cepted international conceptualisation of technologically-focused warfare 
would provide the US with ample opportunities to keep its position of mili-
tary supremacy. The reliance on the RMA in ‘defining’ future wars and 
transforming the US Armed Forces was thus also affected by the potential 
that it seemed to offer to the United States. As the surveyed documents 
concerning US defence policy in the 1990s show, if there was one country 
that would benefit from the exploitation of RMA, it was the United States. 
As the leading edge power in technological research and development, as 
well as in weapon procurement, and the only state with the capability to use 
force anywhere in the world, the understanding of future war and the trans-
formation of armed forces via the concept of RMA was not only a response 
to new challenges in the international system, but also a vision of the future 
that would be beneficial for the United States. As William Cohen stated in 
1998 in his address in NATO, “we must all embrace the Revolution in 
Military Affairs”.170 
 
By the mid-1990s, then, the RMA discourse started to be integrated in the 
Defense Department’s official documents. The fact that the idea of Revolu-
tion in Military Affairs was generally acknowledged did not mean that 
there would be no debate concerning historical evidence and occurrence of 
such revolutions, the nature of the current revolution, or the necessary con-
crete steps that should be taken in order to exploit it. During the first half of 
the 1990s, the RMA grew from the Soviet launched concept of a MTR into 
a more encompassing, though contested comprehensive approach to a fun-
damental transformation of war. During the time that the RMA was emerg-
ing and was later consolidated into the DoD’s force transformation process, 
as one feature of the changing strategic environment, it carried several im-
plications that are visible in the DoD documents: 
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a. Historical evidence shows that past RMAs have occurred.  
 
b. Lately, information technology has advanced at a revolution-
ary pace, making a technologically driven RMA possible. 
 
c. Those who do not adapt to and exploit ongoing RMAs will 
jeopardize their future. 
 
In addition to the convergence between the discourse of the end of the Cold 
War (characterised by the ‘emergence’ of uncertainty and unpredictability 
in the international security situation) and the RMA discourse (character-
ised by unprecedented capabilities and possibilities for rapid global military 
responses), the discourse of the privatisation of war also ‘supported’ the 
post-Cold War idea of fielding smaller military forces with better high-tech 
equipment. From the mid-1990s onwards, the US DoD focused on discard-
ing the unusable military ‘overweight’ that had developed quickly after the 
Cold War had come to a halt. The changing nature of the international sys-
tem was making some parts of the ‘old’ military infrastructure and many 
pieces of equipment obsolete, while some ‘new’ capabilities and arrange-
ments were being prioritised. The privatisation of war has been part of the 
process of sustaining and increasing the US military edge. This process was 
promoted by accentuating its benefits in reducing expenditures making de-
fence spending more efficient. 
 
While the RMA discourse gained momentum and became widely accepted 
during the Clinton administrations, it was George W. Bush who, as a presi-
dential candidate finally forged an explicit linkage between the RMA and 
the maintenance of the US military edge within the international system. 
After being inaugurated in 2001, he made it ‘official’ and has since repeat-
edly made the assertion that technologically redefined war benefit the 
US.171 From the perspective of this intentional redefinition of war this 
process had been going on for almost a decade within the US Defense De-
partment before George W. Bush made his remarks.  
 
Finally, with the terrorist attacks in the eastern coast of the United States, a 
new US definition of the international security situation emerged. This 
happened abruptly – as had been the case with the terrorist attacks them-
selves – within few weeks of the attacks. The promulgation of a global War 
on Terror was well under way within days of the attack, and in less than a 
month Afghanistan was attacked. 9/11 changed the American definition of 
the international security situation into an aggressively securitised one: the 
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United States was facing covert attacks – war – that demanded decisive 
military action to prevent further attacks and to defend the homeland and 
its people.  
 
The inception of the era of global War on Terror was explicit, clearly ar-
ticulated, and occurred within several weeks. The ‘new’ risk of future ter-
rorist attacks ‘necessitated’ determined military action. The conceptualisa-
tions concerning the nature of war were also changed – war became an in-
definitely ongoing process of battles throughout the globe. In addition, the 
George W. Bush administration proposed that this new war of the 21st cen-
tury would legitimate the use of force (i.e. warfare) pre-emptively in situa-
tions, where no ‘smoking gun’ could be produced. The mere existence of 
classified intelligence reports and analysis would suffice in situations 
where the danger seemed immanent. With the new shadowy enemy – ter-
rorists and states that harbour them – the need to transform the still Cold 
War era-type of US Armed Forces that had undergone only a portion of the 
‘required’ transformation was thought necessary. The way to transforma-
tion had already been show by the Clinton administration, but the full im-
plications of exploiting the RMA had not materialised, according to the 
George W. Bush administration.172 With the radically new threat percep-
tions and the concomitant conceptualisations of the nature of war as a pro-
longed set of military campaigns against states and non-state actors – many 
of which were still unidentified when the war was declared – the role, mis-
sions, and equipment of the US Armed Forces called for a radical change – 
transformation through the RMA.  
 
The shift from the era of humanitarian interventions toward the global War 
on Terror was explicitly defined by the US administration in the expecta-
tion that it would spread all across the world. But as Chapter 5 has already 
demonstrated, this has happened only partially. In addition, within the 
framework of the international discourse concerning terrorism, the Ameri-
can declared War on Terror has had to change and adapt, as others have not 
been willing or able to make the highly militarised responses to terrorism. 
By the end of 2004 the conceptual struggle was continuing within the in-
ternational system and in the west concerning the ‘right’ or ‘acceptable’ 
framework for conceptualising terrorism and ‘appropriate’ means to fight 
it.   
 
Before the ‘War on Terror’ phase (2001-), the Cold War was irreversibly 
over and the non-traditional uses of military force – humanitarian assis-
tance and interventions, as well as small-scale punitive and preventive pre-
cision strikes – had become part of the mainstream conceptualisations of 
war. In addition, the RMA had developed and matured into an accepted 
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description of the effects of information technology upon military opera-
tions, as well as a welcome vision of the future of the US Armed Forces on 
their path to becoming a truly post-Cold War era military. During the 
1990s, the ‘forces’ driving US defence strategy were based on a rather in-
coherent and diffused set of threats. This left plenty of room for the RMA 
discourse to take root. The events of 9/11 and the declaration of the War on 
Terror by the George W. Bush administration turned the rather loose, unfo-
cused, and broadly painted threat scenarios very quickly into focused, 
clearly expressed, and even simplified determinants of post-9/11 military 
action. Winning the War on Terror by military and other means became the 
top political goal, while the transformation of the armed forces – advocated 
intensively already during the 1990s – through the RMA became the means 
of delivering ‘new’ capabilities that were available for use in the – appar-
ently – open-ended first war of the 21st century. Thus, by clarifying and 
unifying the conceptualisation of contemporary and future threats facing 
the US, the Bush administration was able to define ‘clear’ and ‘natural’ 
means at achieving victory in the War on Terror. Since 9/11, then, the logic 
of advancing or exploiting RMA became not only an efficient mean of 
transforming the armed forces (as had been the case from the mid-1990s), 
but a necessity in order to prevail in a war that has been taking place in a 
dramatically changed security environment. 
 
The War on Terror was therefore well suited to the framework of RMA 
warfare as it had developed prior to 9/11. The central idea of RMA had 
previously been to redefine future warfare by exploiting advanced technol-
ogy at a pace that would facilitate the maintenance of a military ‘edge’ vis-
à-vis all potential adversaries and which would give the US a leading role 
in this process of redefinition. The War on Terror, which has been focused 
on the articulation of ‘new’ threats and the rules of applying military force 
to counter these threats, did not challenge the technologically defined con-
ceptualisation of war and military power that RMA-thinking had advo-
cated. On the contrary, the combination of a pre-existing vision and defence 
policy of transformation through the RMA and the declaration of War on 
Terror have supported each other in a broader rearticulation of war – a 
redefinition of war on US terms. With the emergence of a ‘clear and pre-
sent danger’ to the US homeland – terrorism, possibly involving weapons 
of mass-destruction – the high-technology solutions to warfare seemed at 
least as applicable in these ‘new’ wars as against regional ‘conventional’ 
adversaries. High technology military instruments as well as related doc-
trines and organisations came together to promise efficient use of military 
power in a world that was depicted as uncertain, unstable, and unpredict-
able. Together these discourses of the RMA and the War on Terror form an 
explicit American (re)definition of war and military power in the beginning 
of the new millennium. 
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It is noteworthy that the ‘logic’ of advocating RMA within the US defence 
establishment was not unidirectional, static, or unchanging. Rather, in re-
sponse to several different international situations, the case in favour of a 
strategy to export the RMA has had several ‘main’ axes of argumentation. 
The American RMA discourse has also showed resiliency by being able to 
engage and converge with the other discerned post-Cold War era dis-
courses of war – even those that on the surface could be expected to un-
dermine the theses of the RMA discourse. These qualities of the RMA dis-
course are presented in Table 7.1. 
 
This study has proposed a threefold characterisation of the post-Cold War 
era security situation from the US perspective. The analysis so far has 
demonstrated that during all of these post-Cold War era phases the Revolu-
tion in Military Affairs has been located at the core of American under-
standings of military power. The threefold depiction related to the post-
Cold War era US definition of the international security environment does 
not attempt to factor in the many disagreements and debates concerning the 
‘right’ defence policy and the ‘needed’ practical decisions and action 
within the international system. It must be emphasised that this categorisa-
tion is an analytical tool, an as such, operates through simplification in or-
der to identify some central themes that have sprung up from the rich ‘em-
pirical’ material analysed in this chapter. In addition, it is worth restating 
that the construct of the three overlapping phases serves only to reveal the 
logic of RMA emergence, consolidation, and maturation. Similarly, the la-
belling of these phases may be objectionable, especially the phase of ‘hu-
manitarian use of military force’. As has been already claimed, I do not 
claim that this period should be depicted as a time when the US and other 
western states were enthusiastic and optimistic about intervening wherever 
humanitarian disasters occurred. Rather, this phase was a time when the 
end of the Cold War was an accepted ‘fact’ and states were confronted with 
the ‘new’ and emerging problems of the post-Cold War era.  
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Table 7.1.  The Post-Cold War social structure of the international system   
                   from the US perspective 
Elements of Social Structure – US Definitions 
1. Definition of 
the Situation 
“End of the Cold 
War” 
“Humanitarian use of 
military force” 
“Global War on 
Terror” 
2. Norms, rules The Cold War era 
‘history’:  
- sovereignty 
- non-intervention  
- war between states 
- non-use of NBC-
weapons 
The discourse on the 
end of the Cold War: 
- unpredictability 
- decreasing level of 
overall threat 
- versatility of ‘new’ 
threats 
The Discourse on 
new wars: 
- unstable world with 
mostly non-state vio-
lence,  
- weakening of the 
norm of state sover-
eignty 
The Cold War era 
‘history’:  
- sovereignty 
- war between states 
The discourse on 
humanitarian inter-
ventions: 
- weakening of the 
norms of state sover-
eignty and non-
intervention 
- non-state actors 
- failed states 
- legitimacy of inter-
vening 
The discourse on the 
end of the Cold War: 
- unpredictability 
- versatility of ‘new’ 
threats 
The discourse on 
new wars: 
- unstable world with 
mostly non-state vio-
lence 
  The discourse on the 
privatisation of war 
The discourse on 
War on Terror: 
- high-threat envi-
ronment , WMD 
-  non-state organisa-
tions as a danger 
- states that aid ter-
rorists a threat 
- decisive military 
action needed  
- unilateralism  
- pre-emption 
The discourse on 
humanitarian inter-
ventions: 
- weakening of the 
norms of state sov-
ereignty and non-
intervention 
- non-state actors 
 The discourse on 
the privatisation of 
war 
3. Rules for rec-
ognising military 
power 
The Cold War era 
history:  
- nuclear weapons 
- conventional armed 
forces vis-à-vis other 
states’ armed forces 
The RMA discourse: 
- evolution of the 
MTR concept into an 
RMA 
- conceptual clarifica-
tion 
- beginning of official 
acceptance of the 
RMA as a description 
of the post-Cold War 
era ‘reality’ in warfare  
 
The Cold War era 
history:  
- conventional armed 
forces vis-à-vis other 
states’ armed forces  
- proliferation and 
rogue states 
The RMA discourse: 
- high-technology mili-
tary  
* precision 
* C4ISR 
* space 
* information 
- increased possibili-
ties for interventions 
- decreased casualties 
and collateral damage 
- transformation 
The RMA dis-
course: 
- high-technology 
military solutions to 
‘traditional’ and 
‘new’ threats 
    * precision  
    * C4ISR, space 
* information 
* organisations 
* concepts 
- transformation  
The discourse on 
the War on Terror: 
- intelligence, speed 
- WMDs 
- use of force             
  against ‘small’  
  adversaries 
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Finally, too much emphasis should not yet be placed on the ongoing War 
on Terror and its impacts on the long-term ‘reality’ of war and military 
power. The time for that has not yet come. However, it is noteworthy that 
the established and advocated strategy to export the RMA that was devel-
oped in the US during the 1990s fits the discourse of the War on Terror like 
a globe. It is at the intersection of these two discourses that American un-
derstandings of war and military power emerge at the beginning of the 21st 
century. In this respect, from the US perspective, the discourse on the War 
on Terror defines the character of the threats and risks as well as the na-
ture of legitimate war, while the discourse on the RMA defines the determi-
nants of military power. 
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8. TRANSFORMING THE EUROPEAN MILITARIES 
 
 
The previous chapter came to a close with a threefold characterisation of 
US defence policy in the wake of the Cold War. This characterisation was 
presented in the form of three successive and somewhat overlapping 
phases. In addition, it was concluded that within each of the inferred phases 
of post-Cold War American defence policy, the discourse concerning the 
Revolution in Military Affairs has had a distinctive and varying role. How 
does this relate to Europe? The following chapter answers this question by 
analysing conceptions of military power in two transatlantic or European 
institutions: NATO and the European Union. The objective of this chapter 
is to describe the general development of the shared western understanding 
of military power in the post-Cold War era and to explain the changes in it 
by revealing the causal mechanisms that lie beneath them.   
 
Analysing shared conceptualisations of war and military power within 
NATO or the European Union is a somewhat different task than investigat-
ing them in a single state. This divergence manifests itself in the nature of 
NATO and the EU. They are both intergovernmental organisations where 
national governments meet, discuss, debate, and negotiate policies. Based 
on their decision-making apparatuses, decisions taken within NATO or the 
EU already represent more or less the shared western understandings con-
cerning the issue at hand. The decision of NATO to wage war against Ser-
bia because of the stark human rights violations during 1998 and 1999 in 
Kosovo was in itself a result of an international – western intergovernmen-
tal – bargaining process. This process was aimed at reaching shared under-
standings about the situation in Kosovo, defining the shared interests of 
NATO member-states in this situation, and delineating the appropriate 
means to fulfil those interests. Similarly, within the context of the EU, the 
decision to take over the NATO-led SFOR operation in Bosnia in the end 
of 2004 was based on shared understandings within EU concerning the 
situation in Bosnia, the interests of the EU and its member states, and the 
suitable means of meeting the valued goals in this situation. 
 
The analysis of the United States defence policy in Chapter 7 thus deviates 
somewhat from the following analysis of NATO and the EU. In the case of 
NATO and the EU the focus will be on the intergovernmental processes of 
argumentation and negotiation for reaching a shared understanding be-
tween different member-states. It is noteworthy that the United States is a 
member of NATO. As its ‘leading’ superpower member it is in a position 
to influence the shared understandings reached within the organisation. 
 
This above-mentioned divergence in analysis does not, however, prevent or 
impede the study of war and military power from the constructivist per-
 252
spective. Whether one is focusing on individual states or intergovernmental 
organisations, it is these more or less shared conceptualisations that are the 
foundation of policies.1 The fact that NATO and the EU are western inter-
governmental organisations that have developed and still devise common 
policies and actions (thus shared understanding) related to the military di-
mension lends support to the idea of a western security community that 
shares a common understanding of war and military power. 
  
 
8.1. Military Power, War, and NATO 
 
In a constructivist study of military power, the focus on a military alliance 
– NATO – points to the importance of shared understandings between 
member-states concerning faced threats, the nature of war to be prepared 
for, and the role assigned to the use of armed force. From this perspective, 
to focus on NATO’s ‘own’ forces would be of limited utility, since NATO 
as an institution and as an international organisation possesses very few 
military troops of its own. For the most part, it relies on national govern-
ments and armed forces organised by them. NATO is thus a framework for 
the member-states in their day-to-day political decisions concerning mili-
tary affairs. Its effects are not only felt within the sphere of national contri-
butions to NATO force structure or by the official policies and statements 
promulgated in its name. Also the framing of threats, conceptualisations of 
the ‘nature’ of legitimate war, and the shared views concerning functions, 
doctrines, and organisations of national armed forces are all effects of co-
operation within NATO. The Northern Alliance thus represents military 
cooperation within the western/European security community. 
 
From the above-mentioned constructivist perspective, the following chapter 
on NATO conceptualises the changing intersubjective conceptualisations of 
war and military power within the alliance through two ‘ideational’ totali-
ties: 1) the purpose of the alliance and the related understandings of war 
within the alliance, and 2) the shared conceptualisations of how to trans-
form national armed forces within the framework of NATO in order to be 
prepared to fulfil required missions and to be prepared to wage war as 
agreed within the alliance. The latter factor – shared understandings con-
cerning military power – is seen from the perspective of alliance-wide op-
erational concepts and doctrines, procurement priorities of new technical 
systems directed at national governments, and proposals for standardisation 
made to national armed forces.  
 
                                               
1
 It is noteworthy that in certain cases differences over policies may be expressed and 
remain within a national government or an intergovernmental organisation even though 
a decision is reached. 
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8.1.1. Redefining Tasks, the Emergence of ‘the Gap’, and Interoperability 
 
The debate concerning the Revolution in Military Affairs has been mostly 
an American enterprise. The RMA discourse has never been as heated 
within Europe as it has been in the United States, whether one looks at in-
dividual states, NATO or the (W)EU. This does not mean that the issue of  
the RMA has gone unnoticed in Europe. It could mean, rather, that the con-
ceptual debate and ‘development’ has been taking place mostly in the US, 
where as the European members of NATO have had to react to the RMA’s 
practical implications. As an example, the 1998 Committee Report of 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly shows that the Revolution in Military Af-
fairs was something that could not go unnoticed in Europe: 
 
Most military analysts now agree that advances in military technology re-
quire a fundamental reappraisal and revision of operational concepts to 
ensure that full advantage is taken of them. This combination of techno-
logical advances and revisions in operational concepts represents a revo-
lution in military affairs. … There is no doubt that the transatlantic de-
fence technology gap exists and is widening. Without remedial action by 
the Unite States’ allies, sooner or later – and probably sooner – the gap 
will become a rift.  … the revolution in military affairs begs important 
questions about how the allies can ensure that they will be able to work in 
concert with the United States.2 
 
The above-mentioned statement reveals the post-Cold War era dilemma of 
the Atlantic alliance: in an era not defined by grave existential threats, the 
conceptual and practical development of the RMA – the American strategic 
imperative of the 1990s – started to threaten the cohesion of the alliance 
when other member states were not able or willing to implement an RMA 
exploitation strategy to the extent that was the case in the US. Mentioning 
the Revolution in Military Affairs, the existence and the widening of a 
technology gap between the US and the rest, as well as being concerned 
about intra-alliance interoperability, the above quotation is a good reflec-
tion of the military challenges confronted by NATO during the first decade 
of the post-Cold War era. With the ‘emergence’ and ‘widening’ of this gap, 
the foundation of the shared western definitions of military power and re-
lated practical defence policy decisions – consolidated during the Cold War 
– were ‘opened up’ for reinterpretation. Whether this opening up has led to 
                                               
2
 Committee Report of Nato Parliamentary Assembly, Science and Technology Com-
mittee (1998) (my italics); See also Rogers (1998), where he makes the connection be-
tween the restructuring of US Armed Forces – calling that process “the so-called revolu-
tion in Military Affairs” – and the technology gap between the US and other NATO 
members, which may imply a need for the European NATO member states to acquire 
US military technology in order to play their primary roles within the Alliance. Also in 
Gompert and Kugler and Libicki (1999). 
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divergent European and American definitions of military power and war is 
the question to be addressed next. 
 
The end of the Cold War took place in only several years. This becomes 
evident in the NATO framework when focusing upon the alliance’s minis-
terial meeting documents and declarations issued by NATO heads of state 
and government North Atlantic Council meetings from the mid-1980s and 
the beginning of the 1990s. Even as late as 1988, the Soviet military threat 
in Europe was still noticeable, perhaps even severe: 
 
The Soviet Union’s military presence in Europe, at a far in excess of its 
needs for self defence, directly challenges our security as well as our 
hopes for change in the political situation in Europe.3 
 
[W]e have to date witnessed no relaxation of the military effort pursued 
for years by the Soviet Union. … This massive force … constitutes a fun-
damental source of tension between East and West.4 
 
The Soviet threat had almost evaporated by the summer of 1990, when 
NATO’s London declaration was published:  
 
Europe has entered a new, promising era. … The Soviet Union has em-
barked on the long journey towards free society. … The Atlantic Commu-
nity must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries 
in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship.5 
 
Reflecting the changing international political environment of the late 
1980s and early 1990s, NATO’s first post-Cold War era Strategic Concept 
was finalised and accepted in 1991. For the first time, NATO strategy was 
a public document. The Strategic Concept marked a shift from the Cold 
War era focus on deterrence and forward defence towards cooperation and 
a broad framework of security. In addition, the 1991 Strategic Concept es-
poused a preliminary move away from the ‘traditional’ conceptualisations 
of threats and the nature of war. Concerning the old threat of conventional 
attack in Europe, the delegates of the November 1991 Rome summit de-
clared that “we no longer face the old threat of massive attack.”6 
 
Concerning the character of the threats now anticipated, increased attention 
was paid to the “multifaceted” and “multi-directional” risks of the new stra-
tegic environment. The possibilities for proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and ballistic missiles, terrorism, sabotage, and the risk of in-
                                               
3
 NATO (1988a). 
4
 NATO (1988b). 
5
 NATO – The London Declaration (1990). 
6
 NATO – The Rome Declaration (1991). 
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creased instability within the international system were viewed with in-
creased urgency as the conventional threat from the Soviet empire receded: 
“The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO’s European 
fronts has effectively been removed.” This statement was made despite the 
fact that the Soviet capabilities were still “to be taken into account”. Re-
garding the conceptualisations of the nature of war, the 1991 Strategic 
Concept moved away from the need to counter a ‘traditional’ monolithic 
massive global military invasion with a center of gravity in Europe in the 
direction of crisis management, crisis response, and related missions. Ac-
cording to the Strategic Concept these above-mentioned changes in threats 
and the nature of war facilitated also the redefinition of alliance force pos-
ture, equipment levels, readiness of forces and their availability, training 
system and exercises, as well as force employment options. In the docu-
ment this redefinition of the military, which constituted one important ar-
gument in the post-Cold War western discourse of war and military power, 
was seen in reduced military forces with better equipment and shorter reac-
tion times.7 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, NATO espoused  
‘active’ and cooperative security policy within Europe and beyond. The 
focus on the new transatlantic security architecture and the declared 
strengthening of the European pillar within the alliance were manifestations 
of the changes taking place in the early 1990s. In 1992 NATO declared its 
willingness – on a case-by-case basis – to support peacekeeping missions 
mandated by the CSCE and the UN Security Council. It was also declared 
that “we will further strengthen Alliance coordination in peacekeeping, and 
develop practical measures to enhance the Alliance’s contribution in this 
area.”8 In 1994 the alliance endorsed the concept of the Combined Joint 
Task Forces (CJTF) for the purpose of facilitating contingency operations, 
with the possibility that non-alliance members would participate in the op-
erations. Similarly, the strengthening of the alliance’s European pillar 
moved forward in 1994 when support was given to the emerging European 
Security and Defence Identity. In addition, the westernisation of militaries 
in the non-NATO (eastern) Europe and the former Soviet republics was 
promulgated under the programme of Partnership for Peace (PfP).9  
 
By the mid 1990s, then, the Atlantic Alliance was well on its way to adjust-
ing to the end of the Cold War and the ‘emergence’ of the post-Cold War 
era security situation in general political terms. The military alliance of the 
                                               
7
 NATO’s Strategic Concept (1991) (also quotes). 
8
 NATO (1992a); NATO (1992b) (also quote). 
9
 NATO – The Brussels Summit Declaration (1994). Already in 1991 NATO invited its 
former adversaries to participate in consultations and cooperation within the framework 
of North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NACC. See NATO – The Rome Declaration 
(1991). 
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bipolar confrontational world was transforming into a versatile security ac-
tor that intended to shape the future nature of the international system by 
cooperative means – rather than relying solely on deterrence and defence. 
The military elements for deterring adversaries and defending alliance terri-
tory were left intact in the post-Cold War process of adjusting to the ‘new’ 
international security reality, but the ‘new’ tasks of the alliance – crisis 
management and the westernisation of the societies and militaries of former 
adversaries10 – came markedly to the fore. As was explained in 1996: 
 
Today, we have taken decisions to carry further the ongoing adaptation of 
Alliance structures so that the Alliance can more efficiently carry out full 
range of its missions. … The new NATO has become an integral part of 
the emerging, broadly based, cooperative European security structure…. 
We have… reconfigured our forces to make them better able to carry out 
the new missions of crisis management, while preserving the capability for 
collective defence.11 
 
The cooperative approach to security policy within NATO was strength-
ened with the consolidation of the Mediterranean dialogue, the establish-
ment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the beginning of acces-
sion talks with three new member-candidates – all taking place in 1997. 
The rationale for these ‘new’ political arrangements came from the process 
of adapting the Alliance to the significantly changed post-Cold War world 
– taking into account that the process of ‘defining’ the post-Cold War era 
was still in the making as ‘new’ security threats were still emerging, many 
of them in rather vague form. The traditional, but very unlikely, mission of 
territorial defence provided relatively clear goals for the maintenance and 
development of alliance capabilities and policies. The requirements related 
to the “new missions of crisis management”12 were more indeterminate as 
the nature of potential missions varied considerably. In addition, as the des-
ignation of “new missions” reveal, there was hardly any organisational or 
decision-making routine related to the processes of deciding when and how 
to commit the alliance to these missions and how to prosecute the mission 
once the decision has been made.13 The concept of the CJTF, which was 
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 See e.g. NATO Press Release (1997b), paragraph 3. 
11
 NATO Press Communiqué (1996) (my italics).  
12
 See e.g. ibid. 
13
  See e.g. NATO Press Communiqué (1996), paragraph 7. The document states that 
the Alliance will develop its procedures in order to “undertake new roles in changing 
circumstances, based on … the ability to mount non-Article 5 operations”. These new 
operations are depicted in the document as a variety of missions that “may differ from 
one another in contributions by Allies”. The political decision-making related to these 
operations is declared to be made “on a case-by-case basis”. 
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promulgated in 1994, was one attempt to come to terms with the practical 
implementation of crisis management missions.14 
 
Throughout the 1990s those security challenges, risks, and threats that were 
not directly associated with the traditional NATO mission of collective de-
fence or the “new missions of crisis management” were the most indeter-
minate in nature. This was so in terms of the assessed severity of the differ-
ent challenges, risks, and threats, as well as the proposed countermeasures 
to be taken in preparing to decrease the probability of their occurrence or to 
limit the damage caused by them. The 1991 Strategic Concept notion of 
multi-faceted and multi-directional “security risks and challenges” – the 
military might of the Soviet Union, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, the disruption of the flow of vital resources, and actions of ter-
rorism and sabotage – turned into “threat[s] to international security”, 
“threat[s] to the conduct of normal international relations”, or “threats of 
wider nature” caused by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and their delivery means, international terrorism, and illegal arms trade.15 
There was thus a gradual move from challenges and risks – something that 
may pose future threats – toward threats – something threatening NATO 
members now.  
 
Following the gradual move from challenges and risks toward threats fac-
ing NATO members – and more generally taking into account the evalu-
ated nature of the international security situation in the late 1990s and the 
proposed missions and tasks of the Alliance – the Strategic Concept was 
rewritten again in the late 1990s and was accepted at the April 1999 Wash-
ington summit. After all, it was only some two months after the adoption of 
the 1991 Strategic Concept that the Soviet Union had dissolved. The 1999 
Strategic Concept moved away from the 1991 framing of strategic balance 
with the Soviet Union and a possible – though remotely so – general war in 
Europe towards regional threats, terrorism, sabotage, organised crime, eth-
nic and religious rivalries, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. 
Russia – a former enemy in the form of the Soviet Union – was named only 
in the context of “Partnership, Cooperation and Dialogue”, not “Security 
challenges and risks” as had been the case in the early 1990s. While the 
defense of allied territory was mentioned as the bedrock purpose of NATO, 
the global context had to be – according to the 1999 strategic concept – 
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 NATO Press Release (1997b), paragraph 17. It is noteworthy that by the late 1990s 
however, the concept of CJTF had not developed into a significant tool of crisis man-
agement.  
15
 NATO’s Strategic Concept (1991), paragraphs 7-14; NATO – The Brussels Summit 
Declaration (1994), paragraphs 17, 19; NATO Press Release (1997b), paragraph 25. 
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taken into account, for example in the form of non-article 5 crisis response 
operations outside the alliance territory.16  
 
The shift in the rules of using military force within the framework of 
NATO during the eight years following the end of the Cold War – from the 
1991 Strategic Concept to the 1999 Strategic Concept – is indicative of the 
changing post-Cold War era conceptualisations related to threats and the 
nature of war. According to the 1991 Strategic Concept: 
 
The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever 
be used except in self-defence.17 
 
When the next Strategic Concept was embraced in April 1999, the alliance 
was in a middle of an ongoing war in Kosovo, a war not of self-defence, 
but a war related to a 
 
fundamental challenge to the values of democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law, for which NATO has stood since its foundation. … NATO’s 
military action against the FRY supports the political aims of the interna-
tional community: a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo in 
which all its people can live in security and enjoy universal human rights 
and freedoms on an equal basis.18 
 
The broadening of NATO’s agenda, in geographical area and by the variety 
of military tasks assigned to the alliance, has not taken place in an atmos-
phere of pure optimism among the member states. Suggestions of a tech-
nology gap between the United States and its military allies, especially in 
Europe, were heard in the 1990s. According to the proponents of the gap 
thesis, the Gulf War was indicative of the huge differences in the possibili-
ties to wage expeditionary war across the Atlantic. Other experiences in 
Europe during the 1990s – Bosnia and Kosovo – highlighted the uneven 
capabilities of conducting military operations within NATO. The gap thesis 
gained currency simultaneously with the adoption of the RMA into official 
US defence strategy, from 1997 onwards. Since the apparent emergence 
and widening of the gap coincided with the transformation of US Armed 
Forces by exploiting the RMA, transferring RMA-related thinking into the 
framework of NATO was conceptualised – in the US defense establishment 
– as one possibility to guarantee future military cooperation – albeit under 
rules imposed by the US. An example of the ‘pressure’ for RMA-related 
thinking within NATO can be located in speech Secretary of Defense Wil-
liam Cohen gave before the Munich Conference on Security Policy in Feb-
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 NATO’s Strategic Concept (1999), also quotes. See also NATO’s Strategic Concept 
(1991); NATO Handbook (2001), pp. 42-47. 
17
 NATO’s Strategic Concept (1991), paragraph 34 (my italics). 
18
 NATO Press Release (1999c). 
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ruary 1998. Secretary Cohen addressed the problem related to the concept 
of interoperability:  
 
Each Alliance member must provide sufficient resources to sustain its own 
national forces, both for ‘Article 5’ requirements and for other more likely 
missions. This is especially important as we enlarge the Alliance. Allies 
need to be able to protect their forces against the effects from weapons of 
mass destruction. And we must all embrace the Revolution in Military Af-
fairs, which will transform the character of our forces and how they fight 
through the application of information technology and other advances. … 
Ultimately, we risk diminishing our collective effectiveness as Allies un-
willing to commit sufficient resources become less interoperable with 
those who make the necessary investment in modern war-fighting tech-
nologies. It is not just a matter of incompatible equipment, but, over time, 
incompatible doctrine.19 
 
On general terms, this statement echoes the American Cold War era and 
especially post-Cold War era calls for burden sharing on the part of the 
European allies. In addition, the foundation of any military alliance is that 
military forces – including their equipment, doctrine, and training – are ca-
pable of combined action. In other words, national forces within a military 
alliance must be interoperable. Besides the logic related to the effective 
functioning of any military alliance, the above statement can be construed 
as one of several attempts to export the American RMA to its allied part-
ners, especially in Europe:  
 
For roughly ten years, NATO has engaged in a perennial debate over bur-
den sharing and the need for European members to acquire high tech mili-
tary equipment. The new formulations affecting the most recent debate are 
the Revolution in Military Affairs and information warfare.20 
 
The above-mentioned US strategy to export the RMA has been cast in a 
way that takes technologically defined conceptualisations of military power 
for granted. Within this strategy, the path chosen by the US is conceptual-
ised to be both natural and logical, and those not willing to take the same 
path will become militarily obsolete within a short time. From this US-
espoused perspective, exploiting the RMA is a universal way for states to 
modernise and transform their militaries in the post-Cold War era. 
 
At the heart of the emerging technology gap between the United States and 
its European NATO allies – it has been argued – has been the US policy of 
devising new high-tech military systems. This policy began during the Cold 
War. This technologically centred focus picked up speed during the post-
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 Cohen (1998a) (my italics). 
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 British American Security Information Council (1999). 
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Cold War era development of new information technology and the chosen 
security strategy of backing US interests worldwide with military force by 
developing power projection capabilities. According to an American esti-
mate, the respective European response to the new security environment 
has been less visionary, and according to some analysts, more driven by 
inertia and domestic political issues than security considerations. From the 
American perspective as expressed in the late 1990s, the technology gap 
could turn into a rift or a gulf. This would mean that the lack of concrete 
European action in participating or harnessing RMA within NATO would 
turn US interests away from Europe. It could also cause US to accelerate 
the unilaterally defined transformation of its armed forces and result in 
Revolution in Military Affairs becoming solely an American feature. Thus, 
the meaning and ‘content’ of the RMA would be completely defined in the 
United States. The exploitation of such an RMA could be an insurmount-
able task for the Europeans.21 
 
In addition to the rather ‘visible’ symptoms of the emerging gap during the 
1991 Gulf War and the air campaign over Bosnia in 1995, the peacekeep-
ing operation in Bosnia did signal the existence of a technology gap be-
tween US Armed Forces and its European counterparts, although the nature 
of the operation – peacekeeping or crisis management instead of high in-
tensity warfare – and the sectoral structuring of troops in Bosnia (into US, 
British and French sectors) did not bring the wideness of the gap to the 
fore, at least according to the American RMA proponents.22 According to 
US Secretary of Defense William Cohen: 
 
But for Bosnia-like operations in the future, NATO, and particularly the 
European members of NATO, must have the ability to project their forces. 
…If Bosnia reveals the face of future missions, it also reveals the difficul-
ties that can result when you have a great disparity between coalition ca-
pabilities.23 
 
Concerns for the divergent developments in the military field across the 
Atlantic were also raised in Europe. The then UK Defence Secretary – later 
to become NATO Secretary General – George Robertson expressed his ap-
prehension that the NATO might turn into a two-speed alliance as the 
Europeans seemed unwilling to keep up with the Revolution in Military 
Affairs.24 In a similar vein, the Chairman of the Military Committee, Gen-
eral Klaus Naumann, expressed publicly his concern for the unbalanced 
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 Gompert and Kugler and Libicki (1999), especially ch. 1.  
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 On RMA lessons learned from Bosnia, see Gompert and Kugler and Libicki (1999), 
ch. 1. 
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 ”Can Europe Keep Up with the Revolution in Military Affairs? Defence Secretary 
George Robertson on the Danger of a Two-speed Alliance” (1999), p. 49. 
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exploitation of the RMA by member states, creating interoperability prob-
lems and a capabilities gap. He thus articulated the military’s vision of the 
need to exploit the RMA within other member states of NATO. In his opin-
ion “the growing gap of capabilities which we see inside NATO … will 
lead to an interoperability problem within NATO over time and could mean 
that the military will be unable to catch the train called Revolution in Mili-
tary Affairs which is about to leave the station.” Naumann goes on to say 
that military capabilities of the European nations and Canada must be im-
proved.25 
 
Naumann later made the case for implementing the RMA within NATO: 
 
One key area of modernisation, which would be ripe for implementation 
decisions at the Prague Summit, is that of command, communications and 
computing, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). 
This is the skeleton or grid around which all other capabilities necessary 
to implement the revolution in military affairs could be built. … Decisions 
taken along these lines at Prague, compiled in a programme to improve 
European defence capabilities, would be important steps, which are feasi-
ble and affordable, towards modernising capabilities and the implementa-
tion of the revolution in military affairs.26 
 
In addition to the understanding that a technological gap exists between the 
US and Europe, the 1999 war in Kosovo provided once more the familiar 
lesson concerning technology. Although not shared as widely as the tech-
nology gap thesis, this second lesson concerned a more general theme of 
the nature of modern warfare and the role that technology plays in it. It has 
been argued that Kosovo showed that technology would be a key to success 
in future war.27 Furthermore, it was proposed – by US Deputy Under Secre-
tary of Defence Joseph Eash – that: 
 
[W]e all [NATO] need to embrace the revolution in military affairs.28 
 
Thus not only was technology decisive in determining outcomes in warfare 
for the future militaries, but the development of NATO concepts of opera-
tions, force structures, and particularly military materiel should have pro-
ceeded by following the path that US Department of Defense and US 
Armed Forces had taken. 
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Although the RMA is a rarely used concept in official NATO documents, it 
has been referred to in connection with the efforts to increase interoperabil-
ity within the alliance. As a NATO press release explained in 2002, high-
technology military systems constitute the Revolution in Military Affairs.  
The development of these modern systems – and the promotion of RMA – 
demands added cooperation between member states concerning standardi-
sation, with the goal of developing interoperable forces: 
 
NATO nations have commenced a formal ratification process of a major 
agreement in the area of UAV [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle] interoperabil-
ity. In the current drive to enhance Alliance defence capabilities, UAV 
technology is at the cutting edge of the Revolution in Military Affairs, as 
clearly demonstrated by military operations, notable in Afganistan [begin-
ning in 2001], and earlier in the Gulf.29 
 
Furthermore, it has been argued that what on the surface seems to be a gap 
in military technology – the driving force of the RMA – is more impor-
tantly a gap or divergence in security strategy between the United States 
and Europe. While the US had already prepared during the old War to de-
ploy large amounts of troops – especially to Europe – in a short timeframe, 
the Europeans prepared for a war on their own soil. The two world wars of 
the 20th century and the subsequent preparations for the third large-scale 
conventional confrontation during the Cold War pushed European thinking 
toward a definition of war as the defence of borders and territory rather 
than expeditionary operations – with the partial exception of Great Britain 
and France. The US exigencies of global area of operations and expedition-
ary warfare operated as strategic level motifs for excelling in the offensive 
use of military force and thus for developing the Revolution in Military Af-
fairs. As the authors of Mind the Gap explain, the “RMA thus has a distinct 
and crucial strategic purpose for the Americans, motivated by U.S. interests 
and shaped by U.S. politics.” It is the nature of global interests and security 
responsibilities that actually demand an American RMA.30 
  
It is noteworthy that the American criticisms of the reluctance or inability 
of Europeans political structures to transform the European militaries and 
support the RMA have also acknowledged that their own highly visionary 
and optimistic conceptualisations of transforming the US Armed Forces 
through the RMA have not been realised to full extent due to domestic po-
litical, bureaucratic, and budgetary reasons. According to the American es-
timates, the slow process of transforming the European militaries is the re-
sult of the absence of a vision or a strategy to operate militarily on a global 
scale. Similarly, cuts in defence expenditures in the post-Cold War era 
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‘new’ international security environment have been cited as reasons for the 
slow and modest European military transformation efforts. According to 
one American estimate, the United States “is moving not only at a different 
velocity but also in a different direction, with different priorities, based on 
a different philosophy than its [European] allies in modernizing its forces to 
exploit new technology.”31 
 
Such statements are partly influenced by political motives in the US to di-
rect the European strategic-military thinking towards US conceptualisations 
of war and military power. In addition, genuine concern has been expressed 
in the United States over the mismatch between European ‘lip service’ and 
concrete actions to bolster efficient warfighting and crisis management ca-
pabilities. From the US perspective, the inability or unwillingness of 
Europe to commit itself to harnessing the RMA will hinder possible future 
combined military operations, at least at the ‘high end’ of the conflict spec-
trum. While the capabilities that are needed for these multinational opera-
tions are based on new high technology, novel concepts of operations, in-
novative operating procedures, and new ways of organising forces (ele-
ments of RMA), the obstacles to creating a European RMA or an RMA 
within NATO are seen to be at the level of security policy or strategy. Only 
after a new vision of European military capabilities and their usage 
emerges – if ever – would it be possible to start focusing on the technologi-
cal and industrial deficiencies of Europe vis-à-vis the United States in a 
way that might lead to a European RMA. Until Europe is willing to use 
force in a wider fashion than the Petersberg Tasks require (the European 
conceptualisation of war can quite convincingly be defined as crisis man-
agement), attempts to overcome the asymmetries in the level of develop-
ment of information technology and the competitiveness of defence-
industrial-technological markets will not succeed.32 
 
Related to the RMA discussion within NATO, the question of increased 
interoperability beyond technological matters has surfaced on the agenda. 
The need for conceptual, organisational, doctrinal, and even cultural inter-
operability has been emphasised in view of need for confluence in practical 
policy outcomes – especially in Bosnia and Kosovo – and the development 
of the RMA thesis, particularly in the opinion of the United States defence 
establishment.33 While the discussion of interoperability and the technology 
gap between the United States and the rest of NATO members was 
launched in the aftermath of the Gulf War with a technological emphasis, 
the realisation set in during the late 1990s that in order to fix the gap and to 
advance possibilities for technical interoperability, a ‘new’ shared frame-
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work for military operations would be necessary. The idea of a technology 
gap has thus metamorphosed into that of a capabilities gap, reflecting an 
expansion of the focus from ‘purely’ technological factors to include or-
ganisations, concepts, and doctrine.34  
 
The above-mentioned shift – from a technology gap to a capabilities gap – 
has been broadened further within NATO to include a military transforma-
tion gap between the United States and other member countries.35 With the 
founding of NATO Concept Development and Experimentation Center in 
Norfolk in the year 2000 and the center’s close collaboration with US Joint 
Forces Command – in charge of US force transformation by exploiting the 
RMA – the notion of a transformation gap approaches that of an RMA gap 
between the US and its allies. 
 
 
8.1.2. The Defence Capabilities Initiative 
 
In addition to the new Strategic Concept, the Defence Capabilities Initiative 
(DCI) was one of the most significant developments within NATO at the 
1999 Washington summit. The initiative had been developed since 1998, 
primarily as a project to narrow the gap in military technology between the 
US and the other NATO members. Subsequently, the framework of DCI 
has broadened in scope to cover doctrinal and organisational elements.  
From this perspective, DCI went further than the long-standing NATO 
Standardization Program and can be conceived of as an attempt to respond 
to the American RMA within NATO.36  
 
During the time that DCI was officially launched, the war in Kosovo – Op-
eration Allied Force – was underway.  The Kosovo situation highlighted 
the limited air power capabilities of a vast majority of NATO allies in 
terms of precision engagement as well as intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance. Although the European allies possessed formidable num-
bers of troops and equipment, contributions of fighting troops or other as-
sets to Operation Allied Force were very limited.37 In addition to highlight-
ing the inferior capabilities of US allies in the war in Kosovo, the need to 
improve planning for non-article 5 operations, ameliorated command and 
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control policy and procedures, and political-military interfaces within 
NATO were among the lessons learned in the US Department of Defense.38 
 
The launching of the DCI can be understood as an effort to commit the 
European allies of NATO to develop their capabilities in accordance with 
the lessons learned from the Gulf War and Bosnia – and actualised by the 
war in Kosovo.39 DCI was an attempt to move NATO into the 21st century 
– although from the start it was obvious that the Initiative would not result 
in national or European-wide procurement and military transformation 
processes that would match the American RMA.40 The genesis of DCI can 
be located at the June 1998 NATO Ministers of Defense meeting, where 
US Secretary of Defence William Cohen addressed the need to have a 
shared vision of the Alliance’s future and only then consider force mod-
ernisation based on this accepted vision. Cohen brought forward three fu-
ture challenges: new missions, technological change, as well as biological, 
chemical and missile threats. In response to these challenge Cohen pre-
sented several elements that he categorised under two headings: “Interop-
erability or Force Compatibility Initiatives” and “Conceptual Guidance Ini-
tiatives”. The two sets of initiatives suggested that forces should be capable 
of operating efficiently together in multinational operations. The intellec-
tual roots of Cohen’s initiatives seems to lie in the US experiences of in-
creased jointness during and after the Gulf War – and especially during the 
latter part of the 1990s. These roots were familiar with the RMA discourse 
in the US during the 1990s. As Cohen’s formulation concerning one re-
sponse to new challenges – adaptation of NATO doctrine and operational 
concepts – shows, the future of NATO he visioned was not very far from 
the exigencies of the RMA: 
 
If we are to truly take advantage of the opportunities offered by advances 
in technology for meeting future threats, we will also have to change the 
way we organize and operate our forces. This will require adapting our 
doctrine and operational concepts. In the U.S., each of our Services has 
been experimenting with new operational concepts and organizational 
structures. … I recently designated the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. 
Atlantic Command as the Executive Agent for joint concept development 
and joint experimentation.41 
 
Later, in a conference of NATO’s transformation in November 1998, 
Cohen continued with the same line of argument in launching the Defence 
Capabilities Initiative: 
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But because we are modernizing and restructuring at different rates and 
with differing national visions, we are not as effective as we need to be as 
an alliance. … We must craft our common operational vision to include 
four core capabilities: Mobility, Effective Management, Survivability and 
Sustainability.42 
 
The 1999 agreed upon formulation of DCI contained five issue areas for 
improving interoperability between the member states’ armed forces: de-
ployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, survivability, effective 
engagement capability, and command, control and information systems. 
Technology was central in all issues touched upon by the DCI. But as the 
Heads of State and Government agreed in Washington, within the frame-
work of Defence Capabilities Initiative:  
 
[I]ncreased attention must be paid to human factors (such as common ap-
proaches to doctrine, training and operational procedures) and standardisa-
tion, as well as to the challenges posed by the accelerating pace of techno-
logical change and different speeds a which Allies introduce advanced ca-
pabilities. … The initiative… considers issues such as training, doctrine, 
human factors, concept development and experimentation, and standardi-
sation.43 
 
While the 1999 Strategic Concept defined the alliance’s view of the con-
temporary security environment and provided guidelines for the alliance 
and member states, the DCI operationalised these strategic level require-
ments into concrete issue areas so that member states – especially in 
Europe – could focus the modernisation and transformation processes of 
their armed forces on the basis of the 58 action items of the Initiative. In-
creasing European interoperability with US armed Forces – in the form of 
similar equipment, doctrine, operating procedures, and training – character-
ised the thinking behind the DCI.  
 
During the launching and the beginning of the implementation phase of the 
DCI at least two general processes apparently supported the initiative. One 
of these was the American-defined Revolution in Military Affairs that was 
allegedly changing the nature of western war. When the DCI was accepted, 
the RMA thinking had been evolving in the US for a decade. It had also 
been accepted as a guiding principle for the transformation of the US 
Armed Forces. The lack of an RMA policy in Europe was the root cause of 
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the widening capabilities gap between the US and its NATO allies. Second, 
the lessons of Kosovo – drawn during the war and immediately thereafter – 
supported the process of developing the US allies’ military capabilities 
through DCI. These lessons were linked to those of the preceding wars of 
the 1990s – especially in the Gulf (1991), over Bosnia (1995) and in Iraq 
(1998). The most articulate proponents of the lessons of Kosovo were the 
Americans, particularly Secretary of Defence William Cohen.  
 
We have what we call a Revolution in Military Affairs. … You’re seeing 
just a part of that take place over Kosovo today.44 
 
I’d like to say than like Bosnia, before Kosovo, we also had a reminder 
that NATO’s transformation from a force to repel an armor-heavy inva-
sion to one that could mount a more flexible and mobile defense is still in-
complete. … And because we were the only country with precision-
guided munitions that can operate in all weather, heavy cloud cover in the 
initial stages of this campaign made it almost an exclusively American op-
eration. … the technological gap between the United States and the other 
NATO Allies [--] will continue to grow. … this campaign reminds all of 
us that the revolution of military affairs is fundamentally changing the 
way in which we fight. In Operation Desert Storm … there were only a 
handful of sophisticated aircraft that could carry precision-guided muni-
tions … In Kosovo, nearly all of our [US] fighters could deliver these dev-
astating weapons.45 
 
This [Kosovo] is an incredible display of air power that we, again, should 
be very, very proud of. … this is not a unique capability. It has, in fact, 
been carried out before. We carried it out in Desert Fox.46 
 
The DCI fitted ‘easily’ within the western discourse of the emerging and 
widening technology/capabilities gap and the American discourse of the 
RMA. According to the general western understanding, it was the vigorous 
and early American espousal of the RMA – combined with the military 
edge inherited from the Cold War and the global strategic focus of the US – 
that had caused to gap to appear and continue to widen. The DCI was thus 
a response to the deteriorating interoperability situation within NATO. In 
order to improve those military capabilities that were conceptualised to be 
important and necessary in the post-Cold War era wars and crisis manage-
ment operations, US allies committed themselves to the Defence Capabili-
ties Initiative. The DCI also had an additional dimension. Not only was it 
intended to contribute to the amelioration of European and Canadian mili-
tary capabilities, but its successful implementation would also have sig-
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nalled the commitment of US allies to truly espouse the RMA.47 Within a 
year following the signing of the DCI, the American disappointment con-
cerning the slow process of implementing the RMA-related DCI was ex-
pressed.48 
 
Since the US Department of Defense had already espoused the Revolution 
in Military Affairs in its operational concept development, equipment ac-
quisition, and organisations, DCI can be seen as an ‘export venture’. The 
US objective was that the American RMA – or at least thinking about war 
and military power ‘beneath’ the concept RMA – would be transferred to 
the NATO framework.49 As the US A National Security Strategy of a 
Global Age – published in 2000 – mentioned: 
 
At the same time we push technological frontiers and transform our mili-
tary, we also must address future interoperability with multinational part-
ners. … We must encourage our more technically advanced friends and 
allies to build the capabilities that are particularly important for interop-
erability. … A Multilateral program has also been developed. NATO’s 
Defence Capabilities Initiative now includes both a NATO-centered and 
nation-centered concept development and experimentation program, 
which Joint Forces Command complements with a joint experimentation 
program to include allies, coalition partners and friends.50 
 
Whether or not DCI’s action items would be realised in its implementation 
phase, the acceptance of a new Strategic Concept and even more so the 
launching of DCI within NATO affected the thinking concerning the role 
of military power in the new security environment at the turn of the cen-
tury. Going officially out-of-area, espousing a global perspective on peace 
support operations, and defining new probabilities for war within the in-
ternational system, the Strategic Concept consolidated the unofficial les-
sons learned during the 1990s concerning humanitarian interventions and 
‘new wars’. Similarly, the DCI consolidated the American lead in defining 
the way that armed forces should wage war in the technological, but also 
doctrinal dimension. As the only superpower, the United States was ad-
vancing with utmost speed in order to procure new information-based sys-
tems. It also possessed the greatest capacity to be militarily engaged in 
global affairs. The Armed Forces of the United States were the obvious 
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yardstick against which others could compare the state of their military de-
velopment.51 
 
By the turn of the century, then, there seemed to be a convergence of un-
derstandings within NATO that the Cold War era ‘lenses’ for conceptualis-
ing war and military power were becoming more and more obsolete. New 
capabilities were needed to facilitate engagement in new wars. The war 
over Kosovo gave the final or ‘decisive’ impetus to the process of focusing 
on interoperable military capabilities through a shared framework that was 
leaning heavily to the American developed concept of RMA. Many of the 
lessons learned from the other wars and interventions of the 1990s fitted 
rather unproblematically into this framework: it was clear in retrospect that 
the Gulf War, Haiti, Bosnia, and Iraq (Desert Fox 1998) had witnessed the 
emergence and progressive maturation of the RMA discourse and the RMA 
capabilities in actual use. The experiences of Kosovo also had a decisive 
impact on the European Union’s developing defence dimension – a theme 
dealt with in Chapter 8.2. The lessons Europe learned from the wars and 
interventions of the post-Cold War era combined with an explicit and inten-
tional attempt to ‘export’ the American RMA and related thinking to 
Europe and even globally. As additional factor one might mention the po-
tentially profitable ‘new’ opportunities for American defence contractors in 
Europe, should other NATO members ‘accept’ the RMA as a foundation 
upon which to build future forces and capabilities. The importance of this 
market potential was codified in the American Defense Trade Security Ini-
tiative, launched in 2000, which was sought to increase Alliance interop-
erability and to facilitate the transfer of critical American defence equip-
ment to US allies.52 
 
 
8.1.3. 9/11 and the Transformation of NATO 
 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 caused a quick NATO response: within 24 
hours of the attacks, the Alliance invoked article 5 of the Washington treaty 
– declaring that the attacks against the United States were attacks against 
all the 19 member states53. Subsequently, terrorism and the connected 
threats related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the 
existence and emergence of failed states within the international system 
became the defining threats and risks in NATO assessments. With the ad-
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vent of these new threats, which created a new post-9/11 security environ-
ment, the logic of recreating NATO became more compelling.  
 
Terrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
and their means of delivery currently pose key threats and challenges to 
Alliance and international security.54 
 
In a strategic environment that is marked by terrorism, failed states and 
proliferation, projecting stability is a precondition for ensuring our secu-
rity. If we do not tackle the problems where they emerge, they will end on 
our doorstep. … NATO is finally turning into a framework for transatlan-
tic action wherever our security interests demand it. This is a sea change 
in the way we think about – and employ – this Alliance.55 
 
One of the raging debates within the Alliance throughout the 1990s – the 
one concerning the out-of-area operations – became much calmer when the 
post-9/11 ‘reality’ showed the dangerousness and the novelty of the threats 
of terrorism, WMDs, and failed states. While NATO had been engaged in 
out-of-area operations in Bosnia and Kosovo during the 1990s, engagement 
beyond the continent of Europe was facilitated by the strategic imperative 
of countering terrorism in a globalised world. As threats and risks had be-
come global in nature, the locus of the ‘logical’ response shifted beyond a 
geographically defined regional approach to security.56 This new perspec-
tive of international security and NATO’s role in the world facilitated the 
reinterpretation of the military capabilities required by the alliance and of 
the schedule for acquiring lacking capabilities. While this reinterpretation 
was deemed necessary already before the attacks of 9/11, the impetus pro-
vided by them is clearly visible.57 This momentum for change within 
NATO has been expressed most explicitly through the process of trans-
forming NATO. 
 
When the explicit reinterpretation of the international strategic environment 
and the role of NATO in it were called for in the aftermath of the 9/11, 
NATO was able to take two ongoing American discourses into account in 
moulding its own perspective upon the post-9/11 world. One was the ex-
ploitation of RMA for transforming the US military establishment. This 
project had been embraced for several years within the US. In addition, the 
US had pressed for a more intensive RMA exploitation strategy within 
NATO – appealing to the lessons of the Gulf War, Bosnia, and Kosovo. 
The second project – still in a very formative phase – was the War on Ter-
ror declared by George W. Bush. This project was maturing and advancing 
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rapidly, as President Bush was underlining almost daily the new nature of 
war in the 21st century and preparing the American public for it – first in 
Afghanistan and after its proclaimed successful completion in Iraq. The 
rapid and determined response of the George W. Bush administration in 
declaring the War on Terror was affected by the fact that the destructive 
attacks took place on US soil. This was conceptualised in the light of the 
Japanese attack in Pearl Harbor and the fact that the territory of the United 
States had become a battlefield.58 
 
The combined effect of the American declaration of the War on Terror and 
the NATO invocation of article 5 of the Washington treaty placed some of 
the American allies in an awkward position. As promulgated by George W. 
Bush, the declared War on Terror would last indefinitely and those who 
were not on the American side would be against it. This meant, in political 
terms, that showing solidarity and support for the US administration in its 
efforts to undermine future terrorist capabilities, would be tantamount to a 
commitment to wage war against terrorists. Some of the member states of 
the Alliance were categorically unwilling to commit military troops to the 
War on Terror as defined by the US. The secondary role of NATO in the 
Afghanistan campaign did not totally erase the logical connection that the 
NATO members made between that campaign and the American-led mili-
tarised response to terrorism. At any rate, once that it had been declared, 
the American global War on Terror became something that all NATO 
members had to adapt to. While the American approach to global terrorism 
was couched in terms of a ‘war’ – despite its multidimensional character as 
a political, economic, military and diplomatic undertaking – Europe has 
characterised it more as a ‘fight’, ‘campaign’, or ‘struggle’. The Secretary 
General of NATO was able to characterise the undertaking as a War on 
Terror. Speaking at the North Atlantic Council meeting at the end of 2001, 
the Secretary General, however, accentuated the political and economic 
aspect of this war: 
 
NATO is one player in the war against terrorism. It is a multi-faceted war 
which involves legal and political and economic aspects as well and they 
have achieved much less attention than the military ones in recent 
months.59 
 
When the initial military responses to 9/11 were formulated and being im-
plemented in the attack against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan begin-
ning on 7 October 2001, the Bush administration had received wide-
ranging political support and expressions of solidarity throughout the 
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world. Within and without NATO, many states60 were willing to send mili-
tary forces to the war in Afghanistan – a war of self-defence according to a 
UN Security Council resolution.61 Based on the Bush administration’s deci-
sion to allow for maximum freedom to maneuvre and to avoid the Kosovo-
war type of ‘war by committee’, NATO as a transatlantic military alliance 
did not participate in the war against the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, but 
individual NATO member-states offered to commit troops to the opera-
tions. Taking into consideration the lessons of the Kosovo war – highlight-
ing the capability gap between the US and the rest of NATO members, and 
the difficulties the United States had in waging war with the associated po-
litical bargaining concerning targeting and operational matters – and the 
obviously limited role of NATO in Afghanistan, the possibility that NATO 
would be derailed as the post-9/11 western security framework was seen as 
a threat to the future significance of the Alliance.  
 
The American pressure to export the RMA framework to NATO was noted 
above. With the 9/11 attacks, this pressure broadened to include the impor-
tance of transforming NATO. NATO in 2001 was still very much like the 
NATO of the Cold War. Lacking clear strategic imperatives during the 
1990s, the reorientation of the alliance, on the bases of a consensus was a 
slow-moving process. In the US, however, the Cold War era strategic im-
perative of the massive Soviet threat shifted during the early 1990s into a 
wish to prepare militarily to meet new, much less clearly defined risks and 
threats. This was conceptualised to be possible first by exploiting the RMA, 
and later by exploiting it in order to transform the military. Thus, when the 
attacks of 9/11 took place, the transformation of the US Armed Forces was 
already a central part of defence policy. In line with the ‘transformation 
through RMA’ framework, President George W. Bush emphasised the 
post-9/11 need for NATO transformation and the acquisition of new capa-
bilities to match the American military transformation. During his meetings 
in Europe in May 2002, he stated that: 
 
[W]e need to work within NATO to make sure that NATO has got the ca-
pacities to - - to better use capabilities, define capabilities and strategies 
… We’re transforming our [US] military or trying to transform our mili-
tary rapidly. … And NATO must transform as well in order to meet the 
true threats. … I’m optimistic about NATO changing.62 
 
The commitment to transform NATO was officially launched during the 
Prague summit, 21-22 November 2002. This process was necessitated not 
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only by the surfacing and widening of the capabilities gap within members 
of the alliance. In addition the decision to enlarge the alliance by inviting 
seven new members to begin accession talks and the emergence of ‘new’ 
threats in the form of international terrorism fuelled the perceived need for 
transformation. Despite the confluence of political, military, and techno-
logical reasons for transforming NATO, the ability to field allied forces 
“quickly to wherever they are needed” has been at the core of transforma-
tion. Three ‘pillars’ to support the transformation of NATO were erected in 
Prague. First, the creation of a NATO Response Force (NRF) – introduced 
by US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld in September 2002 – to be 
the technologically superior, rapidly deployable joint force of the alliance. 
Second, NATO’s military command structure arrangements were to be 
streamlined. This included the establishment of a strategic command for 
transformation that would be responsible for transforming military capa-
bilities and increasing interoperability between member states. Third, the 
Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) was approved in order to improve 
the alliance’s military capabilities by committing individual members to 
develop and acquire military capabilities that corresponded to the nature of 
modern – post-Cold War – warfare.63 
 
Even before it committed itself officially to alliance-wide transformation, 
NATO established a Concept Development and Experimentation (CDE) 
centre to operate as a “change agent” concerning futuristic concepts in the 
field of military materiel, doctrine, organisation, and training.64 The CDE 
process is a procedure for advancing the alliance’s capabilities and to pro-
mote interoperability by developing concepts and experimenting with them. 
Most of the projects with the CDE process focus on technological interop-
erability, and they reflect a lack of alliance-wide transformation strategy. 
As Echevarria noted, the projects developed within the CDE process are 
“enabling concepts” instead of “umbrella concepts” and thus “represent 
only individual components of an overall approach to information-age war-
fare that resembles NCW [Network Centric Warfare].”65 
 
In June 2003, Allied Command Transformation (ACT) was established in 
order to oversee the transformation of NATO’s military capabilities – in 
tandem with the US Joint Forces Command. The task of ACT was de-
scribed to be one of enhancing training, developing doctrines, assessing 
new concepts, improving interoperability, and improving capabilities. Situ-
ated in Norfolk, Virginia, ACT is operating under a commander who is also 
responsible for the transformation efforts within the US Armed Forces – 
                                               
63
 NATO Press release (2002b). 
64
 NATO CDE newsletter (2001), p. 2. 
65
 Echevarria (2003), pp. 55-58, quotes on p. 58. 
 274
Commander of US Joint Forces Command.66 The explicitly articulated 
NATO conceptualisation of transformation is identical to the corresponding 
US version. According to the lead agent of NATO transformation, trans-
forming NATO means more than “just purchasing new technologies, sys-
tems and platforms. It also means changing our thinking, organisation and 
culture by adopting new structures, improving training methods, adapting 
doctrine and educating leaders.”67 In addition, the process of transformation 
– depicted as a move away from the force that won the Cold War into a 
force that is to be superior in the post Cold War era and, particularly, the 
post-9/11 era – is characterised as “a never-ending process”.68 The com-
monalities with the US DoD formulations concerning transformation are 
clearly visible.69 
 
The ‘nature’ of NATO transformation was highlighted during the 2004 Is-
tanbul summit, where it was agreed – according to the Summit Commu-
niqué – that transformation “must continue” since “NATO must be able to 
field forces that can move quickly to sustain operations over distance and 
time.”70 Similarly, at Istanbul, it was explicitly noted that transforming 
NATO is a continuous process – instead of a single event – of adapting to 
the new strategic realities of the post-9/11 era. Transformation was thus 
defined in terms used by the US Department of Defense, which have high-
lighted the need for a long process of continual transformation for creating 
new advanced capabilities to match the existing and emerging new threats 
of the post-9/11 epoch.71 
 
Thus, the above-mentioned NATO (ACT) approach to transformation is 
practically identical to the one espoused by the US DoD – especially during 
the Bush administration after 9/11. Transformation is the framework-
setting process, heavily influenced by technological change, but must be 
accompanied by new organisational, doctrinal, and training-related innova-
tions. This similarity is hardly surprising, for the commanding officer of the 
ACT is also in charge for developing and implementing transformation 
within the US Armed Forces. In addition, as the events of 9/11 traumatised 
the prevailing western definitions of the international security situation, the 
already existing American conceptualisation of transformation provided a 
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well-established conceptual tool for use in Europe. Without a pre-existing 
conceptual tool that seemed to fit the new security definitions – one that 
had matured and developed for more than a decade – the Allies would have 
found themselves in a time-consuming process of developing the required 
policies from scratch. 
 
In addition to the impulses toward NATO transformation coming from the 
US, the situating of ACT in the physical and cultural location within 
USJFC, the lead agent of US Armed Force’s transformation process pro-
vides one additional piece of evidence for the accumulating western accep-
tance of the American RMA transformation formula for developing mili-
tary power. As a Canadian NATO General from ACT observed in 2004: 
 
The beauty of Allied Command Transformation Headquarters is it’s right 
here in Norfolk where the U.S. equivalent, the U.S.  Transformational 
Headquarters is, and therefore we can gather the best lessons from them.72 
 
In addition to committing NATO to a process of transformation and estab-
lishing an organisational structure for implementing and guiding this trans-
formation, NATO Response Force was approved in the 2002 Prague sum-
mit after being introduced by US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld 
earlier in the same year. According to NATO, NRF will be a “catalyst”, 
“engine”, or “vehicle” for transforming a joint force of approximately 
20,000 soldiers, focusing on those capabilities that are seen to be central in 
light of the new threats and new missions facing the alliance.73  While op-
erating under Allied Command Operations (ACO), the role of Allied 
Command Transformation is essential in developing future capabilities and 
refining the NRF concept.74 
 
The creation of NRF within NATO to operate as a nucleus for larger capa-
bilities transformation reflects the generally accepted condition that the 
post-Cold War era international changes have made many past military ca-
pabilities obsolete. This view was highlighted by NATO Secretary General 
George Robertson in his often-cited ‘mantra’ “Capabilities, capabilities, 
capabilities.” Along similar lines, when advocating the transformation of 
NATO, getting rid of the Cold War era legacy forces, and  developing 
NRF, George Robertson noted that: 
 
[T]he overwhelming part of the 1.4 million soldiers [that Europe and Can-
ada have under arms] are useless for the kind of missions we are mounting 
today.75  
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The concept of NRF espouses the idea of expeditionary capability – the 
possibilities to confront threats and challenges anywhere in the world 
where it is deemed necessary. NRF operationalises a shift from the Cold 
War era forces’ organisation, training, and equipment to deter and defeat 
unambiguous military aggression against a NATO member to a post-Cold 
War era requirement of being able to apply force rapidly, decisively, and 
selectively across the entire spectrum of conflict. This shift is conceptual-
ised as a piecemeal one, beginning with the development of NRF as a sub-
set of the NATO force structure, leading ultimately to the situation where 
NRF encompasses the entire NATO force structure.76 
 
The creation of the US-advocated NRF is thus not only intended to give 
NATO a capability to operate flexibly in out-of-area operations. NRF is 
also a tool in the efforts to transform the alliance. The goals for transforma-
tion are politically defined, and the similarities of NATO transformation 
with that of the US Armed Forces point to the importance of US-defined 
goals regarding the future nature of war and the constitutive elements of 
military power. It is also noteworthy that the effects of NATO transforma-
tion – implemented by Alliance Command Transformation – are not con-
fined to the armed forces of the NATO member states. The transformation 
of NATO is also stimulating innovative thinking in partner countries – es-
pecially within the PfP – and spreading a vision of future warfighting 
across the globe.77  
 
The launching of the NRF can be conceptualised as a further step in the 
process of exporting the American RMA capability and related ideas to 
NATO. The initial phases of this process were witnessed already during the 
late 1990s. After the 1990s’ debate about the emergence and widening of 
the capability gap between the US and Europe, the new security environ-
ment of the post-9/11 era called for a reinvigorated process of augmenting 
European military capabilities. DCI had not (yet) done the trick, and in the 
atmosphere of the need for an urgent redefinition of the international secu-
rity landscape after 9/11, the RMA-based NRF as a “technologically ad-
vanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force”78 offered 
a pre-planned path to new security programmes. NATO’s reliance on this 
existing (mostly) American-based view of transformation was not coinci-
dental, as it was practically the only explicitly articulated and matured vi-
sion of future militaries. In addition this vision was backed up’ with lessons 
learned from multiple wars and military engagements in the post-Cold War 
era. As was explicitly argued by US DoD, “transformation is highly path-
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dependent”79, and creating a ‘new’ NATO transformation process – a di-
vergent one from the already ongoing process of US military transforma-
tion – would simply have had to overcome too much organisational inertia 
and conceptual sedimentation within the US defence establishment, not to 
mention the effects of sunk costs of the US RMA exploitation strategy that 
has been in place from the mid-1990s.  
 
The US advocating of NRF within NATO as a specifically European project 
can be considered as an implicit ultimatum for the adoption of – if even on 
a small scale – path toward the development of a European RMA capabil-
ity. From this perspective it was and is a test case, determining the possi-
bilities and willingness of the Europeans to remain loyal, useful, and inter-
operable partners with the US in applying what are substantially US-
defined rules of western military engagement. Conceptualising the NRF in 
this fashion as an implicit ultimatum takes account of the gap-debate of the 
1990s, the heated post-Cold War discussion of NATO burden-sharing or 
“responsibility sharing”80, the American attempts to vitalise European mili-
taries by suggesting small-scale and multilateral RMA exploitation strate-
gies, as well as the shared acceptance of DCI on the conceptual – but if not 
so clearly on the practical/budgetary level. From this perspective, the re-
peated attempts of the US administrations to advance RMA thinking and 
espousal in Europe that gained momentum in the second half of the 1990s 
turned into a more concrete and pragmatic programme of emphasising 
those capabilities that from the American RMA perspective seem necessary 
in today’s military missions.  
 
The replacement of the DCI with the Prague Capabilities Commitment 
(PCC) in November 2002 reflected the shortcomings of the European ef-
forts to develop the agreed military capabilities. As one of the three “key 
military transformation initiatives” agreed upon in Prague, the PCC frame-
work identified eight important fields and more than 400 specific areas of 
capability development. The general-level fields of capability improvement 
‘fit’ within two of the post-Cold War era American-dominated discourses 
of war – namely the discourses on RMA and War on Terror:81 
 
• Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence 
• Intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition 
• Air-to-ground surveillance 
• Command, control and communications 
• Combat effectiveness, including precision-guided munitions 
and suppression of enemy air defences 
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• Strategic airlift and sealift capability 
• Air-to-air refuelling 
• Deployable combat support and combat service support units. 
 
Although the above-mentioned fields of agreed military capability im-
provement cannot be reduced to the discourses of RMA and War on Terror, 
it is particularly these two discourses that characterise such a view of war 
and military power that ‘require’ the capabilities listed in NATO fields of 
capability improvement. The first of the fields is related to the threat of 
WMD use – an asymmetric threat of the post-9/11 era that is clearly envi-
sioned in the discourse on the War on Terror. The following four fields cor-
respond particularly clearly to the technologically defined view of warfare 
and constituent elements of military power – expressed by the RMA dis-
course: accurate and timely information about the enemy and the purported 
battlespace communicated in almost real time and when necessary, con-
nected to the use of smart weapons. The remaining three fields correspond 
well to the exigencies of expeditionary operations – the mainstream type of 
western military operations in the post-Cold War era. The discourse on 
RMA and the conceptualisation of military power that it advocates are di-
rectly linked to the expeditionary nature of military operations. The devel-
opment of smaller and more effective forces as well as of high-tech mili-
tary equipment has improved the ability to intervene rapidly in crises all 
around the world with fewer ships, aircraft, and other means of transport. In 
addition, the range of traditional weapons platforms – which in many cases 
deliver smart weapons – can be extended indefinitely by means of modern 
air-to-air refuelling technology. 
 
The creation of the PCC was aimed at promulgating a military capability 
improvement project that could be implemented by the European members. 
PCC was thus to guide the implementation of a plan to help Europe catch 
up with American capabilities through national and multinational projects. 
The implementation of certain capability improvement projects – e.g. stra-
tegic sealift and airlift as well as air-to-air refuelling – by pooling dispersed 
national resources into multinational efforts acknowledged the differences 
of magnitude in military resources and capability between the US on the 
one hand and individual European NATO members on the other.  
 
The piecemeal approach to creating rapid response European high-
technology NATO forces within the framework of NRF and multinational 
cooperation in capability improvement within the PCC process reflects the 
limited resources and thus modest possibilities of creating or launching a 
European RMA project. In addition, the uneasy attitude of some of the 
European NATO members concerning global military missions à la US – 
i.e. the lack or limited quality of acknowledged global strategic interests in 
Europe – has stood in the way of turning the collectively embraced concep-
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tualisations of war and military power into practical, urgently implemented 
national procurement projects and processes of restructuring the armed 
forces. However, after the scaling-down of the defence budgets and troop 
levels of the immediate post-Cold War era, the evolution of NATO in the 
late 1990s and early 21st century has witnessed several attempts to take 
concrete steps to facilitate the development of national and alliance military 
assets to match the assessed threats and projected missions – according to 
the shared understandings of war and military power. Transformation of 
NATO through NRF and PCC is one of the latest manifestations of this. 
 
 
8.1.4. Exporting the Western Standards of Military Power – The Role of 
NATO  
 
American military influence has not been restricted to other western allies 
or members of NATO only. Connected to NATO, the increased military 
cooperation between the alliance and non-members has been aimed at 
‘transferring’ western military understandings more generally. The primary 
audience has been the former eastern bloc states and the newly independent 
former republics of the Soviet Union.82 
 
Two intertwined politico-military processes have been developing since the 
1990s: the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Membership Action Plan 
(MAP). Both have operated as vessels for establishing and consolidating 
western conceptualisations of democracy, the military, and international 
relations within the former communist bloc members and as catalysts for 
increased security-military cooperation – e.g. increased interoperability – 
with western non-member states. 
 
The Partnership for Peace was launched in January 1994 and enhanced in 
1997 in order to widen the initiative’s scope. Depicted as an attempt to en-
hance stability and security in Europe, it has been an initiative to tie the 
former adversaries and neural states into cooperation with NATO. This co-
operation has bilateral and multilateral manifestations within the frame-
work of PfP. In addition to emphasising the democratic control of the mili-
taries and transparency in national defence projects, the PfP has sought to 
develop military relations between NATO and the partner countries – based 
on NATO-defined standards. This military cooperation touches upon mili-
tary planning, training, exercises, equipment, and forces.83  
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Concerning capabilities, the Planning and Review Process (PARP) within 
PfP has identified and evaluated partner forces and capabilities that are 
available for multinational training, exercises, and operations – peacekeep-
ing, search and rescue operations, humanitarian operations and, after 1997, 
peace support operations. This planning and review process relies on the 
idea of creating non-member interoperability with NATO by identifying 
those capabilities that are operational with NATO forces and by setting 
Partnership Goals in order to create and enhance interoperability through 
NATO standards. NATO thus “provides guidance on interoperability and 
required capabilities.”84 
 
The Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) has also been developed 
within the partnership programme. This concept has an added focus on 
military capabilities needed in NATO-led operations and has thus provided 
the partner countries with better possibilities to prepare themselves for the 
operations of the Alliance.85 According to NATO, 
 
it [Operational Capabilities Concept] also establishes a mechanism which 
will enable decisions taken in the context of the Defence Capabilities Ini-
tiative (DCI) to be reflected in the future development of PfP.86 
 
PfP has thus operated as a framework for NATO to mould its security envi-
ronment through military cooperation without detailed promises of mem-
bership to all aspirant countries. However, the first PfP countries to join 
NATO – Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic – did so in 1999. Simul-
taneously with the first wave of post-Cold War NATO enlargement, the 
Alliance introduced the Membership Action Plan in order to express its 
commitment to future enlargement and to lay down its expectations for the 
aspirant countries. Concerning military capabilities, the MAP has required 
aspirants to “prepare for participation in the full range of new missions” 
and to “pursue standardization and/or interoperability.”87 Seven MAP part-
ners acceded to membership in 2004, leaving three MAP partners  – Alba-
nia, Croatia and Macedonia – waiting for the next round of NATO 
enlargement.88 
 
The cooperative approach to security that NATO espoused from the early 
1990s has gone through a process of evolution – during which its ambi-
tiousness has increased. The 1991 promulgation of the Strategic Concept in 
this field – under the title of dialogue and cooperation – has grown into a 
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multifaceted and more tangible set of projects with increasing functional 
cooperation in many issue areas. Concerning military capabilities – and 
thus the shared understanding of military power – the Partnership for Peace 
has been the most visible and concrete project directed outside NATO. The 
increasing importance of peacekeeping and peace support operations, and 
the operational capabilities needed for such operations in the post-Cold 
War era have been addressed generally within the framework of the PfP 
and its constituent programs, described very briefly above. 
 
Thus, the post-Cold War cooperative security framework within NATO has 
spread the western model into the perimeters of Europe on at least two lev-
els. On the politico-strategic level, the ‘westernising’ emphasis has been on 
the democratic control of the armed forces and the related transparency of 
all defence-related functions. On the more concrete military capability 
level, the western model of using troops and equipment for expeditionary 
peace support operations and equivalents has led the way. The combined 
effect of these two levels of influence has not only relieved tensions within 
Europe and elsewhere, but has also exported and consolidated the shared 
western understandings of war and military power within the former east-
ern bloc. Cooperation on NATO’s terms probably best characterises this 
process of engaging former adversaries and turning them into more west-
ern-style countries with ‘westernised’ militaries.  
 
The increasing significance of partner contributions to NATO-led opera-
tions since the inception of the PfP supports the idea of exporting western 
conceptualisations of military capability in particular and the nature of 
post-Cold War era warfare more generally. More than ten participating 
partner countries have participated in the Bosnian IFOR and SFOR, and in 
the Kosovo Force89 (KFOR) following the NATO bombing campaign of 
Serbia in the spring 1999.90 Six partner countries in addition to several 
NATO allies participated in the post-9/11 US-led Operation Enduring 
Freedom (Afghanistan).91 Nine partner countries have contributed to the 
succeeding International Security Assistance Force (ISAF, Afghanistan 
January 2002 onward).92 Eventually, in August 2003, NATO assumed 
command of ISAF.  
 
The increasing frequency of crisis management and peace support opera-
tions is naturally not ‘proof’ that a western-defined military power is 
spreading from the Euro-Atlantic axis towards the fringes of Europe. How-
ever, according to the theoretical framework of this study, the increasing 
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military cooperation via military preparations, planning, and the conduct of 
combined operations between the west and the former eastern bloc – par-
ticularly on western terms – is bound to root and consolidate the shared 
western understandings of war and military power in the post-Cold War era 
partners. It is not just about partners behaving according to western expec-
tations in order to receive (material) benefits, but also about the properties 
– i.e. identities and interests – of the partners. In addition, this process of 
reconstructing the identities and interests of the former eastern bloc states 
as they approach the west, Europe and the west are also being reconstructed 
through the incremental process of ‘assimilating’ the former adversaries 
within the western security community and dealing with emerging global 
challenges that are seen to require a western response – e.g. terrorism after 
9/11. 
 
 
8.1.5. NATO – Conclusions 
 
The abrupt end of the Cold War led to a rapid and fundamental redesigning 
of the European security architecture. The 1990 Paris Summit of the Con-
ference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) promulgated the 
Charter of Paris for a New Europe in November 1990. It visioned “a new 
era of democracy, peace and unity”.93 In the United States, President 
George H. Bush advocated “a New World Order”. Similarly, NATO re-
wrote its strategy and moved away from the confrontational depiction of 
the European security situation. NATO embraced cooperation and partner-
ship with its former adversaries in the east.  
 
Given the fundamental changes taking place in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s, NATO was faced with the question of its utility in the emerging 
post-Cold War world. With the massive Soviet threat gone, ‘new’ threats to 
international stability and the security of NATO members were identified 
or envisioned. To counter the proliferation of WMD and weapons tech-
nologies, terrorist acts, and the spread of small arms, NATO needed a new 
approach to security and the defence of alliance territory. With this process 
of identifying and assessing the nature of security threats of the post-Cold 
War era and the associated decrease of the level of the faced threat – from 
nuclear annihilation to ‘lower’ level threats – NATO embarked upon an 
incrementally cumulative project of establishing and developing coopera-
tive security dialogue with former adversaries. 
 
Similarly, the devised NATO missions and organised forces underwent a 
process of adaptation to the new security environment. NATO started to 
transform in order to adapt to the new emerging security challenges and 
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risks of the post-Cold War era. Fewer forces with streamlined command 
structure were possible and ‘necessary’ for the post-Cold War era NATO to 
take a new role in the globalising world.  
 
By the mid-1990s at the latest it was becoming clear that the post-Cold War 
era security environment was distinctly different from the bipolar world 
that prevailed until the late 1980s. This ‘new’ era was riddled with ‘new’ 
crises and demanded different military capabilities than those that had 
characterised the Cold War world. With the demise of the threat of land 
invasion, and the increase in importance of peace support operations, many 
of the old NATO territorial defence capabilities started to look obsolete or 
outdated. The ‘new’ military capabilities of the 1990s were increasingly 
geared to permit military interventions outside the developed west. The 
only remaining superpower – the United States – was practically the only 
NATO member that had during the entire Cold War era prepared itself for 
expeditionary operations and had military capabilities that were more or 
less suited to the needs of peace support operations. Within Europe some 
modest expeditionary capabilities existed at the end of the Cold War – 
mostly in the UK and France – but these were qualitatively and quantita-
tively on a different level than the American intervention capabilities. This 
became evident in the Persian Gulf and during the crises of former Yugo-
slavia, particularly Bosnia. In the latter case three years of European man-
agement and leadership in solving the crisis did not bring an end to the vio-
lence. Only after American military involvement – after a long period of 
hesitation – was it possible to take credible military action in Bosnia and 
reach an agreement to stop the ethnically manipulated violence. European 
governments could and did contribute to the 1995 bombing campaign, but 
only as junior partners within the American established military frame-
work. 
 
By the late 1990s, then, a continent-wide process of reconceptualising and 
reorganising the military was underway. Many European governments 
pondered and took decisions to abolish conscription and to create profes-
sional armed forces. Troop strengths were lowered as were the readiness 
levels of most of forces. However, congruent with the process of winding 
down the Cold War era western militaries was one of creating some smaller 
forces capable of rapid military intervention. Humanitarian operations, res-
cue missions, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace support opera-
tions were the emerging forms of western warfare in the post-Cold War era 
– particularly the 1990s. NATO prepared itself for these non-article 5 mis-
sions from the beginning of the 1990s. It also decided to go out-of-area, 
and did so – e.g. in Bosnia. 
 
With this shift in the focus of NATO missions and forces, the cooperative 
arrangements with former adversaries and other western non-members 
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were suited not only to increase stability and the spread of democratic con-
trol of the military, but also to spread NATO standards concerning how to 
organise, equip, and train the partner militaries. The progressive develop-
ment of the partnership programme in tandem with the emerging humani-
tarian crises during the 1990s thus reflected the benefits of increasing sta-
bility within the ‘widening’ Euro-Atlantic area by political engagement and 
of creating a widening pool of military assets inside the alliance and else-
where for various kinds of peace support operations.  
 
Practically throughout the 1990s, the United States was pressing for a more 
far-reaching and ambitious European response in the process of internal 
military reorganisation within NATO.  Although Europeans were cutting 
their Cold War era armed forces in order to adapt to the post-Cold War era 
security situation, they were not capable of providing intervention forces, 
except for mostly secondary roles in US-led operations. Even military ac-
tion in Europe was too demanding a task for the European static territorial 
defence forces of the Cold War. Britain and France had some experience of 
expeditionary operations during the Cold War and were able to contribute 
somewhat to the offensive intervention capabilities in operations that were 
conducted under US lead. But their combined capabilities only faintly re-
sembled those of the United States. 
 
In addition, the disparity of military capability between the US and Euro-
pean NATO members seemed to increase, as the US had been explicitly 
embracing a policy of exploiting the technologically defined Revolution in 
Military Affairs since the mid-1990s. The overwhelming US superiority in 
contributing modern combat power was made clear during the Gulf War. 
Ever since, the lessons America learned during of the Gulf War and the re-
lated policy of exploiting the RMA, seemed to increase the US lead in pos-
sessing, developing, and defining military power within the framework of 
NATO. The NATO campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the subsequent 
stabilisation and reconstruction operations (IFOR, SFOR, KFOR), provided 
the Alliance members with first-hand empirical material for use in delibera-
tions on the post-Cold War nature of war and related needed military capa-
bilities.  
 
The European inability to act in Bosnia and the subsequent American-led 
bombing campaign taught significant lessons during the latter part of the 
1990s when NATO – and the EU – came to terms with the emerging nature 
of the international security situation and the role of military force in it. Af-
ter the American Defense Department had become an explicit advocate of 
the Revolution in Military Affairs, the lessons of Bosnia were used as lev-
erage in the campaign to spread the American-defined RMA to Europe. 
The lessons of Kosovo supported these theses. 
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By the end of the 1990s the US-articulated military transformation through 
an RMA had become part of the European defence and military thinking. 
This was evident not only in explicit statements made by officials of the 
American administration(s), but also in the lessons learned in Europe from 
the military conflicts of the 1990s. It seemed natural that humanitarian in-
terventions and peace support operations require state-of-the-art military 
systems that can ensure low levels of friendly casualties and collateral 
damage, as well as facilitate effective and rapid reaction military capabili-
ties. The very genesis of the post-Cold War humanitarian military missions 
can be found at the intersection of a political change of the international 
(security) situation and the technological-conceptual change within the de-
fence establishments and militaries, particularly in the US and some of its 
close allies.  
 
When NATO was confronted with the task of reconfiguring the rationale for 
operations and the needed capabilities for chosen operation types, the 
United States was already in the position to provide the other allies with a 
recipe of military success in the post-Cold War era military contingencies. 
The American RMA formula for meeting post-Cold War military chal-
lenges had been in the making for about a decade when the “New NATO” 
or a relevant NATO was being reconstructed. By the time that the operation 
in Kosovo could be evaluated, the American military vision of the early 
1990s – the RMA – had turned into a widely recognised politico-military 
project aimed at keeping and increasing the American military edge and 
sharing that edge with those who were willing to pay the political and eco-
nomic price. By the late 1990s, this project also included the idea of 
spreading the RMA thinking, systems, concepts, and organisations 
throughout the developed western world. In the US, a solely American 
RMA was evaluated to be a less favourable scenario than one with Euro-
pean (and other) allies sharing the burden of operations and, possibly, pro-
viding market opportunities for the well-established American military in-
dustry that had been at the crux of the technologically-defined American 
RMA. 
 
Thus, the pre-Prague transformation of NATO was more in the nature of 
the Alliance – through its member states – adapting itself to the ‘new’ and 
emerging exigencies of the post-Cold War era. In Europe this transforma-
tion meant reductions in defence expenditures and cuts in troop strengths 
rather than new military investments or innovative thinking. With the in-
creasing evidence of the effectiveness of the American RMA throughout 
the 1990s, and the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO officially 
embarked upon a route of transformation – this time with the intention on 
increasing relevant military capabilities. The post-Prague process of trans-
forming the Alliance has thus witnessed a more concrete military capability 
dimension on the side of the political dimension of reconstructing the 
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threats, possible Alliance missions, and mechanisms for cooperation with 
partners. The precursor of this rather tangible focus on capabilities was 
launched in Washington 1999 during the war over Kosovo. 
 
The thinking beneath the NATO decision to embrace transformation and 
focus on military capabilities grew and matured during the 1990s. With the 
demise of the Cold War a new logic for the defensive alliance was called 
for. The probability of a traditional military invasion into any of the mem-
ber-states grew more and more unlikely as the decade progressed. Simulta-
neously, under US leadership, the Alliance and some international ad hoc 
coalitions were increasingly involved in peace support operations and other 
military missions that relied on high-technology military systems. While 
‘traditional’ Cold War era forces proved operational in some types of new 
operations – particularly in the post-attack phase of peace support opera-
tions or the peacekeeping phase of humanitarian interventions – the west-
ern focus on military power became increasingly connected to the trans-
formation of the Cold War era armed forces into ones better suited to han-
dle the new warfighting missions represented by humanitarian interven-
tions and other contingencies that may involve non-state actors. After 9/11, 
the possibility of using military force against terrorist organisations, states 
that support these organisations, and even individual terrorists, was more 
accepted – although requiring case-by-case judgement.   
 
Although the direct or observable connections between the American RMA 
and the post-Prague transformation process of NATO do not seem to be 
very strong – at least on the surface – there are several elements that can be 
construed as a transfer of RMA-related thinking into Europe. First is the 
strong new accentuation of transformation within NATO. This took place 
five years after the idea of transforming the US Armed forces via exploit-
ing the RMA was officially integrated into the US defence strategy. In ad-
dition, as was shown in Chapter 7 dealing with US DoD’s conceptualisa-
tions concerning RMA and transformation, these are terms that on many 
occasions are used as synonyms – or ‘near synonyms’ – in the process of 
harnessing new technologies, concepts, doctrines, and organisations within 
the armed forces. Also in this context the remarks of the chairman of 
NATO Military Committee, General Harald Kujat, in 2003 are revealing:  
 
Much has been said in the recent years about the revolution in military af-
fairs. The Alliance [NATO] has been much proactive in this regard and 
translated this trend with ‘transformation’. …Technological improvement 
is only one aspect of the transformation though; doctrinal, cultural and 
structural changes must also be introduced with new systems and, in many 
cases, even precede technology.94 
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In a similar fashion, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Exter-
nal Relations Jamie Shea noted in 2003 – concerning NATO’s transforma-
tion – that the United States had a head start in harnessing the RMA vis-à-
vis Europe, where the efforts to begin its revolution in military affairs had 
just recently started – “far too long after the Cold War”.95 
 
In addition to the importance of transformation within NATO and the es-
tablishment of a strategic command for implementing transformation, the 
ACT’s co-location with USJFC and the dual heading of ACT and USJFC 
by an American commander signal the process of transferring the Ameri-
can RMA into the NATO context. As the United States’ DoD has defined 
transformation by exploiting RMA a key objective of its armed forces, and 
has harnessed USJFC to be the executive agent for transformation; the link 
from transforming American armed forces to NATO’s transformation is 
strengthened.  
 
The official espousing of expeditionary military capabilities in NATO 
within the framework of NRF also signals the transfer of American strate-
gic thinking to other NATO allies. The expeditionary culture of the US 
Armed Forces has been second to none after the Second World War. Great 
Britain and France have had some limited resources concerning expedition-
ary forces for several decades. The framing of NATO transformation and 
its lead agent – Allied Command Transformation – according to American 
model of post-Cold War era military transformation, suggests that the al-
most exclusively American RMA thinking has taken some root in other 
western countries.96 In addition, the catalytic role of the NRF in transform-
ing NATO military forces by accentuating rapid deployability, high-
technology, and joint operations suggests further that concrete steps have 
been taken in Europe in order to test the usability of mostly non-American 
RMA forces. 
 
It is noteworthy that the American influence on transforming the military 
forces at NATO’s disposal via the RMA took effect rather slowly and 
mostly on the level of ideas – i.e. shared conceptualisations of the constitu-
tive elements of military power. Until recently – most notably until the de-
cisions concerning the DCI, PCC, and NRF were formulated – the accumu-
lation of this western understanding of military power in Europe was not 
evident on the level of resources or technology to the extent that it has been 
in the US for years. Even today there is no distinctly European RMA pro-
ject or its equivalent in the making. However, it seems that in the European 
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(NATO) analysis of contemporary military power of states, the constituent 
elements of the explicitly formulated American project of transformation 
through RMA have been accepted – although the possibilities for Europe-
ans to participate in this project are understood to be limited. It is more a 
question of multinational European cooperation to produce specific RMA 
capabilities rather than an overall RMA exploitation strategy. With the 
creation of NRF the American RMA project is being inserted in a moderate 
or modest way into Europe on practical terms that take into consideration 
the limited European strategic interests, the rather non-existent expedition-
ary culture, and the fragmented nature of the European defence policies. 
 
While the RMA has never been as celebrated within NATO as it has been – 
mainly in the late 1990s – within the US DoD, the perceived need to a) op-
erate militarily around the world (expeditionary ‘culture’), b) reorganise 
armed forces by exploiting information technology, and c) increase inter-
operability with the only RMA force in the world – the United States 
Armed Forces – is now driving NATO transformation. This transformation 
is currently taking place according to US definitions. 
 
 
8.2. Towards Autonomous European Military Capabilities –  
The European Union  
 
The post-Cold War era has witnessed a declared European willingness to 
develop autonomous military capabilities for different kinds of military cri-
sis management missions within the framework of the European Union. 
Autonomous in this context means military action without the involvement 
of NATO or the US. However, development of the Union’s military capa-
bility for autonomous military operations has been based on the possibility 
of relying upon critical NATO military capabilities – e.g. command struc-
tures.  
 
Momentum in the process of defining and ‘creating’ European military ca-
pability picked up speed at the turn of the millennium. By that time the 
Balkans had been riddled by almost a decade of turmoil and violence – 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and by 1999 Kosovo. Simi-
larly, by the end of the 1990s, the Union’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy had operated and matured for almost a decade. As one manifestation 
of this development process, the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty be-
came ‘binding’ during 1999. This meant the inclusion of crisis management 
tasks – defined in the WEU Petersberg Declaration of 1992 – into the Un-
ion’s agenda and the progressive framing of a common defence policy.  
 
The fact that the framing and implementation of the European defence pol-
icy and the ‘creation’ of EU’s military crisis management capability have a 
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relatively short pedigree does not prohibit an analysis of the shared Euro-
pean understandings of war and military power that have become more ex-
plicitly formulated during the 1990s and the first years of the new millen-
nium. In this context, the ‘European military’ refers to the national military 
forces fulfilling policies agreed upon within the European Union. The poli-
cies formulated and negotiated within the EU concerning the threats facing 
the Union and its member states, the nature of war in today’s international 
system, and the constituent elements of effective military power can be 
conceptualised as a shared western European paradigm of war – one consti-
tutive part of the western paradigm of war. 
 
The general characteristics of the two ‘deeper’ elements of a western para-
digm of war – the character of threats and the shared understandings of the 
nature of war – were analysed in Chapter 5. A clear shift was noted towards 
non-state actors as a source of threats – e.g. terrorism and organised crime. 
In addition state failure – a [non-traditional] state-level threat – is now con-
ceptualised to provide a breeding ground for threats of non-state terrorism 
and crime. The threat related to the proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction is similarly connected to the threat of non-state terrorism: “The 
most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons 
of mass destruction.”97 According to the 2003 published European Security 
Strategy, the combined effects of the mostly non-state new post-Cold War 
era threats could become a serious challenge: 
 
Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maxi-
mum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised 
crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force – 
we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.98 
 
Concerning the nature of contemporary war from the western perspective 
the shift from the Cold War era has been characterised by an awareness of 
the increasing obsolescence of large-scale military formations and decisive 
battles, and the increasing significance of crisis management operations, 
humanitarian interventions and other smaller-scale military contingencies – 
often in remote locations.99 This trend was expressed in the early 1990s and 
has since then consolidated significantly in Europe by the increasing focus 
on military crisis management and less concern for territorial defence. 
 
The following chapter analyses the shared understandings of military 
power within the EU. This analysis is based on the decision to develop an 
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autonomous military capability for the Union. The two above-mentioned 
‘deeper’ level shared understandings form the framework for this analysis. 
They will be elaborated to the extent that their framework-setting function 
requires. 
 
 
8.2.1. The Road to Cologne 
 
The development of the European Union’s defence dimension and the pro-
gressive framing of the Union’s defence policy surely did not begin in Co-
logne (1999), with the approval of the Amsterdam Treaty, nor with the en-
dorsement of the Maastricht Treaty. Similarly to the American case of 
promulgating defence policy of the post-Cold War era during the 1990s, 
the roots of those policies are in the Cold War years. Concerning the Euro-
pean case – the Cold War era European Community (EC) – the European 
Political Cooperation (ECP) started to form its international relations 
framework at the beginning of the 1970s. Later, this framework was institu-
tionalised in the Single European Act, and then codified as Common For-
eign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1991. 
The treaty included defence matters in the agenda of the Union under the 
second pillar – the CFSP.  
 
Beginning in the early 1980s the strengthening of the Western European 
security dimension took place within the Western European Union (WEU). 
As was stated in the 1984 Rome Declaration, the member states agreed to 
make “better use of the W.E.U. framework”. In addition, according to the 
declaration, “a better utilisation of W.E.U. would not only contribute to the 
security of western Europe but also to an improvement in the common de-
fence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance”. The ‘reactivation’ of  
the WEU and the emerging policies and actions within this framework 
were intended to make a European contribution to the defence and deter-
rence efforts of the Atlantic Alliance. A better use of the WEU framework 
meant the strengthening of the European pillar of NATO.100 
 
Simultaneously with the process of framing and constructing the European 
Union and its first formulations on security and defence matters, the mem-
ber states of the Western European Union took joint action in the Persian 
Gulf and were involved to some degree in the Yugoslav conflict. Impor-
tantly, the WEU Council of Ministers also defined the self-imposed Euro-
pean limits on military operations in the 1992 Petersberg Declaration – go-
ing beyond article V and collective defence – by focusing upon humanitar-
ian rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis 
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management, including peacemaking.101 Starting with the articulation and 
further development of the European Union’s second pillar – that of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy – most of the missions and structures 
of the WEU were transferred to the EU framework within a decade of the 
signing of the Maastricht Treaty. During this period, however, the WEU 
formed a link between the EU and NATO, concentrating on participating in 
the Petersberg tasks in its rather small-scale operational role. When the 
CFSP and the ESDP gained momentum within the EU, especially after a 
British policy change in 1998 – the Western European Union was practi-
cally dissolved, except for its common defence article V and the Parliamen-
tary Assembly.102 
 
The development of the political cooperation and the establishment of the 
CFSP was not only an internal process within the Union; it also reflected 
the general change in the international security landscape caused by the end 
of the Cold War. With the Soviet threat gone, the framing and development 
of a European Security and Defence Identity was no longer inhibited by the 
transatlantic logic103 that guided much of Western Europe’s security efforts 
during the Cold War. On the contrary, it could be argued that the creation 
and fostering of a European Security and Defence Identity became neces-
sary as the United States reoriented its defence policy and withdrew a large 
portion of its troops from Europe. The burden of providing security and 
defence in Europe was becoming more a matter for the Europeans although 
the traditional military threat was decreasing rapidly by the beginning of 
the 1990s. In addition, within several years of the end of the Cold War the 
continuing reality and relevance of military force in international affairs 
became apparent. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent large-
scale Gulf war, the highly publicised internal disorder and violence in So-
malia, and the breaking-up of Yugoslavia, all came together to shape a 
western view of a violent post-Cold War world. Contrary to the emerging 
vision of a ‘New World Order’, the first post-Cold War era decade was 
marked by the continuous and even increasing possibility of large-scale – 
though not necessary interstate – violence. For the maturation of the Euro-
pean military project, the unfolding of the Yugoslavian case was particu-
larly important.104 
 
After the decision was made to develop the Common Foreign and Security 
policy – with the vision of framing a common defence policy, and the pos-
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sible prospects of a common European defence – one important task at 
hand was to articulate its meaning for the transatlantic community – NATO 
in general and US particularly. After all, ever since the reinvigoration of 
the WEU had begun, the declared European aim had been to strengthen the 
European pillar of NATO. With the growing significance of the EU and the 
WEU in European defence matters, the role of NATO and that of the US in 
taking care of European defence and in rearticulating post-Cold War era 
western security policies needed to be explicitly stated. 
 
After the signing of the Maastricht treaty, the situation in the former Yugo-
slavia unfolded and the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia became starkly ap-
parent. Lacking the needed capabilities to act militarily without the United 
States under any European ‘coalition of the willing’, the general European 
lessons of Bosnia suggested increased intervention capabilities with an em-
phasis on possible future interventions at an early stage. The Cold War era 
European armed forces and the related territorial defence system proved 
less useful in the context of Bosnia than they had been vis-à-vis the Soviet 
threat. The lessons of the crisis in Albania 1997, especially Operation Alba 
(which was not implemented within the EU framework, but by a European 
coalition of the willing) reinforced the lessons of external intervention and 
the need of Europe to act at least within its perimeters.105 
 
Concerning the European defence dimension, the 1997 signed Amsterdam 
Treaty was an advance over the Maastricht framework. The lessons of 
Bosnia were codified in the treaty, which spoke of “progressive framing of 
a common defence policy”, established common strategies and the post of 
High Representative. Importantly, the Amsterdam Treaty marked the EU’s 
entry into crisis management as Petersberg tasks were added to the Union’s 
functions. According to these tasks, the EU would contemplate participat-
ing in military missions that vary from humanitarian and rescue tasks and 
peacekeeping missions to the tasks of combat forces in crisis management 
and peacemaking. In anticipation of the acceptance of the Amsterdam 
treaty, Operation Alba had already carried out part of these Petersberg 
tasks, though not within the framework of the European Union.106 How-
ever, the lessons to be drawn were there for all of Europe. 
 
The deteriorating situation in the Balkans became manifest once again in 
Kosovo, in 1998 at the latest. The ongoing ‘internal’ conflict there intensi-
fied the European response to the challenge of creating a coherent common 
security and defence policy as well as acquiring relevant intervention capa-
bilities that were suited to the articulated Petersberg tasks. In December 
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1998 The United Kingdom and France issued a Joint Declaration on Euro-
pean Defence – the St. Malo Declaration – arguing for the need for the EU 
to accept “its full role on the international stage” in order to turn the Am-
sterdam Treaty into reality. The document argued that: 
 
[T]he Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by 
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness 
to do so, in order to respond to international crises. … Europe needs 
strengthened armed forces that can reach rapidly to the new risks, and 
which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence indus-
try and technology.107 
 
The St. Malo Declaration and the subsequent December 1998 Vienna 
European Council espousal of the declaration reflected the frustration over 
the inability of Europe to act in Kosovo. Combined with the coming war 
between Serbia and the US-led NATO, the focus of the European defence 
dimension shifted from the ‘top’ political objectives and forms of defence 
cooperation to the more concrete level concerning capabilities – and the 
relationship between EU’s military capabilities vis-à-vis NATO and the 
US. This emerging European understanding highlighted the need of the EU 
to back the CFSP with “credible operational capabilities”.108 
 
 
8.2.2. Focus on European Capabilities 
 
From the European perspective, the increasing tensions and violence in 
Kosovo during 1997 and 1998 was a depressing and a reminiscent process. 
The depressing nature of the evolving crisis in Kosovo was based on the 
analogy of Bosnia few years earlier and the European inability to act deci-
sively. Without the American lead, and its proportionally greater military 
efforts, the Europeans had little chance of success in solving the Bosnian 
problem. When the tensions in Kosovo became apparent early 1998109, the 
Treaty of Amsterdam was not yet in force and no politico-military process 
for constructing a European Union crisis management capability existed – 
apart from the shared understanding that such a capability was of the es-
sence and the general agreement on the need to develop it.   
 
The war over Kosovo was coming to a close during the June 1999 EU Co-
logne European Council meeting. Influenced heavily by the Kosovo ex-
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perience and by the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam110, The 
European Council declared that: 
 
[T]he Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by 
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness 
to do so, in order to respond to international crisis without prejudice to ac-
tions by NATO.111 
 
The emphasis on the availability of credible military forces to fulfil the Pe-
tersberg Tasks highlighted the need for the member states to acquire what 
they needed to engage in expeditionary operations. After all, the projected 
Petersberg missions were planned from the start to be executed outside the 
Union’s territory. Capabilities “in the field of intelligence, strategic trans-
port, command and control” were thought to be needed most. Similarly, 
efforts to strengthen European defence industry and its technological base 
were conceptualised to be at the core of creating the appropriate post-
Cologne military capabilities.112 
 
The requirements ‘directed’ at the national governments in developing ap-
propriate military capabilities were thus intended to make European expe-
ditionary operations possible. The Cologne Presidency Report on the 
Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence 
added to the European Council Declaration that the ‘missing’ European 
capabilities were related to the military characteristics of “deployability, 
sustainability, interoperability, flexibility and mobility” – all features that 
had sprung up during the decade of post-Cold War experiences of the west-
ern (mostly US-led) crisis management missions.113 
 
The areas of acknowledged European military weaknesses reflected the 
changing nature of projected military missions – from territorial defence to 
crisis management. Being able to deploy small and efficient mobile forces 
quickly even to remote locations was at the heart of these changing concep-
tualisations of European military missions of the late 1990s and particularly 
of the future.  The characteristic of interoperability – one of the military 
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catchwords of the 1990s – left ample room for interpretation. Was it inter-
operability between different national elements of EU forces, between 
forces of NATO and EU, or between EU and the US. After all, the only 
power that had been committed to a series of expeditionary operations 
globally in the post-Cold War era was the United States. Occasionally it 
had been accompanied by junior partners from Europe and elsewhere.  Fo-
cusing solely on interoperability between the national forces that the EU 
was commencing to create would have limited the operational possibilities 
of those forces in combined operations – either with the US or with NATO. 
The latter was increasingly conceptualised to be in the position to ‘lend’ 
capabilities to the EU – if the Atlantic Alliance was not willing to get in-
volved in a mission that was deemed to be important for the Europeans. 
 
The question of interoperability did take into account the American lead in 
military technology and operational concepts. This was a practical neces-
sity after the politico-strategic European decision had been reached about 
the desirability and, in fact, necessity of the Union’s capability to take mili-
tary action outside of its territory. This idea of western interoperability – 
between EU, NATO and the US – was observable particularly in the fram-
ing of EU-led operations using NATO assets in situations when the Atlan-
tic Alliance would not be committed to take action. The most probable sce-
nario for the EU-led operation to take place with NATO assets would be 
one where the US has decided to refrain from taking part, thus transforming 
the burden of responsibility to Europe. The NATO decisions of Berlin 
(1996) – to continue building the European Security and Defence Identity 
within NATO and the general agreement on future WEU-led operations 
based on some “separable but not separate”114 NATO capabilities – and 
Washington (1999) paved the way for the Cologne formulation: “EU-led 
operations using NATO assets and capabilities”.115 
 
The explicit acknowledging of interoperability with the United States – in 
addition to NATO – was stated in the 2003 European Security Strategy:  
 
The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the Euro-
pean Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in 
the world. Our aim should be effective and balanced partnership with the 
USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capa-
bilities and increase its coherence.116 
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The Helsinki European Council’s reference to the “mutually reinforcing” 
nature of the EU’s headline and capability goals on the one hand and 
NATO’s 1999 launched Defence Capabilities Initiative on the other high-
lighted the deeply interpenetrated nature of the interoperability concept.117 
After all, the DCI was devised in order to get the other NATO members to 
start approaching the Americans by acquiring ‘new’ military systems and 
adopting related operating procedures. Interoperability à la EU has thus 
been directly connected to NATO, but at least implicitly has taken note of 
the need to be interoperable with the US – the leading NATO state. 
 
Following Cologne it was the Helsinki European Council that brought the 
development of European military capability to fruition. The headline goal 
of being able to deploy 60,000 troops within 60 days, and capable of sus-
taining the deployment for at least a year was reached in Helsinki. In addi-
tion, part of this force was to be “available and deployable at very high 
readiness.” The focus on capabilities – the collective capability goals – was 
related to command and control, intelligence, and strategic transport. In ad-
dition, the Helsinki European Council decided to establish the required 
permanent political and military bodies – Standing Political and Security 
Committee, Military Committee, and Military Staff – for the implementa-
tion and guidance of the developing European military dimension.118 
 
The further development of European military forces after the Helsinki 
European Council has since revolved around three themes. First is the ra-
tionale for the development of these ‘new’ capabilities,  premised on the 
notion of the EU “playing its role fully on the international stage”. Being 
before mostly related to economical cooperation, this ‘military dwarf’ was 
conceptualised in the late 1990s to need civilian and military tools for crisis 
management. Regarding the development of military capabilities, the need 
to address the challenges posed by new wars – possibly in Europe and in 
Africa – has guided the framing of threats that ‘necessitate’ the strength-
ened European contribution in addition to NATO. 
 
The second theme concerning the development of European Military forces 
since the Helsinki European Council has been the need to focus on those 
capabilities that are needed for the Petersberg missions. The general no-
tions of availability, deployability, sustainability, interoperability, and 
flexibility circumscribe the extent of the consensus among the member 
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states. These highly general characteristics have been developed into a 
more tangible set of previously lacking European operational capabilities. 
Especially the ability to command and control forces, the means of acquir-
ing and delivering useful intelligence information, and the means of de-
ploying troops and supplies through air and sea transportation systems have 
been the backbone of this capabilities enhancing process.  
 
The transformation of pre-existing (Cold War era) European military capa-
bilities and the creation of a new European (EU) means to decide, launch, 
and conduct EU-led military operations within the perimeters and particu-
larly outside of Europe reflects the shared European understanding of mili-
tary power in the contemporary international system. This European con-
ceptualisation of military power did not espouse the Revolution in Military 
Affairs explicitly, but it does share the logic of the American promulgated 
transformation of the armed forces via an RMA. The ability to use small, 
well-trained, professional, mobile, and rapidly deployable forces with tech-
nologically advanced military systems that may be used in distant theatres 
captures this ‘emerging European RMA logic’. As was articulated in the 
European Security Strategy adopted in 2003: 
 
To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to en-
able them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and 
more effective use of resources are necessary.119 
 
The third principle theme in the European Defence project since the late 
1990s relates to the means of maintaining momentum in the progressive 
framing of the defence dimension. In addition to creating ‘new’ forces with 
‘new’ equipment or transforming the already existing forces into modern 
crisis management forces, the Union has found itself in the position of es-
tablishing a new set of agencies, procedures, and mechanisms in order to 
evaluate, define, and create ‘proper’ forces. It has also had to construct a 
review mechanism in order to monitor progress, (re)define needed capabili-
ties, and inhibit the incoherence of the Union’s military dimension with the 
existing western defence commitments – mostly through NATO.120  
 
Concerning the development of the Union’s military capabilities vis-à-vis 
NATO, it has been clear from the beginning that “any unnecessary duplica-
tion” should be avoided. In addition, going further than merely avoiding 
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unnecessary duplication, it has been emphasised that the process of devel-
oping European Union military capability should take into account 
NATO’s Defence Planning Process and the Alliance’s Partnership for 
Peace Planning and Review Process – PARP. Furthermore, with the prom-
ulgation of the guidelines for developing EU capabilities, the more detailed 
NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative was espoused, namely 
 
the need, for the countries concerned, to ensure the compatibility of the 
commitments taken in the EU framework with the force goals accepted in 
the framework of the NATO Defence Planning Process or the PARP; 
[and] … the need for mutual reinforcement of the Union’s capability goal 
and those arising, for the countries concerned, from the Defence Capabili-
ties Initiative.121 
 
There has thus been close cooperation between the Union and NATO in the 
process of defining the required European military capabilities. One of the 
latest expressions of this was the finalisation of the Berlin Plus arrangement 
in March 2003, which implemented the earlier political decision to estab-
lish EU-led crisis management operations using NATO planning capabili-
ties, assets, and capabilities. The agreement also included procedures and 
mechanisms for the release, monitoring, return, and recall of NATO assets, 
as well as consultations between NATO and the EU in situations where a 
EU-led crisis management operation has been established. Finally, the Ber-
lin Plus agreement provided “[a]rrangements for coherent and mutually re-
inforcing Capability Requirements” between NATO and the EU.122 
 
Another example of the close collaboration between the EU and NATO can 
be found in the explicitly declared parallel between NATO’s Prague Capa-
bilities Commitment (PCC) and the Union’s European Capabilities Action 
Plan (ECAP) with the establishment of the NATO-EU Capability Group in 
May 2003. This development continued – and thus strengthened – the logic 
behind the link between NATO DCI and the Union’s ECAP.123 
 
If the Helsinki Headline and Capability Goals were similar or even identi-
cal to the goals agreed upon within the NATO DCI-framework, the crea-
tion and development of the EU Battlegroups concept had its ideational 
role model in the NATO Response Force (NRF).124 The idea of developing 
a European rapid response capability was expressed concurrently with the 
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more detailed analysis of the Helsinki Headline Goals125, but it was in 2004 
that the implementation of this EU rapid reaction capability advanced rap-
idly under the concept of EU Battlegroups – “a combined arms battalion 
sized force package with Combat Support and Combat Service Support.” 
This approximately 1,500 persons strong military force package is sup-
posed to start implementing its mission on the ground within 10 days after 
the decision to deploy has been reached.126  
 
The Battlegroups concept endorses the global nature of the EU and its mili-
tary ‘out-of-area’ crisis management operations, particularly in Africa. It is 
at the heart of the post-Helsinki Headline Goal 2010, expressing the need 
to rectify the qualitative shortfalls of the military forces assigned to the 
Force Catalogue that sets out national commitments to the Union’s pool of 
forces. This shortfall was noticed already at the Laeken European Summit 
in the end of 2001, when the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) 
was launched.127 The characteristics – or “capability standards” – of EU 
Battlegroup forces include availability, employability, deployability, readi-
ness, flexibility, connectivity, sustainability, survivability, medical force 
protection, and interoperability.128 
 
The momentum of creating and refining European military capabilities has 
been reinforced by the Union’s crisis management operations, which 
started to be implemented during 2003.129 The first military crisis manage-
ment operation of the Union was operation Concordia, a follow-on opera-
tion of NATO’s operation Allied Harmony in the former Yugoslav Repub-
lic of Macedonia. The operation commenced in March 2003, and was ter-
minated nine months later in December 2003. It involved approximately 
350 lightly armed personnel from thirteen member countries and an equiva-
lent number of third countries. France operated as a framework nation in 
the operation until the transfer of responsibilities to EUROFOR in Septem-
ber 2003. The operation was based on the NATO Berlin Plus arrangement 
that was agreed upon in Prague 2002 and consolidated in the Framework 
Agreement on March 2003. Accordingly, operation Concordia’s headquar-
ters was located in Belgium, at Supreme Headquarters Allied Power 
Europe (SHAPE).130 With the termination of operation Concordia in mid-
December of 2003, the EU launched a police mission – operation Proxima 
– as a follow-on mission to Concordia. 
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While Concordia was still underway, EU launched its first autonomous 
military crisis management operation in Africa, in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo. The French-led, UN Security Council mandated operation Arte-
mis involved approximately 2000 troops and replaced the existing UN 
peacekeeping troops on the ground – temporarily. The deadline of the op-
eration was already in sight when the decision to deploy was made. It was 
set to be 1 September, with the return of a UN peacekeeping force.131 In the 
beginning of December 2004 the Union took over the crisis management 
mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina from NATO-SFOR. Again, under the 
provisions of the Berlin plus package, this EU-led force relies on NATO 
capabilities. The magnitude of operation Althea supersedes the Union’s 
precedent crisis management operations – some 7000 troops are now de-
ployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
  
The momentum of progressively creating a European crisis management 
capability has thus been maintained through the mutual influence of setting 
capability goals and fulfilling these goals, as well as committing troops to 
increasingly demanding and larger-scale crisis management operations. 
The process of setting military goals, committing troops, and evaluating 
committed capabilities began in 1999. In December 2001 the Union was 
able to announce a limited crisis management capability at Laeken132, fol-
lowed by a declaration of “operational capability across the full range of 
Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by recognised shortfalls”133 in 
May 2003. Simultaneously the Union had launched its first crisis manage-
ment operation, soon to be followed by its first autonomous military crisis 
management operation outside Europe and the conceptual development of 
the European Battlegroup. 
 
The European Security Strategy was approved in December 2003. It re-
flects several of the ‘new’ features of the post-Cold War and post-9/11 era 
security environment. First, it conceptualises threats mainly from a non-
state perspective. It lists terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass De-
struction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime as the key 
threats of the contemporary era.134 In addition – following the lessons of 
the 1990s – it espouses a strategy of greater EU activity in the globalising 
world: 
 
We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when 
necessary, robust intervention.135 
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Thirdly, the strategy proposes a Union with military capability for diverse 
missions. With the acceptance of the security strategy, the previously ac-
cepted Petersberg Tasks were supplemented with “joint disarmament op-
erations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security 
sector reform.”136 
 
Between the end of the Cold War and the time that the European Security 
Strategy was debated, negotiated, and finally accepted in 2003, a threefold 
change had taken place within the international system on the one hand and 
within Europe on the other hand. The first was the demise of the Cold War 
and the related possibility of rapid and even far-reaching political coopera-
tion on the European level. The second was the experience of the 1990s – 
the increasing call for western crisis management operations in Europe and 
elsewhere. This need was met mostly with ad hoc arrangements, as Europe 
and the United States were still trying to come to terms with the principles 
of the post-Cold War era use of military force. The third element of change 
was linked to the preceding two elements. It was accepted that the Euro-
pean project should increase relevant military capabilities for military in-
terventions. This had taken place mostly in the aftermath of the war in 
Kosovo. With the willingness to prevent humanitarian suffering and avoid 
large-scale crises within the international system, and with the increasing 
military capabilities at the disposal of the Union137, the end of the year 
2003 proved ‘ripe’ for an explicit statement of the fundamental shared 
European ideas on security. 
 
The progressive implementation of the European crisis management capa-
bility moved beyond the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal with the official an-
nouncement of the Headline Goal 2010 in 2004. The new Headline Goal 
emphasises interoperability, deployability, and sustainability of forces – 
based on the evident shortfalls of the European military capabilities vis-à-
vis the Helsinki Headline and Capability Goals, the promulgation of the 
European Security Strategy in 2003, the effects of the recent evolution of 
technology, as well as the lessons learned from the European crisis man-
agement operations – particularly operation Artemis. The conceptual inno-
vation in Headline Goal 2010 is related to the rapidly deployable forces 
through the Battlegroup concept. It specifies that a decision to deploy 
forces must be made within five days and that implementation of the mis-
sion on the ground must begin within 10 days after the decision.138  
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The Headline Goal 2010 emphasises the voluntary transformation of na-
tional military forces in order to arrive at interoperability at the technical, 
procedural, and conceptual level. In addition, interoperability is considered 
in a broad framework including military, civilian, and civil-military as-
pects, as well as the further promoting of agreed standards with NATO.139 
 
In addition to the practical implementation of the Battlegroup concept by 
attaining operational capability for these rapid response capabilities by 
2007 and the accentuation of a broad framework of interoperability, the 
Union also decided to create an agency in the field of defence capabilities 
development, research, acquisition and armaments – the European Defence 
Agency – during 2003. The Agency was established in 2004 with the aim 
of: 
 
[D]eveloping defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, pro-
moting and enhancing European armaments cooperation, strengthening 
the European defence industrial and technological base and creating a 
competitive European defence equipment market, as well as promoting, in 
liaison with the Community’s research activities where appropriate, re-
search aimed at leadership in strategic technologies for future defence and 
security capabilities, thereby strengthening Europe’s industrial potential in 
this domain.140 
 
The main projected task of the Agency has been, then, to identify and pro-
mote the creation of usable military capabilities and to evaluate the capabil-
ity commitments of member states, to harmonise military requirements for 
furthering interoperability, and to adduce multilateral projects in order to 
promote cost-effectiveness and efficient procurement within the Union. In 
addition the Agency seeks to strengthen the technological and defence in-
dustrial base of the Union in order to devise up-to-date military capabilities 
and promote a competitive European defence equipment market.141 
 
 
8.2.3. 9/11 and the EU 
 
Shortly after the decision to develop European assets in the field of crisis 
management was taken, the effects of 9/11 – and the subsequent American-
declared War on Terror – were felt also in Europe. When the extraordinary 
European Council meeting on 21 September 2001 was held in order to 
evaluate the effects of the terrorist attacks on the international security en-
vironment, President Bush had already declared the global War on Terror. 
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In addition to expressing full solidarity with the United States, the Euro-
pean Council declared the fight against terrorism to be a priority of the Un-
ion. The external dimension of this fight fell into the domain of the CFSP: 
“The Common Foreign and Security Policy will have to integrate further 
the fight against terrorism.”142 
 
With a new threat of destructive terrorism facing the “open, democratic, 
tolerant and multicultural” western societies, the international role of the 
Union was to be heightened. The means to do so were conceptualised to lie 
within the CFSP in general and the ESDP particularly: 
 
The fight against terrorism requires of the Union that it play a greater part 
in the efforts of international community to prevent and stabilise regional 
conflicts. … It is by developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and by making the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 
operational at the earliest opportunity that the Union will be most effec-
tive.143 
 
[T]he ESDP must take fuller account of the capabilities that may be re-
quired, in accordance with the Petersberg tasks and the provisions of the 
Treaty, to combat terrorism.144 
 
The European Security Strategy also emphasised the priority assigned to 
the threat of terrorism. Putting aside the threat of large-scale military ag-
gression against any Union members, the strategy placed its highest priority 
on the threat of terrorism. Of the five named threats facing the Union in the 
beginning of the 21st century, terrorism was the one that had links with all 
the other threats – WMDs, failing states, regional conflicts and organised 
crime. In the document, terrorism is conceptualised as the new determinant 
of early 21st century threats facing Europe. In order to counter the terrorist 
threat – and the other non-traditional threats – new modes of operations are 
called for: “the first line of defence will often be abroad.” With the adop-
tion of the European Security Strategy, the member states of the Union ac-
cepted the general notion of transforming national militaries in order to ad-
dress new threats and included new Union missions alongside the Peters-
berg tasks. Concerning the threat of terrorism, support for third countries in 
combating terrorism reflected this “wider spectrum of missions”.145 
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After the March 2004 Madrid terrorist attacks, the member states of the 
Union declared solidarity against terrorism. In the spirit of the draft Treaty 
of the Constitution of Europe, the member states agreed to: 
 
[M]obilise all the instruments at their disposal, including military re-
sources to: 
• prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of one of them;  
• protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any 
terrorist attack; 
• assist a Member State or an acceding State in its territory at the re-
quest of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack.146 
 
The boost of 9/11 to the development of the ESDP has not meant that a 
European response to terrorism would be dominated by military action. 
While the EU has increased the sense of urgency related to the develop-
ment of the ESDP after the 9/11, the European response to the threat of 
international terrorism has been centred within the frameworks of police 
and judicial cooperation.147 Nevertheless, within the framework of the 
developing defence dimension of the Union – the ESDP – the attacks of 
9/11 and then Madrid provided at least a two-fold new momentum within 
the Union. First, it was acknowledged that the Union should play a more 
active role within the entire international community. Second, the already 
agreed-upon provisions of Helsinki, with their subsequent modification and 
rearticulation, were conceptualised to need rapid implementation and 
development.148 
 
In the aftermath of Madrid bomb attacks, the Union declared its position 
“on combating terrorism”. While retaining a primary position on the non-
military aspects of counter-terrorism or anti-terrorism, the member states 
agreed to “do everything within their power to combat all forms of terror-
ism”, taking into account the UN Charter and particularly UN Security 
Council Resolution 1373, which had been adopted before the American-led 
attack on Afghanistan 2001.149 The resolution reaffirmed that the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 – and all acts of international terrorism –  “constitute a 
threat to international peace and security” and that terrorism needs to be 
combated by all means.150 
 
With the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent American launched War on 
Terror – and the European fight against terrorism – the new military re-
quirements of the post-9/11 era have been somewhat different from the ac-
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cumulating lessons of the 1990s crisis management operations. Even 
greater emphasis has been placed on rapidly deployable effective military 
force during the post-9/11 era. Similarly, increasing emphasis on quality 
instead of quantity has marked the recent efforts to develop European mili-
tary capability. However, these trends of the post-9/11 era have not com-
promised the Union’s efforts to generate military capabilities according to 
the Helsinki goals. Rather, the Headline Goal 2010, which was promul-
gated in 2004, continues the development of existing and projected military 
capabilities and thus builds upon the preceding five years of defining and 
building European military capability. 
 
The battlegroup concept is the most telling example of the new momentum 
provided by Headline Goal 2010. Although the Helsinki formulations al-
ready contained the notion of “smaller rapid response elements available 
and deployable at very high readiness”151, it was not until the adoption and 
development of the Franco-British initiative during the first half of 2004 
that a concrete project to create effective multinational European rapid re-
sponse forces was actually in place. Already in November 2004 – less than 
a year after the official acceptance of the European Security Strategy – it 
was agreed that 13 battlegroups would be committed by the member states, 
nine of which would be multinational. Initial operational capability was set 
to be reached in 2005, paving the way for full operational capability in 
2007. 
 
 
8.2.4. The EU – Conclusions 
 
For more than half a decade now, the European Union has been taking se-
rious measures in order to become a regional and even global crisis man-
agement actor. Being an economic and political union by nature, the Union 
has decided to expand its agenda into the field of security and defence. This 
has led to the setting of politico-strategic level general goals for outlining 
the purposes that the military dimension of the Union’s security policy is to 
serve. The 1992 Petersberg tasks – declared within the framework of the 
WEU and later adopted within the framework of the EU – have outlined the 
general principles of developing the European military dimension. Accord-
ing to these tasks, the European Union’s military capability is to serve cri-
sis management purposes. In addition to providing a common European 
vision for the military role of the Union in the world, the Petersberg tasks 
have also imposed limits to more ambitious articulation of the Union’s 
military development. With some operational European military crisis 
management capability, and in the aftermath of the 9/11, the idea of widen-
ing the scope of the military crisis management tasks to include joint dis-
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armament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism, 
and security sector reform in addition to the Petersberg tasks was injected 
into the Union. These ‘new’ tasks were codified into the European Security 
Strategy, and have since then been characterised as possible missions152 
within the whole spectrum of crisis management operations of the Euro-
pean Union. 
 
Similarly, within this process of defining and creating military ends and 
means, the Union has specified those required military capabilities that are 
considered to be necessary in order to successfully boost European military 
crisis management capability. On the general level this has taken the form 
of Headline Goals – first the Helsinki Headline Goal and later the Headline 
Goal 2010 – which describe the general requirements of future European 
military forces. On the more specific level the military capability goals 
spell out the more detailed requirements that must be met in order to turn 
today’s European military forces into capable forces of the future – ones 
that can fulfil the roles and missions described by the headline goal and the 
politico-strategic guidance of projected missions. 
 
The idea of introducing security and defence issues to the European agenda 
gained momentum during the Cold War. The reactivation of WEU in the 
mid-1980s was one pragmatic step in this process. The easing of super-
power tensions in the latter part of the 1980s and the subsequent end of the 
Cold War facilitated the explicit articulation and development of European 
foreign and security policy, supported later by a common security and de-
fence policy and the development of a progressively framed military capa-
bility for crisis management tasks. The inclusion of the defence and mili-
tary dimension into the Union during the 1990s was not only possible due 
to the changing international security landscape, but was also deemed nec-
essary, as the increasing political significance of Europe in the world also 
called for the means to deal with the diverse crises taking place particularly 
in eastern Europe and more generally throughout the world. This logic was 
reinforced by the argument that a European pillar within NATO should be 
strengthened.  
 
In the articulation of possible EU military missions, the lack of historical 
‘baggage’ – from the Union’s perspective, not so much from the perspec-
tive of individual member states – has facilitated the focus on the new mis-
sions of the post-Cold War era. In addition, the strong transatlantic link in-
herited from the Cold War and the existence of NATO as the western col-
lective defence organisation have directed the emerging European military 
efforts to be able to take on non-article 5 types of missions. Still, just as the 
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strengthening of the European military capabilities has also benefited the 
Atlantic Alliance, the general idea of a militarily more capable and active 
Europe has been accepted and embraced on both sides of the Atlantic – al-
though some concerns have been expressed by the US throughout the proc-
ess of creating a stronger autonomous European military dimension. 
 
In the process of defining and articulating the projected military missions 
of the Union, several factors have come together to influence the route 
taken. The end of the Cold War has facilitated the process by which the EU 
has become an actor with a regional and, lately, global military agenda. The 
multitude of post-Cold War humanitarian catastrophes due to new wars or 
civil wars has prompted the desire to manage and prevent these conflicts 
for humanitarian reasons and in order to preserve and bolster international 
stability. Particularly the wars of Yugoslavian succession have pushed the 
European military dimension forward. In addition, NATO’s intra-alliance 
dynamics have added to the ‘pressure’ for Europe to create usable military 
capabilities. The gap in military technologies and capabilities between the 
US and its European allies has been showcased consecutively in the Persian 
Gulf, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, and in Afghanistan. The resulting pressure 
from this widening gap not only stems from the US efforts to get Europe to 
build more and better capabilities, but also from the European understand-
ing that it should keep up with the US to such an extent that military coop-
eration between Europe and the US remains a viable possibility also in the 
future. While NATO is the main framework for US-Europe military con-
sultation and cooperation, links between the US and the EU, and NATO 
and the EU also in military matters were clearly strengthened after the de-
cision to include security and defence issues in the Union’s agenda was 
made. 
 
The effects of 9/11 have also impacted the framing of the Union’s pro-
jected military missions. First, taking into account the lessons of Kosovo 
concerning the poor ability of the Europeans to operate militarily alongside 
the US, the post-9/11 US choice to cooperate militarily with those countries 
that have operational offensive military capabilities has further highlighted 
the capability gap between the US and Europe. As a result, the Union has 
faced pressures to take more vigorous steps in its capability improvement 
process. Second, the American declaration of the War on Terror and the 
raising of terrorism to the top of the list of threats facing the EU have 
meant the surfacing of a need to reappraise projected missions in the post-
9/11 world. The Petersberg tasks do not provide a basis for the use of mili-
tary means against terrorism, and after the Union decided to use all possible 
means against terrorism – including military ones – the need to redefine the 
tasks or at least to add some new tasks to the already existing Petersberg 
tasks surfaced. Thus the notion that the Union might decide to support third 
countries in combating terrorism was accepted. 
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The guiding principle of constructing an autonomous European military 
capability for crisis management operations has not meant departing from 
the general notions within NATO concerning contemporary western mili-
tary tasks or constitutive elements of today’s military power. This is not 
very surprising, as a vast majority of NATO members are also member of 
the European Union. Thus the European Union’s military project has been 
built upon practically the same foundations with NATO, but taking into 
account the possibility of ‘purely’ European military operations – with or 
without NATO assets. Taking into account the different nature of NATO 
and the EU – the former is a military alliance and the latter a more wide 
ranging political union with a defence dimension – it is to be expected that 
within NATO the shared military provisions and tasks are more encom-
passing and ‘demanding’ than within the EU. The very recent launching of 
the European military project also means that within the institutional struc-
tures of the EU the shared conceptualisations of a European defence di-
mension – the ‘proper’ role of the EU in global security affairs and the re-
sulting defence policies and military capabilities needed – are being articu-
lated for the first time. 
 
In the post-Cold War era European project of developing military capabili-
ties the link between the European Union and NATO has been strong. 
From the very first formulations of a European Security and Defence Iden-
tity to the articulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Euro-
pean Security and Defence Policy, and the practical ways to implement 
these policies have been connected to the pre-existing structures and proce-
dures of NATO. Although NATO itself has been undergoing several proc-
esses of transformation in the post-Cold War era, it has been a reference 
point for the EU’s military crisis management capability development and 
the articulation of European defence policies. This has been so for several 
reasons. First, while it was acknowledged in Washington that the Europe-
ans needed to develop their military capabilities in the new security envi-
ronment of the post-Cold War era, any attempts to develop autonomous 
European military capabilities outside the traditional transatlantic forum – 
NATO – have been watched with caution and scepticism in the US. Sec-
ond, the already existing structures of military cooperation within NATO 
provided familiar and sedimented channels for the development of allies’ 
military capabilities. In addition, with the declining defence budgets of the 
1990s, any unnecessary duplication in defence matters has been avoided on 
both sides of the Atlantic. 
 
Looking at the European project to build autonomous military capabilities 
for Petersberg crisis management tasks and lately also for some additional 
tasks from the theoretical perspective presented in Chapters 4 and 5, the 
close link between NATO and the EU is expected. As most European 
NATO member states are also members of the EU, it is rather logical that 
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the shared understandings of military missions and constituent elements of 
military power framed for half a century within NATO would provide the 
foundation upon which the European project can be built. The shared west-
ern understandings concerning threats, the nature of war, and the constitu-
ent elements of military power that have existed and evolved for five dec-
ades within NATO are not disappearing from European intersubjective 
knowledge as the NATO framework is being ‘replaced’ with a EU one. 
Similarly, the developed common operating procedures and standards 
within NATO have developed into such sedimented structures of influence 
(inertia) that an attempt to devise ‘purely’ European way to organise and 
conceptualise the EU’s defence dimension would be impractical, not to 
mention impossible to conceive. 
 
The shared understandings concerning the constitutive elements of military 
power within the EU are based on the shared ideas of what is threatening 
the member states in a way that requires military preparations and for what 
purposes the Union must be prepared to use armed force. In respect to the 
faced threats within the EU, the explicit and implicit articulations of threats 
and risks are practically identical to those of NATO. However, the nature 
of potential EU military missions deviates somewhat from those of NATO. 
This feature derives from the different, though converging, natures of these 
two institutions: while NATO is transforming from a defence alliance to-
wards international crisis management consortium, the European Union has 
started to develop its military dimension particularly for crisis management 
operations.  
 
Looking at the constitutive elements of military power within the frame-
work of the EU, it becomes obvious that the trend within NATO of accen-
tuating rapidly usable expeditionary capabilities and the exploitation of ad-
vanced technologies, is also guiding the construction of EU’s autonomous 
military capability. Naturally the very close contacts between NATO and 
the EU, as well as the dual membership in both organisations by a vast ma-
jority of the member states, has led to the rather identical conceptualisa-
tions of military power. It is noteworthy that the accentuation of usable 
military capabilities within European NATO members, and the transforma-
tion of NATO coincide with the rapid development of autonomous military 
capability within the European Union. Both of these highly intermingled 
processes build on the end of the Cold War and the subsequent changes in 
the nature of contemporary warfare and the related western possibilities to 
respond rapidly by relying upon smaller, better-trained forces with better 
high-tech equipment. 
 
Most of the momentum for developing post-Cold War era RMA forces 
emanates from the United States. Analysing the EU framework, the influ-
ence of the United States on the European conceptualisations of military 
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power through the RMA is most clearly visible in the way the US has 
viewed NATO. After all, the US has been pressing vigorously for the de-
velopment of European military capabilities within NATO according to the 
RMA requirements – under the rubric of interoperability or narrowing the 
gap. In addition, the military capability dimension of the EU has been de-
veloped in tandem with NATO as cost-effectiveness and (alliance-)political 
reasons have demanded caution in this field. Furthermore, the member 
states of the EU – even those who are not members of NATO – have wit-
nessed the supremacy of American military capabilities in the interstate 
wars of the 1990s and the new millennium. These capabilities also provide 
possibilities to engage troops and apply military force in the kind of opera-
tions that the Union has been planning – peace operations of different kinds 
– although they do not totally replace the need to have the ‘traditional’ 
peacekeeping troops, the soldiers on the ground.  
 
  
8.3. Transformation of the Post-Cold War Era Determinants of Military 
Power – The European Perspective 
 
The post-Cold War era process of rewriting or redefining threats and the 
nature of military confrontations within the west has been a continuous 
step-by-step process. With the progression of time and the fading of the 
Cold War era paradigm of war, the post-Cold War era ‘new’ realities have 
become injected within the European conceptualisations of war and mili-
tary power. 
 
The development of military capabilities of both NATO and the EU reflect 
the general shared western understanding about the need to transform 
armed forces in order to be effective and useful in the new – still evolving – 
security environment of the post-Cold War era. The underlying conceptu-
alisations of the constitutive elements of military power within these trans-
atlantic and European frameworks have been rather consonant with the 
American promulgated vision of military transformation through the RMA. 
Although the concept of the RMA has never evolved into a catchword in 
Europe, the central message of the American-led RMA discourse has char-
acterised rather widely the terms of the European policies of developing 
new transformed and useful military capabilities for the ongoing and future 
military conflicts during the post-Cold War era. Small, mobile, and effec-
tive forces – equipped with advanced military technology – characterise the 
projected European fighting forces, whether used in military crisis man-
agement or other more high-intensity missions.  
 
The realisation of what might be called a moderate European RMA is to be 
carried out through the process of transforming the militaries according to 
the model provided by the United States. While the proposed American 
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RMA capabilities, and the related operational concepts, and organisational 
innovations will mostly be out of reach of the Europeans, the direction of 
force transformation is similar to that of the US. Thus, while currently not 
being able – or willing – to compete with the United States in the field of 
military power, the Europeans have accepted the overwhelmingly US-
defined understandings of the constitutive elements of military power in the 
post-Cold War era despite some differences in assessing the terrorist threat 
and disagreements over the proper way to counter this threat.  
 
When comparing the three western agents of this study – the US, NATO, 
and the EU – the EU has been the least prone to participate in the American 
RMA. While the Union has not espoused the RMA officially in its efforts 
to develop and broaden the scope of the CFSP and the ESDP, it has fol-
lowed the route embarked upon by NATO in the late 1990s – that of accen-
tuating the transformation of national armed forces by exploiting the possi-
bilities of high-tech military systems and the benefits offered by them. In 
addition, the Union has expressed its willingness to expand the potential 
repertoire of its missions with the increase of its military capability and fol-
lowing the changing nature of the international security situation, particu-
larly the effects of 9/11. 
 
The conceptualisation of military power according to the logic of the RMA 
discourse was consolidated in the US between 1995 and 1997. In Europe, 
the corresponding change started to take root explicitly in 1999. By that 
time the wars of Yugoslavian succession had already shown the brutal face 
of post-Cold War era new wars and highlighted the limited European capa-
bilities for military action. During the late 1998 and early 1999, military 
confrontation in Kosovo started to look probable. By that time NATO was 
developing its approach to ameliorating European military capabilities – 
through the DCI. Similarly, the European Union began a rapid process of 
developing its security and defence dimension – including usable military 
capabilities.  
 
The conceptualisations of effective military power within NATO and the 
EU were ‘formed’ within the framework of the American RMA discourse 
and the intentional US policy of exporting the premises and capabilities 
related to the ‘emerging RMA’. In addition to the need to acquire useful 
military instruments to confront the new post-Cold War era security chal-
lenges and risks, the European path of ‘modest’ accentuation of RMA 
forces and capabilities has been taken only after considerable American 
RMA prodding: intentional attempts to make the Europeans follow the path 
of the American DoD – transformation through exploiting the RMA. 
 
It needs to be accentuated that the notion of shared western conceptualisa-
tions of military power according to the RMA discourse are not totally co-
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herent, fully shared, or without tensions. As was claimed in Chapter 4, the 
continuous process of redefining shared understandings contains controver-
sial as well as taken-for-granted aspects. It is the very essence of shared 
understandings – particularly concerning their transformation – that some 
level of conceptual ‘struggle’ is involved. Thus shared understandings are 
never 100% shared, and this applies also to shared western understandings 
of military power. However, in estimating the post-Cold War era processes 
of (re)constructing military power within the framework of evolving shared 
conceptualisations of war, the US-originated and dominated discourse of 
the RMA has provided the west with one ‘successful’ reading of the effec-
tive and legitimate means of playing an active role in post-Cold War era 
military confrontations.  
 
The RMA discourse has been connected to the Cold War era understand-
ings of war and military power, but at the same time has opened up the 
possibility of devising and using military force innovatively at a time when 
the nature of the international system is perceived to be undergoing a proc-
ess of change. Combined with the other discerned post-Cold War era dis-
courses of war, the discourse of the RMA has not only been part of the 
western process of reconstructing the constituent elements of effective and 
legitimate military power. It has also been part of the wider process of re-
constructing war in the aftermath of the demise of the Cold War.  
 
The United States ‘inherited’ strong expeditionary forces when the Cold 
War came to an end. Its military-technological sophistication and the large 
quantity of its offensive military capabilities were second to none. In 
Europe the situation was very different. Comprised of many small or me-
dium-sized states with only very limited expeditionary capabilities, the 
European governments faced the end of the Cold War with more decentral-
ised political decision-making structures and with only a very limited arse-
nal of usable military instruments. In addition, the European ambitions re-
lated to the maintenance and use of military capabilities had not developed 
to the level of US ambitions during the decades of the Cold War. Through-
out that period, Europe was preparing itself to be helped by American mili-
tary capabilities in battles taking place on European soil. 
 
When comparing the European development of military capabilities with 
that of the United States during the post-Cold War era, it is noteworthy that 
in Europe the speed and momentum of devising new military concepts, 
forces, and equipment has been relatively moderate and limited. Taking 
into consideration the above-mentioned aspects of the European Cold War 
era defence strategies and forces – as well as the dominating role of the US 
within the Cold War era western alliance – this is hardly that surprising. 
But the limited post-Cold War era European reconceptualisation of military 
power – to the extent that this has occurred within the NATO processes of 
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the DCI and NATO transformation as well as the development of autono-
mous military capabilities within the EU – has followed the American lead. 
When the redefined European interests regarding the use of military force 
became expressed in more concrete terms at the turn of the millennium, the 
road to be followed had already been ‘defined’ by the US. The discourse of 
the Revolution in Military Affairs had become more than an academic dis-
course concerning the rewriting of modern warfare, or ‘pure’ political 
‘rhetoric’ concerning the American attempts to spread the idea of an RMA. 
The spreading of the post-Cold War era RMA discourse emanated also 
from the practical instances of US-led military action and the generally in-
ferred lessons learned from those operations.  
 
With the inclusion of catastrophic terrorism among the top security threats 
or risks after the surprise attacks of 9/11, the logic of creating rapidly us-
able autonomous European military capabilities was strengthened. In addi-
tion, the calls for increased European contributions within the transatlantic 
alliance in order to narrow the existing technology gap – or capabilities gap 
– between the US and the European members of NATO were strengthened 
as the dangerousness of the ‘new’ terrorist threat was revealed. One possi-
ble avenue for the military response to catastrophic terrorism was ‘within’ 
the RMA discourse. Rapid reaction forces with high technology intelli-
gence and communications systems and precision weapons provide possi-
bilities for traditional large-scale military operations, military crisis man-
agement, and counter-terrorist operations. This quality of the RMA dis-
course – its offer of effective military solutions to practically all envisioned 
post-Cold War and post-9/11 western military engagements – has facili-
tated its ‘rise’ into the shared western understandings of the constitutive 
elements of military power. 
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9. WAR AND MILITARY POWER IN THE POST-COLD 
WAR ERA 
     
 
This study has been animated by a need to understand the consequences of 
the end of the Cold War for the shared western understandings of war and 
military power. The analysis of war and military power has traditionally 
been at the core of international relations research in general and realism-
oriented strategic studies particularly. During the Cold War the dominant 
position of realism – within IR and strategic studies – was supported by 
disciplinary and international political circumstances. By the time the Cold 
War was coming to an end, the first-order theorising of realism had been 
challenged for decades, and the second-order theorising was coming under 
attack when the debate between positivists and post-positivists started to 
dominate scholarly activities. Although realism – in a multitude of diverse 
and even contradictory forms – has retained a significant or even main-
stream position within the discipline, its overwhelmingly dominant role has 
receded and given way to other theoretical constructs. As an expression of 
the increasing theoretical polyphony within the discipline of IR and the 
subject of strategic studies, this study has aimed at engaging realism and 
explaining the changing nature of war and military power during the post-
Cold War era. 
 
The dual task of this study called for a review of the Cold War era interpre-
tation or expression of realism in IR studies related to military power be-
fore attempting to conceptualise and explain the changing nature of war 
and military power from an alternative perspective – one that has not tried 
to refute or neglect realism, but rather engage it. Moving beyond realism to 
postmodernism – in Chapters 2 and 3 – and the articulation of a theoretical 
framework for analysing war and military power – the constructivist 
framework in Chapters 4 and 5 – was conceptualised as a dialectical proc-
ess of reaching a synthesis through the promulgation of a thesis and an an-
tithesis. It is noteworthy that the synthesis – the ‘paradigm of war’ frame-
work – is based on the interplay of realism and postmodernism on the one 
hand, and different versions of constructivism on the other. The ‘paradigm 
of war’ formulation is not unsympathetic to the classical realist writers, 
particularly to the more sociological European realists. The criticism of re-
alism is based on Cold War era interpretations of these classical realist 
writers and the ‘scientification’ of realism, accompanied by an attempt to 
apply methods from the natural sciences and to emphasise theoretical par-
simony at the expense of historical context. 
 
Chapter 4 explicated the general constructivist framework of this study, 
accentuating the important roles of socially positioned actors, norms and 
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rules of the international system, social and material resources, as well as 
of historically structured meaningful action. Chapter 4 also presented a 
morphogenetic methodology that does justice to the historical path of 
events and their effects on the present conditions of the international sys-
tem, while at the same time noting the importance of agents’ practices in 
continuously directing the historical path into the future.  My account of the 
changing nature of war and military power has been based on theory-
dependent generative mechanisms and concrete contingencies that have 
together produced particular outcomes. This explanatory format explicitly 
rejects the positivist ideal of objective laws and regularities in social sci-
ences. The positivist conceptualisation of military power – the bedrock of 
the Cold War era strategic studies – creates an illusion of a predetermined 
future that can be approached objectively. The ahistorical caricature of 
military power sketched by the realist wing of IR studies is based on quan-
tified indicators and the natural laws of human existence. Thus, for the 
positivist, the process of understanding the genesis – through reproduction 
or transformation – of military power by agents is a futile enterprise.  
 
The theoretical framework and adjoining constitutive explanatory format of 
this study have thus sought to downplay the objectivity often assigned to 
military power. The importance of unforeseen contingencies and historical 
context has been emphasised. The question of what constitutes military 
power is not only a question of developing effective military systems for 
the Armed Forces. It is also connected to the questions of what kind of mis-
sions the armed forces should be prepared to undertake, and in which situa-
tions is the use of military force appropriate, possible, or indeed necessary. 
The constructivist theoretical framework and the constitutive explanatory 
format thus envision the future being made by the interaction of agents’ 
practices and the intervention of contingencies. 
 
The general theoretical framework was elaborated for the case study of 
shared western understandings of military power in Chapter 5 – under the 
title of the ‘paradigm of war’ framework. This framework accentuates 1) 
the shared understandings concerning the character of threats that require 
military preparations, 2) the shared understandings of the nature of war – 
i.e. the objectives that can legitimately be sought with warfare, and the 
means of warfare that are legitimate – and 3) the shared understandings 
concerning the constitutive elements of military power. In addition, the 
framework accentuates the material factors related to the 4) prevailing level 
of technology, and 5) the distribution of material resources within the in-
ternational system.  In this context it was assumed that within the west – 
described as a historical, not a geographical construct – a shared paradigm 
of war exists, meaning a rather similar outlook towards war and military 
power. For analytical purposes of this study, the concept of the west was 
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limited to the United States and Europe – the latter covering the mem-
bership area of NATO and the EU. 
 
The following chapters – Chapters 6-8 – approached war and military 
power according to the ‘paradigm of war’ framework. The case study on 
shared western understandings of military power accentuated the Cold War 
paradigm of war and the post-Cold War era discourses of war that chal-
lenged this sedimented and ossified paradigm and opened up possibilities 
for rearticulation or redefinition of post-Cold War era shared western un-
derstandings of military power.  
 
The analysis of today’s shared western understandings of military power in 
Chapter 6 focused on the changing aspects of the international systems’ 
social structure after the demise of the Cold War. The norms and rules of 
the Cold War were challenged, as states and other agents faced the end of 
the Cold War and the ‘new’ or ‘emerging’ post-Cold War era. Without ex-
plicit or taken-for-granted corresponding ‘new’ shared understandings 
about the constitutive and regulative rules of the new era, agents began to 
construct these norms and rules by their actions – mostly in reactionary 
ways – and thus either reproduced or transformed the Cold War era ac-
cepted and taken-for-granted norms and rules of the system. The address of 
President George H. Bush before a joint session of the Congress on the 
Persian Gulf Crisis and the federal budget deficit on 11 September 1990 is 
a revealing case in point: 
 
We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the 
Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move to-
ward an historic period of cooperation. … Today that new world is strug-
gling to be born, a world quite different from the one we’ve known. … 
This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He 
and other leaders from Europe, the Gulf, and around the world understand 
how we manage this crisis today could shape the future for generations to 
come.
1
 
 
Chapter 6 also focused on the historically structured meaningful action 
through the prism of military power in a snapshot-like picture of today’s 
shared western understandings of military power. It did so by analysing 
some recently published official security strategies and other security-
related declarations made by western officials. Thus, while Chapter 5 
elaborated the Cold War era ‘baseline’ of western understandings of war 
and military power, Chapter 6 discussed the current western view on them. 
Together these chapters then provided the ground for the process tracing 
analysis of the post-Cold War era shared western understandings of mili-
                                               
1
 Bush (1990). 
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tary power by analysing the historically structured meaningful action 
within the ‘paradigm of war’ framework. 
 
Chapters 7 and 8 – respectively – analysed how certain key military re-
sources and past military actions have been bestowed with meaning and 
significance in the US and in Europe during the post-Cold War era. Both 
chapters acknowledged – and indeed traced – the historical path of events 
and its effects on the subsequent (present) conditions of the international 
system from the perspective of military power. This process-tracing enter-
prise was guided by the analytically selected and defined case of the Revo-
lution in Military Affairs. Chapters 7 and 8 were designed to explain – in 
constitutive fashion – the process through which the Cold War era shared 
western conceptualisations of military power have transformed into those 
of today. With their emphasis on meaning, sequence, and contingency, 
Chapters 7 and 8 provided empirical material for analysing the post-Cold 
War era western redefinition of military power. Explaining the transforma-
tion of military power has thus relied on the sequential interplay of struc-
tural conditioning, social interaction, and structural elaboration.  
 
The analysis in Chapters 6-8 led to the conclusion that the American-
originated discourse of RMA has been at the heart of the shared western 
understandings of military power. Chapter 7 shows the path. The American 
defence establishment ‘accepted’ the notion of RMA at the middle of the 
1990s. A few years later the RMA was officially espoused within the US 
DoD and by the President of the United States as the vehicle with which 
the US Armed Forces were to be transformed. The rationale for this trans-
formation flowed from the end of the Cold War and the subsequent need to 
be prepared to wage ‘new’ wars of the coming century. 
 
Chapter 8 focused on the European – and transatlantic – conceptualisations 
of military power, concluding that within Europe the shared understandings 
of military power have also been defined within the discourse of the RMA. 
On the European side this development has been considerably slower and 
more moderate than in the United States. This discussion was also ex-
pressed less explicitly and later than in the US. NATO has been the forum 
within which Europeans have – together with the United States – redefined 
the projected tasks of the military and the constitutive elements of military 
power. The developing security and defence dimension of the European 
Union also reflects the lessons of the RMA discourse in the Union’s project 
to create and transform military capabilities, although less explicitly and 
with more restricted goals than is the case with NATO. 
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9.1. Socially Positioned Actors and Shared Western Understandings 
       of War and Military Power in the Post-Cold War Era 
 
In is noteworthy that the general constructivist framework of Chapter 4 
provides an additional broader perspective on the ‘paradigm of war’ 
framework. While the latter focuses upon the emergence, transformation, 
and withering away of several discourses of war within the international 
system or within the west, the former focuses upon the socially positioned 
actors, norms and rules of the international system, resources, and histori-
cally structured, meaningful action. In this way the general constructivist 
framework elaborates and builds upon the analysis of the ‘paradigm of war’ 
framework. After all, this framework accentuates historically structured 
action and the norms and rules of the international system. 
 
Accordingly, the end of the Cold War was a reproduction crisis for the 
western states. With the ‘old’ paradigmatic threat gone, the norms and rules 
of the international system, as well as the identities of western states, were 
open to redefinition for the first time in several decades. As it was no 
longer possible to define western military policy and response on the basis 
of a Soviet threat, new determinants or signifiers were ‘needed’.  
 
The United States found itself as the only superpower of the international 
system when the Soviet Union disintegrated and withdrew from its former 
empire. Its purpose or rationale for action – now as the sole superpower – 
was perceived to be in need of reinterpretation. While the identity and in-
terests of the United States were under renegotiation after the end of the 
Cold War, the resources at the disposal of the US were on a relatively 
higher level that during the Cold War. Now, without peers, the political, 
military, and economic resources of the United States were unmatched.  
 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was one significant intervention of con-
tingency in the larger chain of events related to the ending of the Cold War. 
The United States used this event in an effort to redefine the emerging post-
Cold War world by orchestrating a multinational response to Iraq’s aggres-
sion. As an incipient rationale for military intervention of the post-Cold 
War era, the American-promulgated “New World Order” was an attempt to 
define the nature of the post-Cold War era international system on Ameri-
can terms.  
 
Also the Europeans hailed the end of the Cold War. After all, had the threat 
of the Soviet Union resulted in military invasion, that invasion would have 
taken place in Europe. In the beginning of the 1990s the European nations 
had only scant military resources at their collective disposal. Although 
some countries had usable offensive military expeditionary capabilities 
during the Cold War and its demise (mostly Britain and France) the bulk of 
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the operational and usable expeditionary forces of NATO were American. 
The European Community was not a credible political, not to mention a 
military, actor. It had focused mostly on the economic sector during the 
Cold War. Thus, while many European governments accepted the Ameri-
can lead in the response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait – and some even sent 
troops, supplies, or provided monetary resources for the costs of the 1991 
war – they did so under American leadership and on American terms. 
 
While the emerging and developing nature of the post-Cold War era inter-
national system facilitated cuts in the military budgets and forces of west-
ern armed forces, the ‘new’ essence of the international system did not 
emerge with the successful termination of the Gulf War. Although the rapid 
capitulation of Iraq to the superior American military capabilities provided 
lessons concerning the importance of high-technology military systems in 
warfare, these lessons were based on the assumption that US troops would 
have to be deployed far from US territory, indeed globally – when and 
wherever the stability of the international system was threatened. Thus, 
rather than being objective lessons applicable to all agents within the inter-
national system, the RMA lessons of the Gulf War advocated an interven-
tionist, technocentric, and offensive view of post-Cold War era warfare. 
 
The gaps in the western military horizon caused by the demise of the Cold 
War were partially filled with the lessons of the 1991 Gulf War. Under 
American leadership, the west came to be defined militarily more through 
military intervention outside the western territory than had been the case 
during the Cold War, when the focus was on defending Western Europe. 
This process of identity-transformation – i.e. changing the role of the armed 
forces for the west – was easier and more natural for the US than for 
Europe. After all, the US had planned, trained, and procured intervention 
forces for decades while most of the Europeans had relied on more static 
territorial defence forces. However, within the context of NATO, the con-
cept of engaging in ‘new’ missions outside of alliance territory was gradu-
ally embraced. 
 
While the emergence and development of the American RMA discourse 
was based on the military technological lessons of Operation Desert Storm, 
its influences were not felt for several years within the international system. 
Rather, after the Gulf War, the emerging ‘new’ wars confronted the west 
with a new problem. Again under American leadership, peace operations 
and military crisis management to prevent, contain, or limit the destruc-
tiveness of new wars rose in significance, as traditional territorial defence 
missions lost some – though not all – of the importance previously ac-
corded to them. 
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Although the next interventions of contingencies in Somalia, former Yugo-
slavia, Rwanda and Burundi, Haiti, and East-Timor did not strengthen the 
case of humanitarian interventions, from the military perspective the west 
was increasingly defined by the capability to intervene militarily outside of 
one’s own territorial area: The traditional threat of large-scale armed ag-
gression receded during the 1990s and practically all the western military 
missions conducted during the 1990s were peace operations conducted un-
der US leadership. Military relevance in the west was increasingly con-
nected to the ability to take part in multinational military operations. In 
practical terms this meant interoperability with the US, as no other agent 
was able to mount a large-scale military operation for a lengthy period of 
time – exceeding several months. 
 
The domestic American RMA debate gradually gained momentum after the 
1991 Gulf War. Originating within the US DoD it quickly spread to the 
larger defence establishment, including the think tanks and the American 
defence industry. The strengthening of the American RMA discourse and 
its injection into official defence policy during the mid-1990s were con-
nected to the perceived need to reconfigure the role of the Armed Forces 
domestically vis-à-vis the declining defence budgets and troop strengths, as 
well as to the process of reconstructing the post-Cold War US identity in 
view of its exclusive superpower status and the new understanding of what 
constituted military power after the end of the Cold War.  
 
The American RMA discourse provided possibilities to redefine military 
power during an era when the old system was acknowledged to have ended 
but the new defining features of the post-Cold War era were still in the 
making. While, at first, the RMA provided a vision for the development of 
American Armed Forces based on a projection of what the post-Cold War 
era military conflicts would be like, its implications for redefining military 
power more generally within the international system on American terms 
were soon acknowledged. Within a year after the official adoption of the 
RMA concept in the American defence policy, the European allies were 
facing pressure to follow the American lead.  
 
Once articulated, the American RMA thesis offered to transform conceptu-
alisations of military engagements and needed military instruments – corre-
sponding to the change related to the end of the Cold War – while at the 
same time it still reproduced the state-centric focus on military affairs. 
Thus, on the one hand, the RMA thesis provided a sense of continuity for 
the US DoD during the unpredictable post-Cold War era. On the other hand 
the RMA-discourse was in tune with the process of redefining the post-
Cold War era American military identity and interests – the sole super-
power coming to terms with the new exigencies and rationale for its mili-
tary actions within the international system. The RMA thus offered a means 
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by which the US could adapt its military capability and respond appropri-
ately to new threats with the weakening of the sedimented Cold War era 
social structure of the international system. 
 
The American RMA discourse, and the US policy of orchestrating a Euro-
pean strategy to exploit the RMA did more than just serve the purpose of 
transforming the armed forces by investing in advanced technologies. It 
also promoted a particular understanding of war and of the role of the US 
and the west in managing the international security situation. Although 
RMA capabilities could be used in traditional large-scale mechanised war 
in defence of national/alliance territory, its implications for the shared 
understandings of war were mostly related to the shift from these 
traditional military missions to global intervention capability and the 
offensive use of military force. All of the practical lessons of the emerging 
RMA were inferred from the outcomes of military missions that did not 
correspond to the Cold War era understanding of conventional war. Even 
though 1991 Gulf War, which raised the RMA into the American strategic 
discourse, came closest to the traditional Cold War era understanding of 
war, it also furthered the ‘new’ western outlook on war – offensive inter-
vention outside the traditionally conceptualised theatre – Europe. 
 
By the end of the 1990s, then, the Cold War era norm of non-intervention 
had evolved into a more contested and conditional approach to solving in-
ternational problems with military implications. This was not only reflected 
in the more active use of military force in many post-Cold War interven-
tions by the US and NATO, but also in the development of the European 
Security and Defence Policy, and subsequently the development of the 
EU’s capability to intervene rapidly under the battlegroup concept. Simul-
taneously with the weakening of the norm of non-intervention, the United 
States began to press for the development of a European RMA in order to 
facilitate future military cooperation on US terms.  
 
During the first years of the new millennium, Europeans have taken the 
first steps – though relatively cautiously compared to the US – in the proc-
ess of realising a limited European RMA capability within NATO and the 
EU. This caution has been caused by at least two intersecting factors. First, 
the Europeans have come to terms with the post-Cold War era military con-
flicts and the need for western responses to them. During the first decade 
after the Cold War, the west committed itself to the more active use of mili-
tary force for crisis management in the expectation that embracing the 
RMA would provide effective and useful military capabilities to take neces-
sary military action. Second, as has explicitly been argued within the EU, 
Europeans have accepted that it is in their interests to allow the EU to take 
its ‘proper’ role in the world – meaning that it should increase its ability to 
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intervene militarily to defuse crises – and they have internalised the Ameri-
can view of military power in the post-Cold War era. 
 
In the US and in Europe, the espousing of RMA thinking has been con-
nected to the process of redefining military identities and interests in the 
post-Cold War world. While differences of magnitude and scope still re-
main between the US and the Europeans in their different RMA exploita-
tion strategies, the rather straightforward acceptance of RMA by the Euro-
peans has meant a partial fulfilment of the vision of President George W. 
Bush – namely the redefinition of war according to US standards. The sole 
superpower status of the United States – inherited from the Cold War era – 
has provided it with social and material resources to operate as a lead 
agent in the redefinition of shared western understandings of war and mili-
tary power during the post-Cold War era.  
 
The response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 – the global War on Terror – 
has explicitly redefined the American view of international norms: the ‘old’ 
restrictions concerning the use of military force do not apply if the re-
quirements of US national security make them obsolete. Similarly, the US 
has redefined itself as the leader in the global struggle against terrorism. 
With its policy of the more assertive use of military force, and a clearly 
promulgated global leadership position, the US has advanced and ex-
panded the pre-9/11 vision of redefining war on US terms by devising new 
technologies of war to include the redefinition of threats and risks and the 
rearticulation of the legitimate means of warfare – unilateral and pre-
emptive use of military force against emerging threats and risks. 
 
These emerging threats and risks have not led to a similar revision of mili-
tary priorities in Europe. While some European governments have partici-
pated in the US-led War on Terror – e.g. Britain, Italy, and Denmark – the 
development within NATO and the European Union in military terms has 
been more limited. Both organisations have declared terrorism to be the 
defining security threat of today, but neither shares the militarised response 
taken by the US. Nevertheless, the topic of countering terrorism with mili-
tary force has now been placed on the European agenda. Corresponding to 
the slow start and a more limited European RMA exploitation strategy 
compared to the US, the military dimension of the post-9/11 terrorist threat 
has explicitly been defined by the US. The limited European military re-
sponse to terrorism is taking place mostly within the US defined War on 
Terror.  
 
In all, the post-Cold War era redefinition of American and European mili-
tary priorities – and these in the west in general – have been associated 
with the changing character of military threats as well as the emerged real-
ity of new wars and the need to contain them. In addition – as a derivative 
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of the changing nature of threats and the nature of war – the foundations of 
the entire western military establishment have been redefined in terms of 
the development and use of technologically advanced expeditionary inter-
vention capabilities. The United States has been the lead agent in this proc-
ess, but the Europeans have gradually participated in it more actively by 
not only adapting to the new military exigencies of the post-Cold War era, 
but also by helping to define them.  
 
While Europe has not embraced an explicit RMA exploitation strategy, the 
spreading of the American RMA thesis to Europe has meant that the post-
Cold War era process of redefining shared western understandings of war 
have converged around the shift from defending national/alliance territory 
towards more active and more interventionist use of military force within a 
larger geographical area. Although the discourse of the RMA has not been 
the only element in the process of redefining war in the post-Cold war era, 
its implications have been wider than the overtly technological focus on the 
RMA discourse implies. The RMA is not ‘just’ about effective military 
systems! 
 
 
9.2. Socially Constructed Material Resources 
 
The United States and Western Europe won the Cold War. With the demise 
of the superpower confrontation and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
the United States remains the only truly global superpower with wide-
ranging interests and unrivalled political, economic, military, and cultural 
resources. At the end of the Cold War, Europe was still politically, militar-
ily and culturally fragmented, although its economic power has since in-
creased.  
 
In addition to the military identity crisis caused by the end of the Cold War, 
the demise of the cemented rules of the superpower confrontation started to 
challenge the material military aspects of American power. After all, its 
superpower status was based militarily on the possession of a vast number 
of sophisticated nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, large-scale 
mechanised armed forces, and the capability to transport large number of 
troops and heavy military equipment to Europe and elsewhere. The chal-
lenge of the post-Cold War era emerged only gradually during the 1990s – 
particularly since the 1991 Gulf War had been waged successfully based on 
the Cold War formula. Still, as the new military realities of the post-Cold 
War era gradually emerged, the old determinants of military power were 
challenged. Armoured divisions, aircraft carriers, and strategic bombers 
seemed to be of limited usefulness in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former 
Yugoslavia. Nuclear weapons were even less useful than the conventional 
forces and equipment of the Cold War era. 
 325
From the European perspective, the weakening of the Cold War era rules of 
recognising military power was not as problematic as it was from the 
American perspective. The status of Europe in general, and of most of the 
individual European states, had not been defined by military might during 
the Cold War. American military preponderance in the west during the 
threatening decades of the Cold War had secured the safety of Europe, al-
though the Europeans had provided the bulk of NATO forces for the possi-
ble conventional war against the Soviet Union. Europe had no defence 
identity during the Cold War apart from NATO, and even the militarily 
most prominent European states – Britain and France with their nuclear ca-
pability – were militarily significant only as part of the western alliance.  
 
In addition to its overwhelming material military resources compared to 
those of its western partners, America also possessed formidable discursive 
resources. During the Cold War years, the American strategic community 
expanded as it elaborated and refined nuclear theorising and provided pol-
icy recommendations for decision-makers. Government agencies and think 
tanks in the US were at a much higher level than anywhere else in the west.  
 
Even with the acknowledged transformation of the international system as 
the Cold War ended and as the 1990s progressed, the inertia of the sedi-
mented Cold War era rules for recognising military power inhibited the 
promulgation of path breaking or totally new shared western understand-
ings of military power. However, with the reduced threat level after the end 
of the Cold War, the west was able to demobilise and disband many of the 
units that had been preparing to counter a possible Soviet invasion. It was 
at this juncture that the discourse of RMA was internalised within the US 
defence establishment. 
 
Within the American defence establishment, the emerging RMA discourse 
provided a new focus for the military vis-à-vis the lowering troop strengths 
and decreasing defence budgets. The emerging RMA discourse provided a 
proactive – rather than a reactive – view of military affairs, promising to 
replace the challenged Cold War era forces, platforms, and doctrines with a 
set of new, American-defined, military instruments. When the Cold War 
era military legacy was beginning to be conceptualised as an obstacle to 
military change and as a waste of money, the discourse of the RMA offered 
an empirically ‘tested’ vision of post-Cold War era warfare that promised 
to reverse the declining utility of America’s military resources vis-à-vis the 
new reality of war.  
 
Thus, in response to the slow gradual process of undermining the Cold War 
era determinants of military power, the embracing of the RMA discourse 
within US defence policy facilitated the rearticulation of US military lead-
ership within the west and more generally globally – particularly if others 
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acquiesced to it. Transformation of the armed forces by exploiting the 
Revolution in Military Affairs thus became not only one important aspect 
of the American defence policy in the latter part of the 1990s, but also a 
significant part of the US attempt to frame the post-Cold War era reality of 
war and military power within the west and throughout the international 
system. 
 
The Europeans have witnessed the actual deployment and utility of US-
defined military capabilities in the several post-Cold War era wars in which 
the west has had a stake – at least in relative terms when compared to the 
Cold War European legacy forces. The typical feature of these wars has 
been the use of military force in out-of-area offensive operations. And with 
the increasingly accepted European need to participate in military engage-
ments outside of Europe, the American RMA capabilities have offered a 
‘ready-made’ solution to the European problem of developing and procur-
ing military capabilities that are effective in the post-Cold War era interna-
tional system.  
 
Calling for the abandonment of the Cold War era military mindset when 
declaring the War on Terror, the George W. Bush Administration explicitly 
acknowledged the limited utility of many of the material military resources 
available during the Cold War era. In addition, the administration has 
turned what was an implicit American goal of the 1990s to redefine war 
and military power within the international system into an explicit project. 
Thus while the rationale for transforming the militaries by exploiting the 
RMA was promulgated already during the 1990s, the post-9/11 American 
view on war and the exploitation of RMA in order to fight the War on Ter-
ror have explicitly challenged the western Cold War era paradigm of war. 
 
 
9.3. Avenues for Further Research 
 
Even without a revolutionary paradigm shift within the western paradigm 
of war, and taking into account the incrementally transformed western con-
ceptualisations of war in general and military power particularly, the proc-
esses by which the west responded to the perceived need to transform the 
military calls for further research. This study has been focusing almost 
solely on the shared understandings related to war and military power in 
the US and Western Europe. These shared understandings have been inter-
preted within the constructivist ‘paradigm of war’ framework, analysing 
the publicly expressed post-Cold War era discourses that are related to the 
way that the west has conceptualised the threats that need to be countered 
with physical violence, the legitimate objectives and means of war, and the 
constitutive elements of military power.  
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Within its explicated research problematique and the constructivist theo-
retical framework, this study cannot provide all-encompassing answers re-
lated to the changing nature of war and military power within the interna-
tional system of the post-Cold War era. It has deal only with a small part in 
a larger set of possible research problems and questions. Based on the theo-
retical perspective of this study, there are many interesting areas of further 
research.  
 
First, this study calls for further research on the domestic US processes re-
lated to the emergence of the RMA discourse and related policies. The 
links between the US DoD, the US Armed Forces, defence industry and 
military contractors, as well as individual ‘opinion leaders’ within these 
and other defence institutions should be subjected to additional scientific 
scrutiny. These studies should concentrate not only on the importance of 
certain prominent figures – such as William Perry, Andrew Marshall, or 
William Owens – but focus more on the interplay of the changing interna-
tional security environment and the domestic US defence policy circles. In 
addition to the traditional methods of historiography, this kind of research 
should be based on a theoretical framework that would facilitate the writing 
of an analytical history of the emergence of American RMA conceptualisa-
tions. 
 
Second, this study lays the foundation for further research focusing upon 
the way in which the national American and European armed forces have 
been and are being transformed. This future research should take into ac-
count the projected military missions assigned to the armed forces and the 
corresponding military means aimed at delivering projected outcomes. In 
addition, the changing operational concepts, organisations, and procure-
ment priorities should be taken into account in studies of national militaries 
within the west. 
 
Third, this study also provides a theoretical basis for further research on 
other western national armed forces. Particularly the cases of Canada, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand could provide valuable additional perspectives.2  
 
Fourth, this study calls further research on the topics of non-western states 
and their conceptualisations of post-Cold War era threats, nature of war, 
and military power. Particularly interesting would be studies concerning 
Russia and China as representatives of existing and/or potential military 
great powers. In addition, studies of the reforms now being made within 
Russian and Chinese defence establishments and armed forces in the post-
                                               
2
 Also the case of Japan as a developed and modern state could provide interesting in-
sights concerning the redefinition of war, military power, and identity in the post-Cold 
War era.  
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Cold War era would provide additional valuable insight to the changing 
global understandings of war and military power. 
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APPENDIX  A  
 
 
Multilateral Interventions in the Post-Cold War Era 1989-20031 
 
 
Angola    (1989) 
Namibia    (1989) 
Nicaragua    (1989) 
Western Sahara   (1991) 
El Salvador   (1991) 
Cambodia    (1991) 
Croatia    [1992] (1996) 
Bosnia-Herzegovina   [1992] {1995} (1995) 
Somalia    (1992) {1992} [1993] 
Mozambique   (1992)  
Georgia    (1993) 
Liberia    (1993) 
Haiti    (1993) {1994} 
Rwanda   (1993) {1994} 
Tajikistan    (1994) 
Guatemala    (1997) 
Central African Republic  (1998) 
Sierra Leone  (1998) {2000} 
Kosovo    {1999} (1999) 
East-Timor   (1999) {1999} 
Democratic Republic of Congo  (1999) 
Afghanistan   {2002} (2002) 
Iraq    {2003} 
 
 
 
(1989) = year of ‘traditional’ UN peacekeeping mission. 
[1989] = year of coercive UN mission. 
{1989} = year of intervention with leading role of non-UN actor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 Modified from Ottaway (2003), p. 78. 
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